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Abstract o:e: .British Foreign Policy .~oward the Spanish 
Civ:i;_l \Yar, 1936-1939. John Foreman. 
From the outset, one must decide~what one means by 
the term 'Britain' and what one considers is involved in 
the rormulation of 'policy'. Britain cannot be merely 
• 
taken to be the political.leadership of Briatin, while 
foreign policy formulation is a group activity in the 
fullest sense. The decision-makers responsi.ble :ror foreign 
policy stand between the national comnnm.ity which they 
represent and the international society in which they 
must advance national policy goals. One· of the tasks \Vhich 
face decision-makers is, therefore, to manage the tensions 
that • from the incompati.bili ty of the values and arise 
interests o:r the national conununity vii th· those of the 
other actors in the internntional system. 
Britain, in the latter 1930's, faced a threat from 
, Germany, Italy and Japan to her Imperial interests which 
she did not have the military resources to meet. As a 
result to avoid becoming involved in conf'licts and to 
attempt to alleviate such possible conflicts became a 
cardinal aim of British foreign policy. This was the 
essense of the policy of appeasement. Spain became one 
conflict which threatened to cut across appeasenmt of 
i 
.. Italy and Germany, vvho commi ted theaselves to o·btaining 
victory for the Nationalists in Spain. The British Govern-
ment attempted to remove this obstacle ·by accepting the 
intervention of Italy and Germany in Spain. 
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This led to tensions within Britain since a variety of 
factors had led to the emotional commitment of the British 
people to the Spanish cause. As a result, Britain ·became 
the prime mover • in the e sta·bli shmen t ot: a Non-Interven-
tion Committee, \Vhose suppsed task was to limit interven-
tion by outside powers in Spain but whose • main purpose 
to shield the British Government from the outraged con-
science of the British nation. 
was 
However, the British wanted to be hoodwinked. Funde-
mental changes in the economic substructure and social 
' 
attitudes were creating a New Britain indifferent to the 
realities of the outside world and fully supporting 
appeasement, even while carrying the moral attitudes of 
an older age. In carrying out a policy that the majority 
wanted, British policy \Vent through many twists and turns 
to satisry an uneasy conscience. 
Indeed, the main lines of policy were carried out in 
the traditional diplomatic channels away from publicity. 
British policy toward Spain was a function of the policy 
of appeasement and as such a matter for direct negotiation 
·between Britain and Italy and Germany. As it became clear 
that Franco would win, the British Government in secret 
negotiation with the Nationalists undertook to protect its 
economic and strategic interests in Spain. 
In its superficial aspects, British policy was the re-
sult of the need to manage tensions; in fact it was the 
result of the need to remove Spain as an obstacle to 
better relations with Italy and Germany. 
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INTRODUC1rION. 
ttFiction there is - and history. Certain critics or 
no little discernment have considered that fiction is 
history ·~vhich might have ta.ken pls.ce, and history fiction 
111hich has taken pla.ce. Vie are, indeed, for.c·ed t.o aclmovv-
ledge thB.t the novelist's, art often compels b.(31ief, just 
as re2lity sometirnes· :de:fi.es it. Alas! there exists an 
··orde1") of· rninds so .ske·:pticrtl tha.t t:qey de.ny t.p.e :possib:'iJ_ity 
· .. o· _· -.-1"") · · · f · .L · 
· • t .a1ny 2.c L,_ :a2; soon 2.s 1 · diverges fro n1 th·e commonplsce. 
r·t is n·ot for then1 that I v;ri te." 
(Andre Gide - Ls.fcadio 's Advent·ur\e:s) 
content a.nd nature of Br~i ti sh foreign __ policy· towa11 d the· , 
Spanish Civil vYar iiill depend in. pa.rt on the conceptual 
frame\vor_lc of decision-ms.king that is a.dopted. The si. n1plest 
is to c.011.c-e·iv.e foreign policy as. c-o:risi,st.:i.n·g,; of a series of 
decisions mad~ by a group of respbneible peopie in re-
sponse to problems tha.t pre·sent thein_r::elves .fn the adjust-
ment of the relation's of the- s·tat~, for· -"vhJ.ch they are 
responsible, ~vi th other states prefzrent i·n ·the international. 
aren~. This approach has he virt~.~ ·of simplicity, but -
also its vices. Decision-makers do not exist in a vacuum, 
judging· each new problem purely in terms of the elements 
,,:: '. 
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present in the new situation. As a conceptual framework, 
thisapproach does not allow_for the accomodation of the 
complex elements present in the decision-rnaking ·process. 
George Modelski, in his study of the formulation of 
foreign policy, correctly rejects this approach as inade-1 
quate. Two broad areas of the foreign .Policy formula-
tion process point to the· inadequacy o:r the approach: 
(1) The indivia_ual, or group of individuals, responsible 
for foreign policy :formulation, in ful:filling that function 
are responsible to the conununity, or at least to elite 
r;roups v-1i thin the com1nuni ty. A decision-making :proce·ss. 
vii thin a politic al society perfor1ns the function cff 
.articula·ting and agg-v:· a.gating conflicting intEJ_:re.s·ts pre sent 
·iJ1 the. co1lliiluni ty, and interests are .aggragated throughout 
t.he vvhole structure of the politic~a.l .structure of the 
/\ community, not merely at the top-most levels. ,As Almond 
and colema.n state: " •••• the aggr2.gative function may be · 
;, p(:3:rformed \Vi thin all the subsystems of the political 
·system-legislative bodies, politic al executives •.• bureauc:rac.i.es, 
media of cornmunication, party sy.stems, i_nte-re st, groups o:f 2 
the varicus types." One should,. therefore, :n.ot merely 
concentrate on the- desires and. the goals of the decision-
makers, but also upon the structuring of.the entire politi-
cal process and the interests vvhich are fed into it. Certain 
_ decisions will be of more interest to certain groups than 
to· o:thers (the question of Britain's possible Rarticip.9.ti. on 
j~n the ·war,,. i11 Vietnam v1ould be of less int ere st to 
industrial groups and trade unions, than \Vould the ouestion 
'."". ),: 
.. 
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of entry into the European Economic Community,) and thus 
each new problem presented by foreign events presents 
diffe·rent. tasl{s of interest conciliation: "One must r" 
describe in more detail the type of problem, the type 
. of decision, with which statesmen are called upon to deal. 
Their specific activities are determined by the sort of 
func.tions they are req ..u_ired to perrorn;i, and therefore 
the concept of t~ taslcs and dutues of policy-ma.kers 
gives a more correct vie1v'V of their a.ctivities, and of the 
res:ponsibilities S:rising :from their uniq_ue position as 
intermedi9-ries betvveen their community and the internat .. io:n.al 
3 society, than the concept of 'decision-making' 11 
( 2) No problem faced ·py de.¢ision-malrers can be seen as 
being independent of t:he ·total syndrome of .. vorld events, 
on one 
ideas on 
past and present; neither can decision-making 
particula.r problem be independent o:r peoples' 
dimly perceived future, 1:1hich makes necessary planning 
such contingencies aa can be forseen. In fact it is 
totally unrealistic ·to conceive of :foreign policy as a 
,. 
the 
for 
. series of prob:l.ems; ·:roreign policy forms a continuous flow 
of activity - actio:ns taken on one :problem, having led to 
the formation or a 'policy' must effect actions taken on 
another problem, since peoples' minds are not totally 
compartmentalised, and the institutionalisation of foreign policy planning and execution tends to lead to bureau-
cratic inertia. Having reacted to a problem, success, or 
J.ack of success with that reaction \lVill lead to the learning .... ~- ·~. 
' of lessons and the accumulction of kno·~vledge vvhich 1.vill ' -~ ... 
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be applied to future problems. This learning process 
links the past with the present and the dimly perceived 
:rut:ure, and provicles the continuity in foreign policy 
\ {critics often see this as the establishment of :.J?-
precondi tioned or 'fixed' irratio~al responses). The 
-
Bay o:r Pigs fiasco may, in part, be seen as Kennedy 
if1eri~ing plans drawn up by the previous administration. I 
Johnson's policy tov1ards the Dominican crisis .may, in 
_part, be seen as the result of 'lessons' le2rned from 
Castro's accession to power in Cuba. ttMoreover, often 
conceived of as -a .suc~ession of separate responses to 
world events, •detlsion-m?king' tends to ignore the 
:continuous stream of activities nithin which decisions. 
are embedded, and pay·s little. h·ee-d., tn t·heory a.t least, 
to the a.ctions that link: one. de:··cisi·o_n t.o another. A 
v1orkable conception of ·foreign policy should put 
g·reater emph2_sis on ·t·he <D ntinui ty of all foreign poli-cy 
processes; it should be supplemented by em1Jhasis 011 fore-J 
sight, on the necessity for constB_nt preoccupation ·~vith 
the future, on what -might perhaps be called 'strategic 4 
planning.' tt Accumulation of kno-,nled~i:e \¥ill not only 
link a.ctions from one period of time to another, 2. classi:.c:. 
example of which would be Eden's belief that Nasser Nas 
a new Hitler come to devil him, and that the lessons learned 
from the failures '(real or supposed) ·,qof appeasen1ent should 
not be repeated. American action in Vietnam may, in part, 
be seen as a continuetion in Asia of policies developed in 
i 
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Greece and Turkey·in the immediate post Second World 
War period. 
The fra.mework, there:rore, 1-vhich v1ill be . adopted in 
analysing the foreign policy of Britain towards the civil 
vvar in Spain vv-ill be borro,v111ed fron1 Modelski: "Policy-
makers fi~l the crucual role of representative agents 
(not principles), o:f intermedi8.rie s or go-betrveens. 
~ 
Although they are not neutral intermediaries, becaur.e their· 
prima_ry loyalties be long to the comn1uni ty, they. constitute 
an essential instrument v1hose function is mediation be-
5 \) 
tween that CD 1nmunity and the outside ·;1orld." Decision-
makers cannot be mnceived ot' as neutral or the, additional 
reason tha.t they themselves have id.ea_s on \Vhat should be 
the n8_ture of foreign policy. -:rt v1oul-d be unrealistic 
. 
. to loop upon decision-maker.s as honest brokers, mediat·ing 
bet,veen conf·licting interests v1ithi11 the comrnuni ty, un-
interested in the outmre. The f·oreign polioy formulating 
mBchine is one that embodies a continuity of·traditions and 
concepts th2t are fed into the decision-moking process. In 
a foreign policy debate 1n the Houle o:f Commons on February 
21, 1938, Mr. De Ch~ir raised a ple2.ding voice against Lhe 
machin8tions of the British foreign office: "I could not 
help thinking o:r the sort of mentality I co me across in my 
exploration into the field of diplomacy, and the type 
of convers2tion I used to hear. If I might b~ allowed to 
caricatu1~e, this vvas the sort of conversation one used to 
. . . hear: ~What, not be . in the next big :1ar ! After all, the 
trouble vve have taken to bring it along! VVhy, this ·vvar is 
• ' " '·- ••-•••••0, ••,,••••-A-~·- .. ··-••·-·---------•••-•-
•'' "o.,. -.-
• J ~ •, 
- 8 -
the pet hot-houFe plant of the diplomatic • service. We 
watered it in 1919, pruned it in the invasion of the 
Ruhr, and--.'' At this point Mr. Ernrys-Evans 1.vas forced 
• 
to interject: urs the hon. Member really putting tha.t 6 f·ovvard as a serious staten1ent?'' To Mr. Emrys-Evans question 
one must add an ardent 'Amen', but Mr. DeCha.ir I s statement is 
useful in po,.inting out the fact that foreign policy is a 
result of· a complex intera.ction bet·11veen the de sires of 
interest groups \Vi thin the commu.ni ty, the distilled 
diplomatic 1Nisdom, tradition ana_ strategic planning em-
bodied in the f.oreign ~f~fairs dep2.rtment of tne civil 
_s.ervice, _and. the personali ti.es and be liefs existing ·;1i thin .. 
the elected dtfc:ision-maJcerr:, \Jithin_ the community. 
The relatio~·ship bet1neen the internal setting of the 
community and pol.icy tov1ards the v1orld outside the colllinuni ty 
' 
is a complex amalga·n1 of the forma_l structure o.f the con-
stitutional decision-:-mak·ing ins ti tut ions, the a_:ct·ivitie s of 
interest groups and polit.:ica.l parties, a.Iid the effects of 
p.ersonality. These 'el.eme,nts' a-r1e 'mixed' in various a:nd 
varying i'lays within dif:fe1'°)ent states, so that the cont:plexitIBs 
,·c-en only be analysed in terms o:f specific decisions mad.e \Yithin: 
_specific situations. But :for tre moment it 1,vill suf:fice 
to state that the position of the decision-rnak6r is not 
-
merely that of a purchaser sin t·he m:=:.rl~t of : .. he interest 
group loyalty. The a.uthori ty of the decision-maker to . 
.. 
"l 
make decisions places him in the posi.tion of a sell.en, .as 
1ell as_abuyer. The dec·ision-maker is also a 
creator/ of opinion -r1i thin the com1nuni ty, due to the decision-
i / ·, 
i 
I 
; 
I 
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maker being in a position of authority, with all the trappings 
of public office and the attenc1e11t prostj_ge; ·the l)J:~obs.lJlc· 
ir1po~:t,12.1·~ i1lace 1:1i thin an important political party '~Vi thin 
the ct~te q~~c to tn1 e a·Q~1~~ '0~ i·-n~1~,~-nnn L.:· ·· r~~ ___ t_L 1...> _ a -- ..:.. ...i.... \... .. :'-' ..l. ·..._ ... ,..; .-~ ""l ., J_ 1"e o.... t 1,,l~ ., 0 ., e I ..1.. a o i ..L l ~ ·:l ~,, o 
mobi~_t:.c T,c; ~2~·: ! .-~r!.u. tl1e decision-makers c:ontrol of the 
instruments of gathering and ?nalysing information fror.a the 
diplomati.c services, and thus having the spotlight concen-
trated upon himself as a source of authoritati.v,e kno,vledge 
\Vithin the community (as \Vell a·s the ability to 'leak' such 
inforilL9.tion as is considered de sirab.le). A poli tica_l Janus, 
the decision-maker looks both to the demancls of the various 
interests fed to him by the comm.unity, and to the demands 
of the international sys-~em as seen ·through his sense of 
logic and value system. 
It is nece:s·sary to disti:ngµtsh b·et-ween V9ri:o:us demands 
that the decision-maker .has' t:o ta·ke into account v1hen 
.arriving at decisions. These .can be grouped nnder the 
general headings of th.e d.emancls of the partyi system, 
demands of specific i-nterest groups, and finally what may be ·.: ~ - rrt 
termed the general temper of the contry· - the mo st difficult 
for the analyst to pin-point. In a parliamentary system of. 
the type that exists in Britain, the concentration of 
political po\ver to make decisions vvi thin the cabinet and the 
aggragative two party system protected the legislature from 
being effectively penetrated by interest group activity, 
with the result that '' ••• th!3 impact of any single interest 
group - with the exception or the trade llllions - is quite 
.. 
• .. 
-·.,--',,•.,,., .. •, ,·i,.;·. 
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6 
limited." The growing compleci ty of modern life has led to 
an alteration in the nature and organization· of interest 
group:-:activi-ty, and the point of attack by the interest 
groups on the decision-making proaess. The ever developing 
need :for the expert specialist in a complex scientific v1orld, 
becoming increasingly interdependent, has led to decision-
making becoming devolved upon the administrative 
bureaucracies in direct delega.tion of decision-making po\,ver 
and in the need of decision-makers for advise. "As long 
as Parliament held the centre of the political stage - as 
long, that ts to say, as political con~licts centred on 
parliamentary policies - interest groups tended not only to 
act chiefly through 'interested' MP.s but to be emphemeral, 
one purpose organisations~ chiefly concerned with raising 
a l8rge volume of publi-c support for important legislative 
changes. Nowdays, however, they possess much greater 
continuity and engage in a much vvider va.riety of political 
activities, for their interests are being constantly af·fectad 
by governmental actions. The public campaign has been 
replaced 18.rgely by the informal. and unostentatious contacts 
betY1een officials,. and interest groups themselves have 
become increasingly bureaucratised (in short, more and more 
like the government departments with which they deal), f--0r 
only the bureaucratic structure is appropriate to the kinds of 
. . 7 negotiations groups must carry on· to realise their interests." 
One might (with some trepid~tion it must be admitted)advance 
the proposi tio·n that interest group activity dire_cted at the . .. ,. -=~ ::::i, 
- 11 -
state's foreign policy has been less affected by the social-
service trend of state activity, and that indeed interest 
group activity is usually directed toward the economic activity 
of the state' rather than its foreign affairs, ·and that in 
the area of foreign policy interest activity will tend to 
remain more informal, and utilize interest grou~ 
bureaucracies not established primarily to influence foreign 
policy - such as the trade unions. Contacts 1vv·111 therefore 
tend to remain more on the·personal rather than the 
institutional level, directed to in.rluencing interested M.P.s, 
interested members of the Cabinet, and trying to establish a 
favourable public opinion. Foreign policy in its formulation 
depends more on the selection of values and estimates of 
capabilities rather than the demands, for an example, of th:e 
lal1s of economics, and thus some decision-makers in the past. 
have felt confident to rely on their own judgement rather 
than that of the Foreign, O~fice. (One notable exception vvould 
be the g~estion of British entry into the European Economic 
Community.) Interest groups attack the area v1here~decision·s 
are made, and therefore will concentrate their effo:rts on 
the legislature and the cabinet, as well as attempting to 
influence the tide of public opinion. 
An examination of the impact of public opinion on the 
I,. 
··'!) formulation of f~reign policy raise several points for de-
bate. While 1 t may be said, that since one of the pri111ary 
goals of an elected decision-maker is to maintain himselr 
in power, care will be taken not to alienate significant 
~ 
sections of the population by undertaking unpopular 
policies it is usually interest rates on mortgages and 
_ _) 
'· 
i 
- 12 -
,., ' 
increases in pensions rather than foreign policies which 
decide elections, and so the main planks of election 
platforms rarely consist of foreign issues. (One exception, 
the famous Kharki election of 18 over the problem presented 
by the Boer Republics, merely serves to prove that generally 
this observation holds true.) The very term 'public opinion' 
demonstrates the difficulty of the problem. If one differen-
tiates between the activity of interest groups and the 
influence of public opinion, one must conclude that public 
opiniorr consists of the unorganized and incoherently express-
ed opinions (such as exist) of those too unconcerned to 
Frankel concludes that: ttpositive influence on the conduct 
of foreign policy is exercised only by organized groups or 
by the leadership, but the people as a mass exercise an 
important negative influence through the climate of public 
opinion of what Gabriel Almond calls 'the mood', which 
prescribes the limits within ·which foreign policy can be 
shaoed. Such mood can exclude all practicable choices and 
leave the decision-makers with probhibitions only. Power of 
a vague and very real nature is wielded here without any 
8 
clearly defined responsibility.u Baldwin provides with this 
' 
illustration of a decision-maker being bound within a limited 
area of action by public opinion: t'You will remember the elec-
tion at Fulham in the autumn of 1933, when the seat which 
the National Government held was lost by about 7,000 votes 
. 
on no issue bu the paci~ist. My position as the leader of 
a great party was not altogether a comf'ortable one. I asked 
myself what chance ,w0s the~e. - \iVhen that feeling was given 
\ 
,',, 
'' 
- 1[5 -
expression lead to stresses in the N.A.T.O. alliance. Thus 
' '. 
in any examination of British policy toward the civil war 
in Spain, one must exa1nine the power base on which British 
policy was based, and the calculation by the British 
decision-makers of the risks and gains that accrued from 
the application of power. In this it is the Eerception 
of how much power would be necessary to achieve a d.esired 
end, and the perception of risks and gains, that.is 
important. 
In any calculation of power resources the problems 
that present themselves are interelated - events in one part 
of the world effect decisions made with respect to a 
problem in another part of the world, since resources 
available to these pronlems are usually scarce (especially· 
in Britain in the Tvtentieth Century), and have to be 
allocated to each problem so as to ha.ve the optimum effect. 
The development of the Spanish Civil war added another 
problem that had to compete for resources, in the context 
(as we have previously noted) of a general policy-line 
formulated in relation to other problems. Thus one must 
concern on.e self with the question or to what extent one 
can talk of 'a policy toward the Spanish cmflict', 
since the policy vvould to some extent be determined by 
ot~er foreign policy issues. The extent to which this 
would be true would depend on the total resources available 
to the British decision-makers, and the ranking of the 
Spanish coD.rlict by the British decision-makers among tla 
total of problems faced according to the extent tm t the 
- ~ .. 
problem affects perceived vital interests (the interests 
themselves being ranked according to the value-structures 
of the decision-makers and the community in general). These· 
value structured desirable interests can lead to conflicts 
in resulting policies: the maintainance of peace - the avoid-
ance of violent conflict with other states - have been two 
consistent British interests that have conflicted, since 
the necessi t~y to exert power to maintain the former can 
iead to conflict with other states. 
One may, in fact, be a bl.e to pas tula te the exis tance of 
an inflaticn cycle in the ability of individual problems 
to purchase attention, as the number of problems faced by 
tl1e decision-makers increases. In time of world-wide 
crises as the inter-war period, the perceived importance of 
any one problem declines as the ability of resources to meet 
theee crises becomes increasingly strained. ~hamberlain 
wrote to Mrs. Morton Prince, his stepmother's American 
cousin: tl'll'herefore our people see that in the absence of 
any powerful ally, and until our armaments are completed, we 
• $ must adjust our foreign policy to our c~rcumstances, and 
even bear with patience and good humour actions v1hich we 
10 should like to treat in a verJr different fashion.u 
As· well as the dispersal of resources in a period of 
reoccurring crises, a dispersal of the emotional involve-
ment of people infforeign affairs will occur, leading to a1 
infla.tion of interest and a decrease in the ability of new 
crises to purchase the commitment of peoples' emotions • 
.. 
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People arc able to absorb only a certain amount of headlines on 
wars, bombing of defenseless civilians, and aggression by foreign 
states in a period when crisis a.nd voilence seem to be the order 
of the day, and still maintain their soci.al consciences at full 
streneth. Christopher Ishen1ooc1 has put it this way: "Pr;rhaps I 
had travelled too much, left my heart in too many places. I knew 
what I was supposed to feel, what it fashionalble for my generation 
to feel. We cared about everything: fascism in Germany and Italy, 
the seizure of Manchuria, Indian nationalism, the Irish question, 
the workers, the negroes, the jev1s. r1e had spread our feelings 
over the whole world; and I knew that mine were spread very thin. 
I cared - oh, yes, I certainly cared ••• But did I care as much as 
11th I said I did, tried to imagi..n.e I did? No, not merely as much." 
This problem is of special relevence in a sufy of Bri tiah foreign 
policy toward the Spanish conflict, since Spain raised or so it 
has appeared, th.e emotional fervour of peop~.ea to a pitch 
~ .. 
unprecedented during the thirties. This can lead to the theory 
that tension was created between the emotional desires of the British 
people which became concentrated. on-Spain, and the policies adopted by 
the British decision-makers, basing their policies on a more 
rational appraisal of the requirements of British foreign policy; 
Brj_tain thus became 'divided'. Therefore it will be necessary to 
examine the interrelationship between the Spanish civil war-and the 
climate of public opinion in Bri.tain to see what, if any conflicts 
were created. It will also be necessary to examine the impact of 
Spain on the ranking of problems by the British decision-makers, 
and decision-makers in other cou~tries with whom Britain had to deal, 
;· 
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to see what new problems werecreated by the reactions of other states 
to the Spa.nish conflict. 
·In view of the fact that British policy toward the Spanish conflict 
was to some extent a function of policies formulated in relation to 
problems other than Spain, and this paper will not be able to 
examine all these other problems and policies in great detail, and 
examination of the interests and power capabilities underpinning 
'~ 
Bri'tish foreign pol:l.cy will be made, in order to state the general 
nature of British foreign policy - to set the Spanish conflict in 
its general context, as well as to goin insights of special relevence 
• 
to Spain. The paper will therefore be organised in the following manner: 1 
( 1 ) • An examination of the interests and pov~er resources underlying 
British foreign policy, and the evaluation by British decision-
makers of these interests and power resources - involving an 
examination of the structuring of decision-making within 
Britain, and struggles that occurred within that structure 
between individuals and groups. 
(2). An examination of the interrelationships between the civil Wc_;_r 
in Spain and the cljmate of public opinion in Britain and the 
international community, to see what problems were created for 
British decision-makers and the policies that were evolved to meet 
these problems. 
(3). A chronological examination of the nature and development of 
British policy toward Spain. 
(4). Concluding remarks, including a discussion of the relevence 
of criticisms made from the vantage point of historical hindsight. 
•· . ' --- ., .. •· -- .•.. ,.··· -··- .... ,.._,, ·- ..... ~·-·----~---·---·· , ........ ----···-···· .. -·-··-··· ·--······· ···-·. ' 
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ChaJ?ter One : Strategic Interests and Appeasement. 
"Of course, always g(? to a taxi-driver when you want a sane 
independent opinion. I talked to one today. He said: 'When 
we are at war, it'll be the time to start talking about war. 
Just at present we aren't at war.' Very sound that." 
Uttered by Box-Bender, M.P. 
(A character in Evelj7Il Waugh I s Men at Arms.) 
*************************************** 
In the introduction, the problem was taiaed as to the extent 
that it was permissable to talk of their being a policy tovvard the 
Spanish civil war, since British policy toward the Spanish conflict 
would bear a direct relationship to British policy toward other 
problems presenting themselves to the British decision-makers. Thus 
British policy toward Spain would to some extent be a function of 
British policy toward Germany, Italy, France and so on. Since it 
is not possible to examine in detail all of the other areas that 
1) ------
were covered by British policy, a solution has ·to be found to the 
problem of deciding the nature of the relationship between British 
policy toward Spain and policies toward other regions. One is faced 
with the difficulty that if one does not state the nature of British 
policy towards other areas, hov; can British policy tov,ard Spain be 
placed in tie general context that is so ·obviously necessary for a full 
understanding of the problems faced by British decision-makers. 
One solution (not unfortunately a complete one, but it is in the · 
. ' \ '." ' 
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Britain, and conflicts that developed through the existence of 
differences of concept within the decision-making process, as for 
instance between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office, and the outcome 
' . 
of these conflicts. 
One may be able to state, as a starting point that the formulation 
o·r foreign policy is not merely a matter of will, of the desires of 
decision-makers to attain certain goals, but also a matter of 
capabilities, of what decision-makers feel they are capable of 
atta;ning. British decision-makers from the beginning of the 
twentieth century had had to make a continuous reappraisal of the 
capabilities of the British power structure.1 The conclusion of the 
~ 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 marked a revolutionary turn in 
British foreign policy and the evaluation by British decision-makers 
of Britain's place in the world, as ~s shown by this statement 
by Lord Lansdowne in response to a memo by Lord S?].isbury urgine 
that Britain sho11ld not " ••• incur novel and dangerous obligations" : 
"I think ••• that we may push too far t.he argument, that because we 
ha.ve in the past survived in spite of our isolation, we need have no 
misgivings as to the effect of that isolation in the future. In 
approaching the Japanese we have, indeed, virtually admitted that 
. . 2 
we do not wish to stand alone." 
Th.e co!Jlins of the twentieth century in fact s~w Britain's position 
/ 
.,,-· 
in.,;the world in transition, in which Britain continued to have the 
commitments of a world po1:ver, while the ability to fulfil tl1ese 
commitments was slipping from her hands. The centre of an Empire 
·t ®: 
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that was represented in all the continents of.the world, Britain, 
in ~ddition, as a small island with a large urban population, repl~ed 
on world trade to feed her people and thus had to be able to defend 
against any potential the trade routes that linked her with her 
sources of raw materials and her markets. 
Operating from a world-wide network of strategic bases, the 
,1 
Royal Navy had made Britain for a period the almost unchallenged mistress 
of the reas. France who had been the main challenger to Britain, was 
faced by the threat of the developing strength of Germany, a..nd thus had 
to allocate resources to the maintenance of a large-scale land army, while 
Britain was able to devote the greater part of her resources to the Navy. , 
In addition the greater industrial povver of the British meant that Britain 
could overhaul the French in the utj.lisation of technica.l innovations in 
naval warfare (such as the introduction of iron-clad ships to replace the 
1v1ooden walls' that had been the traditional safeguard of Britain, and the 
introduction of the screw to repl&ce sail and the paddle for motive power). 
In the early years of the twentieth centur;,r, the developine threat of the 
German navy, which was emphasised by the Agadir crisis of 1911, had led to 
' t¥conclusion of the Alliance v-rrith the Japanese, as Britain found that < 
her navy inadequate for the defense of the home waters as well as the 
outlj-ine parts of the Empire. Even througr1 Britain emerged from the 
First World War with her naval position much improved by viture of the 
fact that the German Navy lay at the bottom of the ocean, in reality 
that peculiar set of factors which had enabled Britain to assert its 
naval supremacy whenever it wished during the nineteentl: ce11tury had 
pasaed away forever with the spread of industrial skills frcm Britain 
; .If 
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Nature of compromises that they £all short of the desired goal) is to 
examine those factors that under-pinned British policy toward all of 
the problems that faced British decision-makers, and then to place 
British policy to,vard Spain i.n this dont~xt. This will involve a 
calculation of the relative importance that·:was placed upon the 
~ Spanish conflict by British decision-makers as opposed to other problems 
that presented themselves. In undertaking this task our attention 
will be drawn to two main areas o~ interest: the first being the 
strategic interests of Britain, and the position that. Spain was felt 
to hold within those ihterests: the second will be an examination 
· of the impact of these conceptualised strategic interests upon the 
formulation of British policy toward Spain. The emphasis is placed 
on the conceptual nature of strategic interests, since an interest 
is a mental construct without reality except in as much as it exists 
within a person's mind (Thus one cannot make a differentiation 
' /. between 'objecti~ely' considered strategic interests a.~d man's 
'subjective' consideration of them, since apart from being valueless 
as an instrument of foreign policy analysis, who is to be the judge 
of objectivity? The arguments of thoa who support one's own position 
are usually to be considered 'objective', those of one's opponents 
'subjective'). Thus the first part indicated above will contain 
an examination of what \Vere generally felt to be strategic interests 
of Britain, with Special weight given to the views of the military planning 
staffs. The second·part will be a more detailed examination ~f the 
structuring of these interests withii the decision-making process within 
., 
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to the other parts ot the world, and the change in the 
balance -,of power \Vi thin Europe:" • .,. by 1913 Germm y 
had exceeded Britain° s total volume· of exports (though not 
her manufactured exports). Already twenty years later 
Great Britain's production of manufactures hadbeen 
surpassed by the United ~tates; and by the turn of the 
century Japan was emerging as a potentially f ormida'ble 
economic competitor, after her incredibly rapid transform-
ation into a modern industrial state in the course of a single 
generation. Moreover, the greater size and t• resources tj 
of the United States and Germany, and the very fact that 
their major industrialization had been later and had 
therefore made use of more up-to-date methods and equipment, 
spelled a further threat to Britain's position of world 3 
economic leadership ••• " 
Britain's position as the first state to undergo the 
industrial revolution therefore proved to be a handicap 
·as she found herself entering the twentieth century with 
both the equipment and the organisation of her major 
industries in an antiquated s tate:" In steel the United 
Kingdom sut·fePall the consequences of' the general decline 
\c, in the export trade of iron and steel materials and 
finished products, and at the same time was unable to fully 
introduce the necessary large-seale techn~al modifications 
and general integration which in this industry have an 
' ( enormous influence on coats. The result was that tha effects 
J 
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or the European depression in the industry were felt with 
a_dded emphasis ·in this: ro untry; in add.1 t1on, the rising 
world tariffs against the exports of heavy industry 
. 
.......... turned Br1tian into the only remaining dumping ground 
for the products of her co m:petitors. The request by 
the steelmakers for a protecti'tv0 tariff in 1925 came too 
soon after the expression of the el•ctorate on the subject 
of free trade; the request was rejected and the industry 
could ~ot; therefore, afford to engage in large-scale 
re-equipment in view of the uncertainty of its markets. 
Nor was it sufficiently unif1$d to nogotiate with its 
continental competitors a volumtary division of the market I 
0 
•••• as late as 1928 the average weekly output of British 
blast furnaceswas less than 1,000 tons, while nearly all 
American and many oontinental furnaces could produce ... 
1~· that amount in one day •••• It has been said of ti> tton 
and it is also true of thm iron and steel and o t:m r 
old-established industries, that one of the chief obstacles 
t.o reorganisation s;hemes came from 'the 1mplacab111 ty 
of small but belligerent minorities who have, to a degree • 
far in excess of their importance, been able to delay tm 
process'. The work of combination and absorption gathered 
momentum, both the acquisltion of overcapitalised firms and 
obsolescent plants prevented the realisation of the full 
f'rui ts of these ac ti vi ties. At the sane ti me trade 
organisations, though they had been in existance for a 
I:•~··------------....-------------------------........... II. • I ;.. • . • ~I : ; 
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consideI'able period, re.ma.ined extremely imperfect organisa-
tions with limited powers, while the National Fecteration ot 
Iron and Steel Manufacturer& itself lacked the aurhority and 
functio~s to give a rorceful and unifying directive to industry 
or to spe·ak on its behalf to the Government. The iron and steel 
industry, on which depended so much of Bri ta1n 1 s commercial 
1 
prosperity in time of peace, and industrial power intime of 
war, presented 1n the year 1931 a disquieting picture of 
4 
confusion and decay." 
Thus it is that ''In a retrospect the year 1914 has seem-
'l 
ed to mark the end or an economic apoch... (Even·i-though) by 
the end of the nineteenth century there had been an aware-
ness that the balance of economic power in the world was J 
shifting. In Western Europe (e~pecially Germany) and in 
Japan industrialization had been increasing; in the United 
States the expansion of productive power had-been astoni-
ehing •••• 
"Buch changes•;--JWtt~• already calling f'or adjustments in 
Britain's industry and commerce: the First World War ma.de 
the proce s infinitely more difficult. Changes tbit might 
have been spread over a generation or more were compressed 
in a fe\v years. The 1vvar producted otm r changes which might 
not otherwise have occurred and prevented adjustments that 
would otherwise have been madeo Instead of being gradually 
adapted to meet foreign competition the staple industries 
were further expanded to meet_ a 4emand that was purely tem-
,.',.. , 
·• 
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poracy. Poet-war demands for the products ot Britain's 
staple industries were indeed lower than those of pre-war 
Years. As a result or the \Vars, economic nationalism flour-
---
1 shed, currencies were unstable, some of Britain's custom-
ers were impoverished and other customers had established 
industries to produce the goods - or substitutes for t:m 
goods - that they could not get from Britain during the war. 
Meanwhile the world centre of gravity had shifted further 
westwards. The war ha.d greatly stimulated the productive 
power of North America ••• Many other markets hitherto fed 
by Britain turned to Japan for supplies •••• 
. . 
"Britain's export· trade had reached a climax in the years 
immediately preceding the First World War. In 1913 the fav-
orable balance of payments on current account was a·bout 
£200 millions ••• In the nineti,en-twenties this balance on 
current account, this surplus avail~ble for investment a·broad 
declined: in the nineteen-thirties it disappeared and became 
a negative quality_~ The appearance o·r an adverse balance 
of payments was a landmark in the history or Britain's 
5 
economy." 
Britain had been able to extend and protect its E.llll)ire 
by virtue of the fact that there har:i existed \Vi thin Europe 
a balance before th, First World War between the major 
eta tes of Europe which enabla d Bri ta1n to become tle 
premier colonial poiver. Outside Eur1ope, apart from the United 
States and Japan, the~e was no state or a sufficiently ad-
vanced technological and industr·ial development to of'f er a 
- . ,. --· .... ····•· . . ····-· .. ·---~-----------~·-··"·····- ., ··- -- -·-····~ .... -·-··· -·---~-----.-~--·-- --- ·• . ·--. - .. - .. -·-··. ··-·-- ----.----··- --- -- . ' -
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serious and lasting threat to the security of the British 
Empire. It was not until the urn of the century that Japan 
became a major naval power at which time as /13 have already 
noted, Japan became allied to Britain and the protector of 
her Far East-ern interests, and as f'or the Uni tad States, the 
interests of tlle two countries in the main coincided - the 
ltonroe Doctrine was for a long period only enforced by mesas 
---
of the fact that Britain, no more than th@ United States, 
wished to see South and Central American become a target of 
a scramble for colonies, as Africa later became; Britain's 
interest was in trade not colonies. But gradually the balance 
in Europe and the Far East which had served to protect the 
British interests in these regions from a serious challenge 
became upset as both Germany and Japan becaID3 major indust-
rial powers, and Britain ~ound that rhough her relative 
decline as an industrial producing pov,er she was unable to 
exert that moderating influence that Britain had at times 
been able and had at times been willing to exert. 
As a result of the First World War, the map of Europe 
II 
had -een redrawn, with Austro-Hungary and Tzarist Russia 
t 
disappearing completely~ Neither of these two counties 
was thus able toact as e counter-balance to the ambitions ot 
the German nation in the latter part of "th~ Nineteen-thirt-
ies to dominate Eastern Europe. A major change in the dip-
lomatic alignment in Europe had occurrea with the accession 
to power of the Bol.shevi:ts within Russia, since in the per-
.. 
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iod befoI'e the First world War, France had sought to ·balance 
the greater threat that was posed by a Germany united (except 
:for the German Provinces in Austria) by Bismt:\rck~_ s victories 
over Austria, Denmark and France between 1861 and 1871, by 
means o:f an alliance with Russia in the East. The Treaty of 
Versalles established in Eastern Europe a belt of small 
nation-states creating a power vacuum into which Germaiy 
' was able to move aided by the outburst of nationalist :feeling 
that occurred within these small states (with a few except-
ions) which effectively prevented these states from uniting 
in self-defense against the German threat; the Bolshevik 
re-volution served to prevent the effective collaboration 
of Russia,. France and Britain to counteract tl'B German 
challenge the European status-quo, since despite the exist~ 
ence arter 1935 of a Franco-Soviet Pact~ capitalist-socialist 
hostility served to keep these three states whose interest 
in security against the German the at colhnc·ided, from e:rt·ect-
1 vely concerting their activities. 
In addition to the alteration in the diplomatic situation 
within Europe, which became accentuated as Italy gradually 
emerged 'into the camp of the revisionist states 9 France 
had :found that to progressivly increasing extent during 
the cru.rse of the nineteenth century that she was declining 
in relative power terms to Germany, 1n this case equating 
the power base with the rela_tive population and industrial 
levels of the two euntries, and excluding other consider-
ations, e~ as alliance potential or diplomatic pre~tige: 
I''\'----.---~-----------------. ;;· ? 
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" ••• France began with a marked head start over all other 
countrieso 1During the Napoleonic era and until the middle 
of the nineteenth century France was one of the most 
economically developed nations of the worldo From then 
on, qespite a wealth of resources·and skilled labour, 
her economy declined in comparison with almost all the 
countries of Western Europeo Her total national income betv1een 1870 to 1940 rose by about 80 per cenet; that of Germany increased by five times; that of Great Britain 
three and a half timeso In the years between the two 
World ilars (1918 = 1940) inv0stment declined to a point belo~J zero = that is~ France was livixlg on her capi tel, 
using her factories and equipment without replacing them in fullo She was going through a period of disinvestment 
••• oin 1800 9 France had the largest population of any 
country in Europe and the A.mericaa 9 excepting only that 
of Russiao The Napoleonic armies were recruited from, 
and supported by 9 26 million French men and women 9 when England had only 11 million inhabitantsv the United States five and a half millionv and the German states 9 including Austriav about 23 million.a France maintained the population 
advantage until about 18609 when she had about 38 million. From then on 9 her popula_tion remained "W-1 rtu.ally statico 
In 1940 9 for instance SJ it was al mo st exactly L~O million, 
while that of the United States was close to 150 million, 
Great Britain 50 million 9 Germm y (Vffest and East 9 ·but Tfi thout Austria} 65 milliono Xn the years Toet'1veen 1930 and 1940 the French populaition actually declined -
that is, there \Vas an. eJccess of deaths over births.," b 
The decline of the ability of Britain to protect what 
were considered her vital interests parallels, and was in 
part caused ·by the decline of France relati vc to Germany, 
since this decline created a continuing danger with tl:B turn 
of the nineteenth century of the establishment of a German 
hegemony w1 thin Europe which v1ould threaten the :freedom and 
independence of the Low Countries, an area, which since it is 
·situated opposite to the Thames Estuary, has been of special 
interest to England since the time of Elisabeth 1. The 
establishment of the German potential :ror the establi·shment 
of a hegemony in Europe had its counterpart in the rise of 
the Japanese position in the Far East. Japan expanded its 
I(! 
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industrial potential during the twentieth century, despite 
the problems presented by the depression of the nineteen-
twentiess· In the period 1914-1930, the population of Japan 
increased:"·"bY twenty-five per cent to sixty-five million, 
while the national inco1ne increased f\our:fold, allov11ing a 
high level of investment in the economic sector, In the_ 
J same period there occurred a fourty per cent increase in the 
production of raw materials (whichw as greatest in agricultural 
,, 
raw materials) and industrie·s based on imported techniques 
from the Wes.t .. ,_(~uch as chemical, engineering and iron and 
-· --._J 
steel industries) although relatively on a small scale, 
... 
begun to grow in importance. In the thiries greater emphasis 
was Placed on developing metallurgical and chemical industries: 
steel production increasing in the period 1929-1936 from 
t,vo and a half million tons to five and a half million tons. 
ment of the Manchukuo puppet sta~ this region was develop-
ed il;i.to an important area of chemical and metallurgical ind-
ustries for Japan. Through a series legislative enactments 
Japan in the second half. of the thirties sought to a:>ntrol 
the development of industry within J~pan, with tl'e accent 
being placed upon those industries necessary ror the devel-
ment of Japan's military strength. By the Emergency Funds 
Adjustment Law of 1937, government approval was needed f.or 
capital outlays of more than, £50,000; In 1936 and 1937 the 
Major Industries Control Law .~18.B revised to strengthen its 
·" 
coercive features, while the 1938 General Mobilisation Act 
. 
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gave the Government unlimited powers.to regulate the economic 
· 11re of the nation. Thus concludes Lock\vood "After •• • 1937, 
the while network of industrial and trading associations 
became simply a part of the machinery by which the Japanese 
7 
economy was mobilised 1·or \Var., tt 
The developments in industrial mcl techno.logical progress 
in other regions of the world and the changing distribution 
of population meant that Britain found old concepts that 
had guided the direction of British f)oreign policy had to 
be abandoned. We have already seen that Britain could no 
longer remain aloof from undertaking commitments o~ military 
and navi,l cooperation with other states. This possibility 
was ended by the rise of German dominance in Europe, vvhich · 
led to the alliance with Japan in 1902, and the Entente with 
France in 1904. Though the defeat of Germany in the First 
World War meant a temporary respite, Britain could no longer 
return to that posi ion that she had occupi~d in the nine-
teenth centu1~y of concentrating her resources upon the 
protection of her Imperial interests: 11At the end of the war 
••• the British Government CD nsidered it neither necessary 
or ]Ossible to mciintain :f'leets of adequate strength in both 
the western and the ea.stern hemispheres. It was accordingly 
decided that the British fleet 11hould be held in a central 
position in European water·s,. from whi,ch it could reinforce 
. 9 ' the Fa~0~East as and when required." One cardinal feature 
of British policy·had to be modified through the inability 
of Britain's resources"'to give er·fect to it, and that w~s 
! 
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the ma1nta1nance of naval superiotity over any potential 
threat to the security of Britain defense or her trading 
routes. 
Though the German Navy had been limited by the Treaty of 
Versailles to 15,000 men, the treaty provisions were circum-
vented, as naval organisations were disguised as civil min-
istries, the order to destroy the coastal fortificatuons 
I> 
was never carried out and orders were placed for submarines 
to be built in Finland and Spain. The period ~rom 1925 to 
1932 marked the beginning of the period of serious recon-
struction, with the cruiser Emden being launched in 1925 
-
and a large building programme initiated. The first of the 
pocked battleships was laid down in 1928, the building of 
submarines continued, w~th their crews trained under the guise 
o-r anti-subma_rine . training, and preparations were even made 
to develop, a fleet air arm. As soon as Hitler acceded to 
power in Germany in 1933, Admiral Raeder was given a free 
ha_nd to preps on with the reconstruction pr·ogramme, :although 
-
"\ 
th-t\' pretence of, naval 11,lllitation was kept up until the signature 
<. .... 
.,.....__ 
.-
of the Anglo-German naval agreement iP the 18th or June, 1935, 
by which the Germans agreed to limit their nava ccnstruction 
to thirty~f1ve per cent of British strength, except in 
submarines, in which they were accorded parity but agreed not 
} . to build up to forty-five per cent unless a situation arose 
which made it necessary. The latter promise was not kept, as 
the British Director of Naval Intelligence was able to inform 
•· 
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the First Sea Lord. His statement that the Germai submarine 
strength was thirty coasta1 and twenty-nine ocean-going 
boats was only three more than the correct total, a figure 
than meant that on the outbreak of the war in 1939, the 
German U-boat strength was· only one less than the British· 
10 total of fifty-seven operational submarines. Captain 
Roskill {from whom this_ story of the development of the 
11 German Navy is entirely borrowed) concludes 
" ••• although greatly inferior to the British fleet in numbers, the German Navy consisted almost entirely or modern warshipso The Royal Navy 9 on· the other hand, was still equiped with large numbers of ships whose design dated back to the 1914=18 v1aro Some had been modernised 9 others had noto But the age or the British ships and of their weapons 9 taken with the NavyQs world wide responsibility for the de11ense of our shipping, went a long way toward couteracting our superiority in numbers." 12 
In assessing the strategic threat posed by the German 
fleet, one must note t:tat Britain was faced not only by a 
challenge by Germanys, but by Japan and Italy. The problem 
confronting British decision-makers was thus that they were 
presented with a threefold challenge to the strategic and 
political status quo, in a situation where Britain's 
resources were already overstrained. (Or rather the resources 
that British decision-makers vmu prepared to allocate to 
defense spending were insurfic1ent to meet the strategic 
requirements.) On May 23, 1934, Japan announced that she 
was not prepared .to accept a renewal of the Washington· Naval, 
i Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which 
together had s~ught to contribute to the maintainance or 
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international peace in the Far East and to prevent this region 
13 from being stfbject to a naval arms race. On December 1934, 
Japan gave notice of the I:ptention __ to terminate the Viashington 
Naval Treaty, so that on December 31 9 1936, the limitations 
that had been imposed by the Washington and Loncb n agr_eements 
upon the level o~ naval armaments and fortifications in the 
Far.East lapsed. 
Notice had been given by Japan 1n a Foreign Office statemet 
of Apri4,'\1934, that she considered she :ted a special interest 
\ 
in the regulation of the affairs of the Far East and that 
p 
she was claiming the right to establish an 'Asiatic Monroe 
Doctrine' in the Far East in contradiction to British interests: 
"Any joint operations undertaken by t·oreign Po·11vers even in the name of technical or financifil assistance at this particular moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents 
are ~botmd to acquire political st gnificance o Undertakings 
of· such nature 9 if carried through to the end 9 must give 
rise to complicationsoooJapan therefore must object 
to. such undertakings as a matter ot' principleooooSupply-ing China with war aeroplanes 9 building aerodr~mes in China9 and detailing military instructors or military 
advisors in China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan 9 China~ and other 
countries 9 and to disturb peace and order in Eastern Asia. Japan will oppose ooch projectso 9~ 14 
Despite the fact that in 1932 the Chiefs of Staff had 
recommended that the assumption that there would be no 
major ,, ar for ten years should be abandoned, and gave the 
warning that "·· .1 t \Vould be the height of folly to per-
petuate our defenseless position in tlle Far East ••• the 
Cabinet expressed no dissent, but said that this should not 
be taken to justify '·expanding expenditure by the def~e11se ., 
::/.;',·., 
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services without regard to the very serious f1nanc1a and 15 
economic s1tuat1one" Britain's defensive pisition in the 
Far East \¥as predicated after the First vVorld War upon the 
Existance of a naval base that would be able to-hold out 
for a suf'ficient period of time aga.inst hostile forces to 
allow a fleet to be sent from European waters, and in June 
1921, the Cabinet approved in principle the co nstructio]l 
of such a base, there being no such base at that time. 
Though the site of Singapore was agreed upon, the actual 
construction of the base was subject to a stop-go-stop 
,/ 
policy, \Vhich meant that even as late as 1936-7 no work 
had begun on the second stage of the defensive zone. It was 
not until 1937 that it was decided that the defense of Singapore 
involved the defense of the Malayan Peninsular, and was followed 
by a further report of the General Of1ficer Commanding Malaya, 
llajor-General no·bbie in 1938, that an attack on Malaya from \ 
the north should be oo nsidered tm greatest danger. To 
rectify this danger DoL.,bie was alloted the princely sum of 
£60,000 in 1939. In fact the strategic position in the Far 
East had been determined by the conclusion of the Anglo-
-German Naval Agreement, since " ••• the rebirth of the German 6 
fleet meant that, when her building programme was completed, 
the greater pa.rt of the British fleet would have to ·be re-
tained in home waters regardless of theevents in the Far 17 
East." Thus .purely from the point of consideration of the 
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.. _ 
defense of the British position in the Far East, peace in 
Europe became a prime ronsideration of British decision-
rnakers. The importance given to the British b'ar ~astern de-
fensive position can be gauged fcom the review of Imp rial 
Defense made by -the Chiefs of Stat·f in 1937, ,~vho made 1 t 
plain that in their opinion Japan ranked second to Germany 
as a possible enemy9 while Italy W,38 r~ed third; they con-
tinued that even thoug~ the size of the fleet sent would be 
\. 
\ determined by home requj\rement:s, a fleet \Vould have to , . .., 
'\,_, be sent to the Far East, "Even •:though the British position 
in the Eastern Mediterranean would ·be precarious ••• this 
weakness ••• would not be nearly_- as serious as 'the su ·render of 
British sea power in the Far_ East ••• ,leaving the coast of India, 
Australia, and New Zealand, the the sea routes to ·these 18 · -
Dominions open to attack." In,_addition to the purely 
strategic consideration, there were the economic interests 
that Britain had in the f'ar East. British interests in the 
~ Far East were the most extensive and the longest established 
01· any other western state, and v,ould be seriously ef~fected 
by any attempt on the part of the Japanese to establish 
economic 'protectorates'. Britain had invested in China 
more than one thousand million dollars, Nith 846,000,000 19 invested in Tientsin alone. This region was in addition 
an important source of raw materials for Britain that-became 
closed w1 th the Japanese <mquest of this region: 
• 
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"Within four months the balance of supplies as ~bet\veen the allies and Japan al terad completely ·in the case ··of three important materials: rubber)7 hard hemp 9 m. d tin. In the Philippi~e s . Japan gained the only source of· 
manila hemp 9 _ a.nd· in Malaya 9 the Netl1erlands East Indies 
and neighbouring· territories ninety p·er cent of the 
worldqs crude rubber resoui~ces 9 just over sixty per 
cent of its tin ena_ a signiiiicant quantity of· sisa., 
a substitute of manila hemp in many useso The 
allies loss ot· tungsten 9 chror!li te sn. d silk were less over-whelming but nevertheless serious 9 en cl imports of other 
.. materials such as antimony and hardvvoods were like\vise 
·reduced9 though to a lesser extent." 20 
Britain 9 as a world wide power, had to have a global 
strategy to give optimum utilisation to her resource base. 
The limited.nature of the resources that Britain had at her 
disposal tteant that a system of priori ties had to be establis-
hadas to the regions that formed part of the strategic network 
of Britain's Empire and trade route complex. Thus it was that 
there was an interaction betvveen the actions of the Japanese 
in the Far Ea.st and the civil war in Spain. Both presented 
threats to the security of the British stratigic position, 
and both had to evaluated in terms of the thre9t presented 
with the premier thrEEt~pesented by the growing dominance 
of· National Socialist Germany in the second halfa o the 
nineteen thirties. To a country that has inadequate resources· 
to meet challenges f'rom various areas or the v,orld, each 
threat must be considered a relative one - there can be no 
consideration of each individual trouble spot without con-
sideration of the total strategic position, and it is only 
in these· terms that British reaction to the events in Spain 
following the attempted pronunciamiento by a group of Spanish 
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generals on July 19th, 1936. 
The Economist of November 28, 1936, raised the important . question of the e:efect o~ a victory by Franco upon Br1 tain' s ~- . 
. 
J 
. 
-
# 
'1 
.. .,_~ .. --.----· 
freedom of" movemant in the Mediterranean: 
"We suspect ·that the Government have made up their mind . that, at whatever cost9 they will refuse to be drawn into war over Spain 9 as they ref~used to be drawn into to \Var over WLUnchuria or Abyssiniao For indulgence over Manchuria and Abyssinia the bill already presented to us includes the stultit'ication of the League of Nations and the crystallisation of something like a new Triple Alliance between Germany9 Italy and J,pano Xn the Spanish case9 the first item on the ·bill9 if General Franco is carried to victory on the 11trings ot' his backers, will be the loss of our B1~1 tish naval command of the Meditterraneano Without attempting to say whether peace is worth such a price we must surely all agree that tm price is very high~ ~9 
We will not at this point attempt to answer the question 
of whether the assumptions upon which the British Govern-
ment base its policy meaningful, but rather to examine 
the oo nsiderations "vVi th which the British· ·Government had to deal. The strategic position occupied by Spain and Italy 
~·/' 
are once again very conveniently summarised by the Economist (of October 24, 1936: 
••In a communique \Vhic-h signor Mussolini laid before a -: ·._Cabinet Council at Rome on October 10th, the head o,f the Italian State has anno-unced to the world a formidable Intensif'ication of~ Italy 0 s ef:torts to strengthen her armaments on 1and9 at saa9 and in the airo Between the lines of the document it can be noted that the Italiai_ anncoUJX!cement is a reply to the decilarations made by Sir Samuel Hoareo o o that v·1hi.le this country has no intention o:f evacuating the liledi te ·ranean 9 but means to ensure that her hold on this· essential line of maritime oo mmumications between dif'ferent parts .:;of the Br~tisl1 Empire shall at least be as strong 8.S everooooThe 1/itruth is that the short route between the British Isles /and India9 Australia and New Zealand= a route which has been under British strategic control ever since the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 :followed the opening o:r the Suez Canal in 
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1869 - is now traversed by the cross route from Italy 
to the Italian colony of Libya~ It is also shadowed 
in the Levant9 Suez Canal and Red Sea by the new 
Italian imperial highway from Genoa or Naples to 
Massawaho Italy now considers herself as much entitled 
to protect her maritime route to Etheopia as Great 
Britain may be to protect hers to India; and it 1·s 
impossible :for both Italy and Great Britai11 to simult-
. aneously to possess the desirable margin of superiority 
in strength over all comers in these v,aters 9 the new 
situation that has been created by the Italian conquest 
of Abyssinia is big with possibilities of a most 
dangerous Anglo=Italian Compeitiono In this competition 
Italy is much less at a disadvantage than she would have 
been 30 or !.~O years ago 9 owing to tl1e potency o:e air= 
power in the narrow seaso Malta 9 an.d perhaps even Aden, 
is already overshadov1ed by the uvings o:e the Italian . iar 
force l and our British command over the Straits of Gi.bral tar 
has now been placed in jeopardy by the entente between 
Italy and the Spanish insurgents." 
The element of a challenge to the British naval position 
in the Mediterranean was repeated by Mussolini in a speech 
on November 1st, 1936, when he declavad that Italy was "an 
island vihich ijuts into the Mediterranean" and that while 
the Mediterranean was for Britain "a read, one of the many 
roads, a short cut rather whereby the British Empire reaches 
more- rapidly its outlying territories," for Italy nit is 
life. We do not intend to threaten that road, we do not 
propose to interrupt it, but, on the otre r hand, we demand:. 
21 
that our vital interests should also be respected." 
As a result of the Italian challenge to the traditional 
British position, relations between the two countries stead-
ily deteriorated follo\ving -.-he Italian conquest of Abyssinia, 
Bingham, the United States' Ambassador in London reported 
on March 25, 1937, that: 
"There has been a steady deterioration of .Anglo- Italian 
understand.ingo The recent massacres in Abyssinia, 
14ussolini's rearmament program, his declarations to the 
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llussulman world upon his arrival in Libya, and the question of the Italian coronation envoy have all re-kindled public opinion in this country o l~ean.v1hile 
· the denouniation of Italy :erom British pulputs 9 tha British Broadcasting Company_u s charaterisation o:r the recent raver sal: s in Spain as n a s·e cond Caporet to 9 and the tone of the press generally have all tended to < 
------.. --.. · inci ts Italian resentment against Exl.glsndo In the estimate of one of my colleagues English animosity toward Italy~ at this moment is greater than public feeling r:gainst (}ermany o o o I tmderstand that the State.men ~t by the Italian Ambassador in the Non=!ntervention Committee ••• that Italy would not be willing to discti:ss the wi thdra.vtal of1· voA-imteers :erom Spain has 1·urther incited public opinionoooForeign O~fice points out that the German volunteer position in Spain appears to be somewhat liquid-ated gleaving Tifussolini to hold the bagg and that9 by this recent sta·taxnant o:f the Italian Ambassador 9 I ... calian Volunteers in Spain must in a measure appear as units of the Italian army and as such queries whether they can be left there unsupported.u 22 
At this point the extent of the Italian challenge to the 
Position of> Br'i tain will not 'be examined in great detail, 
it will be sufficient to note that it included deiplomatic 
intringue and radio propaganda t·rom the Bari Broadcasting 
station against the British position in the Near East, and 
the enforcement of .. the garrisons of Libya which 01·:rered a 
potential threat~o the security of Britain's position in ~ 
EgYJ)t. 
The e:rfect of intervention by Italy and to lesser extent 
Germany in the civil war in Spain, orfered yet another 
threat to the security of the British <X>mmunications through 
the Mediterranean. Bielfeld, from the Germai ,Embassy in 
London reported on July 31, 1936, that the British were 
anxiously w2tching the situation in Spain, snce they see 
" ••• dangers for the interests of Britain in a victory by the 
rebels, above all for her Mediterranean interests. Is is 
~ feared that a government formed by the Spanish rebels "'NOUld .-/ 
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seek the closest ties with Italy and that such a government 
might grant nava bases for the Italian fleet, ~or example 
on the Balearic Islands or in the port of Ceuta, which is 
23 opposite the har·bour of Gibraltar." Straus, the United 
States·' Ambassador in France, reported on July 31, 1936, 
that: "Concerning the German angle to this situation 
(the civil war in Spain), our informant appeared to give 
credence to the report that General Sanjurjo had some time 
ago offered to or actually concluded an arrangement vvi th 
Hitler \Vhereby if the Insurgents were successful Germm y would 24 be granted a naval base at Palma." 
A British Foreign Office Memorandum of October, 1938, 
estimated that here were 40,000 Italian troops in Spain, 
, 
while the Italian e.rforce had 2,200 men in Spain and the 
25 Balearic Islands, together with 250 machines. Dodd, 
the United States' Ambassador in Germany, reported as early 
as December 4~ 1936, that: "The British Embassy here states 
conf'identially that it has received a report from the British 
Consul at Seville that· about 5,000 Germans passed through that 
city a few days ago on their way to join the Spaiish 
Nationalist forces and that although they did not wear uniforms 
they were equipped with rifles and some artillery pieces. It 
is under.stood that prior to this or about the 20th last 
month a German anti-aircraft detachment consisting or some 
700 men with equipment was landed at Cadiz • .Most of the Germans 
despatched. to Spain appear to have some connection with:: the 
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German Army either as reserves or as regular soldiers who 
~hile technically on a leave have 'volunteered'for service - 26 
ab:Poad." 
In the House of Commons on July, 1937, the question of 
guns being mounted in Spain opposite Gibraltar. Winton 
Churchill stated: 
'' ••• I ·Nould in the most general terms, dealing vvi th the ger1eral aspect of the Mediterranean, say, 1:f ther·e is any idea that the mounting of guns to dominate or cover the Straits of Gibraltar is not a ma0ter or first consequence • to US 9 that it iso You could hardly.have anything or greater im~p,_ptance to the B1~iti-sh state and to the general- pro·blem 01· British Imperial def-enseo o oBu-t this does not s-tand alone o There is the general qµestl on of our positionoooin the Mediterraneano It is not only Ceuta and .!Ugeciras Bay 9 there are the Balearic Islands; there are the conditions which are being established at Malta 9 placingthe while question of the det'ense of that island in a nevJ lighto There is the small roclc of· Pant-ellaria vvhich is ·being f 1 orti1-;,ied and made a powerful airbaseooooI wish merely to say that guns at the mouth of· the Mediterranean cannot ·oe considered apart :rrom the whole process o~ fortification that is going on right to the Eastern end of Leros and Rhodes 9 right down to the Red Sea at .Massowah 9 the whole or this creating day by day and. month by month a position that we have never had to face before." 27. 
Though it \Vas true that in the war plans that were drawn ~ 
up by the Admj ralty prior to the Second World \Var it \V as 
ac~eptad that Bri~sh mercantile traffic would be diverted 
to the long route via the Cape or Good Hope, Gibraltar still 
maintained its card.ins.. importance f~rom the ability to deny " 
to enemy forces free access to· the Medi te2ranean through the Straits of Gibraltar and thus enforcing the blockade of 
Italy through the capture of enemy merchant vessels and the 
controlling·of the carriage of <Dntraband of war to the enemy .. 
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in neutral vessels. Gibraltar would remain strategically 
important in the defense of the -vital north-south Al tantic 
trade route, which was the partial responsibility of the North 
28 Atlantic Station, with its headqua~ters-- at Gi'bralter. 
The strategic importance of Spain was not m nfined to 
Spain's geographical position on both sides of the Western 
. entrance to the Mediterranean, but also from its position 
on the soutern flank of France, and thus abl~ to create, 
if so desired in Spain a totally new strategic balance in 
, .. } 
Europe. Straus reported on July 31, 1936, that: 
"Blum appearing before the Foreign Af·t·a1rs Commit tee o:t' the Senate yesterday admitted frankly that the French Government had at first seriously oonsidered acquiescing in the request of the Spanish Governmen"'c f·or assistance 1m the way of aeroplanes amd amunitionso In this connection our inform8.nt said tl1at the Franco=Spanish border is in one sense comparable to the American-Canadian border in that it liasnot been flortified (apparent ommission) years~ France has not maintained troops there and it is one rrontier from which France has felt that here was no danger to be feareHio The se L, ting up in Spain of a government of the military dictatorship type might well al tar this situation and prove a seraious dtanger to French securityo A glance at the map would clearly indicate tl1ii an unf')riendly regime- in Spain could in time of .. vvar prevent the transport of· troops f~rom French possessions in AfricP to Eu1~ope through su·bmarine operations from the Spanish coats." 29 
This i?)leme is repated in a co,nversation that Wilson (the 
Charge in France,).:Z~had with Delbos { the French Minister for 
Foreign Af·fairs) on August 6th, 1936; 
11Delbos said there was no doubt in his mind that 'both the German and Italian Governments had made arrangements with the 1'l}e·bels vvhich in the event of the latter's success would give these Governments bases in Spanish Morocco and the Spanish Islan'ds 0 there-oy cutting of our communications with North A,fricao Q G.1 30 
. 
. 
Thus there existed the danger of France finding herself 
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confronted on the South as well as the East and South-East 
by a fascist government, and in that situation becoming 
paralyzed in her relations with the fascists by thethreat 
presented, or even succumbing to rascism through the 
growth of fascist organisations within France. Britain would 
-· 
thus be deprived of" her main ally on the continent of Europe, 
and have to watch as the balance of power swung irretriava·bly 
to the fasist states. It should be remembered that France 
represented not only a powerful counter to the thrleat of 
German aggression on the mainland of Europe, but also a 
major naval power, commanding a dominating position in the 
Western Mediterranean. Thus states Captain Roskill: 
ttour (British) control of· the \Ve stern basin of the 
Mediterranean was greatly simplified by the presence 
of the gt.)eater part of the French Fleet in those waters, 
and by its \Vell=placed -·bases in southern France and on 
the North Afri-can shore o kcordingl; it vva.s agreed -~ith 
our ally tha.,G the v1estern basin should -be a French 
responsibilityo This enabled greater British strength 
to be allocated to the ea.stern Mediterranean vvi thout 
unduly ileake)µng the Home Fleet a ig 31 
It is therefore clear that the attempted coup d'etat 
·by the Spanish generals and the aid given by Italy and 
Germany. represented a serious menace to Brita.in' s strategic 
position in the Mediterranean and that British diplomacy 
would have to ·be directed toward mitigating any possible 
harmful effects that v1ould follov, a victory by France. One 
can indeed trace the diplomatic ef·forts (as we will in a 
later part of the paper) made with this intent: The Anglo-
Italian Joint Decla_rati on of January 2nd, 1937, by 1;vhich 
the t\VO governments: "Recognise that the freedom of· entry · 
; 
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into, and exit\ from, and transit through, the Mediterranean 
is a vital interest both to the different;··~,parts o:t' t.te British· 
Empire and to Italy, .;and. that these interests are in no way 
. , 
inconsistent with each other; 
"Disclaim any desire to modify or, as far as they are 
concerned, to see modified the status quo as regard nation-
al sovereignty or territories in the Mediterranean; 
"Undertake to respect each other's rights and interests 32 
in the said area." 
In an exchange of notes bet\veen the t1,vo countries on 7 December 31, ld.936'.' Ciano confirrm d" •••• the accuracy of His 
Majesty's assumption, namely, that, as far as Italy is 
concerned, the integrity of the present territories shall in 
33 all circumstances remain intact and unmodified." 
Similar assurances were given by Italy to Britain in the 
.Anglo-Italian .Agreement o~ April 16th, 1938, together with 
an agreement of April 16th, 1938, together }li th an agreement 
• ii" . 
.. 
to exchange annually informtion regarding major changes envis-
aged in Italian or British troops in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
Red Sea or Gulf of Aden, and to grant notification of any 
intent to build naval or air bases in the Eastern Medi ter·ranean. 
The British diplomatic activity was also present in the Non-
Intervention Committee, where attempts were made to get the 
(.. wi thdra\val of :t")oreign volunteers from Spain. On Marc·h, · 1937 ~ 
Hassel (T""ne German Ambassador in Rome) reported that Ciano 
had informed him of the following: 
_·:. ___ ....:..._-
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"Since the British have brought up once again in the London Non-Intervention Committee the idea of withdrawing all vo1Ul'll.teers 9 he repeats the reqrast that German representative be instructed to sabotage it. Ciano added that behind the British move ·there was presumably the ulterior motive of ·obtaining from Italy a guaranty to withdraw following the conclusion of peace, if withdrawal now should prove impractical. This was what England was really interested in°0 35 
f! However in the evaluation or the influence of strategic 
factors upon the direction of British policy toward the civil 
war in Spain, and those who became involved in it, one must 
revert to the earlier proposition that was made., that Britain 
as a world power had to develop a world-wide strategic concept 
as the basis or strategic planning. In her reaction to Spain 
Britain had to bear in mind events in 0th.er parts of the \Vorld, 
as far away as the Far East. The British Admiralty had to 
provide for the protection of British shipping" ••• along the 
thousands of miles of our highly vulnerable ocean trade routes 
which in the \VOrds ot· t.he war plans, are 'vital to the life of 
the Empire', In 1939 some 3,000 deep-sea dry cargo ships and 
tankers and about 1,000 coasting vessels, totalling 21 million 
tons, were registered in Britain and the average number at sea 
of any one day was 2,500. The need for a large number of 
cruisers to defend this great total of widely dispersed 
merch~t ships requires no emphasis. For many years after 
the First World War the Admiralty had insisted that seventy 
,:; 
,., cruisers was the smallest number vvi th which 'Ne could meet 
our responsibilities. Yet, f·rom one cause or another1 thi·s 
minimum \Vas gradually ,vhittled down until, in 1939~ our ef·fect-
ive strength - including the Dominion Navies - was only 
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Samu.el Hoare, who became First Lord of the Admiralty in 
.__ June, 1936, Was confronted Vii th the Urgent ··problem Of naval 
-Pearament~ In his memoirs he states: 
"The fleet had never recovered from the economies made a! the end or the First World War and in the years between 1925 and 1935ooooYear by year the old ships became ooselete and ths nevJ shil)s v11ere not builto Our cruiser strength9 for instance fell from 51 in 1922 to 47 in 1926 and 48 in 19279 although the Naval staff insisted that the minim~ standard for safety was 70. In spite o:e the :recommendations o:r a strong C~binet Commi tte~ und.ex--z> the chairmanship of Birkenhead i.n 1925 that five a year should be built 9 the Chro~cellor of the E%chequer 9 Chirchill9 had the number reduced to eight in four years 9 and further dinimished by a later cut to threeo It was not surprising in this atmosphere of Unilateral disarmament that the Labour Government of 1929 agreed to anticipate the scrapping ofb five valuable ships 9 all completed in 1914 and with many years service berore them9 to postpone -until 1937 the replacement of our older battleships and to limit our c~uisers am destroyers to a number that suited American prestige rather than our 0'11Jn needso Tius w e .. s the damnosa hereditas from which the navy was s'U.ffering tm.til Mareh 1935oooThe Abyssinian crisis had thrown a spotlight on its (the navy 0 s) ~~Y deficiendeso The Naval Staff had then JJOintag. out th~ extre~e danger of tyin~~ the Fle~t iJg. the Medi ter1".)anean at a t!m<~t \Vhen the _ J§lpanese were threateniµg Bri ti.~h. int,~r~sts in th~ Pacific,o o o nu 37 
1!.l One must conclude there1~ore that while it was clear that 
a victory by Franco, and theref'ore Italian and German inter-
vention in Spain, and the possibilities of Italy and Germany 
obtaining bases on Spanish territory constituted a serious 
threat to Britain's strategic position, any action by Britain 
to prevent the occurence or these possibilities was :fraught 
w1 th dangerous consequences, especially since Britain v-iould 
have to act against Italy, whose leader, Mussolini had pub-
. lically staked his prestige u~on a victory by Franco. 
I 
• 
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Those ractors which would seem to havemade 1t imperative for 
Britain to act to prevent her strategic position in the Medit-
erranean declining any further, also made it see~ imperative • 
that Britain do nothing that would necessitate the use of 
naval or military ~orce, especially against Italy. 
Italy occupies a pa.rticularly strategic position in the 
Medi ter·ranean, jutting out into the centre of the sea, and 
also in ~ossession of the island o~ Pantelleria, roughly 
equidistant between Sicily and Tunisia" Jloreover the 
advent of' the bomber meant that Malta would, under heavy air 
attack be in all probability unusable as a nval base for the 
British. Thus once Italy could no longer be regarded as a 
reliable friend the question of a naval base became acute~ 
Hitherto the Royal Navy had counted on being able to use 
Gibraltar and Malta, but, when the Cabinet in 1937 decided 
that Italy a:> uld no longer be considered a relaible friend, 
another base where uocking and repairs could be carried out 
had to -be found. The decision in April 1937 was Alexandria as 
the main fleet base, but th.e position at Alexandria was f'ar 
from satisfactory, in the facilities available to ships,and 
in the derenses against hostile f·orces. If Alexandria was to 
function as a repair base for a rleet with heavy capital ships, 
it required a suitable graving dock, which would entail the 
deepening of the Great Pass channel, and while much had been 
done to improve Alexandria during the Etheopian crisis, to 
improve the harbour and defenses by dredging and laying 
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•ooring buoys, booms and nets, nothing had been mne in the two 
rears between to improve the docking and repair facilities. 
The_ defenses against air attack were negligible. The Italiaii. 
aircraft in Libya were superior 1n n~ers and performance. 
and could be more easily reinforced rrom their metro~olitan 
base. Th.ere were no fighter aircraft or a.r defences in Egypt, 
and this could only be rectif·ied by removing the necessary 
equipment and machines from Britain where they were 
desperately needed. Highly vulnerable targets, beside 
Alexandria and Cairo, existed in the Oil ref·inery and storage 
installations at Suez; the port and docks at Port Said; the 
port facilit·.ies md shipping in the canal. rhe air rai·d:~ 
precautions were far from complete and there was therrore the 
risk of heavy civilian casualties. The only defenses that 
could be placed against air attacks :for the fleet and these 
targets would be an air attack onlthe Italian arfields 
a! Cyrenaica; however the Italians had introduced their 
Savoia 81 bomber,,-. believed to possess a faster top speed that 
the British fighters and with a 200 mile greater range than 
the bombers stationed in the liliddle East, which meant that 
advanced landing grounds would have to be made available close 
to the Egyption frontier, which in its turn posed the problem 
of the defence of these landing grounds. rheir defence would 
require the ability on the part of the Army to operate to the 
westward, while the defence of the Nile delta would require 
that the enemy be met to the East where the problems o:f eupp17 
. : ;· . . . . ·. . .. '- . ' . . ·_ . _.'.11:.~,~~~~ 
.. :".: / . 
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would be eased and those of the enemy increased. Tobruk was too-
tar· to. the West, so the port of Ma.truth had been chosen during 
the Etheopian crisis as an advanced ·base and al rfieJd, though 
it had a lO\V cargo-handling capacity ll .. d was 11nreliable 
in winter. This base also presented a very vulnerable target 
to air attack. The Army also presented a pessemistic picture. 
The reinforcements that had been sent from Britain during the 
Etheopian crisis had been withdrawn; many of the British units 
were below their war strength and their peace stations were 
far removed from the Western desert. The Egyptian .Army 
was still in the early stages of re-equipping and training, 
while the Italians nad placed two corps of metropolitan 
troops in Li b,ya - four di vis ions in al 1, of which two were 38 fully motorised. In addition to this this extention of the 
docks at Gibraltar to take heavy ships would take another 
two years to complete, and the air defences there and at J4alta \ 
·39 
~ere still in the process of modernisation. 
Captain Roskill demonstrates the purpose of maritime 
strategy: 
"The aim of maritime strategy is not so much to establish complete control o.f all secJ communications, which i.vould be an ideal hardly attainable until final victory was aJmost won 9 as to develop the ability to establish zones of mar-itime control wherave~ and whenever they may be necessary for the proseqution of the 'U'Jar in accordance vii th direct-ions of the Governmento Altd a zone of maritime cont~ol mean.rs no more than ability to pass ships safely across an area of water which maY be quite small in extent or may cover many thousands of square miles of oceano va 40 
Thus it was clear that Italy through the use of aircraft 
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could establish a zone of control in the Central Mediterranean, 41 as she did in~fact during the Second World Waro In addition 
to this ·the excellent centra1 position of the Italians would 
go a long way toward counter-balancing their numerical 
JL 42 inferiority in ships. 
In addition to the Italians being able to estbalish a zone 
of control over the Central Mediterranean, they would, by the 
use of ai rcraf·t and submarines operating from Italian East 
Africa, be alble to establish a zone of control over the Red 
Sea, which \VOuld be the last remaining sea link with Egypt 
in the event of the Medi terraneall route being clo aed to 
British shipping. The security of Aden therefore remai. ned a 
prime consideration, but was under the threat of Italian 
air eraft. There existed as well the general danger of an 
~ Italian advance from Etheopia into the British posessions 
East Africa m d the Sudan. Events during 1937 did nothing 
. to reassure British military and. naval planning starre, 
events which seemed inconsistent, as Major-General Playfair 
notes, with Italy's desire expressed in the Anglo-Italian 
.Agreement of January 1937, to further the ends of peace and 
friendship with Britain; 
... 
.,-. .. 
"For example there were hostile ref~rences to the United Kingdom in the government controlled pressl derogatory broadcasts in .Arabic; and reference by the Fascist Council to increased mili~ary expenditure and_a greater measure~ 
of self=sufficiencya T.here were also the decisions to set 
up a High Command in North Mrica 9 vti th @ntrol over land, 
sea and air forces~ a.11.d to form a ]aetropoli tan army corps in Libya; and there was an announcement that the Italian Navy must add to their battleships and other types so 
.,• ..... , ' 
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to be c~pable of operating on the high seas. Th.e Chief of the Air Staff declared in the Senate that great changes had taken place in the strategical employment o:t· the 
-Italian Airforce; the centre of gravity had been moved towards the Mediterranaan9 the Red Sea9 and the Ind.ian Ocean; consequently all air bases in those zones had 
. '"• ., 
been strengthened ~= Sicily 9 Sardinia 9 the Aegean Islands, Pantelleria~ and Tobruko Massawa and Assab were further developed and the native army in Etheopia continued to expando The campaign or anti=British propoganda and 1ntrigu.e v1as particularly voilent in the Tutiddle. East and the Levant 9 and in a proclamation by Marshall Balbo to the .Arabs o:r Libya it wasproclaimeei that the Duce wa.s now the protector of Islam, and as such exalted the Muslim people. ,i . , 43 
It is in this complex of world-wide strategic relationships, 
together with the special position that Italy occupied in the 
Mediterranean~ that British reactions to the civil war in 
Spain and her relations \Vi th Italy must be set. On the 
outbreak of the Spanish civil war, the Chiefs of Staff emphas-
ized the need for the restoration of peaceful relations in the 
Mediterranean and hoped that nothing would prejudice the 
44 restoration of friendly relations with I,taly. As Italy 
gradually moved into the alignment with Germany and Japan, 
with her acceesion to the Anti~Comintern Pact or Japan ani 
Germany in November 1937, the British Chiefs of Stafr renew-
ed their three power warning: 
"••oinsisting that our interests lay in a peaceful 
, Medi teT~r.?11ean and that \Ve ought ;_·-to return to a 
state or friendly relations with Italyo Without 
over~looking the help we should hope to receive ~rom France and other possible allies$' they could not :rorsee the time vvhen our def·ence f'orces ®uld be strong enough to safeguard our territory 9 t:rade 9 and vital interests 
against Germsn y 9 Italy and Japan simultaneously o They therefore emphasized the importance 9 from the point of iliew of Imperial defence 9 of any diplomatic action that would reduce the number or our potential enemies and 
.·· give us allies. 
"No sooner had this warning been given. than Ita].y 
I ,. , . 
---~-.-.--.-.,-~--------~-,-.. -. --1!1111~ ·~/, 
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announced her withdrawal from the membership of the League. The Brit~ish Chief~s of Staff, with the prospect of three major enemies ever in mind9 recorded their opinion that the military situation then facing the· British v1as c,:rraugt with grea te1~ risk than at any tin1e in living memory 9 apart t·rom the vvar years CJ an·d that an immediate, accelera-tion of the armament -~_prograJnme vve.s essentialo ij~ 45 
Thus British decision-makers \¥ere caught ·between two 
conflicting policy goa.ls: one the protection of the British 
position in the Mediterranean; the other the avoidance of 
,.,,... the use of :ror~e. Ribbentrop, the. German Ambassador in . 
. London gives us his opinion of the affect of this dichotomy 
of interest~upon the British Foreign Secretary, Eden, in a 
report of July 1937: 
"No serious complications for the general European situation are to be expected from the present tension non=intervention policy o England_ desires peace 9 as does France also; in spite of the sharp line followed at present nei~her ot· them vvill push things to the limi tc: uife can count on this as an a·bsolute certain t·actor and can make our future decisions vvi thout ·being inflt1enced or disturbedo o o o .In a speech yesterday Eden mentioned Englandgs anxiety over her position in· the Mediterranean and her sea route to East Asia and stated ~hat the integrity of Spanish territory was an important question for Britain~ooo 
"The intervention of large 9 vllhmlly German and Italian military uni,..GSo o o\flfOUld theref10re in the present general political situation9 involve the danger of weious com:plicationso Additional arms and a1 r aid to Franco f)rom Italy and f·rom u.s vii thout the despatch of· larger 
. conti~gents of· volunteers \:(Wtluld in my opinion not cause any serious complications. 11 46 
The picture that thus emerges is one of Britain moving 
through a period that or'fere·d great risks to the security of 
the defensive system of the British Empie and to the traae·~.:~1.3:-, 
~oute~. wh~eh li:p.edt)lri tain to her t·ood sources, to her raw 
materials and to per markets. Foreign policy is such a 
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a situation had to be shaped to accord to the _realities 
. ~;. 
r•1•~" · ' •:" ·'" 
of Britain's situation, and have as its basic goal the 
.avoidance of v1ar. But one. must :_in follo1vving this analysis 
be\vare of· the dangers of adopting a too deterministic 
position, since policy decisions do reflect the 
interaction between the decision-maker and his environment 
(an environme11t in ·,.vhich the decision-malcer is included as 
a formative agent). The appeasers were not impelled towards 
the policy of appeasement purely because of the weaknesses 
of Britain's strategic position, but also because appease-
ment r·epT·esentecl a continuation of values held. Having taken 
the strategic factors into account, one still has to make 
an exanination of the structuring of the value and belief 
system of the decision-making machine in Britain, and to 
examine the dif'iferences contained within that structuring, 
the conflicsts that developed, and the outcome of these 
struggJe s. 
' There '~vere choices that \Vere made that v,ere determined 
in part by a belief in what the fuure role of Britain 
\P 
should 'be in world affirs. While it is true that De:fence 
expenditure rose from £102 millions in 1932 to £188 millions 
47 
· in 1936 and £280 millions in 1937, the .way in which the mon-
ey was spent reflected a defensive strategy, in ·{vhich the 
armed forces of Britain were to provide for Britain's 
defence and not to provide a force that would enable '.Britain 
to have a voice \nfhich \VOUld carry ,veight in Europe. 
Commenting on the defence programme on February 9th, 1936, 
Chamberlain wrote: ( 
... 
l 
I 
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"I have had to do most of the work on the prog:ramme, 
which has been materially modified as a result, and I am pretty satisfield now that, if we can keep out of 
war for a few years 9 we shall have an airforce of such 
striking force that no one \Vill care to run risks ,.:-,ith it. I cannot believe that the. next war 9 if it ever comes, will_~be like the---~19-st 011e 9 and I believe that our 
resources \Vill be more prof»i tably employed 1n··tn:ef air, 
and on the sea, than in building up great armies." 48 
Daladier (the French President of the Council} when he 
met Chamberla,!Jl during the Auglo==-F~en~h~-conversations that 
were held at the Quai d'Orsay on November 24, 1938, saw 
clearly the direction of Chamberlain's planning and tried to 
persuade him away from the defensive direction that planning 
had taken in Britain: 
"Me Daladier said that he had listened with interest to the inf,,orma tion ths.t Mr. Chamberlain had given him. He knevJ vvell the great ef·t·orts vvhich v1as being made by Great Britainp particularly since Niro Chamberlain became Head of the Governmento But he wondered if the problem were being ?aced from the right angleo He feared T-hat it v,as noto o oiie \iiJOndered9 hovrever 9 whether it vira.s a good idea to :put anti=-aircrafit def·ence above 
everything elseo He thought noto ObviouslY 9 anti= ai ~craf~t defence vvas important 9 but 9 in his vi e\t 9 it v, as better to defend OOndon by having bombers which might go and bomb German towns rather than by concentrating principally on anti=aircraft gunso He did no believe that fighter aircraft v1ere a sµf;ficient defence against bombers. 1' 49 
Chamberlain, who had earlier stated that 
" •• oi t v1as their first duty to ma_ke Great Britain as 
safe as possibleooo(and) that they had decided to give priority to a!lti=aircrart defences over the demands of land forces~0 i) replied to Daladier that 0~He thought it 
un1;vise to lll'l.derrate the value of rifighters and anti-
aircraft gunse 00 50 
Chamberlain on October 25, 1936 wrote in his diary: 
'':.•, 
I 
"We should aim at an ,Army of 4 divisions plus l mobile division, and the necessary drafts to maint~in is strength, and no more for overseas work ••• Territorials should be kept t·or A.A. defence." 51 
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If Chamberlain believed that force was the only argument 52 that Germany understood, as he maintained, it is clear 
from Chaniberlain' s concept of the future of British .Armamen t·s 
that Chamberlain wished to rely on persuation rather than on 
coercion in his relations with the dictators. This was a 
deliberate choice on Chamberlain's part, and it reflected 
both on his belief in the utter futility of war as a means 
of national policy Bnd also his fundemental desire to main-
tain the stability of the British economy. 
That this armaments policy did nonstitute a deliberate 
choice can be seen from this extract :rrom a letter vvri tten. 
by Chamberlain: 
"If ~ve \!Vere to follov, Winston's advice and sacri:rice our commerce to the manufacture of arms, we should inflict a certain injury on ©Ur trade from which it 
would take generations to recover 9 we should destroy the confidence which now happily exis s, and we should 
c~ippl:41 the revenue." 53 
Economic considerations in fact did play a central rose in 
helping to fornulate British attitudes to rearmament and for-· 
eign policy. This role was to a great extent derived t·rom 
the position of sterling as an international currency, which 
• had " ••• to be taken into account not merely because o:f 
administrative complications, but ••• also because it was a 
wartime asset of considerable value. Treasury of·t·icials vvho 
.'fl 
claimed that foreign exchange control would cinterfere with 
'the export trade end reduce the country's foreign exchange 
income were overstating the case. Mor.e substa.ntive 
arguae.nts claimed that as an international banker, London 
I 
i. ) . 
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could to some extent live on its credit. 
"The need to economise in ~oreign currencies was taken 
for granted, and even post-war indebtedness was an evil to 
-
................... . 
be· shouldered only in the clear interest of an immediate· 
war effort. The reluctance to impose controls became a \ 
.. drag on the pre-war preparation, and gave·rise to much 54 
criticism." 
Britain was not able to emulate Schacht 1 s economic mir-
acles in Germany, which :provided the means o:r the rapid re-
armament because of the prevailing economic concepts held in . 
Britain, which prevented the imposition of strict controls 
over foreign exchange, and the adoption of a quasi-wartime 
economy as in Germany or Japan. Keynes in .September 1939 
wrote that "Complete control was so much a8ainst the spirit 
or the age that I doubt if it occurred to anY of us that _it 55 
was possible." Thus it was that ..... economic as much as 
political considerations led them to reject any rigid system 
of control, for such a system might have had effects upon 
British traqe and finance, so soon after weathering the 
recent economic depression, they were not prepared to risk 
experiencing. In the event of· war Britain was likely to 
depend upon her foreign trade for her existence •• ~therefora 
the Government felt that nothing must be undertaken tich -
56 would likely to inter:fere with or dislocate that trade." .. 
It is for thesereasons that Inskip (the Minister foD the 
Co-ordination of Def·ence) refused Churchill's demand for a 
., 
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. ' 
{:,' '.a... Jlinister for Supply to supplement the newly created 11:lnister 
for the Co-ordination of defe~ce, as Feiling makes clear: 
Chamberlain in the debate in the Commons on May 1937 
stated: "Al though in actual war a Ministry of' Supply would be 
essential ••• I do not believe that a Ministry of Supply in 
peace-time will be effective, as the Ministry of l1Iur1i tions 
was effective in the Great War, unless you give that Ministry 
of Supply the same -powers" and these Feili~g states he 
doubted whether they would be given, or ought to be, in 
57 
time of peace. 
Eden's commented upon the effect of the economic influence 
on Britain's rearmament: 
"A difficulty which confronted the British Government at 
this period was that a high priority, too high as is now 
evident 9 was placed on the maintainance of our economic 
securityo This argument found particula_r 1:avour with the 
Prime lJiinister a:nd was constantly used by tl1e T 1 ·easury; 
but it certainly made dif·ticul ties f~or the Se:rv.i ce 
Departments whose political chie~s and staffs had to 
spend many hours trying to curb their demana.s VlTi thin 
Treasury t·igures iiih ich had no particular significance 
in terms. of defence." 58 
Having as Chancellor of the Exchequer, transformed an 
adverse trade balance o~ £104 million into a favourable 
balance of £37 million, Chamberlain did not wish the results 
of his careful husbandry disappear upon the construction of 
weapons and breing to an end tt •• • much cherished plans fior social 
improvement which were at this time on the verge of blooming 
. 59 
into an abundance of expensive blossoms." 
' One cannot explain Chamberlain's policies in roreign affiars 
merely in terms of a desire to maintain a sta-t:>le economy 
or a wish to see his social welfare s:hemes become a 
1··"'" 
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a reality. His policies basically derived from his hatred 
of war and his steadfast determination to do all that he 
·-
could to prevent Britain from being engaged in another 
war. Of ,,ar, Chamberlain said th~rt "\vhen I think ••• of the 
7 million of young men who were cut off in their prime, the 
13 million who were maimed and mutilated, the misery and 
the sufferings of the mothers or the fathers ••• in war 
50 there are no winners, but all are losers. 0 This 
abhorrence of the destruction of war was harnessed to a blunt 
sense of realism derived f·rom his radical background of 
Birmingham and his father, Joe Chamberlain, to an 
unyielding sense of duty and a selfless dedication, and an 
impatience with those who did nothing while the country 
and Europe seemed to be slowly drif·ting into war. 
The most dominant impression given by Chamberlain in his 
attitude to foreign policy is that of the essentially 
Radical attidu,de to foreign a:ffairs, his devotion to the 
welfare of the British people, and the over-riding sense of 
urgency. Samuel Hoare draws us this picture of Chamberlain's 
app~oach to foreign policy: 
"Just as betv,een 1924 and 1929, when he was Minister of Health, he had set before himself a five-year programme of socia,l security 9 \Vith each stage cles_I!J. y marked at the appointed tima9 so in 1937 9 when he became Prime Minister,~ he had in his mind an equally ©ncrete programme of inter-national security based oil definite action 9 anct concent-rated9 stage by stage9 upon carefull selected points in the foreign frontQ It was typical of his mentality ~ thEJt in November 9 1925 9 he 1rvas rea.dy ,vi thin a fev, days 
of becoming llinister of Health with a programme of no less than t'r1enty=fi ve Bills of socia.l refo·rm9 and that by 1929 he had successf\ll·ly car1~1ed them all to ·the Statute Booko In 1937 9 ha \fas equally determined to concentrate his analytical m d methodical mind upon the· crucial points in the faoreign front. A period of drift 
I l,i 
.. i 
~ ~ 
. "-' 
.I"'· 
) 
,,_,.").,~-.: ';l'.,,.t-··.·(:\"l;:;: .... :·~,:;:·:~; __ ·/.'.:~:..:;.:.;~.,'...:,r,:~.:~;.;,;.:.....:.;.,,:;_;~~i·C:,::.:~ ·,;.>.'·_::::a·::,.;~'.-:.: ·..'.'l-~'.·.':-.'. . .;;:;~~--:~';,\.";/,'. .. -.·,.i:j'.:~;.:>.-:,·· ';"·;"i:-::, 
,, _:~_:.; __ ;:_:~~J.~.:L.~~~~"~~~-Y~.(\~-. 
i, 
- 61 -
In Europe had made more urgent th~n ever the need of a concrete and concerted programme for preventing a catastropheo" 61 
Thus one should not catagorise Chamberlain's foreign a• 
policy as being determined by the military weakness of 
Britain, but rather as a function of Chamberlin 9 s 
r· 
J, 
desire to give direction to British roreign policy -- to 
move in an active role to\vard the soluti.on of those 
problems that seemed likely to disrupt the peace of Europe. -
Hoare felt: 
"· •• it ivould not be correct to say th~t our military wee.lmess was the principle cause of the Munich 
.Agreemento The over=riding consideration with Chamberlain and his colleagues was that Lhe very 
complicated problem of Czechoslovalria ought not to lead to a \VOrld ,,·..'ar 9 and must a.t almost any price be settled by peaceful meanso 00 62 
In April, 1938, in front of a Birmingham audience {to 
whom, according to Feiling, Chamberlain always spoke his mind 
most freely) Chamberlain said 
"We pass no judgement here upon the political system of other countrias 9 but neither Fascist nor Communist is in harmony with our temper our creed ••• And yetooodO not forget that We are all members Of the nu.man race 9 and subject to the like passions and 
affections~ and fears and desireso ~nere must be 
something in common l>etiveen us if only vve can t·ind it, and perhaps by our very aloofness 1arom the rest o:r Europe vve may h,sve so·me very special part to play as conciliator and mediatoro Am. ancient historian once wrote of· the Greeks that they had 
made gentle the li1e of the worldoooI can imagine no nobler anfbi tion f·or an EnglishStatesm2n than -co 
win the same tribute f·or his 01vvn country." 63 , 
Spain, with outbreak of the civil war, became to Cham-
. berlain a possible threat to th~ pea.ca of Europe that 
ought thus to become a subject of Britain's role as a 
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medi tator and conciliator. We shall examine this aspect of 
BI'i tish policy in a later chapter 9 and the spacial problems-
. that presented themselves in the fulfilling of this role, to-
gether ,vi th attempts to ---arrange El four-power meeting similar 
to that which met in Munich in Sep.tember, 1938, to settle 
the Czechoslovakian question. 
In an examination of British policy between 1936 and 1939, 
one should avoid the temptation to draw a too_·,;rigid di visbn 
of the period into three different periods which accord with 
the changes of personality that occurred in the orfices of 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, thus: 
· (1) Through 1936 to May, 1937, Ba.ld\¥in as Prime Minister 
and Eden as Foreign Secretary. 
(2) May 1937 to February 1938, Chamberlain as Prime lriinister 
and Eden as Foreign Secretary. 
(3) Following Eden's resignation in ,February, 193~ his 
position is filled by the Earl of Halifax, while 
Chamberlain remains as Prime Minister. 
The temptation to place too much emphasis upon the above 
divisions should be avoided because of the continuity of 
influence upon the decision-making process given to certain 
members of the ruling party in British through the function.:.. 
ing of a parliamentary- system of government. To state the 
proposition simply, the influencE of any member of the Govern-
ment upon any ~ecision made will depend not only an individuals 
c: 
official position given to him by the office that he holds, . 
but also upon his position of~ influence within the· ruling 
party. The dominant position of Chamberlain within the 
\ 
\ 
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Conservative Party acted 
,, 
establish some degree or con-
tinuity during the changes o:r office that we have noted 
above. 
f Hoare (or Viscount Templewood as we should now call him) 
11 . 
notes that Baldwin after 1935, having won the election 
seemed to be a tired ma-n, constantly talking ofl> his 
impending retirement, seeming· to lose much of his interest 
- 64 
in current poli tic-s. Tom Jones had lunch ·.vi th Bald\'iin 
in February, 1937 e,nd " ••• found him counting the hours like 
a schoolboy in sight of· the holidays. 'I shall sleep 1·or a 
week \1then I get out of· this', h,e groane.d. He is just care-65 
taking :for Neville.tt As early as March, 1935, Chamberlain 
wrote to his sister, Hilda: ttAs you \Vill see I have become 
a sort of Acting P.M. - only without the actual power of 
the P .M. I have to say 'Have you 'thought' or 'What v1ould 
/ 
you say' \then it would be quicker to say 'This is \Vbi t you 66 . 
must do' u Macleod is therefore able to conclude 1evi th a con-
siderable degree of truth that "As Baldwin's heal th deterior-
ated during 1936 and a date was put to his retirement, the 
Chancellor's (Chamberlai,n'--s) grip upon the while range of \,, ,_ 67 ~ 
~- - policy perceptibly tightened." A point which Chamberlain 
conrirms in -chis entry in his diary of October, 1936. n1 
am sending for peo~le and endeavouring to conduct business 
- 68 
as if I were in fact P.M." 
Hoare notes that Chamberlain~s :position in the Conser-
vative Party was unassailable, and derived in part f'rom his 
control of the party machine: 
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"Like p.is father bef·ore him, he kept his hand on the· party machineo Ynlen the Party's :rort11nes were at a low ebb in the days of MacDonald's second administration9 he reconditioned the organisation and ,appointed ne1iiv men to manage it. The Party9 s policy was constanly in. his mind, and no Conservative Minister ever taok a more detailed interest in election programme"'' 69 
Even in 1939, the Government Whips were able to 
. 
assure Chamberlain that no Conservative Prime Minister 
70 ever had so strong a hold on the Party in the Commons. 
Chamberlain's dominant position in the Conser¥ative 
Party gave him a continuous influence on policy in 
foreign af·flairs, even vvhen Chamberlain ,vas only the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. According to Macleod, 
Chamberlain in November, 1936, arrived at a Cabinet meeting 
to find his colleagues undecided on the issue of whether to 
.. grant belligerent rights to both sides in the Spanish 
civil war, and persuaded the Cabinet to stick to non-inter-
vention, ard to introduce legislation to prevent British 
71 ships fr~m carrying war materials to any Spanish port. 
Whe~ he became Prime Minister, Chamberlain set about to 
imple}Ilent his programme for the pacification o:r Europe, 
in the course of which he gradually became opposed in his 
ideas with those of Eden, his Foreign secretary. The basic 
disagreement bet1vveen the two arose f 1rom the question of the 
conditions that should exist be:fore conversations Ehould 
be undertaken with Italy in an attempt to reach a general 
appeasement of the Mediterranean. 
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The position of Eden can be best seen in his personal 
.explanation to the House of Commons, of the reasons for his 
resi·gnation :Crom the office of Foreign Secretary, made on 
21 Februaiy, 1938: 
''The inunediate issue is \Vhether ••• of':ficial conversations 
should be opened in Rome now. It is my conviction that the a4tti tude of" the Italian Government to international. problems in general9 and to this country in particular, 
_is not yet such as to justi:ey this course o The grotmd has been in no respect preparedo Propoganda against 
this country by Its.ly is rif·e thro ughou.t the v101~ldo 0 .more-
over9 li0tle progress 9 in f°act 9 though ml.il.ch i:t1 promise, has been made with the Spanish problemo Let me make 
·1t plaino I do not advocate that the Government should refuse 
conversation.swith the Italian Government oooyet we must be convinced that the conditions in which these conver-
sations take place are such to mske for the likelyhood, if not the certainty 9 of their su©Ssso I contend that these conditions do not exist to=daYoooit is my cont-
ention that before His ]fu.jesty~s Government open orficial 
conversations in Rome --;vi th the Italian Governmento o ovlfe 
must make further progress with the Spanish problem; we 
must agree not only on the need for withdrawal and on the 
conditions of~ 'JVi thdra·vval = V11e ha.ve had assurances enough 
of that in the past c::» but "vVe must go flurther and shovv the 
world not only promise but also achievemento The 
wi thdravval must have begun in earnest bef;iora these con-
versa.tions in Rome can be held on a really solid basis good will9 which is essential to successoooif the desire 
of the two parties be to reach agreement on all subjects 
outstanding between them9 including Spain 9 I am quite 
confident that it is the best method to persueo It is the traditional method of diplomacy to prepare for 
convErsations before they are formally openedo It is 
seldom right to depart from the traditional method 9 which has been tested by time and experienceo It is certainly 
never right to do so ·oecause one pe~rty to the negotiations inimiates that it is now or nevero Agreements that are 
worthwhile are never made on_ "Lhe basis of a threat" Nor in the past has this country been willing to negotiate. in such conditions." 72 
The position of Chamberlain and those of his colleagues 
who were of the same opinion was clearly expressed by Halifax, 
then Lord President of the Council, to. the House of Lords on 
the 24th of February: . 
::i .I 
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"It is a i;erfectly ±ntelligible argument that was employed by l[ro Eden in another place ••• that if previous 1llldertalcings have not been observed it is a waste of time to conclude otherso But I venture to think that in an atmosphere clouded by misunder-standings and suspicion~ such simple logic as that is not necessarily conclusiveo We have simple logic as that is not necessa_rily conclusiveo V1Je he.ve only to see what happens betvveen individuals di:f:fering in outloolr and tradition and intellectual process to realise how easily mis'LU1derstandings between nations growo An.a hov1ever good any of us may have felt thos reasons to bes; there was some reason to believe that the Ita ..lian Government on its side felt that on one pretext or another we were concerned to postphone the conversation •• othe Prime Minister, rightly as I thin1{ 9 held that9 if it could be achieved9 the right thing to go for was to reach ml. agreement 9 and that if tmderstanding could be reached and if confidence could be re-estab:tlshed the conditions that ?~o Eden thought necess2ry to secure in advance V'JOUld follovv o 99 
The dif'ferences .. oetvveen Chamberlain and Eden reflected 
in part the radical quality that was present in Chamberlain's 
attitudes to problems which he faced, his impatience with 
as being ;,oo slov, or tied by convention or tradition to 
pre-established methods or solutions. Hoare states that 
Chamberlain: 
tt 
••• was so sure that his plan was right, and so deeply 
convinced that he must carry it though without a moment's delay, that his.singleness of urgent purpose made him impatient of o-ostacles and indif~:rerent to incidental r-iskso The old=established machine of the Foreign orfice did not seem to him to move quickly enough for the crisis thar~ th1veaftened Europeo A foreign Secretary left himself always appeared to be entangled in the web of· an intricete Department. The classical met~o ds u of diplomacy under which ambassadors interviewed Foreign Ministers and leisurely dispatches passed between dis:amt capi tels seemed out of date in the ,uorld of dictators, wireless and aeroplaneso Had not the tim~ come9 he asked himself 9 when the British Prime Tulinister should deal directly with the man who really controlled Italian Foreign Policy 9 rather than through intermediaries who had no povJer o:e theil.,., ovlrn? Being so completely concentrated upon his plan of action, he did not realise some of ·its implications, the danger, t·or 
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instance, os side-tracking the Forei_gn Secretary, 
and dealing with advisors who were not always the accr-edited experts on foreign ·af·fairso" 74 
Suspecting the Foreign Office ot,- being fuided in its 
policies by encrusted attitudes -- he accused the Fore_ign 
Office- of persisting -in seeing Mussolini only as a sort of 7r5 
Machiavelli - he preferred to make.his own judgements and 
forlIIlllate his own policies, and employed channels of 
communication with the dicta.tcrs that lay outside those 
of the Foreign Office. 
Chamberlain is not alone in his appraisal of the 
ability of the Foreign Office to meet the challenge of 
changing situations • .Anthony Sampson quotes R.A. Butler 
asea.ying of higher civil servants: 
"They have very sillcy: minds, they've Rolls Royce minds. in fact the civil service is a bit like a Rolls Royce -you know that it's the best machine in the world, but you're not auite sure what to do with it. I think 76 
- that it's a --bit too smooth: it needs rubbing up a bit.'' 
Sampson also notes that: 
"The Foreign Office have al ways had ai adversion to_ long=term plans ••• of·t·icials p.ave always thought it 
midly improper to put up bold, five-year plans to their pvli tic?l · ma.ste1~so 11 I distrust anyone vvho f~orsees 
conseaue11ces and advocates remedies to avert then1,' 
. said Lord HP_lifax bet·ore the vvar; and this olrl English pragmatism is still glorified •••• 
"Here again vie :tind Rolls Royce diff·icul ties. 'The Foreigri'' Office is like a very sensitive octopus, ' sai.d one of its members: 'It's superbly equipped to receive irnp1')e ssions 1-=rom all over the ·\ivorld, and to react to the1n \Vith speed and ef·~eiciency Q But it's not designed to r.aake positive moves.' Only ~v11en a nevi party is e.lected, -
".:;nd a nevv set of ideas and attitudes is imported, does the octopus come tully alive, and shovv its elf capa'ble ofi movement." 
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Chamberlain wished to give· to Brit;i.sh fioreign--policy a 
radically nevi direction and he regarded -oleakly the ability 
of the established methods to achieve this. He became con-
victed that if only he could talk to the dictators personally 
that the difficulties that lay in the path or appeasement 
could be i-roned out between those who were the rea.l centres 
of political power in their respective countries. He 
, .... therefiore embarked on a process of by-passing the Foreign 
Office in the conduct of foreign relations. Upon coming into 
the orfice of the Prime Minister, Chamberlain wrote a personal~~ 
letter to Mussolini declaring his readiness to open convers-
ation not showing the letter to Eden for fear that he would 78 
object. Chamberlain in his diary mentions the use of 
79 Horace Wilson as a privRte intermediary with Grandi, 
Gr.?ndi talks of a 
a:oo 
'' ••• confidential agent of Chamberlain, \Vho, snce the month of October last year (1937), has been flll1ctioning as a direct and 'secret' link between myself and Chamber-lain. Tl1is agent, ,~ith whom one may say I have been in almost daily contact si-nce the 15th January (1938), ••• " 80 
Though one does have to treat Grandi's remarks with cuation, 
and it is possible that Grandi is deliberately exgerating the 
extent of his 'secret' contacts with Chamberlain in order 
overstate his own import2nce in the development of British 
• ,;I 1 foreign policy, it is clear that Chamberlain was engaged in 
by-passing the Foreign Office and his Foreign Secret~ry. 
:.. Chamberl'ain was determined to take the conduct of rela-
tions into his own hands, and to set Britain on the course 
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of appeasement, "· •• even though it meant losing my Foreign 
81 
Secretary," as he told Horace Wilson on October 18th, 
1938. Grandi describes the meeting that he had with 
Chamberln.n and Eden on 18th Feb.ruary, _ 1938, in these terms: 
ttChamerlain and Eden were not a Prime Minister and a 
Foreign Minister discussing 1;vi th tl1e Ambassador of a 
Foreign Power a delicate situation of an internauonal 
charactero They were~ and revealed themselves as such 
to me in defiance of all established convention= two 
enemies conf14)onting each other like tvYO t·ighting cocks 
in true :f'ighting posture o The _questions a_nd qu.eries 
addressed to me by Chanioerlain were all 9 without 
exception 9 it1lsntiona.lly p11t vii-th the aim of" producing 
replies which would have the effect of contradicting 
and overthrowing the bases of argument on which Eden had 
evidently previously constructed9 or by which he had 
attempted to justify9 his miserable anti=Italian 
and anti~Fascist policy in opposition to Chamberlain 
and before his colleagues in the Cabinet ••• 
"At the end o:r the three hours conversation the two 
men whom I had in front of me gave the indelible 
impression that, behind the v1orld, the arguments, the 
dif~erences of opinion and even the quee.tion under 
discussion 9 they v1ere play ing 9 or preparing to play f·or 
the high sta.lres of~ their futurae destiny in the Government 
and in the Conservative Party9 and that they were 
forging in their debating vveapons f·or tl1e Cabinet mEieti ng 
vvhich is t8king ple.ce at tl1e very moment v1hen I am 
writing this report, a meeting \Vhich f·or them may be 
the decisive battle." 82 
Ciano in his diary seems to be of the opinion that Eden 
was preparing to fight back: 
ttGrandi ha.s ta.ken a step forward in· his conversations 
••• Nevertheless, on Eden's express orders, Perth 
brought me a very f'orcible protest a_bout a colonial 
question of· quite minor impo,.,t~1nce o It strilces an odd 
notes> on the morrovv of· tl1e Londo11 conversa.tionso Every-
thing suggests that Eden 9 seeing that he had lost the 
game against Chamberlain, is still trying to muddle 
t11ings and put back the negotiations back /Jhere they 
began. 0 83 
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But Eden never stood a chance against the entrenched 
·position of Chamberlain, and was in fact regarded \Vi th 
, 
suspicion among a -vvide circle of the Conservative Party. 
for his advocacy of fashiona.ble concepts - as the League of 
Nations (see Chapter Two, Pp. ) - ·while in the Cabinet 
Eden occupied an isolated position. Chamberlain described 
the Cabinet meeting which :follo\ved the conv6rsations ·Ni th 
Grandi: 
"I began by putting my case at some length and .Anthony 
replied rather inneft'ectively I thoughto I then 
invited each member of the Cabinet to give his views in 
turno o oI then ms.rked them as tl1ey -spolce o Twe11ty of 
us were presentoooTaking out .Anthony and myself~ 14 
supported me \Vi thout q_ualif}ication 9 4o o o lli tl1 some 
qualifi,ics.tion or reserve o None supported .Anthony. 
When invited to reply he said he could not accept the 
decision and must resignoooOn Sunday (the 20th) I 
asked A9 to l1ave a private talk be:eore t11e Cabinet ••• 
This time \Vere vv·ere able to agree that the dif·:eerence 
b~tween us was vital and unbridgeableooo.After long 
discussions in full Cabinet 9 1Je suspended our sitting 
to allOvV a committee of) mediatorsoootO try and accom-
adate our differenceso They however made no attempt 
to induce me to alter my views 9 their efforts were 
directed to convincing .J\nthony that ti1e dif1 ... erences 
were less than he made out and that he could \Vith 
a CifJar concience accept the Cabinet 9 s decision 
and proceed with the talks 9 merely warni!)[ Grandi that 
a Spanish settlement was essential to an agreement ani 
that the Italians must implement their pron1ise to 
accept the :formula s_nd a'"t>stain :from reil'l.forcements • 
.Anthony tl1us bomba.rded t·rom all si Cies and very tired,· 
at last begged for an hour vs respite to. think over 
his position m d vie agreed that the Cabinet should 
wait to hear his decisiono About 7 ogclock he came 
and, greatly to his credit as I think 9 ·he inf)ormed 
us that nothing that had been said could shake his 
decisiono Accordingly he went off to wrice his 
letter of resignation." 84 
:.. ~ With Eden's resignation as Foreign secretary, Halifax 
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came to occupy that po·st, and the formulation of policy 
receded completely into an inner group of ministers who 
shared Chamberlain's concepts in foreign at~fai.rs: Halifax, 
Hoare, Simon and Chamberlain. While Hoare states that 
Chamberlain was not an autoc~at who imposed his will 85 on doubting colleagues, Duff Cooper (who resigned on 
the 30th September, 1938, over the Munich .Agreement) 
describes Chamberlain as hatine ~Y opposition, and 
states that the Government had come to mean the Prime 86 Minister, Simon, Halifax and Hoare. .Again vvhile 
Hoare descri~bes Ha.lifax, the Foreign M:i.nisGer as 87 being noi 'yes man', Lord Strang notes that ''An unusual 
feature or the period after Eden's resignation in 1938 
was the extent to which Halifax acquiesced in the 
Prime Minister's conduct of important business that 
was proper to the Foreign Office through channels 
.-.,. outside the Foreign Of·fice. One cannot imagine Grey ~ 
allowing Asquith to use someone like Sir Horace Wilson, 
as Chamberlain did, on Foreign Office Business of first 88 
importance.'' 
One aspect of British foreign policy in the latter 
half of the 1930~s is the indeterminate nature of the source 
or authority for the rormulation of foreign policy, which re-
sulted from the gradual undermining or the·authority of the 
Foreign Oi'fice. The result of this was the confusuion noted 
"' J 
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Ciano above in being faced simultaneously, during February 
.t• 1938, with encouragen1ent from ·chamberlain and discourage-
ment from Eden in the matter of the initiation of con.var-
. 
. 
sations between Brit~in and Italy. Eden in E1ebruary, 1938, 
was forced to protest the activities of Lady Austen Chamber-
lain (which Eden stated "were creating confusion"85, who was 
.. engaged in showing letters to Mussolini from the Prime Mini-
ster which stated that Britain v,as coming around to the idea 
of the formal recogniton of the conquest of Abyssinia by 
Ita.J3, and that conversations to this end could begin at the 90 
end of the month. 
John Connell has described the process as resulting in 
the "position of the Foreign Office (being) ironic and humi-
liating. The high status and great authority which it had 
a~hieved in the previous thirty years were gradually ta~en 
away fr om it, not 9penly and. abruptly" , but by a gradual 
process of unacknowledged transference of power. Crisis 
succeeded crsis; the Spanish civil war, from its dramatic 
and conspiratorial beginning through to the end of its tort-
uous and protracted agony, was the origin not only of ideo-
logical differences in Britain, but of _ .. a number of delicate 
and _compl.ex diplomatic issues, which ~he Foreign Office was . . ~ ,Q '$. . ' 
permitted to handle at tge executive level; but the far more 
important policy on these and all other major issues was re-
moved from it to other spheres. Vlithin the framework of Bri-
tish Cabinet government, there could be no complaint if the 
Prime Minister exercised not merely a supervisory but a con-
\ 
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trolling authority over foreign policy. Baldwin's fault was 
that the control which he exerted was occasional and cap~i-
cious, and that it was subject to the influence of unoffi-
cial advisors and of a small (and largely secret) cabal of 
.. ministers and officials_ vJhose proper fields of responsibili~y 
did not lie in foreign affairs. Chamberlain's fault was that 
he extended and strengthened the influence of this cabal, 
and added to it his own over-riding authority, his own vig-
orous but narrow determination to implement a disasterous 91 and dishonourable policyo 11 
One can .trace differences between the period when Bald-
win was tr.le Prime l\1inister and the pe-riod v1hen Chamberlain 
occupied that office - though as pointed out these diff~erenc-
es should not be stressed to far in view of the realities 
of party politics. It wouJ.d indeed appear as Connell suggests 
above that the control exercised by Baldwin as Prime Minister 
over the formulation was exe,rcised in an occasional fashion. 
Eden notes in his memoirs ·that: "The Cabinet did not meet 
from the end of July (1936) until the beginning of September 
and British foreign policy was in fact decided in the Foreigri 
Offd.ce. Baldwin was not well enough to \~ •.• (deal) with any 
but the most essential business. According to the press, he 't, ':. 
and I were working in close conjunction. I wrote in my diary 
on August 24th: 
'The communique in the press th:rs· morning annowicing that 
S.B. is n~t coming up to London is a little 'tall', since 
his constant touch with me has consistted of one letter and .t~ 
fJ 
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one telephone call this month, and these about my spending . 92 spending a weekend with him in Vlales. '" Eden also notes that d~ing the latter part of October, Baldwin became in-creasingly occupied with the impending crisis of the relat-ions of the King and IVlrs. Simpson, and told tden: "I hope that you will try not to bother me too much v,i th foreign . 93 affairs just now." 
But it v,ould appear tna.t Baldwin did intervene to give direction to British policy. Tom Jones (the Samu,al Pepys of the Cli,~ell set) recordes in his diary on July 27, 1930, that: "S.B. was much affected by the Spanish troubles. 'I tol.d Eden yesterday tfu.t on no acount, French or other, 
94 must he bring usin to fight on the side of the Russians.'".' ,· Jones notes as well that on J11ne 8th, 1936, he "Saw Horace Wilson at No.lQ.:jat 6.40. He had -just reported to S.B. my weekend adventures (in which Jones, together with Lord Lothian discussed with von Ribbentrop with possibilities of a meeting between Baldwin and Hit1er) ••• s.B. replied that he ••• was in favour of meeting Hitler but was of the view that the meeting s.hould be kept qµite open •••• He had 
I 
seen EdeDr;:and it was agreed b·etween them that Eden shnuld 
.. also think hard over the weekend. S.B. is will~ng to go to Berlin, accompanied by Eden. I warned H.W. that the inter~ views must not get mixed up with the apparatus of the For-
. . 96 · eign Off~ce, as one of its objects was to escape it. 11 The lines of authority in foreign· affairs, as has been stated before rWl indistinctly and unevenly, with the exist-
J 
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of two co-existing spheres in which foreign policy was form-
ulated, the sphere centred on the Foreign Secretary and the 
Foreign Office; and the s,ll!lere _centred on the Prime .1Jlini-ster ·· 
and his own private gr,crup·:Of. intir.nate-s. Horace Vlilson appears 
as a connec.ting link betv,een t~e Ad.ministrations of Baidv1in 
and Chamberlain, follotJ11ing from an Imperial Conference held 
in Ottowa in 1932, confined to matters of Imperial economic 
policy, tr1e chief consequence of which was, according to 
Vansittart (the Permenant Under-secretary at the Foreign 
.~. Office) that " ••• Horace vVil.son made his name their to my 
subsequent cost. He had enormous talents, a pure personality 
and a sane tas simplici tas in foreign affairs. His winning 
ways captured S.B. f'rom n1e and spellbound Neville Chamberlain 
with whom he shared imcomprebension of such ugly ideas as 97 
mine." Vansittart traces his increasing isolatior.J. from the 
centre of political power: "The J.onger I vvas in office the 
less I counted with Baldv~in, who was the real head of the 
Government. Nothing could alter my devotion for him, but the 
.others v~ere ·sapping ·his former affection for me vvi th rumours 
that I was wild and hysterical, t!ie very defect that he most 
dreaded, being so highly strung himself. I never thought 
that he could be estranged by conflicting convictions, but 
somehow \'Ve met less often and less amicably •••• Since S.B. 
set out to play the Briton, he could not feel comfortable 
consorting with a pass:Lon he, condemned. No wonder that in 
contrast he called Horace vVil.son 'v1ise, calm and serene'. 
Since Baldwin also thought that Tom Jones embodied 8 the wis-dom of tl1e ages ' , there was hardl.y a point on which our ·, • I ·1 
•.-1· 
I • . . • 
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98 judgements coincided." 
'. J ·., 
With the advent of Chamberlain to the Premiership the 
vagueness of the lines of authority _gradually distill into 
the clearer outlines of the dominance of Chamberlain. In 
the period that Eden was Foreign Secretary the felations 
between Eden and Chamberlain gradually began to worsten 
as Chamberlain extended his grip upon the formulation of 
policy. During January the issue of Chamberlain's rebuff 
of an initiative by Roosevelt designed to influence the 
state of world opinion, led to tl1e relations of the two 
men becoming seriously at odds. Eden states that "Chamber-
lain apparently believed with increasing conviction that our 
approaches to the dictators were likely to lead very soon to 
genuine settlements. I expostulated with him, but only re-
ceived the reply that the Foreign Office \'\las not sincere in 
its efforts •••• VJe were now head on and this brought out in 
the Prime Minister's character a streak of .ruthlessness re-... 
meniscent of his father, Joseph Chamberlain •. He was evi-
dently determined to see the whole .American business on1y 
in the context of his impending talks with the dictators. 
In this sense, Roosevelt, our Rreileh allies and I were all 
in the same boat. We were all held to be obstructing these 
. 99 negotiations, in v1hich Chamberlain had dogma.tic faitho" 
With the promotion of Vallsittart to the position of 
, i Chief Diplomatic Adyisor to the Goverrunent, where he was 
isolated both from the Foreign Office and from Chamberlain 
who did not seek his advice, and the resignations ot Eden 
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and Viscount Cranbourne ( the Under-Secret&rY of State for 
Foreign Affairs) .. Vansittart dep~ting in Janua.l'y of 1938, 
and Ed.en and Cranbourne in February of the same month _ .. 
Chamberlain, as he told his friend Rus_hclift', had nwon thr-100· 
,i oughu g Chamberlain's then becaJD.e the influence that moulded 
the direction of British foreign policy and his will prevail-
ed without the inconvenience of conflicting spheres of author-~:.-·, 
ity. Cha.mberla.in's influence, as we ba.ve seen, was that of-~a 
man whose thoughts were dominated by the strength of his hat-
red of war and his belief that by personally intervening in Sr 
the established methods of diplomatic intercourse he v1ould 
' ' ;. ( 
be able to divert the course of events. He was perba.ds justi-
fied in his belief tba. t the Foreign Office was bound to ·1too 
great a degree by pre-established concepts and that new direct-
ion and impulse had to be given to the flow of British foreign 
policy - the Rolls Royce needed to be ruffled a litt~e. But 
Chamberlain in placing himself outside the established meth-
·, 
ods of diplomatic activity and in by-passing his Foreign Sec-
retary, placed himself outside the total picture ~,of _;:1Eur9pean 
events - he had released his hpld on the ~ctopus'and the ..... 
total range of impressions of :··t oreign events • As Lord Strang 
makes clear: "It is unlikely tha..t any Minister who had the 
whole viorld vJi thin his purview would have so long persisted 
in such an opinion, but Na-. Chamberlain was dealing only with 
one part of foreign affairs, which must by their very nature a 
be regarded as one vJhol-e. If he had had to explain from day 
to day the progressive development of his puilposes to the 
,1 
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French, United States, Soviet and other Ambassadors and to 
the C&echoslovak Minist~_r _, and- had been· obliged to watch 
and to respond to the .impa.et:3-0f his actions upon govern-
ments and peoples throughout the wprld, as a Foreign Sec-
retary must do, he might not indeed have modified his policy, 
but he may have seized its implications better than he per-
101 
haps dido'r To Chamberlain Italy and Germap.y.,_~~occµpiedtthe 
centre of his mind to the exclusion of other problems, which 
only became relevant in as far as they impinged upon the re-
' lations of Britain with the Axis countrieso Thus in Chamber-
lain's mind Spain became a function of Britain'·S,-~}relations 
witg these;- two countries and became considered purely in 
these terms: British policy towards the Spanish civil war 
wider Chamberlain therefore became dominated by the necessity 
to remove the Spanish conflict as obstacle to the development 
of the new era and to the development of the appeasement of 
Europe. But to achieve this goal Chamberlain still had to 
bear in mind the opinion of the remainder o_f his countymen .-
the degree to which Chamber~ lain' s cone ept s of the Spanish 
civil war were shared by the British people will oc-cupy our 
attention in theLnext chapter - a consideration of the prob-
lems that presented themselves to British decision~makers as 
they. atte.11JPted to implement their pblicies toward the Spanish 
'~- -.• .,-- ·•• .- ~ · ·ti , •• , • .j_ ,- ,. - o..l -~ • , ; -.:., 
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Notes : Chapter One. 
fl 
1. Vfuile being aware that the use of the term ''povver" could 
upset the semantic susceptibilities of some, I find its 
use unavoidable. Having used the term, I \Vill take this 
opportunity to guard· my flanks. In using the 1.vord "povver" 
--~-· ·----·-
I mean nothing more or less than the ability to influence 
others to act in accordance with ones wishes. The power 
structure will consist or those elemnts upon which a 
state can call to achieve the objective for which the 
power· is being exerted. These ele1nents of povver 11.ay con-
' si st of the use or the t.hre.at of the use of physical 
coercion, dilpomatic skill, economic relationships, 
lingering prestige of a .more glorious"era, or v1hatever 
means one ·state has at its disposale to persaude another 
to its way of thinking. It must hov1ever be recognised that 
the latter hal:f .of the 1930' s \Vas an era in v1hich it 
\Vas considered among contemporary British political 
circles that physical coercion bore a special position 
in the relations of- Britain 1,vi th the Axis states, viz., 
f 
. '' 
' Chamberlain: ••• force is the only argunent that Germany 
understands.'' 
, 2. Lord Strang, Britain in vVorld Affairs (Praeger, New York, 
1961), pp.250-251. 
3. P.A. Reynolds, Brit~sh Foreign Policy in the Inter-War 
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Years (London, Longmens, 1954), p.2. 
4. J. Hurstfield, 11he Co11trol of Ravv lviaterials, Hist.or;£ of 
- the Second ~Vorld vVar, Uni tea_ I(i11gdorn Qivil. Series, 
W.I(. Hancock ed., (London, H.!vl.fi.O., 1953), pp.14-15.• 
It must be a.a.mi tted that by 1935 the British Iron 
and Steel Federation had been set up with povver " ••• to 
support and co-ordinate the activities of the associations 
and to give a.ffect to .. -the \Vill of the industry in the 
matters of general policy", but, concludes Hurstfield, 
'' ••• compared vi1ith its competitors abroad, and particula.r-
ly ·vvi th the ste.el industries· of Germany and the United .. 
States, the British iron and steel industry had a long, 
way to go both in the intergration of its structure and 
in the application of the results o:r techinical progress." 
·Hurstfield, supra, p. 2l+• 
5. E.L. Hargreaves and lu.r,1. Go·~ving: Civil Indu~try and 
Trade, History of the Seco.nd \Vorld Vlar, Uri.i ted ICingdom 
1~tilitar:x:: Series, ·~v.K. Hancock, e·d., (LOndon, H.11.S.O., 
1952), pp.5-6. 
6. Roy C. Macridis, Foreign Poli,cy in ~Vorld Politics 
(Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp.61-62. 
7. The information- above-on the economic structtn?EJ of . 
Japan in this period has been. taken from G @Co Allen, 
-
-
-
-A Slio~t ko~Qmlc History of J.aiP, (lionaon..c;&p.niA4ttJ11 .. 
Winv c Ili,,~j O 1-'rJ c , · r; 
.8. w ., • Loelmood, The Economic l>ff@l§p.MDt of · lapM, 
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(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954). 
9. 1\fu.jor-General S. ~Voodburn - Kirby, The vVar Aga.ins~ 
Jap8.n, Vol. 1~ TI}e Loss of S~ngapore, Uni ted_Kingdom 
Military Serieq, (London, H .M.S .o .~, p. 2 • 
. 10. Capt. J .~V. Ro skill, The War at Sea, Vol. 1. (London, 
• H.M.s.o., 1954), p.59. 
11. Ibid,pp.51-59. 
12. Ibid, p. 58. 
13. On the 6th. of February, 1922, Great Britain, the 
United States, France, Italy and Japan signed the 
vVashington Nava.·l Treaty. 1rhe Treaty ·v1r1as designed to 
.contribute to the maintainance of general peace in 
the Far East a.nd to reduce the burden of competition 
in naval armaments. By the treaty, the signatories 
agreed tha.t capital ships in the·:t.r ·respective. navies 
should be maintained in the ratio of 5.for Britain 
and the· United States, 3 fo·r Ja~:pan, and 1.6 for 
France and Italy. Under Article XlX, Great Britain, 
the United States and Japan agreed not to estEij,.ish 
any new measures to create ne\v bases or to increase . ' 
I the facilities in this··area. The areas coveredby 
the agreement ,vere: · 
(Ji) for Great Britain \ - Hong Kong and any insular 
possessions east of the 110°.meridian (except 
such areas as vvere adjacent to the coasts of 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada); 
-~ 
. .. 
" 
/ 
(b) for the United States - her insular possessions 
. . i in the Pacific, excepting those adjacent to the 
coasts o:f the U.S.A., Alaska (excluding the Aleutian· 
Islands), the Panama Canal and Hawaii; 
(c) for Japan - her insular possessions and territories 
in the Pacific. 
The Marianas, Caroline and Marshall Islands 
~ere not mentioned for the reason that since these 
islands were under mandate to the League of l'Jations·, 
Japan was responsible to that organisation for the 
maintainance of the 'status quo'. The significance 
of these islands 1vvas that they lay across the United 
States' lines of communications and were clearly of 
great strategic value to Japan were she to be involved 
in a Pacific \Var. No enforcement machinary w·as included 
_in the Washington Treaty and Japan \Vas in a position 
where she ~t disregard the treaty v1ith impunity once 
she so desired. The fact that neither Britain nor the 
United States could construct naval bases nearer to 
Japan than Singapore and Hawaii, and that Japan 
possessed those Pacific islands listed above, meant 
'1;, • i i 
that the Japanese defensive position was extremely 
strong. The effect was to strengthen as well as to 
0 
acknowledge the impregnability of Japan from naval 
attack by Britain or the United States; the security 
~ of Japan's communications in time of war with her new 
continental possessions were thus assurred. Short of 
' 
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combined Anglo-American naval action, there was little 
assurance that any indep~ndent action by Japan could 
·be curbed. The London Naital Treaty of April 1y30 laid 
down a holiday· among th~ five naval powers in the 
; building or capital ships, together with a limit on 
J 
the numbers and the uses of submarines. Britain, _the 
United States and Japan liad down a 10: 10: 7 ratio 
\'.· . .-, 
for cruisers. These provisions were strongly criticised 
1n Britain was endangering British security, and in 
particular the fact that !~cdonald had agreed for 
Britain to a one third reduction in the minimum cruiser 
requirements by nearly one third· in order that agree-
ment could be reached. It was felt in many circles 
that this number of cruisers would be 1nsuff1cent to 
safeguard Britain's commercial routes an4 strategic 
position tnroughout the world. 
14. G.M. Gathornea.Hardy, A Short History of International 
Af~airs (London, Oxford~University Press, 1960), 
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Cha:pte ~ ~vo .. : Non--Intervention. 
",Vb.en I use a word, '' Humpty Dumpty said, in a 
rather scornf·u1 tone, n1t means just what I 
choose 1 t to mean -- neither more nor less." 
Through th~ Looking Glass, Lewis Carrol. 
************************* 
In this chapter we shall be examining the inter-relation-
shi:ps between the Spanish c·i vil ,var, the structuring 
of political opinion in Britain and the international 
system (with emphasis on the meaning and realities of 
the policy or non-intervention that was officially 
adopted by Britain and the international community). 
The purpose will -oe to examine the :probems f'aced -by the 
decision-makers in Britain arising f'rom the intera.ction 
of the Spanish conflict, British public opinion and the 
·-
1 n t e rna ti onal system, together with the pol~cies that 
were developed to meet these problems. In this task, ---
a theoretical formulation of the problems faced by 
a decision-maker of a state not directly a pa_rty to ) . ' 
the internal war will be used as an·· introduction, so 
that the l)O.ssible policy choices and the implications· 
,~·· 
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and difficulties of implementing these policies may 
be made explicit. The theoretical formulation will 
be draYm rrom a re search monograph by George Modelski en-
1 
·titled The International Relations of Internal War. ·----. - - - . 
The chapter will reXlect a belief that in the 
examination or the policy or Britain towards the Span-
ish civil war, the term 'Britain' must be taken as a 
collective name for a structuring of individuals and 
groups embodying values, -oeliefs and interests. Thus 
Britain cannot be considered merely in terms of a 
limited number of decision-makers, such as Eden or 
Chamberlain, and British policy cannot be considered 
merely in terms values and goals of a limited number 
of decision-makers. The nature and content of British 
policy can only be explained in terms of the total 
structuring of political opinion within Britain, 
together with the organisations and institutions 
through which this political opinion is aggragated and 
articulated to the center:.of decision-making power 
within Britain. 
In the course of this chapter, it will be necessary 
to examine propositions put t'orward by various people 
that the structuring of British attitudes towards the 
Sp'anish conflict, or the atti tu~es held by certain 
groups or organizations had a decisive impact upon 
the content and direction of British policY towards 
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. Spain in this period. One such view is that put forw-
ard by Iv·an Ma.isky, the Soviet Ambassador in London 
from 1932 to 1943. Maisky, having described in his 
memoirs a Soviet statement of October 7th, 1936, in 
which the soviet government had listed a series of 
alleged violations by Portugal of the Agreement on 
Non-Intervention, goes on to declare: 
"The British workers were openly sympathetic 
to us, and this could not but find its reflec-
tions within the La·oour Party o For the f"irst 
six weeks of the Spanish war the Labour Party 
Leaders remained obstinately silent 9 avoiding 
the aa_option of any clearly def'ined attitude. 
Only when further silence became impossible 
did they· SU1lll11on 9 on 28 August 9 a meeting of the 
Labour Iv1em"tl~ers of Parliament, the Party executive, 
and the General Council of the T.U.C., at which 
it was decided: 
ttFirst, to maintain a policy of~ neu.trali ty 
· in the Spanish war. 
usecondly, to resist the running of a mass 
campaign in support of Republican Spain (which 
the Communists were insisting on). 
''The leadership o:r the British labour 
movement thus allied itself, in effect, with 
the policy of 'non-intervention' b~ing follow-
. ed by the British government •••• 
·1 . 
"However, the nearer the rebels drew to Madrid 
and the more obvious the intervention of the Ger-
mans and Italianson Franco tJ s side becan1e 9 the 
higher rose the wave of protest against gnon~inter-
vention~ among the British and French workers • 
Fro·m 5 to 9 October the Labour Party 0 s annual 
conf<lerence vvas in session in Edinburgh~ The 
Soviet government statement \Vhich has been 
quoted a-oove came in the 1niddle of its delib-
erationso This demarche on our part aroused 
a fresh out-ourst of· indigna.tion in proletarian· 
circles against the blockade of the Spanish 
Republico The masses were plainly readY to do 
battle, which did not suit the leadership.of 
the Labour Party at all. But the impression 
.. 
. t,. 
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made by the Soviet statement or 7 October was too great, and the Edinburgh conference could not ignore ito The Labou..r bosses began to I. man9euvre ~· tl1e Leader o:e the L~our party, Attlee 9 a.nd his a_eputy Greenv1ood visited the Prime Minister and demanded urgent investigation of all accusations regarding the voilation by some pov1ers of· the Agreement on Non=Interventiqn, and, in the event of such violations being established9 that the Republican government of Spain be accorded the .right to buy arms aborad. The ro.eeting vii th the Prin1e 1fini·ster v1a.s report-ed to the Con:Eerence 9 '\l1hich co nsia_ered itself satisi~ied and passed the f"inal decision of· ,.the Party~s line on the ~Spanish question 9 over to the Executiveo And the latter 9 after the Conf·erence, v:rotmd no justit·ication' f~or my change in its previous position. 
nso the leadership of the Labour Party sabotaged the true 1·eelings of· the masses. This was repeated9 regrettably 9 on subsequent occasionso Throughout the whole course of the Spanish war the Labour Party as a whole (I am not speaking of the individual honourable 
~xceptions) played a treacherous role towards Republican Spain 9 and its example \Vas follov,ed by other socia.list partieso An.d nov1, many years later 9 looking back over the events or those days 9 one see with singular clarity what a large share of· responsibility f~or the· triumph of Fascism in Spain must be bonne by the Second International ••• " 2 
.,. 
The first proposition stated by Modelski is that 
there are international components of internal wars, 
that there in fact develops within the structuring of 
the two belligerents an organization designed to 
accomodate and strengthen these international compon-
ents. Modelski argues ttthat in in.ternal \Var, the 
structures of at least one party to the conflict 
already have, and the others acquire international 
. 
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components. - The incumbents al ways, and by definition, 
~ I ,J t . 
have: international connections, simply because they are 
in charge of legitimate machinery of the state, which 
;.include.a the diplomatic and other international net-
works; the insurgents, by virtue or having to approxim-
ate the incumbents as· closely as possible in order to 
3 supplant them, must develop the same machinery.•• 
Modelaki··,<:·examines what he terms "· •• the essential 
structures of the political system--the structures of 
authority, solidsri ty, culture, and resources ••• "which 
in the course o:f an internal war become "split as it 
were, in two and both the incumbents and the insurg-
ents find themselves in due course endowed with a new 
' 4 set of at least rudimentary political structures." 
Those responsible for decision-making within the 
two competing groups" ••• by nature of their work, and 
because of the kind of men they are ••• always are, and 
properly so, exposed to and subject to international 
influences. (1) Both the incumbents and the insurgents 
operate in that neiwork of external relationships which 
constitutes the int,ernational environment. The 
incumbents deal with foreign representatives B .. nd travel 
abroad in the normal course or their everyday duties. 
The insurgents ••• in the course of the internal war~ •• 
must maintain a foreign policy and a network of relat-
" ionships with foreign powers. Engaging in these 
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contacts, neither side can avoid entering into a 
close political association vii th .at least a few 
other states. (2) For certain areas of decision-
making, the process of recruitment tends to t'avor 
men vvi th foreign experience or background, and even 
more so during a_n internal war. According to Lyford 
Edwards, "It is a matter of common knowledge that in 
every social .... upheaval that the :party attacked claims 
that the trouble has been stirred up by outside 
5 
agents Bnd agitators." 
As \vi th the structure of authority, so V'Tith the 
other structures of a political system, ·Modelski 
• finds that these structures either contain or acquire 
international components. The structu~e of political 
solidarity (or·1n Modelski's alternative formulation, 
the incumbents or insurgents' "re:rerence group" or 
"Political community.")P ."Only in the most exceptional 
case ••• coincide with the boundries of~ a political 
system such as· that of a nation-state. Normally 
1 t is both smaller and larger than such boundaries ' 
would suggest. Those -.r1ho are united in interest with 
either the incumbents or the insurgBI1.ts never all 
belong to one politic~l system: the activation of the 
solidarity structure, and the conversion of potential 
into actual support, especially aborad, thererore are 
among the chief tasks of the leaders of internal war. 
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Among the external components o:r the ref e·rence group 
sho~ld by counted foreign gi. vernments, and orga.nizat-
ions (including for example, private indiviuuals and 
corporations) who aid and support either -side; foreign 
members of poli tic~l and ideological movements to which 
. parties in the internal war may be af':riliated, ·and 1.:·:0thers 
who together vvi 1h the incumbents fiorm a solitary grouping 
6 
on whatever basis is necessary ••• " 
The cultural and communication struc-tures extend 
beyond the confines of the political system in which 
the internal war is being waged. As Modelski states, 
" ••• the language and the style of an internal war are, 
as freq~ently as not, borrowed rrom aborad. The ease 
o~ communication which is the product of the cultural 
structures in an essential cement or political organiz-
ation; it welds together the political elite and facilit-
., 
ates the co-ordination of their followers; it brings 
mass and interna.tional support to the f,ightihg force11 • 
. Some of the most· crU!i.a:J, communication lines of an internal 
war run abroad and as such become the targets of the 
most vocif·erous attacks because, if they are cut, the 
other party has scored a victory and may have achieved 
7 
the isolation or its opponents." 
The f~inal structure ansidered by Mo¢ielski is that 
,. or the resources of the political system, which are 
,, ' .•• ' - J'J--~· 
stated to " ••• normally extend beyond the rrontiers 
of one political system. The incumbents have their 
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alliances and other political associations and the 
military and economic aid they produce. They have 
commercial and non-commercial connections and enter-
prises abroad. Their arms are supplied, as often 
as not, by foreign public or private manut·acturing 
enter:pri ses. But the insu~gents' external resource base 
is even more import~nt, primarily because it represents 
that section of their assets which is beyond the 
control of their opponents. A foreign base of operat-
ions is usually indispensable as a source.~-., of funds, 
.. 
manpower, and supplies, and as a final refuge in time 8 
of def·eat." 
The structures discussed above comprise the intern-
ational components of the political system divided by 
internal 1;var, components wi1ich are mutually reinf~orcing, 
" ••• the presence of an intern8tional component in one 
of the internal-war structures sets up pressures for ., 
9 
'internationalizing' the other three structures." 
In order to more e:t't·ecti vely analize the processes 
whereby·. an internal. -war becomes internati~lized, 
Modelski constructs an intervention model to demons-
trate the forces that are at wort. Modelski's model 
is based on the following simplit·ying assumptions : 
that the ··e is ample time f~or the internal-"vVar to be 
internationalized; that the actors involved are roughly 
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I• ' 
equal in power; rationality and skill on the part or· 
the decision-ma.kers; perflect international~mobili ty 
of resources and communications.· Modelski states that 
there exists a fundamental conditional of disparity in 
an internal war, vvi th the result that when tl:e weaker 
party exhausts its internal resources, on its attempt 
to overcome its opponent, it will invite outside aid. 
Th.us the demand for foreign aid is inherent in the ait-
ua_tion. The action of one state inviting fb reign aid ,, 
leads its opponent to take counter international 
measures: seek to disrupt the actual or potential 
alliances of its opponent and counter them with 
alliances of its own. In this fashion a system o~ 
alignment will begin, tranffbrming the struggle inside 
one political system into a struggle between political 
systems. As the search for outside aid leads to 
move and counter-move, the internal war becomes a 
matter or international cancer~ especially i~ inter-
national alignments are aggravated and external war 
threatens. This stage represents the internationalisation 
o:r the internal war i.e. subject to international discussion; 
the role of' mediator and reconciliator can be played 
either by states or international organizations. 
From this Modelski concludes that there exists three 
foreign policy choices open to decision-makers within 
a third state: (1) helping the weaker party--usually, 
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but not alwa.yt the insurgent--and thus embarking upon 
---
subversion;. (2) helping the stronger party--usually, 
but riot always, the incumbents--and thus engaging on_ 
on foreign aid; (3) attempting to mediate between 
.th'f'J warring facti·ons. 
One of the mes t interesting c:£ Modelski 's conclusions 
is that there u ••• is no fourth alternative,· no way 
for the "second" country to avoid involvement in 
internal war. Even through a country may decide not 
to act at all, to do nothing -a.na_ to say nothing,-· then 
by this very fact it, too, helps--sometimes unwittingly--
to mould the course of the process: for by refusing to 
act, it helps the strorg er party to suppress the weaker, 
irrespective of the merits of the case. This is the 
meaning of' Talleyrand's celebrated def1 ini tion of non-
intervention: 'a myaterious word that signifies 
roughly the same thing as intervention.' Hence there 
11 is no internal vva.r v1ithout intervention." 
Before we go to apply the conclusions reached by 
Modelski to the problems faced by British decision-
ma.kers confronted by the internal w ar in Spain, there 
is one other element examined by lriodelski that wtil 
state these problems in their fullest context, ani 
that element is the ·1nternational system, or more 
precisely, the attitude of the interna.tional system 
to\'lards the political viewpoints of the t\VO parties 
in the internal war. In examining the processes 
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. ,,'' -.... ,I 
·'T 
.. ~ "'·. I 
- 99 -
whereby t·he political system c-an influence the internal 
war, Modelski states that: "Most of these processes 
are covered by the vague ter!ll "climate of international 
opinion' --which,_,., ... a.t any given time, favours or ·condemns 
12 certs.in types of national endea.vor." This inf·luence 
is classified into three types: (1) dirfusion and 
encourage·ment; (2) isolation. and suppression, and (3) 
reconciliation. As in the policy- choices open to 
individual states, the~e is no fourth altern3tive of 
non-intervention, as this constitutes encouragement to 13 
the stronger side. 
The problems tha.t Britain faced in formulating its 
policy toward the Spanish civil war will be divided 
approximately -into pro·olems derived from the impact 
of the internal war upon the international system 
and the attitude or the international system toward 
the internal war. These divisions are t·or conveniance 
only, since these problems., are mutually ,reinf'orcing. 
Frorr1 the analysis ofl, t:te previous chapter, the 
conclusion was drawn that Britain's interest in the 
latter part of the thirites lay in pres~rving the 
stability of the international system and in prevent-
ing, i:f possible, the. outbreak of hostilities between 
-~ 
states in any area that involved British interests. 
With B1r")i tain' s resources already over extended in 
rel~tion to the extensive worl-wide commitments 
I 
that Britain had developed, there was no desire to see 
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an open international conflict develop in Spain into . 
which Britain might be drruni. r Non-intervention 
01fered a solution to this particular problem, 
but its implementation provided problems that were 
partly derived from the mechanics of internal war. 
As we have noted in our examination of Modelski's 
theories on internal war, the boundaries of political 
' 
' 
solida_ri ty ror pPrticipants in an internal \Var only ·,in 
exceptional cases e,orrespond to the boundaries of 
the political system divided by the internal war; 
during the Spanish civil war the boundariesof politic~l 
solidarity extended so .. as to include individuals and 
groups vvithin Britain itself. A partial explanation 
of this ;vill lie in the f'a_ct that since the insurgents 
and the incumbents were eager to obtain resources t·rom 
outside powers, and groups and states exterior to the 
conf~lict that v,ere supplying these resources sought 
. 
to minimise the possibility of international action 
·to prevent such intervention, insurgents, incumb1:_nts, 
and i~tervening groups and states sought to legitimise 
their actions by stating that they were acting to 
protect the collective interests of the international 
. 
community. The participani:is in the s.truglle sought to 
justi1)y their a_ctions in terms which/· they' knew v,ould · 
have wide interna_tional appeal to indi vidua_ls, groups, 
and decision-makers within states which were likely 
to play a, role in the conf1lict. 
The Republi-ean Government on Se·:ptember 15, 1936, 
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appealed to the governments participating i·n the 
Non-Intervention Accord of August 1936, in terms of 
' 
the danger that intervention by Ger,m~ny a.nd Italy 
held :for European vpeace and security' "convj, need that 
this Government 1-vill not id sh to ad.mi t silently~ such 
a voil~tion of law and of international practises on 
the ba.sis of· a political system which v,ould introduce 
in Europe the law or unbridled voilence and would 
put world peace in grave danger, giving a death 
blow to the principle of colective security, requests 
the raisin~ of the embargo est8blished on the export 
of arms destined to the Spanish Government and a 
rigorous prohibition of supplying war mater~al to ll~ 
the rebels.'' The struggle of the Republicans against 
the N~tionalists was represented as the struggle of 
de~ocracy against the forces~of Fascism, while the 
nationalists claimed to be defending Western civilization 
.~:nd Christianity against God-less communism. On 
October -1, La. Passiona.ria* spoke bef1ore the Annual 
Conference of the Labour Party held in Edinburgh, and 
erided her speech: 
''No,iv we are going to leave you, with our hearts very· 
-----------------
* The ramous comm.unists orator, otherwise known as 
Senora Isabel de Palecia~ She spoke perf'ect 
English.· 
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c·omforted. We tha~nk you for your sympathy, and your 
support. We know that we are holdng your hand over 
,, 
" 
the distance. But if you wish this atrocious war to 
end soon, come Rnd help us. Think of the precious 
gift th~t is being wasted -- of the lives of our youth. 
Do not tarry, No\v you know what the situation is in 
Spa.in. Come a.nd help us~ Come snd help us.' Scotsn1en, 15 
ye ken noo.'' · Hugh DPlton comments: "It was a magnif-
icent performance, and it swept the whole Conference 
to its feet ••• As we dispersed, aft8r this dramatic 
intervention in our conference, there were cries 
from some or the delegates: •What about non-intervention 
now?' And immediately et'forts vvere begun, v1ith 
inf'luential support, to have the whole Spc1ni sh q..i estion 16 ra.i sed af·rsh and Monday's vote reversed." (The vote 
referred to was a resolution passed on the first day 
of the conf"erence endorsing the report of the National 
Council on Labour declaring that non-interva1.tion would 
reduce the dsngcr of a general war in Europe. 
\ On July 2~, 1936, Kirk, the United States' Charge . 
d'Affairs in Rome, reported that: 
.,;,, 
\ . 
"Italian orficials are outspoken in their concern over the situation in Spm n. They point out that the uprising there combined with the communist, tendencies a.thready manif~est in France constitute a very real threat of Bolshevism in the \1Vest ana_ tha_t the Soviet Union itself \f:J'i th its reported military preparedness and its reputed financial resources indicates from"'1'that direction a, .constantly grov; i.1.1.g threat to the social order in Europe and the. Ba.lkans. 
• 
·~· 
,.. 1,, 
J 
, - 103 -
Unofficial opinion couples expressions or 
anxiety over these increased communistic 
activities with reference to the evidences of harmonious rela.tionship betvveen I·t3ly and Germany 
and stresses tl1e viei.;v tha.t cooperation ·betv1een ... f the tvtro countries vvould f~orm · a -oul\fl/arl{ ag2 inst 
the spread of.' Bolshevism both t·rom the East and 
the \Ve st" u 17 
Pope Pius XI, placed the weight o:t' the Ca.tholic Church 
behind the Nationalists, santifying in some eyes 
the act of rebellion, in an encyclical letter given 
on Ms.rch 19, 1937, which proclaimed: 
"Even in co'lllltries such as our beloved Spain, \Vhere the pesti tia.l has not yet hPd ti1ne to beget the 
while of its monstrous brood of calamities, it has none the less aroused a frenzy of crime 
and v.blenceo We have seen not merely one 
church here, or there 9 nor merely one mona.stery here or there laid in ruins 9 but, wherever possble 
every church9 every religious house 9 every trace or the Christian religion 9 even though connected 
vvi th the most precious monumt:nts of· civiliz?tion, has been beaten to the grormd. '' 18 
Propaganda machines were created by both the bellig-
\ 
erents to spread their respective bersions of the strug-
gle in Spain. K.W. Watkins in his study of the effect 
of the Spanish civil war upon British public opinion,* 
g·uotes the testimony of Antonio Bahamonde, a well to· I 
do Catholic publisher, 
"I had the duty or propagandizing in Badajoz that in Malaga they had assassinated, during 
------------~-----
* K.W. Watkins - British Divided fhoma.s Nelson, Iondon, 
· 1963.) j 
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the seven months of 'red' domination, some 
fifteen thousand persons, of rightist 
tendencies that they had assasinated all 
the nuns af·ter violating therno Q O:e 11alaga 
said the :priests had been ltilled and hung 
hooks in the· btttchers shops ~v1n. th a card 
a :J tached to then1 on vvhich were i.,vritten: 
'P . l <1 ork t·or Sa_ e o 
'l') 
·, 
\¥8 
on meat 
''At Granja de Torre-Hermose (Badja.dos) -
u:pon the entra.nce of the 'Nationalists' who had 
met strong re si ste_nc e 9 _. they ha.d naturally found 
evidence of~ Qir,tle 9 and a nunfoer o:e. slain lef·t ,, , 
abandoned in v1hat had ·been the field of ·ba.t tle, , 
wliich they he.d immediately haa_ transfderred into 
the cemetery 9 ana. 11htch vrere bar·bariously 
profanedo They opened the stomach of a dead 
\Voman and gou ..ged out the eyes o? one ofi the 
dead men 9 crushed in the head of another with 
a r6ck 9 and separated the arms and legs of 
another rrom the trunko The Burgos brothers (offici2l photographers) were with the column and 
took a number of photographs fDrom dif'f'ere,nt angles •. These photographs have been spread around the world 
as exa.mples of tl1e terrible crimes.committed 
by the 'reds' in Granja de Torre-,Hermosa." 19 
•. 
Bahamonde also cites other examples of 'red' crimes 
staged at Almendralejo and Seville which ~ere released 
. 
to the world. 
The Republicans were also busily engaged in creati~g 
a veil of propaganda that would obscure the true nature 
of the conflict. Watkins cites t·he evidence of the 
testimony of Auther Koestler, who, when engaged in 
writing Spani§h Te,stament at the same time Otto Katz· 
was writing The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain, ,related that 
~ 
Willy Muenzenberg would ''pick up a_ rew sheets or the. 
typescrirt, and·shout at me: 'Too weak. Too objective. 
Hit them! Hit them hard! Tell the whole world how_ they 
run over their prisoners with tanks, how they pour 
,., .. 
•ii, .. 
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petrol over them and burn them alive. Kake t_he world 20 
gasp lVi th ho~o~ ! ' " 
The Republicans were aided in this task by individ-
;-:; uals and organiz·ations in countries such a.s :Britain 
intent on presenting the Spanish con:flict as a conf'ront-
8tion between the Fasicist and the .Anti-Fascist forces 
in the world. Of these one of the mo st importa.nt 
was the ·Le~t Book Club, which published both the 
books mentioned by w~,tkins above. The Lef·t Book 
Club, founded.by.the publisher Victor Gollanz in 
March 1936, ham as its purpose to unite Socialists, 
Communists, and Liberals in the struggle against 
Fascism; In his first editorial, Gollanz stated that: 
'~ranee· had, indeed, for a long time nott/ been an 
exe.mple and an inspiration. It has not been me·rely a 
question of the drawing together of Socialists ani 
Communists, or of the union of these two wings, 
of the Labour movement with the Radicals; it has 
been rather a auestion of the mobilization of all .... 
men and women of' good will aga.inst tl'8 threat of 21 
Fascism." 
As Juli_an Symons notes, the idea behind the Clubtt 
••• Yta.s broad and simple in outline. A member sent no 
money vii th his subscription fb rm; for half a crown a 
mt?nth he received, through his book seller, or direct, 
the choice of the month in a limp orange binding (price 
to the public, in stiff covers, was seven shillings 
' 
.1 
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sixpence, or more), and he received also a copy of the · 
Left Ne\vs·,. which combined the cha.racteristics of tne ~ 
Left wing magazine and a catalogue ror advertising 
22 
and di scus~i·trg--·--·oollanz books." The choice of· the 
month was made by three men, described by A.J.P.· 
-. Taylor in the follo\ving terms: "Gollanz, at this time, 
sa\V no enemies on the Lef·t; Stra.chey took his 
instructions rrom the Conununist party, if not himselr 
a member; Laski the third ·:1as a Marxist though 
he combined t4is with being a prominent member or 
the La.bour Party. The books chosen usually 1·011owed 23 
the communist line." With a subscription of 24 
something like 60,000, am a network 01· local discus-
sion groups, whose number a_t the movement's peal reach-
ing well over 1,000, (\vith theatre, f·ilm, music and 
. 25 d 
poetry groups loosely associated) the effect as 
described by Julian Symons was to create" ••• a 
blima.te of· opinion in which automatic responses1Aere 
engendered by certain worda - capitalism~ Fascism, 26 
landlord.s, unemployment." Taylor speaks of this 
as "~ •• a rormidable achievement - a membership ten 
; ~-' times greater than the I.·L.P., or Comrmmist party 
• 
had ever secured, solidly based on intellectuals, 
particularly school te8chers, throughout the country ••• 
Novv the Left Book Club wa.s diverting highminded school 
·, 
teachers inti reading co~ist tracts 1vvhen they ought to 
r" ' 
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·But if, we are to account for the effect of the 
Spanish civil \Va--r upon public ·opinion i:r the rest o:f 
the world and especially in Britain, it cannot be 
done purely in terms of the activities of the.se agents. 
, of propaganda. It must also be explr-iined in terms or 
the psychology of the times. Herbert Matthews, foreign 
correspondent for the,New York Times, in Spain during 
the civil war, wrote in the 19501 s long after the civil 
war had ended, that: "The Spanish civil war \Vas, indeed, 
'an international war f·ought on National soil, but 
it WRS much more than that. We, looking back and revis-
1 ting the Spain 1vve lme\vin the lilrid, passionate days · .: 
of the 1930's, can now see that even those who fought 
in the na100 of Anti-Fascism or .Anti-Conununism 1vvere 
at least in part rationalizing their emotions. What 
lingers now is the prof·oundly Spanish nature of) the 
28 
conflict. 11 What vvere these emotions, and what 
\Vere they ba.sed on? A partial ansv1er is to ·be found 
in the chenging structure of the world after the First 
World War, and people's perception of the events that 
were occurring around them. 
If one f'irst attempts to examine the structur~e, 
·ris-~ 
economic, social, a.nd political, o:t' British society 
.. in the inter v1a.r period, and the intera.ction of tl:l.e 
I 
f'orces within ·that soci<::ty with the conflict·s-
gener8.ted by the Spanish aivil war, the most releve.n-t-- .. 
:eramevvork for this , exa.mina ti on is to be f'ound in the 
· cl:SSss structure existing v1i thin Britain and the, 
·1· , r 
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tensions re.leased by the stratification of the 
-·- -· . -~. ''t- ""' fabric·. of society into 
groups diferentia.ted by their income level, social· 
status, and political allegiance. As Taylor notes: 
ttEn.glr.nd h8.d al··Nays been class concious, perhaps more so than most European language 1vvhere accent V/8 s ctetermined more by class than ·by regiono The English were the only Europeacn people VihO sorted themselves out "tJy class a.t meal tir.ces: the masses took their princip2l meal at mid~day, their betters in the evening o Even the d~inkers of beer divided automatically between the saloon and the puolic -oars. tt 29 
r The Industrial Revolution born in Britain in the 
late Eighteenth Century gave birth to an industrial 
proletariat alienated from the rest of society by 
their poverty arid by frustration derived from an 
inability to change their material position through 
political means. G .M. Young describ_es it in these 
terms: 
"But a.11 the v1hile Industrialism had been coming over EnglD.nd like a clima.tic change ••• It is possible to imagine with ~obert Owen9 and orderly evolution of the rural village into the industiial tovmship 9 given the cond.i tions ·vvhich he enjoyed at Nevi Lanark 9 a_ linJi ted sze and a resident 9 paternal employero o"" But any possi.bili ty o:r a general development along these lines was lost in the cha.nge over from vvater to steam povie.r~ in the consequent grov1th of the great urban aggreg-ates, am. the visible splitting of society for which the Enclosures h8d created a rural precedent, into possesors B.nd the proletariato Th:: employers were moving into the country; their off)icials followed them into the suburbs; the better wo~kmen· lived in the better streets: the mixed 
·' mu1 ti tude o:f la·bour, native or Irish, v1as huddled in slums, and cellars, sometimes newly 
,, 
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run up by speculative builders, sometimes, like 
. the labyrinth around Soho and Seven Dials, 
deserted tenements of the t1pper classeso a oLy·ing 
outside the orbit of the old ruling class, 
neglected by th~ir natural leaders 9 the industrial 
territories were growing up as best they might, 
undrained, unpoliced, 1.lllgoverned 9 and unschooled,}t· 30 
While the \Vorking class desire f'or the expression 
of its developing class conciousness led .to the attempt 
to orgBnise frustratton and incoherent aspira.tions 
• into movements such as the -Gra.Id Ne~tional Consolidated 
Trades Union, formed in 1834, and the Chartist move-
ment :formed in 1836, to get :for each mm· in equal vote, ..., 
these movements and the rioting that usually followed 
upon their failure (and the unrest among the agricul-
0 
tural labourer class, manif·ested, :t'or inst~nce, in the 
Labourers' .Rising of 1830), led the middle and upper 
classes to become increasingly aware 01· the threat 
posed by the masses who provided their prosperity: 
''Looking back :from the serene and splendid noon 
of mid~Victorian prosperity, Kingsley wrote of 
the years ,;vhen 'yormg la.ds believed {a.nd not so 
wrongly) that the masses were their natural 
enemies and tha.t they might h1ve to f 1ight, any 
year or any day for the safety of the property and 
the honour of tl1eir· sister 9 Young lads 'Jvi 11 
believe anythingo But men old enough to remember 
the French Revolution 9 or the Committee of 
Secrecy and Ghe Six Acts of 1819, had their fears, 
~too, when they relected that as the country became 
more and more dependent on machines, its stability 
turned more End more on the subordination and 
goo~jwill of the savage masses which tended to 
them." 31 
The pro~peri ty of' the mid and latter Vie"torian period 
t 
saw the peaceful development of the orga.nization, sel:t'-
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. conridence, and political and economic inrluence of· the 
working classes. Elie Helevey draws us the following 
· :picture o:f the cha.nge: 
''Every year, since 1868, the parlia.ment of tll 
working class met in one or another 
of the large to,rmso o oThe meetings were attended 
by 1~1embers of Parlia.men t and British m--d foreign 
economists who were received with the upmost respect 
~n~_ courtesy~ The speeches were usually dignified, 
the debates methodically conducted tm.der the strict 
control of the chair 9 a.nd the delegates concluded 
the discussions by pae.s ing 2~ number of resolutions 
which relected every year the ?eeling that 
preve.iled among the trade unionist so o o The 
reasonable and ora_er spirit vvhich mark the proceedings are the more remarka_~ble \Yhen we 
consider the gres_t and constantly incrensing 
numberical strength of· the 1mionso About the 
year 18959 a million trade unionists sent delegE!tes to the Congresso .And The total 
membership of· the unions of the United Kingdom, 
including those ~nhich 1Jvere not represented at 
the qongress 9 was estimated at one and a 
halt' million== that is to say about 9 about a fifth of ,the enti1-)e n11mber of a_dult male workersi 
There was nothing like it in any other great 
natione 0132 
With the establisment o:f a political party to 
represent the interests of the vvorking c·lasses in 1892, 
named the Independent Labour Party, the means for the 
peaceful accession of the lower classes to political· 
-·power was established. But however peaceful the 
latter part of the Nineteenth Century may have be·en, 
social voilence was endemic PS to later periods, 
liable at any moment to be brought to the surf·ace 
·1n times of economic decline, as may be witnessed 
by the demonstrations in London that culminated in 
.•.;.,·· 
,. 
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'Bloody Sunday' of November 13, 1887, and the London 
dock strike of 1889. Thus, while in many respects the 
.r!~.!~t World War_..,may appear as the great divide in 
.. the development, of Bri ti sli- socio-politic al hi story, 
many of the essential elements of the 1920's and 1930's 
were developmente of trends tha.t forim d the shape of 
English history in the nineteenth century. 
Desmond Young has remarked that those who.fought 
in the First World War tt ••• gad been brought '1-P in the 
last years of the christian ethci's. Even those 1wVhO 
did not consciously believe at least accepted a 
33 traditional sta_ndard of behaviour." 
According to MoYvat, "The war increased the dif~f:.icul-
ties which the churches had been facing long before_ 
it began. Church attendance had been declining, 
and t~e claims or religion had been challenged by 
the advance of scientiric knowledge and secularism 
34 
of' thought." While Taylor states that "Since creeds 
had ceased to di vi de, class Etood out all the more 
35 
sharply" , it is doubtful that religion ha.d been 
purely a unifying factor within Britain. A clergyman 
,r,~ 
wrote in 1895: "The Church of England gives the 
\VOrking man nothing to do. He feels no intergral 
part of her, that he has no viGal connection with 
her, that he is not built into her structures, but 
is lef't, a loose stone, lying a·bout f 1or a.nyone to 
35 
tumble over." The cla-ssic path taken by many people, 
'· 
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tv· in certain parts of Britain, upon shifting upuards from 
one economic class to another, has been to abandon the 
Labour party for the Conservative Party, and the non-
conformist Church for the Church of England. 
While education wasbecoming increa.singly available 
to a '~vider range of' people, it did little to so:ften the 
barriers of class. "Education, usually, a solvent, pro-
duced in England a further hardening of the class lines ••• 
~-·After 1918 all children received full-time. educ a ti. on 
to the age of 14. kl inc_reasing though still small, 
proport.ion continued their educatbn in a.dolescene~, and 
an increasing, though. very small, propo~tion went to 
universities. 'l'his wa.s, however, not achieved by 
opening the existing doors wider and wider until they 
admitted everyone. It was done ·by developing a 
dif·ferent;-' and mainly in:reriour, education for those 
who had previously received none. Thus class differences 
were not only maintained, they we/'e made clearer and 
- 36 
more effective than before. tt Capt a.in Grimes, a character 
in Evelyn Waugh's Decline and Fall, describes the 
operation of the public-school system, which produced 
Britain's upper classes: "Besides you see, I'm a public-
school man. That me'&-~S everything. There's a blesseq 
equity in the English social system •• that ensures 
' . 
the public-school man against starvation. One 
goes through four or iive years of hel;L_ at an age 
when life is bound to be hell anyway, and af'ter that 
·.. ' 
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. 37 the social system never lets one down. tt 
The world in th·e· 192o'·s and 1930's presented 
itself to many as a world of chRnge, in which the 
established order wa.s in a state of flU.X. The 
First World War, according to Arthur !t1an\Vick, was 
tt •• • a steep and sharp Vllatert·a.11 in the course 
of British history. All the economic, social 
cultural 9 and politic8_l f;orces 1Jvhich have 
moula_ed tv,entie~ch=-century Brita.in ivere alrea.dy in flow berore 19149 but t4e war accelerated 
them with such suddenness and turbelence that 
they .\Vere trBnsf1ormed on a giga.ntic scale. . .. 
Furthermore, the war hit British consciou-
sness with traumatic force, leaving bitterness 
·-~~cl cynicism in its traino In this sense it imm~nseaurable more shattering on its efrect 
than the Seco11d Wo·rld v1Ja.r: the thirties 
were eauippea_ tvi th tl1e ln1.ov1ledge of~ the horrors 
oftotal -vvar u.nin1Bgined by the rel8tively placid Edv,ardian and Georgian Britain. Ea.ch year t·rom 1914 to 1918 twice as many combatants were killed compared with each year from 1939 .to 1945. The sacrifice seemed grossly unequal: 
while profiterring 1;vas rampant at home 9 ci'T.rilians 
not linlred 9 a.s in the second \Va.r 9 through 
suffering the parallel menace of aerial bomb-
ardment~ Bitterness, division, cymicism, were 
aggra.vated by grovving doubts as to the corn:petence 
of the milt~3ry and poli tic:91 direction of the 
war._.,, 38 "-·· 
While, looking back to the twnties and thirties 
stability (almost inunoveability) seems to be the keynote 
.,. 
of" the structure of British society, people :percieved 
the \Vorld around them in terms of change, and of forces 
which stretched out from one· nation to another rending 
at values s.nd beliefs held, and inst.i tutions · and wr:.ys 
o:r like that f·orrri the basis of peoples existance. The 
future.could no longer be clearly predicLed .as in the ' 
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period befor~ the.War. Taylor talks of people thinking 
39 that they were living in "a disintegrBting society." 
Mowat in more encrusted phraseology puts it this way: 
"i\fo n19n o:C middle ~~ge and comf'ortable means, , 
contemplating the condi tio11 01· t11ings ir1 the 
early twenties, would agree that the pos~-war BnglancL l:>Or'e .much resemblance to the coU11try he h~d known before the war. The old order· had passed awqy, the halcyon days of-the priviledged classesQ the war had cut across 
everyti1ing. 'ChEtnge a_nd decay i11 all arour1d I see. 'I·t v,a.s e8.SY f·or tl1e casual observer to··· 
sum ·up his impressions in th·e vvoi.·ds of the hymnal, and ignore L.t1e rnanif~old evide11ces of: 
st8_bili ty \Vhic.h.iJVere present." LtO 
Peoples' lives had ·b en affected in the details 
of their exi stance rather than in the subst2nce, ·but 
the details seemed to symbolize the end of what 
appeared to have been, in retrospect, a golden era. 
It is hard in this age to take the following letter 
seriously, but at the time it represented the common 
predicament of the upper and middle classes facing 
a di:fficul t period o:t' readjustment to a changing 
environment: 
"The Ecli tor, The Sunday Times. 
Sir--Cannot you say a few words ror the poor house-holders who cannot get servants? The Labour Bureau is perf·ectly useless, and employs thousands of girls vvho ought to be in domestic service, and training for the :ruture. In my own experience, 
one girl asked for £55 a year, a.nd had Ilever b~en out berore. It is monstrous that girls are paid ror jobs while men are paid for do,ing nothing. 
"' 
.. 
.. 
·. 
41 
A Londoner." 
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The B-ri ta.in o:r ·the 1920.' s and 1930' s saw the eclipse 
of the English landed society. Dea.th duties and income 
42 tax compelled the breakup of the large estates, so 
~ . that ~ne TiJ11.e.s, in May 1920, declared: 
"England is changing hands ••• Will the prof·i teer 
.--·--· 
buy "t? 1 . Will it be turned into a school or institution? 
Has the mansion electric light and modern drainage? ••• 
the old people, lmowing here . relative is· no son or near 
left to keep up the old traditions, or so cripled -by 
necessary taxation that they know the boy 'Ri.11 not 
be able to carry on vvhen they are gone, take tne L~3 
irrevocable stip." The same Britain also saY1 the 
development, f~ed by an ir1crease of real income per 
head of population of about 211- percent (or 20 per 
44 
cent per occupied person) or a new class of 
modern civilisation, the mechanics, a:rmen, radio experts, 
45 :ri:tm producers, popular journalists, industrial chemists." 
Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix have posed the 
question of whether increased social mobility, such as 
was occurring during the inter-yar period will automat-
icaly lead to a more healty so.ciety. They state that: 
t, 
"This theory appeared, and continues to -be persuasive, in thos'e societies in which the widening of oppor·tuni ties produced ·oy industrial-isation coincided with the amalgamation of aris-toiratic and newly rising bourgeois groups and hence vii tl1 the stub-born rete11.tion of q_uasi-feudal privilegeso Though -the evidence is lacking 9 it seems reasona·ble to su1Jpose that 
such privileges actu~i1y retarded the gr~wth or c1. .. _ opportm1ity:, even if they did not, it .is quite 
undisputed that OJ;iportw1.ities \¥ere availaole only 
. •· 
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to those v1ho accomodated themseJv es to a middle· -and upper=class sytle o:e lif·e, vrhich, :ror mE1ny people at leastsi agg1~c1vated rather than a.lleviated their psychologic,?l pro·blems o The bitterness of 
· class f·eeling in ni?11y European societies ce1~ta.i1.1ly derives f·rom the dona_e scer1sion a11d arrog2nc e \Vi th which me~bers of the old or newer upper classes endovvea. all their COlltB.Cts \Vith 1 in:EeriorsQooo• 
"But it appears hazardous to hase fJu·tu1iie studies of social mo·bili ty on the intellectual lt.gacies of a nine=teenth century argu1nento If it is true 9 as we hBve tried to show 9 that all developed industrial societies are characterized by a high rate of socia.l n1obili ty9 it becomes q_uesti onable whether ruture studies or his phenomena should 
·"'°~.,~c be ba_sea_ on the implicit simple assumption that more nio-bili ty is a good thing 9 Is it? To assume as much as much is to ignore- the a·oundant evidence of the social and psychic cost of a high degree of social monility: a cost that is probably high in terms of the combativeness, t'rustration, rootlessness, and other ills that are engendered ••• " 46 
· CertBinly there should be no reason to, doubt the 
assumption that the class which fe.els its dominant 
position.~vithin society, anu inihe case of the trad-
itional upper~class in Bri tian the ·basis of its ecor1omic 
well ·being, to ·be threatened,- will react to pro"tect 
that posi ti.on. A.s Lipset and Bendix state: ttMen 
and women occupying positions of high status generally 
endeavour to preseive their privileuges for their kin 
and heirs; a 'good' father is one who tr~es to pass the ~ 47 
status he enjoys on to his children ••• " This class 
not only saw their economic status undermined, but saw 
also the emergence of a strong political party 
representing the dispised 'mases', proclaiming 
revolutionary socia_list platform. The sixth DUke ·. or ~ 
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Portland saw the thirties in this light: ttFifty 
years ago there was ·little or nothing of vi~al 
consequence at issue between the Liberals and Conserv-
atives ••• Now ••• there is· no longer a powerful· and 
moderate Liberal Party standing bet\veen the Nati o.nal 
Parties and those who support socialist ~and communist 48 
:principles." 
Thus _to a highly class conscious country was added 
the extra divisive fac-r,or of ideological· conf}lict,. 
I ' 
in \Vhich socialism was identi1-.ied ·-:rt t11 the machinations 
of international Bolshevism. The impact of the Zinoviev 
letter on the defeat ot' the Labour Government in the 
general election of October 29, 1924 has certainly 
been over-emphasised, but it does· reveal that many in 
Britain linked the left in Britain vVi th the came of 
Moscow. The General Strike of 1926 again revealed the 
·bitterness and hostility that had developed in Britain. 
The D~ily Mail attempted to print an editorial labeling 
the strike as ttA rev9lutionary movement", 2nd not to 
be 11tolerated by an civilised government" Rnd called 
/I 
on all "la,v-abi ding men and women to nold themselves 
49 ~ at the • of· King and country. tf The British service 
Gazette (the newspaper issued -by tne government during 
. the strike) issued statements tnat seemed to be 
decla.rations of· war on the vvorking classes: "All ranks 
of the Armed F1orces of the Cro\m are hereby notified 
that any action which they may flind it necessa.ry to 
take in an honest endeavour to aid the Civil Power 
' ' 
' 
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will receive ••• the full support .of his Majesty's 
I -
,. Government. tt ''the situation is becoming more intense 
and the climax is not yet reached ••• An. organised attempt 
is being made to starve the people and to wreck the 
\ 
state, and the legal arid constitutional aspects are 50 
entering.upon a new phase.tt 
While the mid and later twenties were characterised 
by industrial Ullt'est and militant trade-union activity, 
gradually in the thirties a new dimension was added by 
developments within otre r countries. The ·.: onslaught 
of the Japanese upon Manchuria in 1931 and North 
China in 1~36, the adver1t of· Mussoli11i and the 
Fascists te,:power in Italy and the attack upon Etheopia 
in 1935, the rise of· Hitler to power in Germany and the 
subsequent rising level of Nazi dema1;1ds and aggression, 
and the development of the civil war in S:pain, led · 
people tQ believe that the world as they knew it was 
in flux and in danger of disappearing beneath either 
a Nazi-Fascist, or Bolshevik tide, according to whether 
their political loyalty lay to the left or to the 
right. Peter Kemp (who entered Spain to fight on 
-
the l'iationalist ·side) recalls that: "When I camti down 
t· -
from Cambridge in June of' that year (1936) the pat~,e.rn 
of European politics was confused and obscure. The 
· foundations of pe 0 ce seemed in danger o:t, collapse ••• " 
George Orlve.11 (who f)ought in Spain on the Republican 
side) puts it more graphically: "Ana·.-'Jet I've enough 
. ' 
sense to see that the old life we're used to is b·ei·ng 
.-· 
51 
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. . . h· 
sawn off at the roots. I can .. :feel 1 t happening. 
I c·an see the· \Var that's coming and I can see the after-
war, the food~queues and the_. secret po~ice and the 
loadspea_kers telling you \Vhat to think. .And I'm 
not even exceptional in this. There are millions - _-..,!- . \ 
of others like me. Ordinary chaps that l meet 
everywhere, chaps that I run across in pubs, busdrivers 
and travelling salesmen for hardware firms, have got 
a feeling that the world's gone wrong. They can 
52 feel it cr·8cking and collapsing under thei·r feet." 
Class and ideological dif~f·erence .. s ga.ined a ne\V 
dimension and 1.vere transmitted onto the stage of 
international arfairs were interpreted in class and 
ideological terms. ''Consciences which had been already 
stirred by the unemployed grew even more insistant 
at the tyr?Jlnies of the Nazi rule. The two emotions 
merged into one. Hunger marchers filled the streets 
one day; demonstrators Egainst Fascism followed on the 
next. Economic discontext was no doubt still the 
· main driving 1·orce, with anti-f·ascism as a top-layer. 
But there was an important change of tone a.nd emphasis. 
Social cµ estions, though sti. 11 important, slipped 
into second place. Those who had begun by applauding 
the hunger marchers, were now concerned to halt capital-53 ~ isms march to war. tt 
Spain in a peculiar way came to represBD.t, to 
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symbolize, the struggles, hopes, fea.rs, and :rustrat-
• ions that had ·become transmuted into international 
terms. It is not easy .. ·to account for this development. 
Perhaps because of propoganda by botrr--the protagani sts; 
perhaps becaus-e _of the voilence of the stru~e,, the 
particular virulence.of civil-wars, in which a nation 
seen to rend itself in two -- this made all the 
more gra.phic ·by· the repoms ofJ countless atrocities~ 
tl1e - attacks on cnurct1es a11d religious persons, and the 
merci.less bombing of defenceless cities; and ferhaps 
·becguse in Spain the issues were posed more clearly. 
Spain in the thirties. was a microcosm of the political 
forces and philosophies existing in Europe in tne period: 
anarchist, socialist, communist, democra.t, fascist. 
One· one side were ranged the forces tnat, to some, 
seemed to stand for stability, order, and the defence 
of' the established systern against the f~orces o:f 
change; on tne other were the forces, that for others, 
• 1. seemed to mirror their own struggle for a better lire, 
for a utopia that would mean an escape t·rom the 
. '$, imperfect world in which they lived. Orwell describes 
,. . his ~irst visit to Barcelona in these terms: 
"It was the first time that I had eve_r been in 
a tovm \Vhere the working class was in the s2_ddle. Practically every building of any size had ·been 
seized by the workers and was draped with red 
flags or with the red and black flag of the Arnarchists; every wall was scrawled with the hammer and sickle and \Vith tl1e initials of the 
revolutionary parties ••• E .:ery shop a1ld caf·e had 
. -. 
•''-'' 
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an inscription saying that it had been collectivised; even the bootota.cks hadbeert collectivised and their boxes painted red and b·lacko Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the f 1ace and treated you as an eoualo Servile and ceremonial forms of sp~ech had temporarily disappearedoooTipping had been f·or15:fdde110 o oThe revolutio11.ary v1ere everywherep flaming rrom the walls in clean reds and blues that made the few remaining 1 advertisements look like daubs of mudooooAnd it was the aspect of the crowds that wasi.he oueerest thing of· all o In outv1ard appearance it 1.n1as a. tovm. in which the wealthy classes had practically ceased to exist" o Q1 oPl'>B_ctically every=-one v1ore rough vvorking clotl1es 9 01'<1 ~t>lue overalls or some va.rie.nt· of the militia unif·ormo All this ~JV8 s qt1eer and 
. movingo There was much in it that I did not understa.nd9 in some ways that I did not like, ·but I recognised it ms a state of· af·t·airs worth fighting fo1~ o vu 54 
John Sommerfield described the reason wny he 
became a volunteer in Spain in these words: 
" •• 'ewe did not come to Spain t·or romantic adventures, but to help win the war - not only from a sense of solidarity with the Spanish :people, but ·because vve all realised, whatever our political views 9 that the issues o:f this struggle are of Bignif·icance f'or ourselves and the whole world is facing today~ •• a conf'lict that 1nust decid_e in this century vvhether the enormous nevi po\vers that science has ?;ivento the l111man rJa_ce are to be used f'or the organization of· decay or :for life, for mechanised ·barbarism or a ne\v adve~ce of the numan spirit." 55 
Watkins auotes this letter from a father to his J. 
daughter: 
"Nov, I v1ant to explPi n to you why I left Englaml. You will have heard about the war going on here. From every country in the v1orld vvorking people . like myself ha.ve come to stop F8.scism here o So al tl1ough I am miles avuay f#ro m you 9 I am fighting to protect you and. all cluldren ;,.in Eengland as well as people all over the world." 56 
lit is p·ossible to see ~vi th the aid of hinds~,ght 
.,, 
) 
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'• . that the world was not to be saved from fascism in Spain, 
but those vvho fought in Spain and those vvho sympathised 
,vi th their str:uggles felt that they \Vere part of~ the 
vanguard of history, a crusade that for thpse who 
sympathies WFre with the nationalists wa~ to preserve - . 
. ·~ 
the old and sacred order, and for those who derended 
the Republic was to help create a brave new world. 
Arthur Koestler portrays this belief exactly in these 
words: When the International Brigades saved l~drid on 
November 8, 1936, \¥e f'elt that they would go down in 
history as the de:fenders of Thermopylae did; and \iVhen 
the first Russian fighters appeared in the skies of 
battered Madrid, all of us v1ho had lived through the 
agony o~ the defenceless town felt that they were the 
57 
saviours of cililisation." 
The impact of the Spanish conflict has been seen 
as dividing further an already divided nation; internal 
war within one state leading to conrlict within Britain, 
as a civil war of an earlier period had - the American 
civil war. Here is a descriptio\i of that earlier civil 
war in its effect upon Britain: 
~ 
"British opinion was utterly divided •••• The upper 
classes na.turally pref·erred the Southern gentleman to the hard=headed Yankee bu·sinessman9 o o oit vvas the British working classes of the industrial regions 
,vho most 1.vholehearterily suppo1r.ited the Nortl10 o o o EJ:'he policy that the British Governoont hoped to be able 
to follow was simple enougho 'For God's sake 1 9 said Russel]. in the Comµ1ons 9 'let µs, if possible 9 keep 
out of it~' This requ~red, a~ong other t~figs, a 
a careful choice of d1plomat1c language. 0 
Non-intervention in the face o~ the Spanish conflict 
. I 
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., 
had its preceden. q 
ter emp returned from the 1lro t in pain to f ind 
hi self ·nvolved ••• 1 - a ·bitter d o1~ten painful 
argument ·.vi th some of my best friends; :for the panish 
Civil ar aroused in ordinary gli shmen gn intensity 
t 
of inter·est and partizan feeling tmusual in a people 
notoriously indifferent to the affai r s of other 
59 
1 ~nds.tt • 1r inston Churchill has described t he effect 
t 
of these di visions thus: tt bet een p anish -8 tionalist s 
8nd eptiblicans, ritish sympa-chies are c1ivi ded. trong 
~ 
elements in tne Conserv~tive · arty regarded the cause 
o'f Franco a s their O\vn. All the p,:- rties 01· t he 'Lef t' 
feel outr8ged by it triumph. But onl·y a small inor i ty 
ould have urged t hat ritain should actively int ervene, 
and in fact the division is so deep, and balanced tnat 60 
no coherent action 'lvas at any ti. rr1e possible ut 
one should not conclu that ritish policy tow ards 
t~ ·-pani sh con1·1ict vv8.S determined by the di visive et·t·ect 
of the ci il ar on ritish public opinion. One has 
the r latio · ship bet een ·c8yse an 
~ . C1 ~~~rs ithin ri a· n drive thei 
0 t.he d · vis· on 01· puo ic 
s pol · c tha 
.. 
• 
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had its precedent. 
.. Peter Kemp returned from the front in Spain to find 
himself _involved " ••• in ~i tter and of~ten :painful 
argument with sqme or my best friends; for the Spanish 
Civil War a.roused in ordinary Englishmen an intensity 
of interest and partizan feeling unusual in a people 
notoriously indifferent to the affairs of other 
59 
-
"· lands. tt Sir Winston Churchill ha.s described the effect 
of' these divisions thus: "As between Spa_nish Nationalists 
and Republicans, British sympathies are divided. Strong 
elements in the Conservative Party rega_rded the cause 
of Franco as their own. All the P?srties of the 'Left' 
feel outraged by it triumph. But only a small minority 
would have urged that Britain should actively intervene, 
and in fact the division is so deep, and balanced that 
60 
no coherent action v:1as at any ti me possible" But 
one should not conclude that British policy to,vards 
the Spanish confilict was determined by the divisive e:ri·ect 
or the civil war on British public opinion. One has 
( to determine the relationship between cayse and ef:rect. 
Did the decision-makers within Britain derive their 
policy from factors other than the division ot· public 
opinion? Was it the conten~ or British policy that 
led to the division within Britain, rather than a 
division leading t9 a certain policy? 
Fenner Brockway~gives us this picture of British 
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attitudes at the outbreak o:r the Spanish conflict: 
''The British Government aga_in adopted the :p~licy of non-intervention~ and at first had the support of the Labour Partyo The Party conference met. in Octoberi) 1936 and somehov1 performd the feat of' at one and the same time endorsing rea1~mament for rr collective security~ to protect· 0 countries loyal tm the league of Nations; against 'potential aggressors 9 anli refAt1sing a.rms to the Spanish . Government (a member of the League) a.gainst an actual aggressor9 General Franco and his Fascist f·orces~ Indeed in the early months of· the Spe .. nish civil war the IoLoPo was the only group in ParliBment to defend the right of the Spanish Govern-ment to buy a1 ... msS) a right vt11ich had never before been refused to any except qenemy~ g)vernments; not even Willie Gallacher 9 the Communist, supported James 1Vla.xton9 for at this strlge soviet Russia also subscri-bed to non-intervention." 61 
The Left in Britain in fact did not function as a 
momolithic unit but was split into fractions which 
reflected the historical development of British politics 
and dif·:rerent :perceptions within the Left of the lessons 
to be learnt t·rom that development. Watkins descri·bes 
the nature of the division and its,effect on the course 
of British policy towards Spain: 
"· •• the division i.va.s between the Right Wing of the Labour Party and trade unions 9 including most o:f the lea.ders 9 on the one hand9 a11d on the other an unofficial ~nd unea.sy alliance of the Left Wing of the Labour Party and trade unions, the Communist Party 9 the Independent Labour Party, and otl"Er groupso In fact the very pattern of division~~ tha""c existed on the Spanish Left and did so much to v11eaken the Republican cause mani~estem itself in Britain within. the context of the very different historical development of the Brit~sh Left. It did much to weaken the support gi y,en to the Spanisl1 Republicans and the effectiveness of the fight against the appeasement policy of the 1~·ational Government. "62 
In fact the division is, in part, derived from the 
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common predicament of lef-wi~g.parties within Britain 
that the support of the· middle class is necessary if· 
left-wing parties are to gain power by constitutional 
me·a11s, and maintain themsel·ves e:rf'ecti vely in power. M-,x;;y,n~T'C' ,,1,,;,..7,1)".f '\.~> "~ -
Thus left-vving par ti es in _Britain will di vi de in to 
those who refuse to compromise their principles, and 
those who feel that their cause can be best served by 
gaining off'ice, even i:r shackled by middle class support. 
The Chartists in the 1830's and 1840's had been raced 
\vith exactly the same problem, and split into two 
1·actions: one under William Lovett who sought middle 
class support, snd the extremists under Feargus O'Connor. 
This tendency had been strengthened in the 1930' s in 
Brit8in by the General Strik!; the Right Wing of the 
Left drew the conc1u·sions that industrial cooperation 
and improved production were the methods by which the 
lot of' the working classes could be im~~ved, since 
the general ultimately only in increased difficulties 
for the British economy through loss of' foreign trade 
" 
1 and the permanent closing of some coal mines. The 
strike had brought to_ the fore of the Labour movement 
counciliators, such as Erne·st Bevin and J .H. Thomas, 
i: which emphasised the- move towa_rds a more conservative 
lePdership with the accession to the leadership of a 
ne\V genera.tion of .. socialists; represented by such men 
as Attlee, Morrison, Dalton, Bevin, GaiiBkell, and 
Green\vood. The _viewpoint or this ~up can be 
• 
1 
• 
•.', 
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in this attack mad by Dalton on the 
Stbcialists League in 193-5: 
"V'Jhatever ma.y be true of other countries, I believe that here it ls possible to make a pe-aceful 9 orderly ctnd smooth transition to 
a bette1~ socia_l order; end that 9 vvi th Et \VOrking Labour rna_jori ty in the House o:r Commons 9 five years of resolute government could lay the 1·01.mda.tions of that ordero Theref·ore 9 at the 
next election 9 the peop~e would be free to 
choose whether or not the work or socialist 
construction should contintleo I discount heavily, in this conunonsense and politically ma.ture .. 
country9 all panic Lalk 9 whether from the Right or Left 9 sf an ineveitable crisis, ani 
all the·,tricPl nightmares of voilent head-on 
collisions, vvrec1{ing the trB.in o:r dernocracy. "63 
The Left Wing of the Labour movement in the thirties 
continued to press for the maintainance of the social 
and poli ticftl struggle against the capitalist system, 
and felt that t~ working classes had been betrayed 
by their leadership during the General Strike. A 
new development was added in the 1930's: the left wing 
intellectual, derived from the uppertand middle- classes 
and free from t:lie working class atmosphere (and even ,._ .. 
~.'~1~ ,-.,' 
· .. ~f ~i~~.r)·' . 
in th~ case of· 1~Aud~n and Spender at times contemptuous 
of those for whom the crusade was lam1ched). This 
new development \Va.s described by Taylor as tt ••• "basically 
a revolt of social conscience by intellectual members 
of the educatated class, ashamed of poverty in the 
~64 
midst of plenty. tt When the I .L.P. broke from the 
Labour Ps.rty in 1932, the int,e:Llectual members of the 
., I.L.P. formed a new org8nisation, the Socialist League 
" ••• designed to continue the work of the I.L.P. in r 
' ,, 
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associ~tion with the Labour Party. The Socialist League 
WPS the I.L.P. 1vvith a difference. The I.L.P. had been 
predominantly working class in composition, despite 
some intellectuals near the top. The sociRlist League 
was intellectual and nothing else, all leaders and 
no followers. Its branches counted for little; its 
, 
progranune of idea.s 1.;vas· all tha:t mattered. It claimed 
to be thinking ror the Labour Pnrty, though in practice 
. 65 
much of the thinking met with La-bour' s disapproval. " 
The Left in Britain v11as thus deeply di vid,ed, both·· 
in the social composition and motivation of its 
adherents md in their policies. In ract several 
conflicts prev nted the Left from developing a high 
level of cohesion: the division between the social 
revolutiona.r-ies represented by Lansbury, .Ma_xton, and 
Jowett, and the more maierate second generation leader-
~ 
ship; the c3 .. ivision between the Labour Party end the 
other organisations of the Left, such as the I.L.P., 
the Socialist League, and the Comrnuninist Party; 
t~e d~vi sion of' tl}e _Labour movement as a whole into 
. the trade unions, the most direct representation of the 
politic al aspirations of the \VOrking class in Britain, 
and the labour Party, by means of ~vhich these 
aspirations were aggragated, and articulated to the 
centre of·political decision making at Westminster. 
The :Cirst of these divisions v1as decided 8t the 
.,;.,'' 
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Annual Conference at Brighton held t·roP:1 September 
27th to Octo·oer 4th., 1·935, whe1i Dal ton, Bevin, 
Attlee,· ~.nd 1viorrison de:feated the e.xtrenlist elements 
repr_esented -oy Lm s·bliry and C_r~ .. p:p.s. Dd. ton opened 
the c:te·bate on f'oreign relations, demandi.11g that a st2.nd 
. be made for the League of Nations and sanctions 
against Italian action in Abyssinia: ; . 
"We stand for strong collective action in def'ence 
of pea.ce against an:v- a.ggressor. This policy 
was reaffirmed last year by a smashing majority 
at our Sounh~port Confer.ence, but it dates -Dnck 
to the day~. of the v1ar. .. o • .,1'b.e inunediate question for us to ~ecide today is: Do Ne stand firm in 
the crisis to the 1Jolicy to Nh icl1 'fie nave so 
often pledged ourselves, our shall 11e turn t2.il 
and run 8_v1ay ••• For -bett,er or 1·or \trorse, this 
conntry of· ours is a. Great PoJver in the -;1orld, 
. .:i th greB.t i111·1ue11ce i11 the Councils of· -che 
I'fetions and vii-th correspondingly great responsi-bilities, not onl_y to our ov1n people ·but to all 1nankind. .And the question is: Are \Ve going to play the par L of· a Great .Pov1er today ••• or are ·ne 
goir1g "CO sli11Jr i1npotently into the shac~dov1s ••• " 66 
' Cripps ·rose to oppose the .Executive 111otion in f·avour 
o:r sanction against Italy, arguing that a capatalist 
gove1~nment such as the Const:rvati ve one could not be 
,• ·, ": 
,a 
. /'; trusted to implement sanctions·; only a L'abq).i'r Government 
could be trusted to with these measures. Capitalism 
haa_ prod~uced tm last vvar, and "The capitalist leopa-rd-
., 
cannot ch::lnge his spots. "The only possible: a·qt.ion 
could be ~voJ-ilring class sanc~·.ions, under ·-.vorl{ing class 67 
control. Cripps in his stand was supported by the 
Socialist League and by a group 01-. spea,lrers r·anging 
. " t·rom Pons6r1by (vvho resigned his seat in the House of· 
Lords arguir1g tl1.e practical d ar1gcr of~ t;10 armed camps 
and vrorld \Var) to l\y.ss. Lucy Cox (general secretary 
•·· 
of· the 'No mor~e(War' 111ovement) stating Ghe.hwr1anitarlan 
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68, position against the destruction of war. 
Lansbury, greeted with prolonged applause, and 
almost the while ·conference singing 'For he'E a 
--
. 
. jolly good 1 ellow', spoke g_ga_inst the Execu~;r,on motion ' 
·~._;f;li 
on the basis of this Christian pacific faith: 
''· •• I live my life ••• amongst ordina_ry people. I iee them when I am at home every day; I m~et them a_nd knov1 all there is to k110,Jv about them; Pnd they knov1 about me o o o I~ mine v1as the only voice in this Conference 9 I would say in the name or f8_i th I hold 9 the belief I have that God intended us to live peaceably and quietly with one another 9 if~ some people do nov1 allow . us to do so 9 I am ready to do as the eRrly christians did9 and say 9 u This is our f~ai th, this is where we st8nd 9 and, if necess2ry, this is vvhere we 1vvill die'" 69 
Ernest Bevin moved massively up to address the Con-
'I 
70 ference, as Dal ton puts it, to hammer Lansbury to death, 
his blunt, direct words destroying Lansbury's position, 
stating in the process of Lansbury: u ••• I hope this· 
Conference will not be influenced by either.sentiment 
or personal atta.chment ••• It · is placing the Executive 
and the 1vlovement in an a·bsolutely wrong position 
to be taking you conscience arotll}d from body ~o bod.lJ 
. 
.,, 71* 
asking to be told 1vvhat you ought to do \Vi th it." 
The Executive motion was carried by 2,168,000 votes 72 
_to 102,000. . .,,-·' :' ·•·.· On October 8th Lansbury resigned the 
leedership or the La-oour Pa.rty, and in the ensuing r--·ce 
to be his successor Cripps had, in D8ltons words, 
73 
"completely cooked his goose.t• Attlee S1ccetided 
Lansbury as Leader of the Party, an event which 
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seems to mark the enthronement of the principle that 
the dictates of the electoral.:.system ratm r than th~o-
retica concepts of socialism \Vere to shape Labours 
, 
programme a.nd policy ( though one could argue that 
the Executive's recommendations to the 1934 
Conference arfirmihg the party's fPith in parliamtary 
government and cha.nge by oo nsent, and a foreign policy 
based on the Lea.gue of' Na.tions, would serve as a better 
'historical watershed') 
The Annual Conference of the Labour Party meeting. 
on October 3rd at Edinburgh, Greenwood, as Deputy 
LeRder of the Parliamentary Party, moved a resolution 
endorsing the Report of the National Counci 1 of~ La-bour, 
which stated that non-intervention should be sup-
ported as long as it ~vas loyally carried out by all 
concerned,r with the hppe that it would reduce the danger ~ 
of a gener~l war in Europe. Despite the fact that 
"Greenwood WPS very uncomf'ortAble '1tVi th his brief 
74 
and was not very effective" However, in face of 
the bla_tent violAtions of) the Non-Intervm tion 
.Agreement ·by Germa.ny and It81.Y La·bour' s support of 
non-intervention ·was dropped, a.nd "· •• at a meeting 
of the tlJVO Internation~ls summoned a_t the request ot· the 
National Council of· Labour, it was unanimously decla.red 
·that ••• the,-,e should now -be 'an international a_greement', 
_______________ ... __________________ ... _ 
* Dalton uses the ·Nord' havvking' instead of 'tak1-ng' ••• in the phrese "tFiking your conscience around from body to -body ••• " Hugh De~lton 11emoirs. P.69. { 
' 
- 131 -
· to be promoted by the' French and British Governments, 
'restoring complete commercia liberty to Republican 
,4,.. 
Spain', ana~ that the Trade Uriions and soci8_list 
., . 
p8rties in the tv,o Internationals should do all tney 
could 'to prevent the despatch of war supplies to 
the Spanish Rebels'. 
"A meeting of our 01vvn Three Exe cu ti ve s unanimously 
endorsed this on October 28th. We stood, hencerorth, 
76 
on the sin1ple slogan 'Arms for Spain.'" 
In the House of Commons the policy of non-inter-
vention came under fire :from the main body of· the 
Labour benches. During a debate on Spain in the 
Commons on October 29th Arthur Greenwood launched 
the Labour a ;_,tack: 
"Will the Prime Minister say that the agreement 
ha.s been honourably f 1ulf·illed by all the Sta.tee 
which promised to 8.gree to it? He \Vill not. 
, 
It has been violRted, and t~ slov1 motion 
picture 01· the non-intervention commi tteet~ ·~vhich 
moves more a.nd more sJ.owly as time goes on 
means more delay, but public opinion vvill 
m8ke mp its mind ••• The truth is that, although 
the policy of non-intervention was adopted and 
an attempt made to strop munitions and warlike. 
supplies going to Spain, a large amount 01· munitions~ 
has gone ,~there 
"The real problem is~.that this .:'fight is not 
one about Spain. Spain has become a pawn 
in the grime of~ povfer politics 9 and no doubt 
that is one re8.son for ·the decision in :ravour 
or non-interventiono But had the boot been 
on the other foot 9 had there been a Fascist 
Government faced with a popular revolt from 
a popul21~ front of) the Left 9 vvould anybody 
have sug;r~e sted the policy of· non-intervention? 
It would never have been suggested. I~ 
is vvi thin the memory of· some Hon. Members 
I. 
' . 
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that tbe British Government intervened yfi th arms a.nd men on the side o:f the legalJ.y constituted government 8.gainst tl1e vvicl{ed Bolshevil{s in Russiao Tha.t is the other side of the questionoooThe Spanish revolt is a modern form Of1 RggressiOl1o o o oV'lfhctt 118S happened i11 Spa.in n1ay v1ell happen elsev1here 9 a.nd if' the revolt succeeds it is 8.lmost cert8~in to happen else1t1here o Aggression 8lvva.ys grovvs ana_ grov1s; its appetite is never satisfied; the more it eats the hungrier it iSoooI think thst in the interests not merely of democf~P,cy in Spain, but of the moral authority of international law in Europe ana_ the v1orld 9 vve should r~eturn to the policy of11 ta.king international la.11 a.s our basis and restore to the Spanish people the rights of \Vhich they vvere unfairly ro·boed. u 77 
Noel-Brker f'ollo1ned a similar line of at tack: 
"I believe we are face to face with a sordid attempt by Fascist governments to undermine the public a.nd constitutional lBvtt of Europe. This is the greatest danger vvhich vve a_nd the world fsce at the present timeooothe only thing we can do is to give back to .the Spanish Government the rightto defend itself 8nd to defend those who attAck the peAce and order of the world." 78 
Attlee hit at the Non-Intervention Committee, 
stating that: 
HThe work of the Committee does not strike me as being genuine, a.s if' the Comn1i ttee really set out to do the work at all. They adopted a :proc.edure v1hich seemed to preculde them from trying to get evid_ence and to have. taken no real effort to ~ind out what has happened • 
-~ 
They l1ave c1epended solely on member sta.tes choos.-ing to bring t·orvvard report so o oI ctm not impressed by the report as to the way in which these invest-igations have been madeo There is no doubt 
.in the minds of most people that there have been gross inf·ringementso Above all there has been delaYo In a matter of this kind justice delayed is juRtice denied. In fact, the party which hesnot arms to start with has _necessarily lost all the way. q 
"The question: is, are vve to farce? Because it hasbecome a humiliating position for this by and saw Abyssinia crushed; 
acouiesce in this _,_ 
farce., It is 
country •• ,,,vVe sat 
now we are to sit 
"' 
I 
.I 
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by 2.nd see Spain crushed. It is not merely, however9 sitting -oy~ vie are, in fact, almost accessori~s be~ore the facto Then there is the Q.uer:,tion ,.,vhether the dHnger is really a.verted, the d8nger that there may be incidents which may give r~ise to further incidents s~nd to ,~var; incid~ents 'iVhic-h are lil{ely to arise by attempts to bring in aJ?ms Pnd by a_ t tern1:>t s -co stop ·a.rms being ·brought ino But i:f the s.greement is not ef;f·ecti ve a.nc1 arms are bei11g ·brought in, the danger is not everted. I think ii is increased. I see no end to this pa.rt-icular dangero te 79 
However, tre sheft of La·bour i'blicy 2.gainst non-
intervention did nothing to heal the alre0dY existing 
di visions \~i thin the left in Britain, but rather temep 
1 
~to harden these di visions. T.he Labour Party steadfastly 
I refused to consider any mo.vs to form any united \Yhether 
to oppose the Government policy towRrd the Spanish 
conflict, \Vhether with the groups to" the lef't or the 
Liberal.Party to the right. The Communist Party 
continued to press for af·filiation to the Labour 
. Party, arguing that the failure of the· Labo.ur Party in 
the Elections of· November 1935, proved the futility of , 
a divided labour movement to eft'ect the ever increasjrg 
pace of fascist strength in E)lrmpe. In his application 
or November 25, 1935, Harry Pollitt, while admitting 
that his party would retain its ultimate revolutionary 
/ objectives, insisted that in its determination to .~-
fight the Nationa Governme~t, fascism, and war, the 
Communist Party 1.vould v.rork hones·tly for a working 
class majority in the Commons. The Labour Executive 
rejected this appeal on January 27, 1936 stating 
that the fundemental di1~ferences which had been 
. ,.. 
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stated so often before still existed,· and that any 
move to alter their prev~ous position would be taken 
~· 80 a.s a move aTvvay t·rom a belief' in poli tica.l democracy. 
11 Two developments led to an increased demand in Britain 
· ·for a uni ting of the Left in opposition to the Con-
servatives: one was the development of the concept 
. o:f the united front on. 'the Continent, which led to 
the establishment in July 1935 of the French People's 
Front, and in January 1936 the Spanish People's 81 
Front; the other WRS the general opposition within 
the Left to continuance of the non-intervention policy 
of the British Government in the 1·ace of f'lagrant 
intervention by Germany and Italy. 
Thus there d~veloped an increasing delll8.nd for a . 
united front agPinst rascism, led by groups outside 
the Parlirmentary Libour Party. The FabiPn Society 
reversed its position to become in favour of 
Comnrunist affilietion and the.united rront. The Social-
ist League and the University Labour Federation 
approved the unity campaign, vthile in some o·f the larg-
l 
1 est trade unions, such as the Engineers and Miners, 82 ,, 
. consid_er8.ble suppor
1
t W8 s generated. On Ja.nuary 17, 
1936 a Special Delegate Qonference of the Socialist 
! Lea.gue decided by 56 votes to 38, 1JVi th 23 abstentions, 
83. to go ahead vvi th the unity campaign, · and the of~1·-
icial announcement was ma.de to the pre 1 s by the 
Socialist League,the Communist Party, and the 
• 
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Independent Labour Party on the 18th. A mass 
' 
meeting held P.t M8nchester on the 24th opened the 
campe.ign, and .. va.s ra.pidly follovved by other meetings 
in other large cities, such as Cardi1~t·, -,s,Nansea, Bir-
mingham, Plymouth, Bristol, Leeds, Glasgow, Edinburgh," 
84 -~ 
and Dundee. 
The attitude of the Labour Party to the unity 
movement is demonstrated by this extract from Dalton's 
Memoirs: 
"But, \Vhile all this good constructuve vvork 
going on, Cri nps and his Socialist Le2.guers 
were stilJ_ na_tter. ng about a 'United. Front' 
Yvith the Comunists a.nd the IoLoPo This V/8.S 
despite overv1heln1ing decisions of· recent 
Conferenceso It was a piece of clotted nonsense 
anyho,N 9 8nd vV?s to me a11d OT~he1,..,2, 9 Et most exasp-
· erating diversion of the Partyus mind and 
enere;ies ••• On J2nl1ary 12th9 1937 9 the National 
Executive issued a.n 9 Appeal to the iviovernen t' 
to take no part in this CPmpaign, and recalled 
that at the Southport Conference in 1934 a 
recommendation of the Exucuihi ve. ha.d been 
carried ·by l 9 820 9 000votes to 89 9 000 'that 
united a_ction 1,nri th the Communist PRrty', or 
its subsia_iaries 1 '·~vi thout the s2nction of· 
the l\Trtional Executive is incornpa.tible ·v1i th 
mem-oership o.e the L8-bour Pa.rty r; and tha.t the 
National Executive seek full disiplinary 
pO"vvers f~ro1n the An.J1ual Conf·erence to deal 
' . 
\Vi th any cas.e s that may arise! ••• On January 27th 
the National Executive disarfiliated the Socialist 
League." 85 · .
The "good constructive work" tha.t Dal ton re .. fers to 
was the :formulRtion of electorBl programme ota the 
Labour Party, \Vhich would be based in Dal ton's vvords 
. on tbe belief that "Previ~us prograrnmes ••• were to 
be 'cQmplicated, too miscellaneous and too· long.. What 
; .. 
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·' 
we wanted now ·t1as somethin.8; short and simple, on which 
86 · 
our propog8nda could concentrate." Pamplets \Vere 
published, such as La.bour' s Inuncdiate P·rog,!~8Jnme in 
M~rch, 1937, and the Labottr' s Pension Pla.r1 i11 Auf;ust 
of· the sBme year, vvhich \Ve1~e designed to appeal to 
tt ••• ~he imaginatio11 of· great numbers of peo1;le, 
respond.ing bo-ch to :.heir hopt s ofJ 2 better socie-r,y 
87 -
and to thei!· so·ber judg, men t." The Labour Party 
Executive WAS thus b8sing its tacLics and policy 
upon the demPnds of what is corisidered the 
requirements 01· an ima_ge that 1.vould have A ch8nce of 
succesR in a future election. .Any ef'fecti ve opposition 
to the Governments policy tov1a.rd the Spa.ni sh con1·1ict 
v1ould .. equire unity of action an1ong all the parties 
of the Left including the Communist Party; however 
the La.bour party ref1used to enter into any union which 
detr~ct from the possibilities of an early electoral 
success. 
·vvatkins describes the choice made by the Labour 
Party in these terms: 
"The tide, ovcrh\vlmingly as a rc_.sult of' the Civil 
War, was running strongly to the Left. Sympathy 
for the Republicans nov.1 embra.ced mm y out side the 
- · orgP11ised Lo-Dour Il[ovement ~ It extended· f"'rom 
tl1e Comrnunists on 0he r.Jeft, Trrough the majority 
not 011ly of tl1e Labou1") Party -out the Liberal 
Party too 9 as far as the Conservatives such 
as -the Duchess of· Atholl on the Rig:ht o But 
it oould only :find a politic2.l ex:prePsion v1hic:p. 
would truely rerlect its magnitud~ through 
the actions of the two decisive bodies: the 
La-bour Party aI?-d the TeU oC o It ---,Nas at this point 
that the bre~rdo1m occurred. The mass feeling 
pulled in one direction whilst those vvho grasped 
• 
r 
,1 ,( 
-· 
..._· 
.... 
J 
.. 
-... ·~ 
- 137 -
. . ,·- ~- ".) 
the levers of the machine tugged in the other. Two alternatives confronted the leadership of 
the Labour Movemento The first was to pursue 
a more mili ta.ntly anti=f·asci st policy 9 especi- .. 
ally in Spain 9 which would have strengthened 
their leadersl11 p 9 and clt the s·ame time v1ould hq.ve cut the· ground under the r·eet of· the 
Commui1i sts o The second v1as to try and hold back the tide 9 us~ng the weapons o? discipline 
- ·s_nd expulsion ag21inst their d..issiclent n1embers, 
a.nd by doing so drive m::1ny into allia11.ce vii th, 
or merrfoer:~·hip Of9 the C0111ll1lU1ist PPrtyooooThe Leadership chose the second path, and in ~oing 
so~ contri-bt1.ted to the sup:eme pare~dox of lVIodern British historyo The policies of both the 
National Governme11t a_nd the La·bour lea.dership in relation to Fasism were to a considerable 
extent determined -oy their 8.nti-communism." 88 
The division of1 the British Labour Movement into tl1e. 
Labour Pa_rty (representing the interests of the working 
classes in PPrli?ment) a.nd the trade unions (as 
the direct represent2tives of working man) led to 
less of a dycholomy within the LPbour Movement 
than one \'VOUld expect, due to the voting system o:r 
the tradeunions at the Trade Union Congresses. As 
Watkins points out, the resoJ.utions of the Trade Union 
Congresses can only be understood in terms o!" the 
block (or card)vote. At the T.u.c. the block votts 
of a h~nd:t'ul of la.rge trade unions decide the national 
policy of the· ·tr~de union movement, so that once 
ei her the Left or the Right has captured the leader-
' ship of the large unions; national policy can be 
' 
dominated, and any opposition ef1fect~valy blocked, 
especially given the permanance of political outlook 
of the large trade un~ons. In addition these same 
block votes can obi' erate those of the Divisional 
f: 
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Labour Parties. Wa_tkins notes that during the "entire 
period of the Spanish Civil Ws.r.. the block vote 89 f?voured the right. 
The position ot Ernest Bevin as Secretary General of 
the largest of the trade unions, the giant Transport 
and Genera.l Workers' Union (in the fowiding of') ·«hich 
-he had been the.principal factor), makes him a key 
figure in the formulation of the policies of· the Labour 
Movement· in this period. But it was not merely Bevins 
position in thE T.G.'~'V.U., nor the fact that in September 
1936 he was elected Chairman of the General Council of 
the T.U.C.m that made Bevin one of the key t1gures in 
the f .. ormulation o:f the policies of the Labour Movement; 
his importFince was derived equa.lly from the int·1uence 
he was able to exert through the strength of his own 
character. Alan Bullock gives a very clear insight 
into the sourcesof Bevins influence: " 
"There \Vere times when the Lef·t hated him, yet there WRS one thing they could never deny and one thing which he represented and embodied in hos . 
. 01,m person the character and convic"'cions of the English working class~s9 prejudice and all. 
"Here 11vas · one source of his authority o A second was his uncontested position as spokesman o:e the tr8 de-union st8_ke in the Labour, Party and ·· the guardia.n of the trade=union t1ictJtitions. tt 90 
A pmwerful, massive appearance, which, while giving 
,,,1- ' the .i_mpression of great strength, was at the same time ,. , 
· .. . _ remarkably expressive or the opinions delivered in a 
poweri·u1 bari.tone voice, which had been trained in the 
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art of debate .:a.uring the-s·truggle to become the 
leader o:r the Docker'.·s- union. To the members of the 
unions, 1wvho tended to viev, the world in terms of 'us' 
the workers, and 'them' the bosses, Bevin epitomise~ 'us'. 
It was in this that Bevin's strength lay, in his ·, 
ability to communicate with the rank and file of the I 
unions in terms of values which they were able to see 
as theirs; it was this that enabled him to defeat Lansbury, 
.. 
Cripps and others in favour of anti-fascist unity 
movement. 
. ~· ' Endowed with great natural, though untutored, 
intelligence, Bevin 
" ••• did not suffer fools gladly and his positive persona_lity m:gde it ha.rd :foxi men of lesser gif'ts to work, and even more, to disagree with htm. 
"His prejudices were strong and hard to· 
,overcome. Fierce!y independent, he reacted 
strongly to any suggestion of pB.tronage, espec-ially f~rom those vvho \rvere better educated than him-
self~, and he vta.s inclined to lock at anyone 1.,rom <J; 
another class as an emeny ••• 
''For all his elf1-confida.nce, he \Vas highly 
sensi ti.ve to criticism, quick to resent opposi t-ion, and to t8ke it as a.personal a tacko J,funy sa.id 
of, him that he took everythir1g too personally 
and could not face opposition without losing his tempero•• 
"He was a man of strong feeiings, with a deep instinct of loyalty. No man ever attached greater importf-"lnce to keeping his vrord or observing 
obligationso The unforgivable crime9 in Bevin's 
eyes 9 was treachery~ once he suspected anyone o~ 
not playing straight9 he could be implacable, 
a.nd on~-his conridence vvas lost, itwa.s almost impossi·-ble to recover." 
Bevin's. chs_ra·cter can, in :par, explain his opposition .. 
,. 
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to the unity movement, and the virulence of his attacks 
upon Lansbury and Cripps, at the Brighton Conference of 
1935. Bevin attacked the pair for disloyalty in bein~ 
menioers of the policy-formulating bodies of the Labour 
Party, end repudiating policies which had been agreed 
upon, and thus forsaking responsibility which they 
had accepted: "All the speeches that have been m8de 
against this resolution ought to have been made last 
year at Southport and the people who oppose this resol-
ution ought to have had the courage of their convict-
ions and tabled a resolution to the effect that we 
should have withdrawn from the League Qt'·Nations. 
You cannot be in and out at the same time, not if 92 
you are honest." 
Coupled with this belie~ that once decisions had 
been reached they should be adhered to, was ·Bevin's 
distrust or the Intellectual and especially of" Cripps, 
one of the main ad.vacates of the unity movement. Bevin 
wrote to G.H.D. Cole (one of the intellectuals of the 
Labour movement): 
.l 
"When vve ha_ve tried to associate with the inte!-lectua.ls, our experience has been that they do not stay the course very long}. hence· our dif"t·icult ••• It is necessary to work out our salv8tion which is the driving rorce; whether the intellectuals are vvi th us or not 9 vve must carry ono You. see the dif"ference "oetv1een the intellectuals a.nd the tr~de unions is this·; You have no respon-siYlilhi tYl you can fly off at a tangent as the wind takes you. We, however, must be 
...... '-
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consistent and ,r,,e have a great amount of' respon-
sibility o We cannot wake up in the morning and get· a -orain,1tave, iJVl1en ':father' says turn and half· 
a million people turn automatically. That does 
not vrorko 99 93 
Bullock notesthat Cripps (who had little experience 
"'--· of- men and the problems o:r a re sponsi.ble leadership, in 
""' con1met to B-evin, and· was completely divorced f·rom the 
life of the working classes) appeared to Bevin as"··· 
the embodiment of all that most exasperated in middle-
class intellectuals telling t.he :brade unions nlld the 
94 
'workers' that they ought to do." 
But the:e were those willing and-able to answer 
the attacks by Bevin and the Labour Party leadership 
upon the advocates of the unity movement with equal 
vigour. Seven M.P.s - Aneurin Bevan, George Srauss, 
s.o. Davies, John Parker, Cecil Poole, Phillips Price, 
and Ben Riley _, as well as many other candidates and 
prominent Party members - R.H.S. Crossman, G.D.H. Cole, 
Frank Pa.kenham - protested in the :eollowing terms: 
''We regard it a.s in keeping \Vi th the failure 
of· the Exec~ti ve to mobilise efif e'c ti vely the 
opposition to the N8tion2.l Government vvhich exists in the country among members of ~.11 parties 
and among those who belong to no partyo There is a grave .danger that this failure, if 
continued, will reduce the Labour Party to political impotence~1 95 
Michael Foot points to Aneurin Bevan as the most 
out spoken ·Critic of the La~bour Party leadership: 
~ 
' 
~-
. "Since a considera'"ble pe_rt of the Executive's 
counterbla.st Figainst · Cripps consisted of· a lengthy compilition of quctations rrom his 
speeches delivered throughout the country over a 
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period of yea.rs, he (Bevan, accused Transport 
House* of using its money to maintain 9 8 sort 
ot· espionage :;,yste1n $.gainst menfoers of· the 
Party who do not t·ind favour with the Janissaries 
of the P8rty mc1cl1ine ~ o In partictllar 9 he invited 
t·he La.bour Pa.rty to dra,11 ij the lctst ·bitter drop 
of~ revol'SJ.tion {j f~rom \Vhat-.. v1as happening in Spain 
wl1ile the Exeicuti ve viTas ·brancti shing its a_i scipl-
ilnil.ry- \Veaponso tie asked his f'ellovv Pa.rty members 
to marlc the :follovving sequence of· eve11tso On 27 
February La·bour had held 8 dernonstration in 
Trat'algar Square to protest against the Govern-
ments intention to recognise General Franco; on 
Monday, 28 Fe-brt:1ary 9 Chanfoerlain ani1ou.ncec1 his 
decision to proceed with the recognition~ on 
Tu'9sday, 1 fi'Iarch 9 La-bour moved. its vote o:e 
censure o But -vvhy 9 a_sl{ed Bevan, viJa.E the Gove1-an- I 
ment able to act in sucl1 fla.grPnt contempt of the 
oppositionvs deepest emotions on aa major issue 
of policy? It was because Chamberlain had no 
fear of the Opposition in the colll1try and at the 
polls; so little had been done to breed the 
respect vvhich an Opposition should be ab le to 
extort.u 96 
To answer the crucial question here - To what extent 
a united_ f~ront would havebeen able to e~ffect the course 
o:f British policy to a greater extent than v1as possible 
given the actua.l Labour Party policy? - is an extremely 
diff·icul t task. Micha.el Foot (who it must, be admitted 
is likely to be biased in this debate - his statements 
in general would bring many a socialist blush of11 shRme 
to those who consider themselves on the Let't in 
Britain) is unable to,. provide any def'inite ansv1er 
that a united front ,vould have be··en able to et·fect 
a radical change in policy: 
.:. 11· . 
1·• ... I .,.. 
-------------------
* Another or Bevin's creations ;--VH .Q. of the T.G .w .u.; . 
also acted as the lG Downing Street of the Labour 
J{ovement • 
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··"The al m \Vas to procluce 8l ch a ferment of opinion, 
·such hostility to the appeasement policy ofi the 
Gover.,nment tha·t British policy cou-ld be diverted 
from i-'cs a_angerous course bei)ore more damage v1as 
donec, The truth vr?.S that no one could gauge r.,-
What vvo1.,1ld -oe the rnagnetic e:e:rect of,. a ra-
alignn1ent of t·orceE on the Left; the claims of 
botl1 the of~ficial leaders and the rebels 11vere 
unprov0-blee 1~_ybe the Popl2r Front v1as alvvays a 
desperate and forlorn bido But what other card 
in the Socialist hand was there to play? Better 
this than.the infuriating inertia or official 
La_-bour ·the face of calamity o For Bevan 9 a.t least, 
one consider8tion vtas pa.ramount: vvhen he said 
that all must be subordinated to the necessities 
of~ the Spanish struggle 9 he n1ea.nt ito ~v1le must 
accept the implications of the Popula.r Front 
alliance 57 9 he said~ a.t the I\[ay Day demonst1')a.tion 
in Pontypoolo 'If the National Governmen~ 
remains in off-;ice a.nother tvvo or three years 
we shall rue in blood and tears that we did 
not t~ke a.ction earliero The country is faced 
with two alternatives= the establishment ot. 
a Popular Front in this country 9 under the 
le~der ship of the Labour Party, or drift to 
disaster under the National Government." 96 
But one is at a loss to find in what \Vay the decision-
makers£rii.RtJ~13i ta.in would have been effected any other policy 
that the Labour Party may have adopted. John Mackintosh 
in his study on the British Cabinet argues that 
. . . 
,· 
;i· .. -.,,.· 
,,.;., 
"Direct control in the sense of a capacity the part 
o~ the Opposition to eject the Government has not 
formed any normal part of poli ticr-; l lif·e since 
the 1880s ••• 
It is now accepted that the Opposition cannot 
expect to dislodge a Ministry \Vith a 1ivorking 
majority ••• 
0 so~ under normal circumstances, Governm€nts 
are not distrubed by the immediate pressure of 
the Opposition •••• 
" ••• liord Morrison has sa.id that a Government 
ought and often does listern to the views of its 
opponents. Hovi far this happens is hard to 
,, 
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'I a,sse.ss but there is no evidence that a confident 
Ministry has altered itsviews to meet Opposition 
'pressureo 
"Lilre a.11 senior British politicians, Lord 
Morrison holds that the Opposition musthave 
the opportunity to state its case but Shat it 
,,ould be undesira.ble to concede any actual pov1er 
to the House of Commons. When Lloyd George said 
'Psrliament has-no control over the Executive: it 
is pure fiction 9 i he was not ruling out the , 
inf'luence of~ pg_rticular elements 9 such as tbe 
b8Ck=·benchers on the Government side 9 he vvRs 
descri.bing the :force regularly exerted 'by 97 
Opposition criticism in the Hou,se of Commons. tt 
In fBct, as a general rule it may be stated that 
dissident -back-benchers on the Gov(rnment side are far 
more likely to have an effect on policy than the Opposition 
fulrilling its alloted role of criticism. Even Atichael 
Foot is forced to admiif that Chambe.P'1~a.in had 81 
98 
im!)regnr-ible Pa.rliama.ntary majority, and one could 
hardly accuse or determination to carry through nis 
ideas on foreign affairs. 
If' one is to attempt to answer th~ question rB.i sed 
previously - Wa·s British poliey-<:~-determine d by the 
divisive erfect or the Spanish Civil War on British 
public opinion? - the Ell.swer must be that this erfect 
had only marginal direct effect. While Britain was a 
country d.i vided on class lines and foreign policy \V8.S 
viewed in class terms, the Left itselr, while united 
I 
in symp~thy ·:.,for the Republican cause was divided in 
itself by the change during the Twentieth Century 10:f' 
the composition of the La·bour movement, the . conflictill.8 
·deducations that the carious elements composing the 
·9. 
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Labour movement, the conflicting ·deductions that· the 
./ 
various elements composing the Labour movement drew 
drom events of the ~nentieth Century - such as the General 
Strilce, and the clash of personalties. The economic 
and social development of Britain had been such during· 
the Twentieth Cent~ry that the rigid charaterisation 
of Britain into the Two Brit8ins - the exploited lower 
classes and the exploiting upper classes was no longer 
true. The transition was from the jerry-built back to 
beck te~raced ghettos that had been the creation-of the 
Industrial Revolution to the New England described by 
Orv,ell 
' 
"You know how these streets fester all over the inner-outer suburbs. Always the se.rre. Long, long rows of little serni-deta.ched houses - the numbers in Ellesmere Road run to 212 and ours is 191 -as much alike as council houses and generally ugliero The stucco front, the creosoted gate the privet hedge9 the green front door~ The La.urels 9 the 1\qyrtles 9 the HaYvthorns 9 Tuion Abri, Mon Repos 9 Belle VUeo At perhaps one house is firty some anti~social type who'll probably end in the workhouse has painted his front door blue instead of green." 99 
The New Semi-Detached su·ourban England developed semi-
detached tastes in which the new classless classbecame 
ilienated from the sense of community ?~d belongingness -
which characterised the industrial ghettos. Social 
mobility led to social rootlessness, with a resulting 
loss of the working class traditions which had provided 
the driving force of the poli tic8.l mili ta_ncy of the Labour 
Movement. A new classlessness led to the loss of the 
I 
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'world cosmic . sense 4 ' described by Roberto Mich els: 
"At first it ( class c':onsciousness) aroused in the workers the traces of a vague '»orld cosmic sense' and an ethical co smopoli tanismo ·. v Their country is the \nrorld 9 9 excalimed Bulvver in 1833 9 e11tranced by the 1J11~ge-v1orkere. of<) Engla.nd. vvhose hearts beat :for ~·oreign and su~ojugatea_ peoples like the Polish, the Irish 9 and even the Negroes of.i Ja.maicao 
- Thus the English proleta_ria.t gra.dually felt i tselr to be a people 9 so ns to spea.k 9 a human aggrag-a.tion clearly distinct from the other classes of the popul8ti.Ono One of the most acute observers of rising English industrialism9 the German Engels, formulated in 1845 in definite terms the thesis th2t in every coun·try the middle class had more ties of arfinity with the other middle classes of the world than vvi th the vror1\'.ers vvho lived nemt door . or even under the same roof." 100 
The world of the new En.gland that developed was limited 
·1n its horisons to more material plane, and the hearts 
of the \l\TOrkers began to beat at the sight of "· •• filling 
stations snd factories that looked like exibition 
buildings, of gi~nt cineams and d8nce-ha.lls and cafes, 
bungalows with tiny garages, cocktail bars, woolworths, 
motor-coFJches, 1.,ireless, hiking, :factct>ry-girls looking 
like actresses, greyhound racing and dirt tracks, swimming 
pools and everything given aw?y for cig~rette coupons." 
The New England through the continuing development 
of the revolution in industrial technology, and the 
development of th( social welfare programs tbat had been 
.irttiated by the Liberals at the turn of the Century 
, 
., and v1hich were so dear to Chamberlain '·s hear. As the 
industrial development of Britain reached the stage of 
. -~ 
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old age*, with the increasing development o:r '.the t~eriary· 
,, . 
. ' •.. ·· .. \I., . 
· Pector, popul~ tion migrated from the coalfields, \Vhich 
had been the location ofthe major industrial urban 
.; ', 
centres of the niueteenth .. century, to the Midlands and 
South East England. The development of a new range 
o~ industries in Britain based on the development of 
electricity as a source of' po\ver, occured at a. time vvhen 
-British industry was :eeeling the challenge o:t' foreign. 
competition and bega.n to attendmore to the home market. 
Therefore rie,v industries bec8me located near the greatest 
area of purchasing power - the Midlands and London area. 
This foreign competition reinforced ~he already existing 
tendency ror these new industries, because there was 
a relatively small loss of weight of material in the 
processes of manufa.cture and relatively small vveight 
of material oper operative; to become located at the 
sour·ce of' consumption rather than the source of the raw~ 101 , 
material. The process became mutually reinforcing 
as the Midlands-Home Counties region developed as a 
source o:f skilled labour t·or these new industries. 
Service industries a_nd t~he teriary sector of' industry 
} 
r 
expanded more than any other during the Deprefsion, 
and naturally the bulk of this expansion occurred near 
I 
the area of gre8tes population - the Midlands- Home 
Counties region. The service industries actua"lly 
------------------------
* The term 'old a.ge' is borrov,ed from G.T. Penner in 
a study of the relationships between industries in industrial regions. 
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increased their employment figures during the Depression 
and in the·cperiod ofj recov:ery employment rose in these 
industries by L~O per cent as compared v1ith a general 
102 
rise cf employment o'f 10 per Gent. 
The migration of popul2tion to this region and the 
expansion of industry within this region led to the 
· coining o1"J the term 'the axial belt' of England to which 103 
. E .G.R. Ta.ylor dre\V attention in 1932, and vrhich 
!"'ollo·1Ned :rrom Pro:ressor Fa111cett' s demonstration in 
1931 and occurred in the ltidlands and South-East 104 . 
EnglBnd. ~etween 1931 and 1937 half a million 
people migrated to London and betvveen 1933 and 1937 
five sixths ot' all new fsctory space was built in the 
London .Area. The result was that London, with l/127th 
of the area or the country had l/5th of the population. 
The area of the axial belt, w3ich may be derined as the 
region bpunded by the t·our tov1ns of GrHvesend, Hazelmere, 
Colwyn, Pn.d Naresborough, vvi th a population o:r 25, 5000, 000, 
contA.ined fifty-seven per cent of the 1Ptal population, 
105 
- .-</ in1 a density of'· 16 50 per sq_uare filij_e. 
Graduated ta.xation and the da.veloping social welfare 
. system acted to diminish inequalities in incomes., a 
{, process vvhich had alref1 dy been.
1
initiat_ed -by the rise of' 
real wages which had o.ccurred during the thirties. 
Mowat concludes that in the period 1924-1938 there 
was an ·increase 01~ real income of~ about 24 p·,_.r cent or 
20 per cent per occupied person. Real wages per head 
, 
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had risen .. about 17 per cent or ·9 per ce11·t including 
. the une1nployed. Mo~vat also not·es · that vithile in 
1913 the v1orking classes paid out n1ore in taxes than 
they received in social benefits, by 1935 the working 
class received more_ than it p2.id out by S:11 millions. 
Taxation and social benefits redistrubuted bet~veen 
200 millions And 250 millions. The effect was to 
raise the inoo me of the vvorking class by 8-14 per 106 
cent. 
While there was serious unemployment, it was in the 
m8in regionally distributed in the older industri~ 
regions v1hich relied on heavy industry: South vVales, 
North-East Engla_nd, I{~h Lancashire, and Central 
Scotland. In 1936 57 per 1000 vvorkers vvere une1nployed 
in North-East England, and 281 in the Rhondda, in Glasgow 
107 perhaps h~lf the population ;:1ere unemployed. Thus 
the an.employment \Vas f~el t ani seen by Ghe 'majority 
of people only as story in the nswspap~ers, and perhaps 
a. sight of· tho Jar·rovv 11.illlger marcl1ers as tr1ey 1nade 
their ·v7ay to London. For these 'vVho v,ere unemployed 
the dole tt ••• kept people alive, and it kept them on the 
sa1·e sia_e of' discontent and tl1oughts of revolution. ~ 
Many people, particularly the young married men, 
vvere better off mn the dole than on the low vvages which , 
- I 
they coulct earn if· employed - ?specially if -~vork ivas 
intermittent. For one thing, unemployment payments 
0 involved the whole system or family allowances, to 
( 
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i1 r 
.:it ( \Vhich industry vvas a stranger. In a, study o:r young 
"'•. , : 
1,,,,, 1 ... 
men i11 C81'>dif·1.., it i:1as found that 3L~ per cent of the 
"' 
single men and 45 per cent of the married men had 
received in their last jon less in wages· than they were ~ 
.108 
receiving in unemployment alloN ances." 
So while unemployrnent seems to be the main charact-
eristic of the Thirties, in f8ct the great majority 
lay in maint8ining and enjoying· this nevi, f'uller lii'e, 
The troubles of unemployment a.nd the strugg~s that 
were going on in :foreign countraes, v1hile disturbing 
a.nd e'iren 'shocking', \Vere distant events that did not 
ru:ffle the mg_in fabric of peoples lives. Or-·Nell paints l> 
this little picture· of' the increasing introspection ot· 
the British people: "I hB_d a look at the paper, -but 
there 'Na.sn' t much nev1s. Down in Spain arid over in 
China they vvere murdering one another as usua. l, a v1oman' s 
-
legs ha.d been 1·ound in a rail1Nay waiting room and King 
109 
Zog' s v1edding was vvavering in the ba.lance." The 
football score-s occupied a far more important place, 
'Ni th the 1 ch,...nce of 1vvinning on the pools. In a world 
where voilence in forei,-,-n countries came to ·be expeo ted 
* as the normal ststeof affairs, it was only a minority 
"-, 
which felt thPt, it had any rele\rcnt to their liv~s. 
Ernest Bevin \VOrking for the ,,_:interests of his 
workers, .was 'f:>ar more representastive of the working 
48 
classes than Aneurin Beva_n, \Vho f·e1 t that something 
should be done to a.id the Republic8ns ·in Span • 
• .. -t' 
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It is for this.reason that Taylor is able with 
Justification to write that: 
"In his lazy fashion, Baldvvin truly represented 
the decadeo The ordinary Englishman, never 
attending chu1"'ch or chr-1pel pro-oal>ly -.vi thout a Bible in his house 9 a_nd yet expectingt his 
children to swallow ~U'lquestiongly a Christian 
educa_tion 9 Yvas a_n exa.ct parEl,.llel to the states 
man vvho m2de speeches sup~porting the Le8_gue 
of Nations and never thought or asking the 
chi etas o:e stst·f ho,;v the Le8gue could be supported. Facade became a re8lity for a generation train@d in cinema palaces. Men believed the phrases 
they heard find they themselves usedo Churchill 
really thought there was a glorius Indian 
empire still to be lost; Baldwin really imagined he was defending democratic values; Lert wing 
socialists really anticipated in Fascist 
dictatorshipo So the watchers in the cinemas 
really f1el t that lif;e \:Vas going on Rmong the 
· shaddows on the screen. Of course no one 
supposed that the tinny worus would t2ke on 
substRnce or tha_t even ·the most menacing figures · 
a.mong the shadovvs could reach out and hit the 
a.udience on the heRdo This is vvha_t happertEd.. before the decade ended. The pretence turned out 
to be no pretencee Or perhaps it merely eclipsed 
the real lif'e underneath." 110 
One doubts the ex·cent to which one can meaningfully 
talk of· Britain being divided by the Span1eh Civil War. 
There existed ane:J,ite ,vho f'elt the impact of the \Var 
t 
on their lives ror various reasons, but ror the rest 
involment was only talk deep. The Labour P2rty, while 
clamouring for resist2nce to the Fascists was still 
able to de vote against rearmament, and demand that 
conscription should not be reintroduced. This is not 
to denigrate th9se brave souls who were willing to give 
their 11 veR ·:for the Spanish people, but they merely 
~~presented a salve for the concience for the great 
t .. 
.'.:'r-·· ..-------------------~~----------------..--~ ..... --~·.,_,..:,. __ .................. -~~ ..... ~ .... ~ r , ."',. I (I:,: 
. '· 
- 152 -
majority. Michael Foot gives us tnis picture of' 
the reaction of reaction of some members or the 
La-oour Party to the Conf~erence at Edinburgh: 
• 
"At the end, the whole Conflerence sung the 
Internationale. 'Then comrades, come rally' 
tl1at \Va.s too much for ·Jennie Lee. She crept 
miserably out of~ the hall a_nd stubled into 
Aneurin o He lool-ce d ha_ggElrd a11d in no 
condi tior1 to sta.nd punishment o He looked as 
if he had just dragged himself from the 
tortt1re cha.mbero .And he vvas not the only 
d~legate who felt like thate Out they came, singly 
and in groups, the most unhappy and guilty look-
ing collection 01· people I have ever seeno Their 
very mis~ry made me hope again. If they felt like 
that ro n1ething could sti 11 be done o '.~ sho1..,t 
while later she strayed into the Caledonian Hotel 
where the Executive was staying~ She looked on 
the company, metalphorically spat and left as 
svviftly as she coulda o o she heard f~ootsteps ·behind 
her and turned to :face Aneurin. 'Jennie 9 'said 
Nye Jho had \¥itnessed the ~cene at the Caledonian, 
'you really must cul ti va.te the gif't 01·· social 
hypocrisy. ' " 111 
- ·"' 
" But can one accuse the Labour Party Executive of 
social hypocrisy. One should beware of the temptation 
to anWse the policies of the Labour Party in this 
periocl i:q terms or Michels' iron law o:r a-oligarchy, 
in vvhich: 
"By giving themselves lea.ders, the v1orkers 
create with their own hands new masters, whose 
principal means of domination consists in their 
technical and intellectual superiority and in. 
the inability of the masses to control the 
execution of' their co n11nands to the leaders ••• the 
mechanism o:f the socialist part of1f·ers to the 
\VOrlrers, tl1a.nks to the numerous s,aleried and 
honoary positions of which it disposes, a poss-
ibility of1 making a C8.reer, ·{vhich excercises on 
them a l;orc,~. ot· c 011sidera.ble att1~2:cti ono Novv, 
to the degree that the political calling becomes 
complicated and tl'le rules of social legislated 
multiplied 9 there is imposed on the lea.ders I 
of* political parties on existance mo.L·e and rnore 
pr~fessionalised, based on a·continuo~sly widening 
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knowledge, sa\d.r-f'~·ire, .routine, and sometimes delicate finesse. This is why the distance betvveen the leaders and the led gor1~vs coi-rst~?n·tly greatero Thus one can place one gs finger upon· tl1e :Clagra ..nt contradiction vvhich exists 9 in mature par~ties9 bet\vcen democrat __ ic declarations and intentions, on one hana_ and the co11cre·te oligarchic reality 9 on the othera Hence the continuous raising of conflicts, often Shakespearean in character, in which the comic borders on the tragico It may be said, therefore that the organisa_t,ion constitutes p1-ecisely the l' 
-source v1l1ence conser-vs_ti ve curretlt d~bouch upcbn the plain of democracy, causing devastating 
' . 
..... : ... ·: 
inundations vvhich render tha.t plai:r1 unrec9gnisable. n112 
The temptation to use .Michels iro-n la\,V of· obigarchy 
.as the sole anlytical factor in explaining the splits 
that occurred in the Labour Movement should be resisted, 
because of the difficulty or demonstrating the proposition· 
that the views of~ the leBdership o:t the Labour M9vement 
were out of' joint ~vvi th those ot· the rank and 1"ile 
membership. Both Watkins and Maisky* claim that the 
block, or card ~oting system was undemocratic in that 
it fRiled to give an· accurate picture or the true 
feelings of the mass membership of the Labour Movement. 
This is certainly true, but it still does not answer 
, ..-the question as to 'Nhether the majority of the La-oour 
mpvement ·vvished to se·e any other alternative policy 
adopted. Can one rebut Dalton's argument that those 
at Edinburgh who became widly excited over the Spanish 
. -
issue did not '1 ••• even dimly, comp_.~,ehend how unrepresen-
tative they vvere, on this issue, of the great mass of .-· 
- 113 ~ 
their fiellovv countrymen. u At the 1936 Trade Unions ~--~~-----~~--~~~--
* Ivan liiaisk:y. Soviet AnfDassB.dor in London 1932·-43. See svc.-~_nish f~pte - books.z p.5Qn.1 
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I 
Congress held at Plymouth f·rom 7 tc 11 September, 
the amendment tabled by the Furnishing Trades Assoc~ 
iation to the le.a.dership 1 s l).On-i·ntervention resolution, 
wished -0 tne General Council to call upon the International 
Federation o:r Trade Unions and the La-bour an:d the Social-
ist International to launch a great campaign to f'orce the 
democratic countries to abandon the deceptive policy 
of neutrality, v1hich the f)ascist dictators are not 
observing, so as to ena·ble the Spanish Government 
to get the arms that 111Vill enable it to strike a blow 114 f 1or European peP.ce and democracyu T"°he amendment 
.. -, ' . ,..-
lost by 3,029,000 to 51,000 votes, v1hich even con-
siciering the card vote seems overv1helnling. Da_vid Cattell 
gives us this opinion or the attitude of the ranl{ and 
~ile membership 01· the Labour Movement to the Spanish 
conf'lict: 
"The circumstances and reactions among British Labour circles ••• were very different from tl1ose in Fra.nce o Q a,. (a) very signif·icant dif·ference in the posj. tion of· the tv10 groups v1as the attitude of· the rank and. f"ile of the Lab ou1~ movements. While in France they staged daily demonstrations in t·avour of tne Spm isn ·vvorkers a.nd J requent siril(es against Blun1° s policy, the Br'i tish \iVOl·lre rs manif·estect only the slightest inte1'".lest o \Vo Lavv'-ther 01· the lvii11ev1orl{ers' Feo_eration aim B ~Ao Ba.gnari of· the Cler .ks and i.\.d.lnini strati ve '{Nor1{ers de scI·ioed this apathy at the Trau.e Union Congre c: s held in Ply1nouth during September, .1936: 
Mr .• W. La1wvther: ! ... It is no\v nearly eiE;ht ~iJeeks since the rebellion started in Spain, and bef·ore going further into the question I should like to dra\V to the attenti_o11 of' the Congress the :e::=,ct that vvhile the Spanisr1 ,Norkers are sacrif1icing their lives in the de14ence of1 democracy it cannot be 
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said that.the Trade Union and Labour Movement of 
. this country has done all it co,uld have done in 
support of the Spsnish workersocolt is true that 
already some ~13 9 000 has been collected9 but it is also true that there has not been one big 
meeting or one -Dig demonstration organised by 
the General Council or by the National Cou11cil _ 
of' La·oour in support ofl Spain and to expla_int the facts of the situation ••• ' 
Mr. B.A. Bagnari:!.~.The General Secretary told 
us vve have raused £13,000. Let us,~ analyse 1vvhat 
this meallsf)" Q It n1e8.ns almost exactly seve1.1-eights 
of a penny per member of the Trqde Union Congress. Is you1~ dernocracy v1orth-=seven=>eight s of a_ penny? •• The 1-.esult of:. this indif>f·erence wa.s tha.t 11either 
the ra111k 2..nd f 1ile nor the la:bo1.1r les.a_ers ·desired 
to t2.Jce a strong st8.nd on the Civil vVar, even 
though their general sympathies were for the Spanish W.orkers. "115 
. 
. One should rebut the argument of Maisky that " •• the 
leadership oft the La-bour Pa_rty sabotaged the true 
- 116 
fieeling of the masses. tt One should rebut the 
argument for the reason that the masses did not 'Nish 
to go beyond the policies which the Labour Party adopted. 
There is little subst2..ntial evidence of 'sabotage' or 
'social hypocrisy';~ those that argued t·cr a more 
mili t::?cnt policy tovv2rd the Spanish con1·1ict represented 
a minority, abei t an extremely vocif·erous minority, 
backed up by the organisation or the Left Book Club. 
For various reasons this minority v1a.s motivated by a 
highly aeveloped 'wand cosmic sense': the communists 
through .their analysis of 1rvorld eventsin teri~is of 
universal soc~9-historical forces; the Independent 
Labour Party and dissident members of the L2bour Party 
such as Bevan, through the ract that they existed as an 
anachronism - 1:epresentatives of' tre remaining areas 
' 
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··· Which retained their proletarian characteristics in 
an age that Y.l?.s rapidly· moving to\vards the ideal of~ surb-
urban 1.lllif·ormi ty, areas that through the economic di stress 
o:r these old industrial regions reta.ined a beli·e:r in 
· working class solidarity, not merely expressions of 
sympathy; and the intellectuals of the Socialist League 
awoken by the pangs of social conscience to the 
suiferings or the world around. These groups and individ-
uals existed on the fringe or the main body of the 
Labour Movement, an activist wing that cannot be consid-
·ered representative of the mass. This can be explained 
in part in terms of the observation by Frankel that 
" ••• people can be divided into a predominant inattentive 
majority and a small attentive minority. Alred O Hero 
Introduced as dividing charactenstics four criteria, 
enumer2ted in order of increasing r8rity: interest, 
~ 117 1nform2tion, realistic analysis and action." Related 
to, and reinrorcing the diinterest of the majority is the 
tendency of the mass of a party to rollow the leadership 
in its policy - the organisational factor demonstrated 
by lfichels. In the case of· the Labour .Movement in the 
thirties, any individuals or groups desiring an active 
line to be taken towards the.Fascist intervention in 
. Spa.in were faced \Vi th the problem that domestic .. , ~ 
and international policies are inerelated • .An inherent 
contradiction had developed in the Lftbour Movement 
through the ignoring of this f2ct: to call for support 
of the League or Nations and resistance to Fascist 
,., ...... ·"' 
j 
I 1·--· .. 
. l .. , ' ~ 't . 
\ 
,· 1•1 / 
' ' i? . ,• 
. I' ,, 
i' 
1 
f 
~ 
' ; . 
'-i 
' I 
' 
1 i . 
i I 
! I , 
! 
i 
... 
'I:-····, 
,,.., . .. ... ..... ' ~-- .,, . 
, I ~i' ,• 
I 
~. I l 
,• 
' 
'"" 
r 
' r 
- 157 -
aggression abroad conflicted with the pac_i:fist currant 
which flowed strong in working class traditions, and the . 
demands vvhich had. been voiced long and loud against __ 
rearament andw the reintroduction of conscription. The .1 
par:-?doc v1as that those who advocated support tne the 
Republicans in Spain v1ere those v1ho ha.d been the most 
vehement apostles of· pacirism ·battling against the 
support of the Lea_g~e given by the leadership of the 
Labour Movement. When in September 11, 1935, Hoare 
pledged Britain's allegiance to the principles of th~ 
Conven8nt "Bevan remained unimpressed. Along vvith 
Starrord Cripps, the Socialist League and the 
pacifist section of the party, led by George L~nsbury, 
he insi ted that no capita.list gave rnment of Ba.ldwin and 
Chanioerlain could be entrusted with the worker' in the 
ID8king or thPeatening or war ••• their fear (was) that the 
Labour Party would be sucked into a full bi-partisan defence 
and foreign policy ·Nith a Capitalist Government \V~ose 
purposes they could netther share nor control.· Britairrs 
policy, said Bevan, in the same speech at Birmingham, is 
that of 'the successful burglar turned householder. If 
I am going to ask the v1orke r to shed his block, it )d 11 
0 not be for medieval Abyssinia of Fascist Italy, but 118 for making a better social system" 
Attlee, Bevin, Gree;nv,ood, Da.l ton, Ci tane, and 
Morrison were not social hypocrites beca.use the 
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majority. of the cl:a.ss they represented, were bent on 
enjoying the :rruits of an increase in income, and the new 
worlds opened up by the cinema and the automobile. Social 
concsience f1otmd its outlet in the hat passed aronnd for 
the Spanish re:rugeas and resolutions in ·ravour or the 
heroic workers fighting to uphold democracy in Spain. 
Brand lists some or the humanitarian acts undertaken: 
"The National Council established and maintained a 
base hospi ta_l '0/hile the Socialist 1tiedical Associa-
tion and a nunfber of tra.de unions financed axnbulances. 
Women 1u1itted thousands or garmentso A milk ~und 
reached £31 9 000; £120 9 000 vvas raise cl to aia_ ref)ugees; 
the mi11e=vvorkers contri·buted £55 9 000 to be usea_ 
especially ror orphaned children of Asturias miners. 
People a.dop~ed Basque children 9 and1by 1937 some 4,000 \Vere in England f)or sa.fety • 0 1 9. 
Non-intervention suited the \VOrker o:r th3 new Britain 
that wa.s emerging in the axial belt or Englani, ani 
the policy or the Labour Party never meandered far 
rrom a non-intervention policy, and rondemnation of the 
Gover:ment' s actions. Even after Octo-ber, 1937, v1hen 1,the 
Labour Party dropped its support of· the Non-Inifrvention 
Comn1ittee, the ne\V line did consist of little more than 
that the·Spanish Government should be allowed to buy arms 
in Brita.in. The slogan 'Arms f'or Spa.in', which La-bour 
adopted shows the extent of the commitment to the 
Republica.n cause. The resolution \Vhich vias adopted by 
the Executive or the Labour Party and the Trade Unions 
in October of 1937 stated that an International .Agreem-
ent should ~be promoted by the British and French 
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Governments to restore complete commercial liberty·, .. 
;,: 
to Republics.n Spain, Yvhich v1ould " ••• thus ena."ole the 
Spanish people to bring their heroic s.truggle to a victor-· 
120 
ious. conclusion." 
. 
Toujours les au'tres les poitrines, las .Anglais les 
machines. 
McKensie makes clear .the fact that any attempt to 
over-emphasis the oligarchic tendency of political.parties 
in Britain, or to d.rav1 a picture ofl the mass membership 
of the Labour liovement \Vishing to go in one direction, 
but ·being pulled rm,villingly-" in the otlar, does not 
accord 'iVi th the reality of party politics. The 
Executive of the Labour Party has been the area where· 
policies are :formulated ·but the opinions of the mass to 
provide li.ijits upon which policies can be undertaken: 
"The La.bour PB.rty' s devices t·or ensuring the 
ascendancy 01· tl1e Pr~rliamentary Party and its 
leaders ••• have depended on the existance of a 
·bond of· conf'idence betvveen tl1e p.srliamentary 
leaders and a sufficient number of leading trade 
unionists to co1m11Gnd perpondera11t support 1·or the 
policies 01· tl1e pa_rty 1.ertdeffiip a.t the party . 
,: 
conrerenceoooin all normal circumstanceS9 Libour's 
parliamentary les"dc1')s ( vvl10 9 like their Conservative 
opposite numbers, will take into account the currets 
ofl opinion ·~vi tl1im all sections of the party in the 
course 01· deterrnining their policies) are likely to . 
be sustained by majority support t~e PoLoPc and. 
the I\fEC 9 and in both the trade 1.lllion and tl1e 
constituency _sections of the mass orgonisation, 
Except ori the rarest occasions in the history of the 
party it has been a Centre~Right majority in the 
PLP 'IJVhich has car1.,ied the day a.gainst a Left 
minority Vii thin each of• the constituent. elements 
of the party." 121 
./ 
In fact it \V_as " ••• a pol~cy-decision process 1.vhich ",.}. ,, 
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conveyed 'the J2Ub.li·c impression that the Labo,ur Party's 
parliamentary leaders \Vere repeatedly on the point of 
. 122 destruction at the hands of' their more rnili tant supporters" 
which leads to an exaggerated statement of· the divisio_ns 
within the Labour Party and the di·vi si ve e:ffects 01 .. the 
Spanish conflict on that moveillBilt. 
lviuch of~ that 1l1ich has so t·ar -been postulated on 
t11e La-oour movem~nt can also -oe applied to the Conser-
vative Party on the right ..ving of British politics. Divisions 
existed, to \Vhich the Spanish conf1lict gave an added pro-
minence. The division was not an equal one. It did not 
divide the Party, but merely divorced a militant minority 
from the mass of the Party, which, contented with the 
policy of non-intervention, followed behind the leader-; 
ship. The extent of these divisions and the difficulties 
wmich resulted for the leadership were, however, ot' a much 
·\ lesser order than in the case of the Labour Party. This 
was due to the traditions of the Conservative Party, the 
' 
less ideological content ofi the Right and the class com-
position of the Conservative Party. 
.. Loyalty to the Party leadership has always been one 
or the keynotes of the Conservatives, an invisible.bond 
setting the limits of) conf·lict \"Ii thin the Party and 
threatening the future political career of anyone step-
ping outside ( though Churchill, \Vi th the aid of the Second 
- .-- . World 1vVar, did manage to overcome the taint of~ disloyalty, 
a task which Iain Macleod has fotmd beyond himselr at the 
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moment) • .An example of the limiting e~fect of Party. 
loyalty is to be found in this little story of Conservative 
discontent During the days of 1939, v,hen it appeared t,hat 
Ghamberlain might grant Franco belligerent rights: 
"Jv~. Duncan Sandys, lvl.P e 9 Churchill's son-i11-la\1V,, 
ha.d 1~or some months been one of the f'ew ba.ckbench 
Tories daring to sl1ov1 Et -tremor of· indepeno.ence" He 
. called a meeting in London de signed to rally"· the 
nation's you .. th i11 s11pport of a 11.evir 9 more robu~'st 
national policyo Fleet Street guessed that the 
move had been made on Churchillvs prompting; might 
· it not indicate that the rebel Tories were at last 
prepared to rebel? But the meeting ended in derision. 
'I a.nd my firiends 9 9 said_ Iilro Sandys at the close, 
'would noL be here if there were any question of 
turning OUG Chamberlaino g If this was the standard 
of audacity among the n1ost 1~dacious ·rories, vvhat hope v1as there f·rom them.?" 5 
Eden's resignation speech, which was remarkably restrained 
reflects the same preoccupation with the effect of his 
actions upon the position of the Party: 
"11y Rt. Hon. Friend has strong vievvs on foreign 
policy, and I respect him for it; and I have strong 
viev1s too" Since ,ve are, as I knovi,, ·both of~ us 
conscious that tnose views have resulted in a diver-
gence9 not only of aim, but also of outlook and 
of approach 9 it is clearly in the national interest 
tl1at unii~4·be restored at t11e earliest possi-ble 
mon1ent." 
This speech was hardly calculated to rally the country 
behind a nevi policy in opposition to Chamberlain. Bevan's 
comment on the sp~ech was: 
"If Eden had been big enough he could have ruined 
Chamberlain. n 
To which Foot adds in his usual tone: 
"Instaed it was the most polite resignation speech 
of moder~2t5imes and left not a ripple on the political waters." 
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The Conservative M.P., Mr. De Chair, during the debate. 
)-
vtich followed Eden's resignation, offered this conclusion: 
"· ••• it shoulcl be recognised that· there have bee:r1 for · 
a long time tvvo q_ui te distinct elements in the Con-
servative Ps.rty in tl1i s House o There has ~oeen the e le-
ment represented9 if· I may sa.y so vvi tl1ou.t of4t·ense9 ~by 
the !iobie La.dy tdeniber of) Perth anc1 I(inross (Duchess of· 
Atholl)·; the hono l.1e111ber f·or Vilest Leeds (llb:o Vo·Pod-a.ms), 
to a less extent by tl1e hono lvlenioer 1·or tVest Le"icester 
(1fr. l\Jicholso11.) 9 end others v1ho li1ce them, vvant us ·to 
fight allcomers = in support of Austria, Czecl1oslovakia, 
the Negus 9 Chiang Kai~shek 9 and every other cause of 
that a_escriptior1 in the ;vorldo T11e other ele1ne11t 9 vvhich 
is more sound and very 1nuch la.rger 9 believes v1l1ole-
heartedly in tl1e cornmon=sense attitude of ti-1e Prime 
Ivtinister in his approach to f·oreign af·fairs. nl26 
As with the Labour Party\, it is possible to divide 
--------~ 
the Conservative ~arty (as indica~d by de Chair) into 
a loyal majority and an activist fringe not prepared to 
to admit the inf·allibility of the Prime Minister on all 
. 
matters of foreign policy. During the period of Baldwin's 
leadership of the Conservative Pa.rty, there v1as no serious 
opposition to his policies. The mood ot· the party can be 
gattged from this declaration by the chairman of the 1935 
• 
Annual Conference: 
·-
· -
"Last.year at the conference and at the mass meeting 
••• the then President (of· the National Union) in his 
speech had to tell 1iro Baldvvin that there vv~re a certain 
number of compla.ints and dif't·e1-aence s on 1natter of· policy 
·oetv-veen members o:r our party o T"hank God 9 I can assure 
the Rrime 1VIinister that every man, \Vornan and child i:g. 
the Conservative Party stands solidly behind him at 
the p1~esent mo1nento 1JVe l1av(? seen in that frea.t con-
ference v-vhich has just closed the w1anirni ty of) the 
Conservative .Party and we can assure yoy sir that howl 7 ever dif-.f-iicul t your task vie are ·behind you to a man." 2 
Otherviise ref")erred to as the 'Re·d Duchess'. 
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Representing th·e other side o:t' the\ class divide 
from the Labour Party, the members of tbe Conservative I 
·1 
Farty were not drawn, through class afinity, to identify 
with the Republican cause. In flact class afini ty served 
to make ardent supporters of Franco many of1 the To:ries. 
as did the Catholic faith. The fact that non-intervention 
aided those in Spain who declared that they were struggling 
against an invasion or conununist ideology and anti-Church 
atrocities, led many on the right in·Britain to support 
$ 
non-intervention. During a Commqns de.bate of~ October 29 
1936, 1~ Denville, in reply to a statement by Mr, Gallacher 
t'hat n ••• i:f \Ve are in support of arms ror the Governemnt 
o:r Spain it is to def·eat the :forces of Fascism and assist 
·12·8 
peace and progress", retorted: 
. "Does the hon. Member n1ean by peace and progress 
the murdering of 15,000 Christains because of their 
t·ai th and the ·burning dovm 01· tr1eir churc·hes? If so, 
I should like him to justif1 y that action. 11 12:3 
In the same debate, .Mr. Emmott was able to argue: 
'-'I can imagine no greater danger to I1nperial interests 
than the establishment in the Toerian Pen.insular of 
of a government whose whole ideology is inspired by 
bitter hostli ty to Imperialis1n and to tl1e B1~i tish 
Empire as the greatest example ofi modern In1perialism. 
Regard. this matter 9 if~ yo1..1 vvil19 on this -oasis 9 and 
I say that the balG.nce mt· Imperial advantage is on 
the side o:e the ests.blish1nent of a fascist st ate· to 
the esta·blishment of a. comrnunist state. "130 
Those of the opinion or Messrs. Denville and Emmott, 
'since non-intervention favoured the rebels, sought to 
argue that non-intervention in the Spanish dispute was 
/~ 
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occurring to an equal extent on both sides and· there-
fore o:r no concern to Britain. Mr. Wise during the debate 
· o:r December 1, 1936, on the Merctiant· Shipping (Carriage 
or-Munitio.ns to Spain) .Bi_ll, felt that even ·though 
Germany, Italy and Russia were vi··olating a non-inter-
vention agreement and breaking international law 
u ••• (it) is s1J.rely no reason vvhy \Ve should involve 
ourselves i11 da11ge1') merely to satist·y some desire 
tha.t the Spanish Governrnent be f;.ully eq,.uipped \Vi th 
muni tionso lVLany of~ us on t.nis side of· the Hot1se 9 
although we desire to preserve the most complete 
neutrality, a.nd \Ve do not think· to a.ssist either side 
vtould think it less embarrassing ifi General Franco 
should vtin the 1,var tl1an it· the Cornrnunist Governrnent 
did (Voice: ~ There is no Cornmunist Government there') 
- not because \Ve particularly desire to see e11.other 
Fascist state in the lfedi terFa11.ean 9 'Nhich indeed ~ve 
do not <> But the internatior1a.l in1plications of· the 
Governn1ent a_re lil{ely to -be :ea~r v1orse tl1an the inter-
national implications 01· a li1ascist victory: and as 
our int,erests are to remain at peace we naturally 131 
prefer the less embarrassing side to be successf'ul." 
This fear of the spread of communist influence in 
the Mediterranean led many of the Conservative Party who 
were otherwise opposed to the appeasement policy of 
Chamberlain to develop a schizophrenic att·i tude to the 
Spanish conflict, torn betvvee.n f1ear of1 both the Cominrmist 
and the Fascist :perils. Churchill, in a Commons de-bate 
or November 1936, stated: 
. 
" ••• but for Russia and ·but for Russian communist 
propoganda and intrigues v1hich :tor more that six months 
raclced Spain be:rore the outbreak 9 the Spanish norror 
need never~ have ocu1uredo () o o It vvould ·oe a crime to call 
upon British and~ ~·rencl1 soldiers 9 or upon the good 
pec11les of~ tl1ese tvro cou:r1tires to go to the aid of· 
such a country. Why i!~ould be worse than a crime it 
v1ould ·be a futility." 
Churchill had already proclaimed in August of that year: 
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"A ,:revivified Fascist Spain in close sympathy \Vith 
Italy and Germany is one kind of disaster. A Commi.inist Spain spreading its tentacles through Portugal and133 France is another, and 1nany v1ill t11inlr the 1:vo1~se o" ·. 
Churc_hill, howev_er, had many an occasion to elaborate on 
the dangers that a Franco victory would entail for Britain: 
"Large hov-vi tzers and many secondary gm1s have -oeen 
·1nounted on botl1 sides of' tl1e Stra.its of Gi-braltar at 
JJ Algerciras and Ceutaooothe potential condition of the 
high\vay of" t11e vvo1.,ld rexnains in the most serious 
f*ormo o o o Conditions in the Be.learic Isla11ds a_re in the 
last degree unsa.ti sf·actory o o o o Vie should make it clear 
and make it clear in good time tliat we could not 
agree to the doors ofl the Medi terranea_n ·-being closed 
,in our'f'a.ces, and that we shall havr F,o range ourselves 
against any 1vvho tried to do i "t •••• " 3i+ 
This ambivalent attitude did much to weaken the 
position or those Conservative ·backbenchers who might 
have been expected to uphold the interests of Britain in 
the face of~ the challenge ·by Italy and Germany. Fear and 
dislike of comrntmism, as well as Party politics, isolated 
those fe\V critics \Vho remained f)rom the main ·body of the 
Conservative Party. At the other pole from these critics 
stood those intent on a violent campaign of denotU1ciation 
of the Republicans, and \Vho vvere castigated in this 
., 
·leading article in the Ne\¥S Statesman\.-L· o~ August 1, 1936: 
tt11ore sinister is the daily n1agnifjication of atrocities 
by the Rothemere press" ldost of the tales of· ho1~ror 
piclted up firom re1 .. ugee s are the f"amiliar stut·1--; they 
did service against Germany during the war 9 against Russia. afjter i t 9 . anc1 nov~ they are used agains-c Spanish 
. socialistso I\Jo dou-ot -they satisfy Colo11el Blimp 9 -out 
they will carry no weight with thoughtful ueople9 More 
signif'icant is tl1e attitude of il'he Times and other• 
reputable Conservative papersooooThe Times has dropped 
the disreputable term 'rebels' and substituted 'anti-
. government f"orces' and its leading article last 
·• 
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Wednesday contained an astonishing collection of statements, the most remarkable suggestion ·being that Soviet agents fomented the troub1e· 9 ::ind that 
'pro1ninent Rus2.ian Comraunists t·oretold so long ago as the Spring that Spain would be in a state of chaos by a. date in July Q {? .Are vie to infer that ·the Bolsheviks de.li'berately .engineered General Franco·~ s 
'war of· liberation 1~rom 1'Iarxi sm. nl3 5 
.Any attempt to limit the intervention of Ger1nany 
and· I·taly in the Spanish conf"lict v1as equated in the 
eyes of many Conservatives with what they considered to 
be the foolish nonesense of the~League of Nations. The J 
· attempts of the Spanish Government to obtain support f .. on 
its cause from the pulpit of the League foun,d very little 
response from the Conservative Party. Any attempt on the 
part Of Eden to implement any :form of e:ff ec ti ve super-
vision or a non-intervention agreement through the 
League of1 1~·ations vvould inevitably run into opposition 
from the mass or the Conservative Party. This ~as in 
part a question of the inter-action ofl party politics 
and partly a matter of personalities wi thi11 the Conser-
vative Party. R.B. McCallum points out that the adoption 
by t}1e Labour and Liberal Parties of the League cause 
.merely swrved to increase the hostiity of many right-
wing members towards that organisation: ,. 
• l 
"In fact, the Conservatives vvere so bored \Vith. the endless talk of the Lea.gue enthusiasts, vvij.om they regarded as fools and cranks, that tl1ey had no cl.ear idea of the is?ueso They took extreme l.a1icf most paci:fist vier1s a.s repr~sentative of the,.'(J"ljoleo The result was that:;:vihen the crisis came ~vi th Italy in 1935 they started to find that the League \Vhich they supposed to be an ' 
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institution, vague and unreli8.ble, f·or the 
avoid_Rnce o:t :112r, ·/trJs an i11sti tution f~or \Vhich 
they 1night have to f'ight o A:l1a_ their irri ta.tion 
vva.s intense "t/hen they o·bscrvec:l Ll1at tl1ose vtrho 
were telling them to fight where the Radical politicians who, as it seemed to them, had been. 
the 1ne1nies of Etll ruil~ tary~ pre~a.~a~ioi-10 They 
were now actually telling tne f1gnt1ng classes 
to go into actiono The relatives of naval officers. 
on tl1e 1\/Iedi terra11ean stB.tior1 suddenly realised 
that their men w~re to be thrown into the front line at tl1e dern,'4.nd of the people 1Jvl10 h8.d starved 
the f'leet 2nd poured contempt on mili ta1,';)y activity. The LB_bour Party 9 throu.gh J.eaders like Dalton and Attlee ·v-vas sa_ound_ing the call for ·oa0tleo 'I'he Li-oerals 
under Sinclair v1ere no less vocal, and the Li-oerals in the eyes of the Tories were experts in ·the art 
ot· stinting the Navy since the days o:t' Glastone 
and co-bden." 136 
The attitude of.the right-wing of the Consergate Party 
toward the League canoe seen from these pronouncements 
by Leo Amery: 
'
1I gather that the Government's view would be that all 
such consi erations (the barbarous nature of the Abyss-inians and the tradition8l ties or friendship Nith the Italians)- hs.ve -been superseded ·by the f~act that Ab~inia \V2 .. s, vvi th Ita_lian su~:port, allovved to slip into the League 9 a_nd that they are bound at all costs, 
and v1ll8.tever sacrif"ice of old f:riendshi·ps and risk 
of futu1'4e emnities9 to 9 tr~((.out' the League - not 
the League of conciliation which was all they believed in last year, but the League off orcibly preserved peace as prePched by Lord Cecil, and the framers of the 
eo-called Peace ballot, to which they now seem to hnve been converted. They are making 9 to use .Mro Anthony 
Ed.en's phrase, a_ test case" Vifell, ~vhat has tl1e test proved so far.? If there wa_s ever a C8.se -vvhere the 
a~essor h8.s given such an1ple notice o:r his intentions it v1as here. Here ·i:va.s the 11a"r of conquest openly 
advertised and organised for the .best part or a year 0heBdo o o This vrss no1:case of the Lea.gue being talcen by 
supise c It knevv months -nef·or~ehand vvhen Jvlussolini meant to striJre" But in spite of all 11,rr o Eclen is efforts. to hustle them9 nothing ivould induce the Counci 1 01· the Deague ta fsce the facts of the situation or to come 
'to any decision a-bout theme, Vfuen . he v1ar., ,began they got as f·ar a.s considering the draft of a. report to the 
·e1·f~ect 1:.hat Mussolini c1id not seen1 ve1--.y co11ciliatory. The only thing that they had achieved in all these 
months was, in accordance with the recognised red tape 
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;i~~enev~.·'procedure, to impose m · embargo on arms and 
··'muni tio11s oeing· sent·. to Ab.yssinia! So f'ar then t'.he_ · ~·i''.. League machinary has not only failed absolutely to) prevent war, but such help as it has given has been to tl1.e a,ggressorooc,The only result I can foRBee from purely economic sanctions is that they will probably decide It8ly to lecve the League, and that they will 1nean consiclera-ble los2- end disloca_tio11 oft trade for those -.vvho e11force them f;or the benefit of those 1ivho do not. They arenot going to stop the war." 137 
The right-v1ingers attitude tovvards Eden, the champion 
of the League, is again provided tor us by Amery: 
"I had, in f 1act been critic al of Simon f;or not insisting \Vi th suff'iciE:nt force, on con1pelling Eden to lceep in line with his own more realistic attitude, and took the first opporuni ty I could tell Hoa, 1 e tha.t his hopes of success depended entirely on 'pullinJs Anthony -back by his coat ta_ils ''." 
., 
'· 
Amery's diary ro mmented up&n Ba_ldv1in becoming Prime Minister 
that: 
ttThe best :feature is the ne·~v arra.ngement in putting Sam (Hoare) at. the F .o. \Vhere he vd 11 have his Nork cut out clearing up the mess into which Eaen got us over Aby-ssinia.. I shall look 1·oftva.rd to September \.Vhen Eden ~vill be sent to Geneva. 1\ivi th onfl.ers to unsay all his high talk of· last month about coercing It2ly to respect the 
'collective system'." 139 
Again, Amery's diary offers us this, written at the time 
Eden's resighation: 
ttNeville ·1J1as in much more ef:fective f'orm that the day before and delighted me by having the courage to say that .ro llec Live security v1a.s dead and only a dm gerous sham •• ~Neville's speech is the rirst breath of fresh air on the Government fron -oench r·or a_ long tirne. But he couldnwt have clelivered it .vhile Eden 1Nas in the Govern-ment, a_nd Eden couldn't have stayed in tl1e Governrnent after that speech, even if there had been no o~her issue. The speech went do&n very well and greatly he atene d ·che Pa_rty. " 140 
-Po~Ner to formulate policies and to have them executed, 
in a Parliamentary political system as exists in-Britain, 
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- . is not merely a matter ot· of·t1ce it is also a matter of ·being 
able to mobilise support within the ranks of the party in 
r 
. power. Eden -s po11ver base was extremely liniited in the 
Conservative Party,. in contrast to that of Bald1vvin or 
~ Chamberlain. Eden and the policies that he advocated 
could unly count. upon the support ot· a li1ni ted group of 
back-benchers, ·,vi Gh the result that 'I/hen the dif'f·erence s 
. over foreign policy betw~en Eden and Chamberlain led to 
Eden's resignation, the repercussions of that act upon the 
Conservative Party and British foreign policy v1ere almost 
negligible, despite the great popula.rity of' Ee.en among the 
masses a.t home and his great reputati9n abroad. The 
isolation ofl Eden within and \Vithout of·t·ice vvithin the 
Conservative Party was a factor that limited the ability 
of Eden to shape t·oreign policy according to his own concepts 
, of floreign policy ancl to bring his public reputation to bear 
\Ni thin Parliament. John Connell notes that upon 
Eden's accession to the Foreign Office 
tt ••• there v1ere many 1vvho \¥ere du-bious or subterraneously hostile. His popular fame was vast and· justly earned; but it did not, at this ti1ne, stir many echoes in the citacels of power in his own ~arty. To many Conservatives Eden seemed to be the showy spokesman 2nd exponent of many trends and tetendencies in international affairs of which they had a deep, instinctive mistrust. It was not in there view at all healthy that he was so loudly praised in progressive circles., Right-vvinge1~s like Leo Amery regarded him ble2kly." 141 
.Appeasement of Itc1ly and Germany was the policy that 1·oun~ 
the strongest response Nithin the r2nks of the Conservative 
members, appeasemenc whether it be in Abbyssinia or Spain. 
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There can be little argument with the statement of' 149.ckintosh: 
''Ch8.mberlain' s policy VJ a_s vvelcomed -by his party and 
by ·t11e public until J.939 9 a.nd even to then there v1ere· 
f'evv doubtso The 011ly ministerial critic of~ his earlier 
a.ctions hr~d ·been l/fro Eden Etnd l1e did notl1ing to 1~8.lly 
the di ssia_e11t s or to build up a dif~f·erent s. t ti tu_de to 
the assumptions on \Vhicl1 tl1e Go,rernn1ent vs policies 
\vere based" .At tl1e time of rnunich Du1·1· Cooper, Vifal ter 
Elliot and Oliver Stabley accepted the idea of ceeding 
the- Sudetenland to G·ermany 9 and \Vere unhappy rn.erely 
over the rnethods that vvere adop e·d and tl1e gu8.r8_ntees 
a.nd cornpe11sations o:. f'ered to Czechoslovakis.o In the end, 
only Duf~f Coope1'2 resigned and he fot1.nd little response to 
his a.rguments a o o The interesting fa.ct about the pmicy 
of appeasement is not the odd objection that it encountered 
bu that Chamberla.in could ··enduce such fervent support 
·~it among the ranks and the leaderhsip of the Conserv-
a tl ve Party. " 142 
· · 
Appeasement as a solution to the problem of' the challenge 
to the status quo made by Germany, Italy, Japan and even 
Fra.nco in Spain WRS ·the policy that seemed to the great 
majority of people in Britain to accord to ·the facts of 
Britain's position in the 1Norld in the Thirties. There is. 
much truth in Du:ff Cooper's characterisation of the 
Ehglishman as disliking "· •• cold logic or facing hard 
facts. The English love postponement and have a genious for 
143 
compro111ise. '' The English desirt. to seek a pragmatic sol-
ution through the application of logic, reason and good 
f'ai th to a problem can, when any solution appears to have 
•, 
undesirable consequences, lead to the tendency to avoid 
seeking a solution to the problem altogether. This 
tendency points out Duff Cooper was especiBlly evident duri'g 
the Thirties, when the British people " ••• believed, as they 
alv11ays do, that war is a feart·ul catastrophe that must -oe 
avoided at almost any cost. Their minds had not been 
'.' , _____ ,.. __ ~ -- - .. ~ ·"'"'''<_.,.,_ ... , .·~- .... ~- -•-• .. - .~ .. , .. -··1·".·-······ ,, ____ ,.,_ :',,~: .. ·:-·"······· ... :·_~-,.--·--;, .. --
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prepared to- ~accept the idea tha.t any immediate danger 
existed. To talk as if it did seemed to them univi se, 
rash and almost indecent - just as in cases of serious ill-, 
ness there are certR.in dread \VOrds, which men he.si ta.te to 
use, 8.s though th.e mere use o:r them may evoke vvhat is 
\ 
dreaded. So at this time men preferred to go on muttering 
va.gue generalisations about the Lea_gue of Nations and 
the Treaty of Locarno, as if they still meant real 
144 
living things and were not mere dead, empty words." 
One may attempt to place the blame on statesmen without 
statescra.ft, lea.ders who did not lesd, and that section J 
of the press which embarked on a deliberR.te policy of G. 
deceiving the public as to the tue state of the inter-
145 
national situation, but it would be very difficult to 
support the proposition that appeasement was foisted on the 
public b,y a small group of Conservative policia.ns. Lord 
Ism8.J1 gives us this remarka-oly honest appraissal of .. his 
./ 
t·eelings d.uring the conclusion of the Munich crisis: 
"The sa.nds \Vere running out, -out tha.t very af .. ternoon 
""Chamberlain mPcie his drama0ic annomicement in the House 
01· Commons thnt he v1s.s making yet a.nether journey to 
Germany s.t Hitle1~'s invi~Letion. Once s.gain one dared 
that vvEtr might -be avoided; and vthen Ch8mber1Bin returned 
tvvo days la.ter v1hen the neviTs that al 1 ·Na.s settled, 
l 
the sense of relief was overpowering and almcst universal. 
For myself) 9 I g9_ve little thought at that 
moment to the price that h8.d been paid 9 or to the prob-
ability that the reprieve w2s only temporary. All that 
ma.ttered \Vas tha.t the dreaded ex1-)losion 9 ;vhich ha_d seemed 
so i1nmi11ent 9 had at la.st ~been pos-'cphonedo I v1as in no 
mood f;or 1=t1rther vlork that evening 8.nd v:ent home 
feeling light of herrtoooOn that evening, I derended 
'l.mD.ich vii th the g1 ... e2~ter.t o:e vigour 9 B_na. ths.t every af~ter- · 
warus I y12.s so ashamed of it ths t I deliberstely put \my 
head in the sand. I ref·used to allovl myself; to think 
about it,. still less to discuss it." 14.6 
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It can be said, therefore, that Britain was divided 
in its immotional reaction to the Spanish conf~lict, 
but not in the desire to rem~in outside ~of-a new world 
. war. Propo.ga.nda a.nd mass conununication o:r a bloody 
.. 
conflict created for the.majority ·of British people 
a -belief in the justness o:f the repu·blican cause. 
However, the ~eft in Britain were no longer the 
.. 
proletarian masses of the _Victorian England, ·but .a new 
suburbia mo,ring into the ds\m o:f ~ffluence.- The 
remaining vestiges of the industrial proletariat 
were confined to the fringe areas or South Wales, the 
North East and Clydeside. The activists in both 
political P~rties were a powerless minority unable 
tp divert their leaderships from non-intervention 
in Spain. The control of Bevan and Cham·berlain v1as too 
great. The majority \Vere theref)ore in f'avour of doing 
nothing even while being continuously pre2ched to 
by ~the Le:ft (and even a fevv f·rom the Right) on the 
immorality or \Veakness of inaction·. \Vhile not :pre-
pared to act, the people of Britain felt themselves 
to be guilty of inaction. This leil:·:~to a_ guilt co1nplex 
and the creation of tensions within British society. 
~n addition, vvhile the1·e was a general desire. to 
gain the benefits of peace, there also existed a general 
tendency not to accept the price of the avoidance of ·«ar. 
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Honour cannot be maint8.ined without 1;var i:f that vvhich 
one eauates with honour has to be ret2ined by force of. 
\\ \ arms •. _ 1vlcCallum t·ells us that " 1r.he average Englishman;·-
••• did realise, more clearly perhaps than his . 
Conservative ruler·s~ that .Mussolini v1as a tyrant and 
Englishman have quite a good nose for the genus tyrant 
. 
since the days vvhen t.hey confronted Napoleon and the days 
·vvhen the·y lea.rned to love Pal1nerstone for .giving de.spots 
147 
the rough edge o:t' his tonge." Appeasement of:rered 
little oppo:rb..uitf :rcr humbling dictators, 
instead- involving the accession of Britain to the demands 
... 
w of the dictators (even ·the ruler of the des~ised Italiann). 
Britain·had to watch as small nationa were swallowed and 
the principlesof the Covenant :Clouted. Thus serious 
tensions were created within Britain ~Y the inability, 
,....i, 
end unwillingness of the British to enforce what was 
felt to be demRnded by the honour or the country, ten-
sions which were heightened by the division of the country 
into socio-economic classes. When the French prematurely 
\ ,, (JP, leaked ©the content of the Hoare Laval ple_n·r, a plan \Vhich 
reflected the basic desires of the British people for the 
pe~;ceful solution of problems, Hoare v1e.s sacrif'iced to 
the storm ot· indignation \rVhich s1Jvept the country and made 
the scapegoat to ease tl1e national conscience. Durf 
Cooper illustrates the con·Lradictory nature ot' the 
motivations behind British attitudes to roreign af'fairs 
at this time: 
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"The British people vvere very angry with Mu.ssolfni and very sorry f 1 0:r the Emperor of Abyssinia, but they were not prep8_red to give g1flounds for v1t~~1~ to the __ or1ner OT· ef'f·ective help to the lattero Sir Stlll1U8.l I-Ioare and Monsieu1~ L,8.Val sought i.o give sl1rpe to -these se11ti-
·men ts ·by an 2greement vvhicl1, 'Nhile hfu'!Cl i ng o·ve1--. tt1e subst2nce ofl Abyssinic1 to Italy, v1ot1la_ have _left a shadov1y remnent to the Ernperor o o a But ·bef"ore the Duce had time to declare himself there arose a howl of indignatio11 fJrom the 1;eorJle of· Grea.t Brits.in. During 1ny experiance of politics I have never 
"Ni tnes ed so devest.?tin,g a vtJave of' public opinion. Even the e2sy=going constituents of Sta Georges di vision vvere prof·oundly moved~ 1/tf posr,--oag \rvBs ftull m d the letters I received v1ere not vvrit·ten by ignorPnt or emotional,_ people -but by responsi-ble . citizens vvho had_ given sober tl1.ought of' ~he ma.tte,r." 148 
Just as thaPpolicy of the Government towards Spain was 
formulated in the framework of the Governments attitude 
to Italy, so the reactions of many people in Britain to 
the Spanish conflict were t·ormed in the light of their 
attitudes to Italy • 
.A.s we have already seen the Spanish civil WEir \Vas 
ievved in very emotion8l terms a.nd becPme intermixed 
'f 
in the fra-bric 9f ciass :reeling within Bri ta_in. The 
social consciences or the majority of people within 
Britain had been stirred by the struggles of' the 
SpPnish people 2.gainst ·what appear·ed to be the ever 
growing tide of Fascist aggression. only a 
minority were prepared to see Britain aptively ·help the 
Spanish people, symp?..thy overflov1ed in a torrent ~:r 
words.. 72 per cent of the British people \rvere in sym:ItthY. 
vvi th the R·epU:blica.n cause, as against 9 per cent for the 14.9 
Nationalists. Thus,, the British Government, in f 4ollowing 
out their policy of" non-intervention were continuously 
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aware of the tension created vd thin the country \... 
. .......... ,.·~·····, 
·by the. contradiction between the emotional outlook 
of the British people tov1ard the Spanish conflict and the 
policy or the British Government f~rr:"med iri terms o~ 
I 
more rational appraisal of British.interests. 
Sympsthy f 1or the Ns_tionalist ca.use 111as not able to 
0 determine the direction .of -Bri ti s·h policy tovtEtrd Spain -
this was determined by the general frBmework of the 
appeP.sement o:C It8.lY and Germa11y, but tl1is syrr1pathy 
vvas able to detern1ine in p2.r the method by \Vl1ich 
the policy \VB.s implemented and the timing. 
One peculiar aspect or British policy tow8rd Spain 
\V8.s the devolion la.vished upon the comic-f·aree of· the 
·Non-Intervention Commit tee e sta·olisheci. to oversee ·the 
policy of non-intervention that had been adopted by 
t/he intern8tional cornmtini ty follO'ilii ng an enq_uiry -by the 
French of the German, BelgiRn, Portuguese, Russian, and 
Polish Governments regarding the matter of a declaration 
of non-intervention in the af'fairs of) Spain, an enqt1iry 
undertaken according to Wilson, the American Charge in 
150 France, "lar~y on the advice of tre British •••• " 
, There is no intention at this point to trace the 
ilhglorious history of) the Comrni ttee, but ra.ther to 
of'f1er a fe\>V contemporary, and po st-contem.pora_ry vievvs,-
.. 
o:r the Committees activities. The Economist o:f 
Septem-ber 12, 1936, af·ter ·describing the onward march 
of· Fr nco to·;vard YL:r,.drid, conti11ued: 
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"Meanvvhile, the French Plan for secu1,,ing the 
cessatio11 of· all aid to e i:tlJS r sicie i11 Spsin_ by other Governments 9r.th8ir nat~onals in patently in suspended snim2tion largely owing to the attitu~e of Portugal 
·=·nd I·t;aly o · Both Po;vers 2greed 'in princiI)le f 'but pleacLed ignor.?11.ceo:f 'the pJ:eci~:_:e scope' o ·the 1)18.n. As a r,2sult, rnor·e It~1 lian sup1)lies of· aePop_Lnnes and 
vvar ma. teri r: ls 1~or tl1.e re·oe 1 tor·ce s have ·oe e11 ·r;e por'"' ed dur·in£~ ·the past ~11/1-__el{ to 112.vebet:;11 la11c1.ed in ·vigo and Lisbor1, f·or tr?_nsi t into Sp211ish ter1,.i tory. 011 Wed11esday trie f~ir·st · 1neeti11g of the 'International Corrunittee fjor the Applic2.tion of the .Agreement r~egard-ing Non-I11tervention in Spain' prove cl a fruitless as its title is i1nposing - the clie,cussio11 ·Nr-:1s re_ported by 9_n august conten1por)2~rY to be 'prosaic' - ill8_inly bec~iuse tl1~mg]j. tJj.e 26 European countries v1ho have imposed 
a.n ernbargo vvere repr~esented, Po1:tug.9_l vva.s the only 
absenLeeo (Incidently it seems strange that while Vi::::cow"'lt Cra.11bouri11e, U11d.er-Secret2ry· f'or Foreign Af'fairs, \Va.s tl1e British 1~eprc senta.ti ve, the Chairman o:f this irnportr.nt Eu1·opean Cammi ttee v1as 1~. V'l .S. 1\fiorrison, tl1e Financim Secreta.ry to the British Treasury.) The Committee therefore recorded its desire to meet a.g9iri at some f~uture date." 
On October 17, 1936, in reporting the deteriorating 
position of1 the Republicans in· the face of the 
.;iaterial superiority of the N?tionalists, the Econo-
mist concluded that 
ttThe ef·f·ective pan on supplies to the Spanish-. Government \Vhich the so-called non-inter .. ention pact constitutes is clearly at present the greatest 
·asset of" the rebels." 
HP.lifax in his memoirs g.ui . e cE1ndily adrni t.s that the 
Commjttee did not, and was not designed to, live-up to 
its imposing title: 
"The immediate practica.l va.lue ofi the Couuni ttee on 1~.nd, as opposed to its action 8.gainst su·b1nn.rines, 
wa.s not gr~at. I doubt ·Nhetl1er a single man or~ gun less rer4ched either side in the \Var as a resul .. , o!") its activities. What, however it did do was to keep 
such intervention as there Vias entir·ely unofficial, 
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to be denied or at least deprecated by the responsible 
spokesn1a.n of~ the ns.tion concerned, so th8.t the e 1:va.s 
neit11er 11eed nor oc,casion f 1or 8ny o:tt·icic.l act ·by Governrnen-ts to suppo1'>t their na,JGiox1alsQ After rnaki11g 
every a.llo1vv211ce f;or~ the unreB.li ty 9 n1rt:e---believe, and discr~dit that c2me to a tech Lo the Non~interven~ion Conunittee 9 I tl1ink this clevice f~or lor1ering the 
temperature caused by the Spanish fever justified itself~"" 151 
Ivan Nfilisky who was in the frustrating position ofa being 
.., 
the Soviet representative to the Non-intervention 
Committee (\vhose experiences bear a remarl{a.ble resemblence 
to thoFe of Alice in Wonderland) descri·bes some of~ the 
devices employed by the Committee, under the lead of 
first Morrison and them Lord Plymouth - the Bri ish 
repr~sent2tives, to ensure that nothing in the work 
of' the Committee should stir the interest 01) anyone 
following its activities: 
"At the meeting or 14 Septemberthe British represent-
ative, W. S. Morrison, proposed that a Chs.irma.ns 
permens.nt Sub-Corn.mi ttee should be set UpJ. to consist 
of') the delegates of· those countries \Vhich 1~vere producers 01· a.rman1ents or -boclered on Spriin. The of·1·iciEll task 
01· the Sub-comrnittee \Vt~s ·billed as tl1e preparation 
!~o the full Coinmit,tee, vvith all 27 co1111·tries represent-
ed, to discuss later and decide upon. This proposal kooKed very innocent and even quite rstional • 
••• But in actual fact th~ intention here was something_ dirferent. As soon as }brrison ~nd Corbin had made 
their speeches supported this proposal the suspicion 
came involunt2rily to mind tha.t Bri t2.in arti France 
were trying to keep all matters connected with non-
intervention within the narrowest possible circle, 
where everything could be discussed 'within the 
fa.rnily'. For the 1 s2.n1e reasons Morrison insisted 
1he11 · the decision to :Corm a_ Sub=,corruni t tee o:r none 1nen:mrs had been taken, that stenographic notesof the 
Sub-conun.itteeils meeti11gs should not -oe n19_de, only 
'>a brier record_ of· decisions takl,n. 
Future prBctice fully co11i1ir1ned the ·rightness of 
our suspicions. 
"To~ sta.rt \Vi th, the main· activity of· the Comrni ttee 
was concentrated in its plenary sessions. In the 
course ·or Septeniber and Octo-oer 1936 ~ there \Vere 
., 
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14 plenr ry sessions, v1hile the Sub-committee met . 17 times, 8.nd Etll its 111eeti11gs at t11at period vtere 01~· a preparcrtory nature. 
"Later on ·tl1e si tua.tion -began to cl1.2.nge : in 
· 1937 there vier~ lL~ plenG.ry sessions ca_lled 9 1JVhile the Sub=-cornn1i t·tee met 69 tin1es., Novi all the 1nost import?11t questions vver~e ·bei11g (1iscussea_ 2.nd declcled u1Jon in the Sub-conuni ttee 9 a11d the plertry 
meetinfs \V') s gradu8_lly t11rned into a voti11g~ 1nachine 
·~vhich si111ply 11u·obe1,., sta1nped the decisions ta.ken in the Sub~comrnitteeo 
"In 1938 the1~e are 17 meetings,~.of' the Sub-committee 
and::one plenary meeting. 
"The f1igt1res speak for themselves. It v1a·s pert·ectly 
obvious Lh2t not only Italy and Germany, but Britain 
and France as well, were trying to keep everything that had to do with the war in Spain as far as possi.ble 1·ro1n the eyes of vvorld public opinion, including the eyes or the members of the Committee· 
ror 'Non~intervention'. 
"Another 1~act is no less signif''icant. At the very first 1neeti11g oi; the Cammi ttee, on 9 September 9 1.9,]6 llb!erisorr:. {aga:tll.4~~ on -oehalf~ ot· Britain, declG.red 'It is e11.tirely for the Cornmittee to decideooGJf·or my pa.rt, I would suggest that we get on very well in private'. 
"And once agB.in 11ot one of· the members o:f the Corrunittee representtng a bourgeois count11 y said a word in opposition. The result was a decision that at the 
end of~ eacl1 meeti11g the.tie Yvould only be a short 
of·t~icia.l co1mnunique ~ v1hich V/8.s to -be o:f a I general' 
a character as possible, that is, 1."12s to sa_y 11othing ••• 
" (The) question o:f the 'leakage' o:f inf')o rm3_t ion fron1 ·t11e four v1a_lls of the Committee became a. conste.nt 
sore point at all the plens.ry sessions and Sub--comm-i ttee meetings. I had t·roiii time to time. to f"ight 01·t· the attacks of the Gre2t Power's representatives, 
especially those of· Bri t2.in, Germany and Italy. At last things ole\ll/ up into a maJor rovv, ·v91hich took place at the 1neeting of~ the Sub-committee on 7 1~y 1937. 
"The British representative, Lord Plymouth, took it upon himself to fire the opening shot. He made a long sp ... ech, in vvhich he turnea_ the 1·u11 force or his \Vrath upon the 1rvretched 'inforrners 1 -and declared in the rnost categoi"ic2l langu2.ge that Britain could 
not allov1 the Comn1ittee to be tu1-ned into 'a.n · instru1nent of propog8.nda u o Plyn1outh proposed a 
resolution,. to be given the v1idest posf;i-ble pu-olicity, that the sole o-b jecti ve source of· inf·o~r_')mrrtion on the 
vvork of the Con1mittee v1as to -be f·ound in the comnruniaues 
. 
-vvhici1 it regulRr·ely issued." 153 The Conunittee as 
~3.isky puts it "should be ,like -che idea.l Japanese ·~vife,. 
vvho sees no.thing, hears nothing:, a.nd sa.ys no thing." 154 
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Britain's attitude to the· Committee as demonstrated, 
.rJ I 
by ].fu.i sky above \Vas not rnerely a f·urc tion of· a de sire 
• 
by the British decision-makers ~o remo, e the Spanish· 
conf'lict .from sight and mind, but vva s·· .. rather a f'unction 
o:r the :fact that the direction, am· method of implem-
entation, or British-policy towa~d the Spanish conflict 
bore an intimate relationship to the structuring of 
public opinion \Ni thin Britain, and the problems presented 
by th_e i:riBraction. of the Sp8nish con:rlict and the 
!J;ntern8_tio11.'?ll community. There were in r"act t·wo s--- ts 
of ternperatures that had to be controlled the temperature 
' \ •.. 
. of the pro-Republican sympa.thy, \IVhich was rei·nt)orced 
by ~eeling of outraged national honour; and the 
.. 
... 
temper2ture of the 'internRtional community which was 
inflamed ·by the various reactions of the international 
actors iD the Spanish Civil \Var. We shall also consider 
later that the British attitude toward the Non-intervent-
ion Cammi ttee \Va.s also a function, in pa.rt, of a feel·ing ,.;.<Pl 
among British decision-makers that far more could be done 
through th~ traditional channels of diplomatic intercourse 
. th[1.n could be achieved in the Committee,\. \Vher the 
presence antagonistic ideologies andthe large number 
of states represented would preclude the achie ement ot' 
an amica-ole compromise bet\veen conf'licting posi,tions. 
Woermann, the German Charge d~Affairs in London 
reported on November 27, 1936, that: 
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ttI kn.ow from statements 1118.de in an a.uthori tati ve.-Bri ti sh Government seas in the embargo com1ni t·tee a use1·u1 rnea.ns of· B.voiding possi-bili ties of· con11 lict and tha·t it is therefore encoura.g;ing a.s dila.tory act,ion a.s possi~Dle on the pa.rt of the co1nn1i tte~. At the same tin1e, the e1cist8.nce of' the conunittee offers tJ1e Governi"Ilent a comfort:? .. ble shield age.inst Pa.rliamentary pressure sou 155 
On September 9, 1936 Bisrna.rck, the then Charge d' .AffJairs 
in London had reported 01· the first mee~ing of· the 
Non-intervention Committee that 
ttToday' s meeting let·t the impression tha.t · \Vi th France and England, the tvvo pov,ers primBrily interested in the committee, it is.not.so much a question of· f:tctuB~lly taking; steps immedi8tely as of pacifying the aroused reeling of the Let·tist p8.rties in -both countries -oy the very ests.-blishment of· such a committee." 156 
That the policy or attempting to make the Spanish 
conflict into a less controversial domestic political 
auestion with Britain achieved some success can be .... 
seen from this report by Woermann of January 20, 
1938: 
I , 
11 In general, the politics has been taken out 01~ the committee to a great extent during the past f"ew months. This has had the result tha.t tl1e interest 
...; ot'· the British public l1a.s greatly decreased. The time i.s p~st when photographers would stand outside the door ·bef'ore e2.ch session and vi.hen the ~ r4 ess carried columns of· reports, some true and ro me 
.f·alse, about the sessions. It Cftn return at any time of course. Apparently the main point of contention, na.mely', the q_uestion vvhether the volunteers are to ·be ·,Ni thdrErvvn or not, is no 
' 
I 
.... 
longer considered a vit2l question even in England."157 
One function of the Non-intervention Committee 
therefore as far as the British Government _vvas conc~rned 
was to ·def·lect cirticism f'rom the British Government 
:rrom -r,hos \Vi thin Britain v1ho 1·e1 t that victory of· the 
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Republicans represented either an ethical good or 
. ! .••...•• 
a vi ta.l interest of· Britain. Just a t·ew of the many 
examples can -oe-- cit~~ d to ·show .. the 1·urc t ion that the. 
Non-intervention Cammi ttee served in the House of) 
CowJUons: on November 5, 1936, the Foreign ![inister, 
Anthony Eden, in· reply to a ·auestion ·by Mr. 
1 W. Roberts asking for in:for-1118. tion 1;-vi th regard 
to Italian armed ·intervention tn Spanish af·t)airs 
in the B,alearic Islands, replied 'Such authoritative 
information as has come_into the possession of His 
Maje sty's Government has· been laid by them bef)ore the 
International Corrunittee, and it would not be proper 
to make a st2tement :1hile the committee is still 
r 158 
examining t.his inf·orm_Rtion." Onl4 February, 1938, 
.· Mr. Noel Baker asked 1'or1 int·ormntion on vvhether 
troops with drawn unde./ the Non-intervention Committee 
.. \ 
plan v1oulcl take their arms and ammunition \Yi th them, and 
whether the pls.ns extented to foreigners serving in the 
naval f·orces o:f the tv110 parti(_s, and received 1his reply 
· f 1rom Eden: "As I have freouently inf'ormed the House, the 
p:roaeedings of) the Non-intervc..ntion Committee are 
confidential. I am not, there:t-.ore at liberty to make 
a st8_t,emeiJ.t in rega.rd to matters which are under 
. 159 
·discussion by that body." 
.. 
Cla.ude Boviers ( the United States Anfoassador· in Spain, 
and it must be actmi tted, an ardent proponent o!· the Re-
publican ca.use) has me_de the serious cha.rge that the 
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a_ri tish Government 'Nas guilty of deliberate miq:repr~sen-
tation in the House o~ Commons: 
I\ 
) 
0 Bri tish ministers vve1~e assuring the House of ·· · ... 
Conunons, on their res1)011si-bj lity as 1hinisters 
01· tl1e Crov?n 9 thct t they l1a.d Ono infior~Jrfx tion' 
tha.t any Ita.lians 1uve1.·e in Spa.ino I lrr1ev1 that the 
·British E~bassy in Hendaye was informing London to 
the contrary o 00 160 It is ina_eed dl:ffricul t to 
reconcile the official denials by Eden of knowledge 
01· the nationality 01· subma~rines v1hich \Vere sinking 
shippi11g trPcting v1ith tl1e Repu-olican side in Spain v1i th this message sent -by 1\feurath ( the 
German Foreign J1riinister) to the Ger'n1an Em-bassy in Italy~ "Please inf~orm Ci8.no pe1'asona.lly th8.t it 
a.1/pears 1~ro1n a st2'teme11t mGde ·by the Bri·tish 
Ambassa.ctor l1ere tha_t ti1e British have intercepted and decipl1e1~ed radio messagi._,s o:t· Ita.lian submB.rines 
operati11g in the lviedi terraneano "161 
The ans\ver must -be that naeessity is the mother 
of invention, the necissi ty in t11is case being 
illistrated by this conversation between 
Lloyd George and de ~hdariaga: 
'' (Doyd George) The pre sent Cabinet will not be 
:forgiven f 1or humbling Englaral before Italy. You 
will see in the General Election of 1939, as 
Disraeli found in 1880Q There are deep-rooted instincts in the English people, tha.t you 
cannot of)f~end '1Ni th impunity e They have not -oeen 
accustomed to bow to the Italians. This led 
Madariaga to quote a version of' Shakespeare 
which he ~ad passed to .Anthony Eden on July 4, 
at Geneva, in the Abyssinia.n de.bate. 
'To speak or not to speak - that is the question. 
vVhether 'tis be st to svrallo1vv the unsv1allov1a ble Uttering words which spit it out in form 
While its foul su·bst2.nce poisons our entrails, Or in a sable silence bury a deed · 
Which, seen, is an insult to the pure -Heavens.'" 162 
Tht=tt in t·act the., inability of sections or the British 
public to s·Nallow concessions to the Italians did act as. 
aslimi ting boundry to the freedom o:f action of· the 
British Go,,ernment can be seen from these ext·racts. On 
JUile 2., 1937 the Turkish Ambas~ador called on Ciano (the 
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Ita.liari Forei'gn Mi11ister) · ,vith the follov1ing message 
' '\- ' from his (the Turkish) Foreign 1/Iin,ister: 
"During 8_ conversation vii th Eden at Geneva, Rustu Ara.s( the Turl.{:ish Foreign Minister) gainea .. the impression that the English G~overnmenMt intends - to m2.ke &ery et·fort 11ecesss"ry to reacl1 a c Qjnplete understa11ding ¥ifitl1 Its.lyo If the1·e is a delay, it is d1..1e to the :fa.ct tl1a.t large sections of English public opinion are still hostile to Fascismo Eden had9 however9 declared that as soon as the recent controversie s l1ad, su-bsia_ed, it was his intention to mak~ a statement to the Corm11ons a.in1ea_ at re stori11g in f·u11 the Nie di terrB.nean . . Agreement of· January s.nd at preparing the basis 1·or a v1ider Anglo°"Italian understrinding. "163 
On June 17, 1938, Halifax (the British Foreign Minister) 
instructed Perth (the British Ambassaclor in Rome) to 
make clear to Ciano 
" ••• that a settlement ot· the Span~sh question must pi·ecede. the entry into force of che Agreement (the .Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16, 1938)~ and the Prirne 1\lini ster has gi ve11 def'ini te pledges on this point. The dif·1·1c11l ty reraa.ins 01· def'ining what constitues a settlement of the Spanish ahestion. British public opinion cannot be ignored~ As Count Ciano v1ill be avrare, the .Agree1nent vvas not tm.i ver-s-ally pop·u.lar at the tirne of signatur'e. In the la.st rortnight the situation has deteriorated to a marked extent ovving to the -bombing o:r tovvns and ships in Spain 9 for which the British public holds, rightly or v1rongly, the· I-tPli8.n Ai.1-.if·cr ce in Spain in Pctrt at least responsi.bleo It is theref·ore out 01· the question 8.ny vvaining of the pre-condition on v1hich the coming in·to 1·orce ot· the i\gree1nent vvas mr1de dependent o 19 On Octc ber, 3, 193& Perth inf·o rnE d Ciano that a necess?ry preconaition to the J\.greement coming into force 1J1101.1ld be a 'Ni tha_rs.vval of~ Ite,lian f~orces from Spain on a .scs.le 1nhich "vvould strike pu-olic opinion" 165 
It could be argued that British insistence toward the 
Italians of the d:lf.f'iculties presented by British public 
opinion was mei·ely a device to gEi_in a ·better ·bargaining 
position by.presenting the British Government as being 
unable, because of' this factor, to grant any f~urther 
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concessions. This report, however, by Woermann to the 
German Foreign· Mini~ter of a meeting of· the~- main 
subcommittee of the Non-In1rarvention Committee held on 
March 31, 1938 revea.ls a similar preoccupation v1ith 
public opinion: 
"The meeting v1as obviously called by Plymouth pr·i11cipally in order to demonstrate to. British public opinion that the ,/.rorl{ of~ the l\fon=-Intervention Committee j.s progre ssi11g o Pro·bably 110 one believes any longer that a iJVi thdrav1al of' the ,,olunteers can ·oe 
actually carried out by the methods o~ the present 
plano Plymo·uth hinted csutiously th8t he had his dou-ots regEtrd.ing tl1e vvhole plan 9 by dropping the b~sual remark that he was aware that the latest 
events in Spain had clearly put the work of the 
conunittee in a somevvh8t di:fferent light." 166 
The plan referred to was the British proposal for the 
wi thdrc1v,al of, volunteers :rrom Spain 1vvhich wi 11 be del t 
with later, the evants in Spain casually remarked 
upon were air raids carried out on Barcelona, 
personally ordered ·by J,lussoli11i 'to the great 
167 
indignetion' or Franco. Stohrer (the German .Anfoass-
ador in Spain) descri·bed the effect of the air raids 
thus: 
''I hear from Ba.rcelona that the results of the 
recent 8i r ra.1ds on Barcelona carried_ out by 
Italia.n -bombers ·vvere nothing less than terri.ble. Almost all pa.rt s of) 0he city \iirere af·f·ected"' There 
was no·. evidence of any atternpts to hit mili tB.ry 
· objectives in B.s.rcelona" H1.Uld1,,eds o:f houses ani 1vvhole streets a.te s2id to have ·been a.estroyed by 
the bombs ·'.Jvhich vvere evidently of .. a pa.rticul8.rly dasGrictiva typec So far 1 9 000 dead·have been 
collllted; it is assumed9 however 9 that many more dead ~vill be found -beneath tl1e ruinso The number 
of wounded is estim2ted at over 3,000- One bomb is 
said to have killed a whole group of women waiting in line to get their millk ra.tions, while another one 
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struck a subv1ay entr8.nce and tore to pieces1 the people who had sought refuge their ••• 
f ''According to v1ha.t I hear, the Red leaders in France are making good use of the heR.VY losses suf'f·ered by the civili8.n popule.tion in Barcelonao o e1Among tl1e inte1~na.tione.l jo11rnslists v1l10 he.ve seen, the results 014) the air re.J .. cls in Barcelona there is the grea.tes i indignstion 9 vJhicr1 is a.ppa.rent i11 the repo1~ts they have sent. their paperso In these circles it is said to ·be the conviction thst the ind_iscrin1ina.te dtln1ping or l>orn-os on the city of Barcelona Vlei s principctlly a mater of experirnenting 'fvi th the nevi bombs,,, rv 168 
.Following these raids, Ribbentrop reports that 
Count Magistrati (the Italian Councelor of Embassy 
in Berlin) informed him that Perth had transmitted 
an aide memoire \FJ'hich stated: 
-.-' 
tt ••• the reports rega.rding the bombing atta.cks on Barcelona by General Fr8.nco ts It8lian airplanes h2"d crea-ted a sens8_tion in Engle.nd. In viev1 of British public opinion it would ·be difficult in case of repetition of' such attacks to -~lJ:f~ing the negotiatio11s Jtith Ita.lY to a succesE-~1·u1 co11c lusio11. T11e British Government req_~ested tl1e Italia.n Gover11Jnent to exert its in1~1uence on General Franco to the end that such 
, bombing at ta·cks v1ould be discontinued in the f'uture. 
"The E2.rl of Perth had added that a delicate situation 1~vould B_rise f;or Chamberlain in case the bombing a.ttacks did not cease. u 169 
It must always be born in mind that one cannot 
consider British attitudes toward Italy in vacuo, 
especially when Chamberlain became the British Prime 
Minister: British policy became directed toward a 
.. comprehensive programme of appeasement in v1hich the 
-L, ·'. 
problems presented by Hitler, liussolini and, Franco became 
.> 
inter11oven. Chamberlain v1rote to his si·sters tm t, in 
regard to the question o_:r British ships being bomba.rded 
in Spanish ports, I have·been through every possible 
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form of relatia·t,ion and it is abundantly clear 
-tha.t none of. them ca.n ·be ef'fective unless v1e"k·are 
( 
., 
I 
prepa.red to go to vvar. \¥ith Fraco, v1hich @ight quite 
possi-bly lead to w2.r \Vi th Ita.ly and Ger.many, and in 
.. 
' 
any case would cut right across my policy or general app-
·~~-- ;•- { · : ·::,-+ 170 4.,; ,:,~ ,.> • •0 .. ' ) L' .:.. "" 
easement." Failing quotes Chamberlain as stating · 
that "If only ·1vve could get on terms \Vith the Germans, 
171 
I \VOuld not care a rap- for Musso. tt In Chamberlain •·s 
mind thererore Anglo-It2lian relations were of far to 
cruitial import~nce the German-Italian relations were 
of· 1·ar to cruial importance to the question o~· vvhether 
Europe v1ould be a·ble to survive the Germ8_n-It2.lian 
challentge to the status quo \Vithout a major \Var 
which would destroy the Europe that those who lived 
-in the thirties knew, for false protestations on the 
impediment placed by public opinion on the f 11 reedom or 
British action, to ha.ve a place in British diplomacy. 
This entry in ChB.niberlain' s Dia.ry, vvri tten in 
IJ 
early February, '1938, v1hile Eden adamantly put 
fori.,vard the view that It2.ly must make a signif'icant (?, 
,•lg . 
wi thdra\ival of volunteers f"rom Spain be:fore conversations 
could begin, illustrB.tes the linkage ot' t·oreign 
Jll'blems in Chamberlain's mind: 
"To intimate novt tha.t this. was not the moment for 
convers2tions to begin would be to convice Mussolini 
tha.t he must consider t2.lks v1ith·us of)f, and act 
accordingly ••• It2lian ptiblic opinion would be raised 
to o. \Vl1i te he8t ag2inst us o T"nere n1ight indeecl ·by 
some overt act of hostility, a.nd ,in a_~y ca2,e the 
dictatorships vvould be c1ri ven closer together, 
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the last s·hred of· Austri.an independence ~:,ould be lost, the Balks.n countries 1Nould feel co1npel1ed to ., turn· to-l:v8_ra~s their po{re1")f·u1 neit~noou1~s, Czecl1oslovakia 
v1ot1ld be S\Vallo-vved9 Fr211.ce 7JOt1-lcI either hs ... ve to submit to Ger.in1~ domi.11,;-~tion 01-a f·ight 9 in \.Vhich case r1e 
shou.ld~ a ... ln1ost certainly be d.1~2v1n in. I could not 1~ace 
the respo11sibility fJor a.llovring such a series o:f 
catastrophes.'' 172 
During a conversB.tion betvveen Count Gr8ndi, Chamber-
lain and Eden oh the 19 February, 1938, Chamberlain 
stated that he would 
''·· .asl{ the Cabinet to be allo;ved to· annour1ce that the Angb-Italian conversations have been of'f')ici2lly beglU1 \Vithout ~;vaiting t·or a previous solution of' 
specific ]K)blem-s or other pr(:,-co11di tions; In order· 
·· to fs_cili tate my (Chamberlain's) a.t tempt to obtain 
a. unani1nous decision by the Cabinet I ne·ve1~theless · 
ask the Duce to see 1;Vhether he CP.11 declare himselr to ·oe in .A.greement v1ith t 11e Br)i tish f·orn1u~la_:_put 
f 1orvv8.rd by Plymouth nnd Ea_en 011 the specif'ic. subject 
under de.bate in the I{oni=,In, .. ervention Con1111ittee 
_ 
concer'11j_ng belligere11c~r s_nd volunteers C, o o VIJe v1ouJ.d •••• 
then precede as follows: Official opening of the Anglo=Ita.lian conversr.J_tions to be simul t.s.neous vii th 
a st2~ten1ent on the Italian side the Fasci st _ Gover11ment agrees vvi th the British Govern1nent on~tb.e 
to be sub1ni ttea_ later to the Non-Ir1tervention ·_ 
Comrni ttee for discussion and approval.' 
I (Grandi) asked Cham-berlain to make it clear 
whether he meant by that that the conversation would begin immediately and without aw2iting whatever 
mi[~l1t -be the outcome ot· the British proposal in 
the Non-Intervention Committee • 
• 
,.,,--
Chamberlain replied that I had given 
interpreta_tion." 173 
G~·:=~ndi added in his report of' Ciano: ,, 
"To say that Chamberlain v1ill have an easy task 
would be inexact. Eden (who had been opposed to Cl1a.niberla_in during. the convers2.tion) has con his 
side the rnan in tl1e street, or~ the 'historical beasti which is always lur~ing in a large 
sectio11 of> tl1e B1")i Lish people, the Left-='vVi11g 
:parties, Frencl1 ant"i-fa.scisrn an.d Ivia.so111,)y,, ·:ho 
sees in.him the hea.d of the future British 
· Popular Front. 
I ,, 
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_
11All through today, Satu.rda-¥, 19th, the politic al 
atmosphere in London a.nd in the House of Conunons is 
the Sc'tlne as in the days preceding the Hoare-Level 
c.risis ofJ Decernber, 1935 • 
• 
· "Today,· in February, 1938, it is over the subject 
of Italy and of policy iovva.rd It2.ly alone. that 
parties and opinions are excited Bnd divided exactly 
as. they v1ere then, in December, 1935." 174 
· If1 Anglo-Italian talks vvere to continue to a success-
ful conclusion, ther~fore, the 'historical beast' had to 
b~e laid lo\v, and the Spanish question, v1hich ha.d done 
,' 
so much to exacerba.te British public .opinion, had to 
. 
be kept, as fsr as vvas possible, di vorce.d in the pu·b'lic 
mind from the discussions that \Ve1'"ie to be about 
initiated between London and Rome. Eden's resignation 
made Chamberlain's task the more di:ff1icult, since 
it was precisely over this point that Eden had 
~ . \ 
resigned 2.nd ChBmberlain ·had to ad.mi t a.<s much in the 
' 
Commons. Hoerver, by the device of· ostensibly represent-
ing the negotia.tions on the :i thdravval of' Italian 
·volunteers to be taking place in the Non-Intervention 
Committee, 'rVhile in :fact ·the question of· the num-oers 
of Italian volunteers to ·be vii thdra.vm ·~vas a matter 
1·or direct negotiation b.et1vveen the British and Italian 
Foreign Of~rices, Ch$berlain \Va.s able to proceed i.vi th 
the convers8tions ,li th !"7:,a.ly shielded f'rom the eflfects 
of public opinion by the Non-Intervention Committee. 
During the debate in the Conunons ot· February 21, 
~' 1938, Chamberlain, in describing the events that led 
up to Eden's resignation and in particul_ar the 
above conversation with Grandi stated that: 
) 
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"I \VflS convinced that a rebuf'*f· _,,to the Ita.lian expression 'of their desire that conversations· should start at once would be t2ken by them as a confirIB8.tion of those suspicionsooothst 'Ille had never re ally ·been i11 e 2tl')ne st al)o11t tl1e conve1""sationE a.t allo o o l ,,3~} s eq_1.1ally convinced that once the ronversations had started we should f)ind good ef·f;ects of the r1e\V 8.trnosphere in rnany places 9 and not2.-bly in Spain, v1here the chief-dif'f'icul ty ·betv1een us had lain i~or so long. 
.::t ~.~~~ 
,· ,. 
"The Fo1~eign Secretary, on the other hand, 
-~vas 1ll1s.ble to agree to any irnrnecliata. decision. He vrished to say in reply that, in the opinion of His r1Iajesty' s Gove1.,n1nent, the n101nent f;or the icial opening of the ~onversations had not 1 arisen .s.nc1 that ··Ne v1i shed to \Vs.it until a subst:?.ntial vJi thdrav1Eil of· volunteers had 
of"f-
takex1 place o o oAt the same time I told the Ambass2dor (Gra.ndit that I vvished to in1press upon hirn certain points. Fi~st of all I told him that the British,Government regarded a settlement o:e t11e S1Janish q_uestion as an essentia.1 f'eatu1")e o1 .. any agreement at in ich v1e· might arrive o No egreement cruld be considered complete unless it cont8.ined a settlement of the Spanish question." 1-15 
.Chamberlain <DJ.ld hardly have said less. Any 
attempt to have opened the conversations without 
stating that they would be conditional upon a 
settlement of the Spanish -~estion would have raised 
( 
... ·. 
the opposition in f'u.11 cry and maue Chamberlain '-s position 
f'ar more dif'f~icult. On July 26, 1938, Mr. Chamberlain 
made the f'ollo11ving sta.tement to the Hou?e o:f Commons: 
·1· . 
"There is a.nether mc1tter which is bound up vvi th the situation in Spain, and that is the position in regard to the Anglo-Ita.lian Agreement~ o "o v1lhen we entered into negotia.tions 9 vie did so because we thought then, 8.nd iJVe a.re still of the sa1ne opinion 1 that the rest,pration o:e the rela=- ( tions betv1een ItB.ly and this country to the1~ old terms of friendship and confidence would bring us appreciably neB.rer to our ultin1ate airn, ·.vl1ich is a general European sp pea.sement. Vie t·e1 t 8.t the time that the mora.l justifJic-r~.tion for our 
' 'I. 
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recognition of the Italian position in Italy vD uld 
·be the knowledge that the recognition had brougl1t viit.t1 it a real contri-oution to the pe2.ce 
_. of Europe? 1Jlle :felt tl1.at 9 \Vhile t.his conflict wa.s going on in Spain under the sort of co11di tions in_which it has been waged, the Spanish situation 
vvas perpetual menace to the pe'~;Jie of· Europe 9 and it '1V8.S for this reason thB.t i:Ve saia_ that it must be removed t·rom tl1a.t category before our Agreement YI/as brou_gh't into force o It is not our fault 9 a.nd it is not tl1e :f2.ul t of the Italian c:=::=:==---====~··==-==-=-,:==,,=--==--==----== Government, th8.t cona_i tion ha.snot -oeen brought about. T11el hflY:§ .. l~~12t .f~a_i tl1 iNi tl1 us •• ~ They kept 1·u11 "f·ai th\ 
us 9 o o in colla·borB. tion on the Non-Intervention Committee." 176 
This atte.mpt to- distinguish between. the activity 
of the Non-Intervention Committee and Italian policy, 
according to v1hich the pre-conditions 1·or entry into 
force o:r the .Anglo-Itc=i.lian Agreement are dependent 
not on a reversal of, policy by the Italians but on 
the mysterious functioning or the Committee, contrasts 
with the development of British Policy. 
Chamberlain in the debate a-oove had continue.d·: 
"I vvas· .. saying_ that vie cannot abandon the position we have taken up in regard to the 
settlement of the Spanish c1uestion \Vhich vve have over and over declared to the Houseo But 
on the other hand 9 ·Ne prot·otmdly regret this 
unforseen delay which hast ·ken place in the com-pletion of the .Agr~eeme11t, and ~ve shall do al 1 \Ve possibly C8Il to f'.?cili tate the vri thdr2.,12l of tl1e foreign volunteers from Spain, in order that that 
count1'?y may cease to off'er any thre,9.t to the peace 
of Europe." 
At this point Mr. Attlee broke in to ask: 
"Do I gather from the right hon. Gentleman's 
sta.tement that v1hat he mea.ns ·oy a settlementl 
•in Spain is the volunteers' withdrawal? hi-
therto vie have not knov1n vvhat he mea.nt ·by a settlem-ent 111 Spaino Do I tinderstand that it is mer,ely a question of volunteers being 'Ni thdra\vn? tt 
~ Chamberlain gave the rather quizzical m swer: 
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"I 1i-vould like to ~ee what happeUs 1.vhen the volunteers 
are \Vi thdrs.\Vn. If His .1t1jesty' s Governn1ent think 
that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace of 
Europe I· tl1ink vie shall regard that as a se--c tlement 
of the Spa.nish ouestion. u 177 "" 
Hov1ever it became.clear that the \Vithdrav11al of a 
•I 
certai·n number of volunteers by the Italians \Vas to be 
regarded as settlement ot· the Spanish question, and 
that this 'settlement' 13as to be a matter of'I unila.teral 
negotiation betvv, en the British and the It8_lians, cts is 
made c.lear by this report of1 \Voermann: 
'
1Having ?Ji thd.ra·~7n a·oout 12,000 men 1·rom Spall the 
Italian Government is negotia.ting vvi th the British 
Gov __ rnment as to v1hether this is suff·icient to put 
Lhe Anglo=-Ita_lian Agreement ot· Easter into t·oJ:~ce. 
The entry into forqe of· l,his agreement litJ&s, as is 
well known, made conditional upon a 'subs~antial 
vii thdrav1al' • " 17 8 
Mai sky offers us this description ot· the activities 
& 
or the Non-Intervention Committee during this period: 
"In London and Paris they remembered about the 
Conuni_ictee t·or 'Non-Intervention'. A little 
campl1or vra s injected into its stit·t·e11ing members,. 
8.nd 1·01~ a 11 ttle 'llhile they begrn to t·,unction 
as if· alive. 
. fJ 
"On 26 May 1938 Plymouth suddenly summoned together 
the Sub-cornrni t tee, .s.nd 8.fter shedding the r'egula tion 
number of crocodile tears over the prolonged pause 
in its activities, addressed to those present a no 
less hypocri tic8.l appesl· to get that c·urnbrous 
vehicle the Britisl1 pla_n moving once ng.r,in 
since 'the international situation is far from eisy, 
and one of the pro·olems m2.l{ing fior ths_t uneasiness 
ir the position obtaining in regard to Sp~n'e 
~he Sub-committee st2rted to ·:1ork '/Ii tl1 an energy 
such as had not ·oeen seen 1·or ·_a long tirne, and in 
the course of· seven rr1eetingE (on 26 and 31 MEtY, and 
2, 21, 2L1.,. 28 clild 30 June) did in f~act prepare an 
agreed text of the British plan •••• 
"And nov1, on 5 July 1938, the plena.ry _ meeting of 
the) Committee vvas ga_thered '·fogethe1; to ~dopt the 
plan v1orl<:ed out ·by the Sub-dommi ttee. This meeting 
\Vas heralded by a grea.t fuss in the pre::s and in 
/ 
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politica.l circles in Bri:.ain and France. To lend 
more ,veight to the meeti11g it v1R s chaired 11ot by 
Plyn1outh 9 bU.,Go ~ ~Lord Halifax. He 1na.de an opening 
speecl1 sui te·ble" to the occa.sion, in v1hich 11.e 
tha111ced all the 1nernbers o:r the Conuni t ..ie,ee f"o.1: tre 
spirit of cooperation they had-shown, and expressed 
the hope that the pr~sent meeting 9may prove to be 
of good augury and omen :for the car1--ayi11g ·througn~\,in 
the international field of a very novel and a very 
complicated piece of real international co-operB,tion '-• 
"Then, af}ter a brief and unaccusto1nedly caln1 
discussion, in the course of which some individual 
and very minor details vrere cleared up, the entire 
British·plan in its last version was unanimously 
adopted ·by the Comrni ttee for 'Non-Intervention'. -
"This v1as to be its last meeting. After this the 
Cammi ttee a.g~in :fell into a state of susp~Ired 
.- anims.tion, <1nd its m1buried corpse st.?.nk f"or ten 
.months more· poisoning the politica.l atmosphere of 
Europe ••• 
., 
"After 5 July, practically spea.king its only 
1·unctioning parts v1ere Lord Plymouth a.nd the 
secritariat under Francis Hemming. This ru1np ot· 
the Co1nmi ttee made use of· ti1e medistion services 
of· the British Government in 01·der to send the 
control plan a.dopted a.t the Corlll11i ttee' s last meeting 
to tl1.e Repu·olicsn Government and to Frs.nco, af'ter 
which it settled down to wait. 
"On July 26 an ansvver ;vas received t·rom the 
Republican ·Government. It vvs.s in the at·t·irmati ve. 
With Franco it was otherwi~e. 
~ "When I returned to London from my leave, at the 
end o:r July, I tried several times to find_ out from 
Lord Plymouth ·,.vhat \Vas h2.ppening in relation to the 
plan, on the far side of> the front, but I could get 
no s2.tiiJfB.ction. The hono11ra-ble Lord vvas -oecoming 
more and n1ore like tl1e Delphic a.ra.cle v1hich as 
:'le knovv vtJ'r-! s f~amous f'or the a1nbigui ty and va~gueness 
o:f i tei 8.IlS'Ner s. One tl1ing vvas clear to me : things 
vvere not going ~Nell for the plan." ovvhile in the 
auturrm of· 1938 the fight.ing of the Ebro v12 .. s in 
,·· 
' 
progress and the t·ascists vYer·e prepa1°ing their att,--ck 
an Crtte.loni2, an Wlhu.rried game of· deiplomr1tic pat-ball 
\Vnet on betvvecn E-ranco r.u1d Plyn1outh, 11hicl1. suited 
per1ectly the interests of' the aggres2-orso" 17~ 
The United ·States i documents provide a. v2lua·o1e 
source or informatiori and observation on the · 
develop1nent t?:nd n8_ture of· British policy during 
during this period. On June 9, 1938, Kennedy, .the 
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American Ambassador in London, reported: q 
" ••• in the course of a convers2tion regarding the 
recent sta_ten1ents in the press that the British 
Government v1ns considering mea_iB.tioJ1 i11. Spain v1ith 
a vievv. to an 8.rmistice, cl Foreign Off~ici,al said 
th8.t even if~ a ge11uine agreen1ent could ·oe re2_ched 
on the Bri tis·h pls.11 f)or the vri thdr8.11val 01· auxil-
arie s 9 it vvoulc1 tsJre considerrt-ble ti1ne bef·ore tre 
Ita.lis.n troops could ler:-ve Spain~ The co11tinuation 
of the civil V/8.r 8.nd ·the d.el::w in reching an __ 
agreement on the British plan m8deit impossible 
to put the Angloc:,Italia.ri .Ag1'l)ee1nent into ef·f·ect. 
This was holding up the appeasement among the Medite-
rranean Povvers ge11erally 8nd in turn retarding my 
progress tovvards.a 1.vider Europes.n settlernen.,co 
"vVi th this in mind 9 the British Government had· 
been cs.sting a_:·ound :for some other scheme ·vvhich 
might hasten a settlement and relieve the present 
tension, and decided to attempt to bring a.bout an 
armistice in Spain~@• 
"Asked vvhether he thought here was any 
likelyhooa_ of sudl a plan succeeding, the Foreign 
6ffice ofricial would only say that his Government ... 
felt it could do no harm and tha.t even if1 it 
fails completely 1 bringing the idea of mediation 
before world opinion might do some gooda He pointed 
out that in any event there was no intention of 
abandoning their efforts to ,ut the British non-
Intervention plan into effect. 
"The Embassy findsi t difficult to say v1ha t, if 
anythi_.g, is bhind this ne\V n1w e, especially since 
the:ee is little or no prospect of· achieving concrete 
resultsa Reports ofi media.tion may, ot· course 9 have been circulated simply \Vi th a vie\V to counte1~acting 
cristism that the British Gowernment is not making 
, active endeavor.s to bring a-bo11t a solution of" the 
Spanish problem.;, a.nd though these repor~ts ~vere 
received ·,~1i thout optimis1n they vvere vrelcomea. in the 
presso In a.ny event the· r~ecen·t intensifiicaoon_ 
of aerial bo1nbing both of B1...,itish 2nd of~ civil 
. popula.tion has made the Spa11ish question increasi.rigly 
embarrassing to the British Government~" 180 
The latter observation is repeated in a report by 
Kennedy the ~allowing day:· 
j :· 
.. 
,, 
. . . . ·y - ·--------:-- .. ----· .,,-. 
,.- .. :; •• ,,,,, .. ,.,.: ,1• : . .:·, ~.-.,'..' ., ••• 
,J 
t . 
I 
,. ~ 
,> 
,'., 
,·'""'·· 
. ,/. .• . 
... ,. 
. ' 
- 165 -
"Last night I sa\lt/ Cadogan (the British Permanent Under Secretary of Sta.te. o:r Foreign A:Ef.siirs) 
.. 
and asked him V'lhe_t his Government v1ns planning to do in connection -..1i th the bombing of~ British ships in Sp2nish 1.va.ters. He tola_ me that the si tu.sti on had 
the Cab·a.net almost distracted ••• 
i:_; 0 Beyond· this ouestion of arranging an ·armistice, ··, he said, the British Government reel they are frankly up against ito. British shippers are crying for protection and the country is beginning to feel 
vii thout realising \Yhat tte f 1inal 1·esul t might be 
that this Government is-not courageous 8!ld states 
that Engla11dq s gre,?._t prestige is rapidly c1i1ni11ishing. Cadogro1 sa.id that -che Prime r~lini ster ~ s ans-:7er so fa.r hssbeen that :Lt j.s much 11101~e cot1rs_geot1s to proceed 
:·along his.'l line of policy a11d t~l{e the chB.rges of 
cow2rdice that it is to t8ke up a position which 
· .7oulc3- 1ne2.n v1:-:~r in ti1ree or four pla_ces 8.t once 
simply -becB.u.se Gre2t Britain a_oes not approve 'of· the 
·bombing. The British, Cadogan sa.id 9 E1re not very proud a.ny solution th8t they 8.re thinl{ing a-bout because they realise ~hat none or these soluticns reR~ 
sons very well but there is a feeling that they will try a.nit idea that 2_:ny·ooay suggests vvhich still 
adheres to the principle ofi not going .to vvar." 181 
On October 8, 1938, Kennedy, af;ter de scri-bing the 
visit. :o.f the Hemming Mission to Frr:nco to explain the 
nature of the British plan for the vvi thdrawe.l ofJ 
f')oreign volunteers, 1vvent on to state that: 
• • "It is reported in today's press :t'rorn the Spanish-
sources, that Fr2.nco has expressc d his agreement to 
the inmunf:nt 'J"fithdi')s.1-v.~1 of about 10,0l)Q men(100 ~Vhile 
this may be a step tO\Va.rd putting into ei;f·ect of· the 
~glo-Ita.lian Agree1ner1t, the declaration 01·· the Barcelona Government at Geneva of its decision for 
the inm1ec:Liate ana_ cornpiliete '.?Jithdravval of all non-Spsnish comba_ta11ts on. its sider; does not n12.J:te 
the pro·b].em of~ the British Governinent a.1y easier! Tl1e P~rin1e 1\ilinister is conunitted in PBrlia.rnt:jn t not 
, to put the Angb=Italian .Agreernent into etf·ect until 
ther·e has been subst2ntial 1:1ithdra·\:'Jal of· f 1oreign vol-
unteer~s -from ·both sic1eso .$.,orne J/.'?.X, vvill h_f.l.Ve ~o be formd to rrrake Fra11co ~ s co11cessior1s ap:Qear . v substantial' = l :a =~ :tMi 
. = == ::c= - -== :rt . h --
-1i···:- ·in the :C~tce of~ the uneoui vocal 21ction of the 
Barcelona Government. Informed official sources 
express confidence .that a ruita-ble t·ormuls.:: to 
make ef'fecti ve the An.glo-It.aiia.11 .. .:11,1vill -oe 1·ound." 182 
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BoYvers give\s us this interpretation of the how the 
trick ~vas to b·e accomplished: 
''In ref~·erence to the Hemming Commission's 
activities in Burgos, I have the honour to report 
that its nlission and a~ctivities a~re most carefully 
concealed from the British correspondents here, and 
that there is nd reason to believe that the reasons 
given -Dy the British Govcr11ment 9 that it is -che vvish 
to 'explain' the Non=Intervention Committee's 
vVi thdra.r1al plan 8.11d 00 11ei~st12~cle Ge11eral Franco to 
accept i t 1 1·s the true reasono In ray ciisp2~tch 
at the ti1ne this Commission a1Jpes_redJ here I 
expressed the conviction that the sole purpose is 
to exaggerr: te out ot· all --pro.porat ions t118 vvi th-
dra.-..val of tl1e 10,000 Ita_lians a.r1a_ to declaI1 e this 
a. complete cornplianee vJi th Jltir ~ Cha.raberla.in 9 s dema.nd 
that there shall be a 0 settlementg of the 
SpEtnish question bef)ore the Anglo-It..alia_n Agreement 
can -oe put into eflflect. There c2tn scfircely my 
doubt of' it no\V. · 
"The fact t:t18.t Hemming went to Cadiz to \Vitness 
the depa:ture of) these Itali::lns, though . ,he 
stoutly decl8.res. such v'las not his purpose, anc1 that 
a British official was sent to Naples to witness 
the 1anding the e, les.ves no room flor doubt 
that ·this '-tli thd1~a'.//al of· a small part of the It~1lian 
army is to be used by)~. Chamberlain as a 
satisractory settlement. 
1!There is signif)icance a.so in the f2.ct that 
the British Bro8dcast reported fully on every 
phnse of the ::-Ii thdr::-=:vval, but has scarcely· Inentioned 
the presence in B.9_rcelona of the r>epresent tives 
e-:r several 11eutrc1_l nations, sent by the Le2gue of' 
lations to SJ!ll)eY..Vise tl1.e vyi·thdvavva_l of a.11 the 
foreigners :rrom the other side. .. 
i 
"The oiginal position of Chanib er lain vvas that 
when a 1 proportiona_te' 11umberof' foreigners on both 
sid_es had been rJi thdrt::i.vvn 'in sub2t:anti2l nu1nber' he 
would consider he Snanish auestion settled enough 
- - . 
. to allovr l1i1n to put. the It.9_lia.n .Agreernent into 
operation., V/i th all 1·oreig11ers le:~!ving loyal=-
ist territory, there is manirestly no proportionate 
withdrawal it all i~ only 10,000 Italian soldiers 
leave Fr2nco's side." 183 
The Hemming Mission followed in what was in danger 
of becoming a tradition of~ British (or British 
'• ,-
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commissions and • • l1ll. ss1ons (after the 
Lytton Comn1ission of~ 1932 and the Rl.Uliciman miss.ion 
of' 1938) vvhose purpose seemed to be to santify all 
that vvas unholy,. and if not to gr8n t a.bsolution to 
the transgres·sory at least to f'ind sufficient 
justification ·ror aggression to ensure that British 
I: •. 
;. 
' 
-~ 
•. 
policy would not be deflec~ed rrom its destined 
course by· any possible t\vinges of· the national· consc-
• 1ence. In the Commons the ·inevitsble argument was 
presentec.i. by Chamberlain to jusif·y bringing the 
Anglp-Italian Agreement into t·o rce: 
" ••• per•hs.ps hon. 11embersmay recollect that on July 26 last ••• I used these v1ords: ' I \Vould like to see v1hat hep:i;)ens \'!hen the volunt,ee1,,s are 
~vithdr8.vvn. I:f His i1,L'ljesty's Governrnent think that Spa.in has ceased to ~be a. n1en.3_ce to the pe2ce ot~ _Europe, I -~11ink vJe sha.11 regarcl that 
as a seT~tlemer1t of· the Sp911ish q_uer-:.tion.' Since then a great deal has ha.1Jpeneclo A11'len.c1y, even 
at that date, all the po~ers represented on the Non-Interve11ti on Corruni ttee ;7 incluclin~: It;8. y,, 01~ 
course, had acc~pted the British plan for the Nith-dra'-.1211 of' vo1U.L-i.Leers, and if' that 11ls.n is 11o_;c in 
ope1·2 __ tio11 toda.y, it c~?ni1ot ·be 88.i d th3. t thin is the 1;~-111 c,i' It2_ly. (I11terru.ption~ It cannot ·be properly said. Aga.in, si11ce t11e11 ·ch.e Spanisl1 Gover~11rnent 11EtVe a1111ou.11ceu tl1.eir inte11tion oi' 
withdrawing Ghe International Brigade (An 11.0110 lJeniber: 'Tl1ey he ..vc do11e it!' ) 
vVhe11 .l .12 .. s at liur1icl1 9 Sigi101~ luussoli11i Volunterred 
n1e tl1e L11i' o 1i1a ti 011 tl1E._: l1lJ i11 t e11·1-~e c1 to :: i thdr a. v1 1, ,OuO rner1:, 01~ 2:bou.~. ha_lf' the Itc,lian i:r1i·2.nt1-.y f)orces, f)rom Spclin, 2 .. nd since tr1en these 111e11 have in f'r1.ct ·been \'iii thc11~0_.1n. ~ ~·.ve 112ve 1~ecei ved f1·om Sig11or I~Iussoli11 i clefin.i: e as EUr'.~,r1ce s 1 f;irst of· 
all ~- 11 ,;i ·'- 1, r-, 1- r=~ --r,0 2· ·1 i --1 :-:.- I-;··-· 11· ~ -1 1=-·o -,-. c e R o 1·-::. a 11 v-.-t..-•. !J .Ll-...: - .._.1. ... _._ 1 -1 Ci V c._._l - U 
ca.tego:;_'ies \Jill ·oe .:1ithc1-1· · .111. \t1l1e11. tJ10 11()11-ii1t1::r~vc.i1tioi1 l)l:.:11 cornes into oper,;s_t,io11; seco11.dly th,::;~- -10) t·u"Y)·1-he-~r It·~.1.-.. i· ,_,--· +y;oo-Jc-.. ,1· 1 '"'1. ·o· e:..:i c·e1-1"- -'-o c... I., 1 - - lJ . . Ctl l I.J - ..t: )_, ~ _._ ,__,; I., L, Spal. ~n • ,...-1~1Q-, -1-11i· , .. ;;1,,r ., fn-; ;::i !- t· 1,1e · -1· -!· ~ r i "":li'·,· ..... ,C=k··,,t,==r-1·11,1r.lnt .._ - , ct l.J • '-'- v o ~ o .., c. V· l - iJ ,,.,-. - ··- c ... d. ,....,l.,; tJ ...., _ - .,, -... . have r1cve1~ i'o 1~ tl1e r.10.u1c11t e11 t ert ~1 ir1e d. tl1<:j io.e a or •• 11 
. • 
" , : 
.,. J '; 
-, " se11d.1r1f:: co 1I1pe11s ·t,01-..y r~.21~ 1 ore es i11 ·c11e J..J. eu 
ot· tl1e i 11i1 ~.r1try 1·orc e f; \Jhicl1 h8.Ve ·bee11 \'l i1~l1-dr a'/!11.,. :.rhe se c.l1re e as su1'l 2.nc as, t r?ker1 ir1 c 011 Ju-
ne ti on \Vith tl1e actual· \Vithd1")av1al ot' this la-rge 
;1 
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bo.dy of rnen, ~i11 my judgement constitute· a 
s-ubst~)ntiB.l ernest of· the good intentions of the It2lian Governmento They form a considerable e_li111i11Ertio11 <:)i.: tl1e S1J211iBh questio11 as a 111e112Lc e to pe .- c·e. " 18Li. ) 
On the question _of) 10,000 men cons ti tu ting a 
"·-· 
of a consider.~.-01e body of men, a British Foreign 
Memoranda of October· 2, 1938 . contP i11ed the 
·following information: 
J 
"· •• AccordiI1g to the latest War Office estime.te the number of Italian troops at present in Spain are as follov1s. 
Infantry ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 22,000 
Afltilery ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Engineers •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Ar1noured Vehicle VolW1teer Personnel ••• 
Services ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
7,000 
2,000 
1,000 
8,000 
Total ••••••••••••••• 40,000 
In sa_ying that 10,000 men constituted 'half~ the Italian forcees' in Spain, Count Ci2.no v12s, 
accor6_ing to the Ws_r Office estin1ate, clearly inaccurate. If he 11ad sa_id hB.lf the inf·antry (22,000), l1is state1nent 'Nould have been. 
app1~oxin1,9tely COJ~rect, parti.culariy if· .la.St8ge in rec·2nt ~ i_ght i 11g 1Nere t.nken into account; even so, according to the VYar or·f'ice estiruate, 18,000 aPti llery, enginee1')s, Elrmoured vehicle per1 so11.nel cJnd other servic~-- s 1.vould re111ai n bel1ind in a.dd_i tion to the a_Jvi sion ot· inf·.sntry. Nor do the e.bove f'igures filovr t·or the Italian air force in Spain, v1hich, acco1~cling to the Air , Minist-r>y, is di 9 tri-buted as f 1 ollovvs: ••• 
Machines--
Mainland 
Bombers ••••••••• 60 
' 
Fighters ••••••• 100 
Reconnaissance. 20 
Total ••••••• 180 
.;· 
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Balearics--
.. 
Bombers •••••••••• 40 
Fighters ••••••••• 30 
.,, .. · 
., 
Total •••••••••• 70 
:·· ·~· 
Grand Total •••••••• 250 
Personnel--
MBinland ••••••••• 1, 700 
Balenrics •••••••• 500 
GrBnd 
Total •••• 2,200 
. : , r 
In addition, there are about 2,200 ci vili.m lorry drivers. 
It is clear that if Signor Mussolini \Vere to 
m2.ke a gesture ·by ui1ilaterally ··Ni thdra.v:ing i.vhat he regar;id_n as a su·bstGntial 1.;u111ber of his forces ~rom Spain he might, and probaoly will 
clain1 that l1e ·119_s i1nplementing the second 
def)i11ition of1 2. settlement of the Spa-11ish question put to hira by Lo1"ld Perth in accorclance ··:ti th tne instructions se11t to hin1 in Foreign Of·f·ic e 
telegra1n No. 350 on the 17 June~ Tl1e pro·olem before His Majesty's Governme11t v1ill then ·be 
whether the withdrawal was uufficiently 'on 
a considers·ble sea.le' to justi-f'y to pu·b-
lic opinion here recogni tio11 of) the Italian 
Em1)ire in Abyssinia in order to ·bring tl1e 
Anglo-Ita.liru1 .Agreeme11t into f'orce." 185 
The Foreign Office telegram m~.ntioned above is 
or interest, since it snows that as early as June ' ~ 
.- , 
\ 
17, over a month be:fore ·Chamberlain hinted in the 
Commons that a· \lvi thdrav1al of· volunt::_ers by Italy 
1vvould be a suflficient condition ot· .the entry 
in -eo t·or ce of the .Anglo-Ita.lian Pact, this in 
,:--
,- . i t·, 
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fsct was a basis of negotiation between Britain ·"' 
and Italy; the in-- telegram No.350 Halif'a.x told 
. ,, .. 
Perth thEt t ~'"'"''~,.1 
''His Majesty's Government are anxious as the Itali2.n Government "to see the .Agreement enter into force as soon ~s possible, and so far 
as they are aware, th~ only obst 0 cle appears to be thesettlement of~ the Spanish questionaaoThe diff·icul ty remains of a_et·ining v1hat co 11sti tute s 
a settlement of· tl1e Sp.9.11ish ciuestion~ British public opinion cannot -be ignoredo o c Vifhat Yfe 
·alvvays had in mind v; .·~s tha.t 9 m ort ofl vict6rf for one side or the other, settlement in- the 
sense of meeting the pledges given· must ·oe 
somethi11g 1vhich could be clloYvn to have eliminated 
or be in t11e process of" eliminating the Spanish quc stion as a. source of international 1·riction. This might be a.hcieved in one of· three \Va.ys :-
(a) By the execution oi1 the Non-Intervention Committee's plan ••• 
(-b) :$y the Italian Government, on the 
accept·: nee by the Non In1:.erv·~ntion Comrni ttee o:e the British plan, at once 
m2king a unilA.terial ·wvi thdr2v1al from Spain ••• 
(c) By ·bringing about a1 armistice •• ~" 186 
In its t~sk of placating British public opinion, 
the British dao-a.sion-makers. asked the permisrion of 
'"' 
the It2lians to be a·ble to misrepresent in tl1e Comn1ons 
the assurances that -~,had been given ·by the Italians 
as a preconditicin fo~ the entry into force of the 
agreement. On Octo~oer 26, 1938, Halifa.x inrormed 
Perth of the following: 
"The Cabinet toda.y decided to bring the Anglo-Italia11 .Agreen1ent into florce ••• you snould a.sk 
a.gain Count Ciano to appro2.ch Signor Iviussolini on the vexed ouestion of· assuranceso \Vhile I h .. 9.ve 
no doubt, that His Majesty 0 s Governme11t ~Nill 
secure the su.-ppo~t of Parliament on the question 
of bringing the .Agreement into f~orce, I am 
( 
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most anxious that this new(?era) in the 
relationship l>etvveen our tvvo. countries should 
not be inaugurated in an atmospnere o~ any greater 
measure of recrirnin8.tio11 th~?.11 is l)erhs.ps 
avoid.2.-bleo I 911ti cipa-'ce that the de·b2t·t.e rill turn 
less 011 t,he rneritBof the .Agreen1ent than on _.Ghe 
C· · z ce.;;;s i •@ . Ita.lia11 1~ole ~ :@ast 2nd t·utu~ee 9 ,it]:. =~J),~\i}~1:., Fo1'} the 
a·bove res.Eons I 11ope you vvill ·be a·ble t.o pe~esaude 
the It2.lia.n C.lovernrn.ent ·to 1~oii1f·orce the a~~~~:"Llrances 
givenoooI11 p2_rticula.r i.,.G 1JVOUld "be hel1)t·u1 i:f I 
coulcl say (ct) that Signor( biussolini ]:ia=ci, used or P\.. 
1vvould use his i111·1uence 1.vi th C}e11ers.l F1~:-111co to 
· ref·rc1.in f)ron1 11sing I) Its.lian -oilot;s sl1d rnacl1.i nes 
against targets which may involve damage to 
:6ri tish s11ipping~ (b): tha.t he had vii thclra\vn 
or vvould_ \Vithfu~aY\f so111e It2lif}Il pilots, even if 
he canno·t -rvithdrs1,v It.--~lian rnachines alrerciy 
hrnded over to Fr.~_nco,, tt 187 
On the 14 Octo-oer, 1938, Perth handed to 
Cia_no the follo·~1 ing memorandum: 
·' 
e 
''Statements 1.vhich I a. sume could be used 
public~t;y in Parliament. 
(a) That the withdrawal or 10,000 It8lian 
infantry constitues a withdrawal of 
more than half the Italian infantry. 
forces in Spain. 
That the remaining categories will 
depart.·v1hen0-che Non-Intervention Committee's 
plan comes into execution. 
(b) That no f1urther It8_lian troops \Vill be 
despatched to Spain. 
fc) That the Italian Government had never 
for the n1oment the idea· of sending 
compen2,a.tory ?.ir r·orces in the place 
of the inf2ntry rorces they were 
'.Vi thdr 8.V/i11g • 
Assurr-nces \'vhich \fJOUld be extre1nernl:.l 
he lpf·u1-. if~ thei could be given and"tmade 
• 
public ig ,;fs.rliame11 t • 
· (a) tha_t it~ is not out of· the q~uestion that 
\Vi thin t 1NO or three months the rest of 
the It~~-lian inf·a.ntry 1~orce s v1ill be 
v1ithdr2.vm. 
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(b) ThEtt no furt-her Italian pilots \Vill be sent to 
Spain. ••188 
r 
In fact, i_t is dififJicult nc.t to reach the conclusion 
that the British Government \Vas being pressured by Italy 
into giving effect to tl1e Agreement. Far 1·rom gaining the 
maxi,inum concessions from Italy in giving re2.li ty to the 
aims of non-intervention in return for the British re-
cognition of the conquest o:r Abby:ssinia, the~main .t:. 
British consideration was the desire not to let slip what 
was appearing to be the last possiblity of we8l1ing 
Italy from the alliance vvi th Germany ·oy ref·using to 
give effiect to the Italian Agreement. The concessions 
,· 
which the British desired to obtain were designed to 
make the implementation of· the .Agreement as :palatable as 
possible to the British nation, and so allow the new era 
in Anglo-Italian relations to be launched with the 
mininru.1i1 of criticism that ·could disturb the relations 
between the two countries. 
Ciano's Diary describes the methods by which Italian 
pressure was applied on Britain to give effect to the 
Anglo-Itelian Agreement: 
"Octo-oer 2. The Duce and I examined the auestion of 
our rela.tions vii th. London ..... I am to send f'or (Perth) 
tomorrov1 and officiEtJ.ly communicate to him the 1Ni th-
dra.v1al 01· the 10 9 000 volunteers c Juter v1hicn I shall 
ask l1im ·01nntly t11e aues-cion are you vlJilling to 
implement the pact of April 16? fJ} o o o tthe Duce s_lso tells 
me to indicate tliat the Grand Council 1night repudiate 
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this agreement, 111hich has been vvai ting to long .for its cc>nsu1runa tion. 
,. 
October 3o I ha.d my c·onversation \Vi th Perth. I 
expressed 1nyself on t11e lines agI·eed \Vi th the Duce. The ar.gurnen.)Gs ar~e so strong that Perth himself1 could 
not 1?a~ise serious o-b jections? thougr1 he triea_ to ma.ke 
a point aJJout the question of' ou1-a aer~opl2t11es o o o Q October 4w I received ~erth at his requesto He wanted illucia_atio11 of certa.i11. points in yes·terday\1 s co11ver-
sation9 vizo 9 a_oes Italy intencl to e,end 1nore ·t,rv<t;ps 
aflter tt1e vvi tr1c.1.ra ... val of~ tl1e 10 9 000 9 a.nd is shtj pre-pared to pron1j_se not to increa.se tl1e number of pi:Lots 
and aircr9-ft 011 the l'iationsli st side? jrhe ans\ver to 
the :first g_t1estion is obvious and I gave it a.t once. On the second auestion I reserved the right to decide 
to the Duce,, 1-md. I ·.7s.s right, ·because vii tl1 good cs.use he re Jee te d a pro111i se \Vhich vvoul d do much to vveaken Fra11co w s posi tiOllo O O 0 
October 6~ Perth brought the British reply. In principle 
they e.ccept the implementation of the pact a:fter the 
withdrawal of the 10,000 meno But Chambe~lain asks for a short breathing spacea He does not want to present himself to tl1e Cal)inet, and subsqu_e11tly to 
the Ho11se of Cow11ons, \Vith the vvords: 'Here you are. Take it or~ 1ea.ve it G Nh1ssolini has t·ixed tl1e a.ate. ' At the moment in spite of the vote of confidence, his position 1'12.s ·been sha.ken, and in those circu.rr1sta11c€s it v1ould ·be untena·bJeo He asks for a. delay u..11-'cil November 1. T11e Duce's reaction to the Britisg reply 
v1as tm1·avoura.-ble 9 -out then he ended by consenting to 
this. On t11e otl1er hand, he na.turally .does not \Vant 
to give any 2.$SUrances a·bout the eir.:force a.nd its 
activities. ul89 _ 
On October 4, Perth reported to London: 
'!) 
ttI feel that we have come_ to tne parting of tlE \Vays. If it is possible ror His 1~jesty's Government to 
autl101'"oise me to inform the 1v1inist·r~r for F1oreigr1 · 
.Afrairs that they are prepared to put the .Anglo-Ita.lia_n Agreement into 1~orce si.na_ to recognlse the Empire once 10 9 000 t1"aoops ahve let·t Cadiz or reached Naples then I ·belj_eve that Signor Iiu.ssolini vfill 
v1ork t·or a Eu1~opean detente aJ1d genera.I pa_ci:fica.tion. If we t'ail to do this he will consider that although he has t'ulf'illed cond.i tion (b) o:t· the memo1')anclu1n 01· June 20 "oy \Vi thdrav1ing Italian troops on a considerable 
scale. vve still re:ruse to give the desired eg_ui valent 
'1. 
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and that we have delib_erately ·adopted and are still 
trying to ado-pt apolicy of' .choloroforming F.tnd that 
_we hs_ve no desire and do not inte11d to bring tl1e 
". allia,_nce into force o Conseq_uently he vi1ill .conclude 
· . a- dE;f"ini te 1nili tary a.lliance 1vitl1 Germany even 
though tl1is is aga.inst his innermost vvish a11d would 
be unpopular in the co1.llltryo"l90 
There would seem to be some real justification ror 
this atte.ck made by Lieut.-Commander Fletcher in the 
Commons against the British Government during the debate 
on the Government's proposal to bring the .Anglo-Italian 
.Agreement into force: 
"This agreement \Vas made contingent upon a. phrase 
'a~settlement in Spain' which has never been derined. 
I ima.gine th8.t this must have been one o:r t11e very 
few occasions on which 2 major negotiation has been 
carried on vvi tl1out any o.ttempt to a .. ef)ine the ·oasis 
o:f negotiationo O O oI consider tl1~tt it V78.S El del ibers.tely 
anibigu_ous pl1ra.ze ernployed ·by the Prime lviinister in 
order to enr:t'ble hi1n to turn in 8. very tight corner. 
Peopme ha.ve very short memories, but long ago, in 
the Non=Intervention Committee 9 Count Grandi made 
the staJce1nent th8.t no Itala1n troops \'Jould ·be vvi th-
dr8.v1n f)ro111 Spain until Ge11erds.l l11 ranco V'l8~s victorious, 
and Signor 1tussolini hB.s repeated.ly declared_ his inten-
tion to use sll Italian resources to ensure a Franco 
Victoryoooo·rha.t is Signor 1Iusso]ni's idea of~ a 
settlement in Spain and our Prime Minister has never 
.cha.llenged it or put :eor\vard .. e:ny alte1~n2ttive to it •••• 
I do not accuse the Prirne lviinister of· ba.d f'ai th; that 
. it not t11e sort of cri ticis1n in vvhich I indulge; ·out 
I do SB.Y tl1at tne Prime k1linister repeatedly 1nal~es 
use El very anibiguous langl12.ge i11 tl1e sta:t;ernents ~Jhich 
he makes to this House at awkward momentso He is wont 
,I 
to make dramatic statenents 9 dramatic though quickly 1~1 
uttered, \Vhich all too ofiten turn out to mec1_n nothing .. " 
The use of the term 1 a large -oody of men'· to -refer to 
the 10,uOO withdrav1n :from S:pain \Vas certainly mislfe-ading. 
10,000 is a large body o:e men, but compared to the total 
Italian eff·ort in Spain, the vvi thdra,:1al did not mean. a 
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a substantial or even a large reduction in the Italian 
effort in Spain. In the opinion of Stohrer, the German 
Ambassador i:ri Spain . " ••• pro·ba~bly has no important ef,1'ect 
192 
on the compara~tive s'trength of the t·~vo opponents." That 
the \Vi thdra"val did not c6nsti tute a 'substantial ern.es·t 
of the good intentions ot' the Italian Government' can be 
gauged from these extracts: firstly, a report by .Stohrer 
on 22 October 1938 that the Italians intended to ship 
home f")rom Spain about 10,600 men for such reasons· as 
ttillness, family matters, etc, of the. volunteers in 
question"; and secondly, a report by Schv1endemann, 
head of Poli tic al Di vision llla (Spain a_nd Portugal) in 
the German Foreign Tulinistry, that the German Under State 
Secretary had told ColUlt Magistrati: 
"Th.ere \Vas to be sure no inunedia_te connection vvi th 
the present negotiations with England, but the withdraw-
al of· 10, 000-l.2, 000 me11 did~ at the same ti1ne result in 
f"ul:filling the British desires and ~vould consequently 
enable the Anglo-Italian Pact to go into ef'f·ect. Llagis-. 
trati shared this opinion. 
''Finally 9 l,Jagistrati confirmed that the vvhole expla-
nation -brought out the f 1a.ct Li18.t tl1ere had ·oeen no 
ch2J.1ge a.t all i11 1iussolini' s policy tov1ard Spai11 and 
that Italy still desired as before to help Franco 194 
obtain a victory. Count lviagistrati also conf~irmed this." 
The statement by Chamberla_in that the remaining, Italian 
forces would b~,withdrawn when the British Plan in the 
Non-Intervention Co.ID.lni ttee came into eff1 ect must -be 
ba.lanced t?gainst this appraisB_l by Halif·ax or the likely-
hood of t11e execution (as opposed to symbolic a_nd 1ne2ning-
a,...' 
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less B.cceptanee) of the Non-Intervention Cammi ttee 's -· ..... ,., .. ,,,,.. J,. 
~ . ~'t 
plan: 
"Un:t'ortunantly there can -oe no doubt that even if both sides ·Nere to accept the plan rmcondi tionally considers_ble ti1ne v1ould els.pse ·before tangible re-su.lts (!!Otild ·be looked f 10ro t•l95 
This appraisal mt1st have been a.dequately confirn1ed -·by the 
Hemming· :Mission, 'vVhose utility vvas described by Stohrer 
in the ~ollowing terms: 
'' ••• the despatch o:e Henuning, Secretary General of the 1'fon-Intervention Committee, to Sprtin, \Vhich Franco fi11.ally agreed to in prir1ciple 9 seems to have f'ina.lly come to nou.ght •• ~ c> It almost looks a.s if the et'fectiveness and the potentialities of the 
·lion-Intervention Connnittee, so often asse.iled and ridiculed had come to an end. "196 
While,non-intervention staggered on, engaged in its ·s 
much publicised futilities, even Perth's ardour began to . ' 
diminish: 
''I spoke to the luhister for Foreign Affairs ·this evening a.bout Tuir. Hemming's visit to Burgo_s and expressed tl1e hope that the Italian Governrn.ent \VOula_ support the 1ni ssion and u .. se their i11f1luence with General Francoo~~I cannot say that he appeared very enthusiastic but on the_other hand he did not adopt a negative attitude. ttl::J7 
For Mr. Cha .. mberlain to pretend that bru.ssolini 's · 
assurances on the withdrawal of the remainder of the 
Italian forces in Spain upon the putting.into effect 
of the British plan represented a meaningrul contribu-
tion to the Spanish probl,em, reflects a deep felt concern 
,vith the state of British public opinion.' In this, the 
Non-Intervention Committee v1as p_laying its accustome.d 
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role of pulling out of a fathomless hat possibilities 
• 
of a solution which in ract did not and which could be 
","\':" .,. __ .,,\., .• f.-;--
q.isplay.ed t·or the edif'lication of· t:t1e general public. 
With the circus the people were diverted; the tensions 
within British society which ~ad been exacerbated by the 
Spanish ¥Var \Vere released, in part, through the torrent 
of' ridicule and abuse that ~vas heaped upon the Committee. 
So far it has been contended that British policy to-
ward the civil vvar in S:pai11 \Vas a t·unction of' a much n1ore 
comprehensive policy 01· appeasement in Europe. Chamberlain 
put this in its clearest t·orm in the course of· a speech 
at the Lord NJayor' s Ba~nquet on the 9th I\Joven1ber 1938: 
tt ••• I attempted soon after I became .t'rin1e litl.nister to improve our relB.tions vii th Italy, and la.st April v1e 
vvere E1ble to 1118J~c .8.n a_gree111ent \Vj_ th the Italia.n Government. Al tl1ol1gh tl1at a.greernent did not inm1ediately come into full operation, yet it at once was followed by tl1e return ofl the old t·eelings of· cordic1li ty and 
rriendship between our two people'so.oQNow sirtce we 
no longer reg2,rd the Spa11ish conf'lict as a. menace to the peace of· Europe, tn.at the agrcer.aent vtilJ~ soon ·oe con1ing into 1~orce, a11d I arn conf~iclent tha.t it vvilJ. be a t·urtb,er advance tovvards ths.t ·:egene1~a1 appeaseme11t o:f Europe vvhich v1e are aiming a·t. n198 
To Chamberlain, and even to Eden, the Spanish conflict 
1nas vievved in terms of -being am impediment in tl1e path of 
peace through appeasement, which haddto be removed. The 
fate of the Spanish ~epublic, though of concern, could 
not be measures. in the same terrEms as the Ill8.intainance \. 
of the peace ~f Europe. As a value jua~ement there is 
much to be said for this 2 .. tti tude (serious disagreemeRt 
could however be made with the basic assumptions of the 
.. ~· ':• . •· , __ .. ~. ,.·-···-·---,-·• ··-···· ·,-- ·-····· . 
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general policy of appeasement, but once these assumptions 
" have been accepted the general line of British policy 
to~vard Spain follows logically). 
However in the irnple1nentation of the general line of 
British policy toward Spain, serious dit·ficul ties. v1ere 
encountered as a/result of the inter-action o~ the conflict 
in Spain and public opinion i:Q.(e·Bri tain. Propaganda, i(!ieo-
logy, class conf .. lict and the fact that Spain became a 
testing ground for the new technology of war in which 
civilian populations were-, before the eyes of the world, 
* subjected to t11e terror of large scale bomber attacks 
resulted in the extention of the boundries of political 
solidarity of tl1e Spanish conflict outside Spain 2tr1d 
to include Britain. The internationalisation of the 
Spanish confl..ict led to a dynamic of tension which 
a:rt·ecte d the method o:f implementation of British policy. 
This necessitated an emphasis on the activities of the 
Non-Intervention ColDlni ttee and inf'luenced the timing of 
British initiatives. British policy was not determined in 
i t-s general direction by this tension - British policy Ylas 
not impelled on the pa th of non-intervention ·by the . 
existence of pro~Republican and pro-Nationalist camps 
./ 
within Britain (and here a distinction must be drawn 
wwwmwa ar :a • 
• There is so1ne evidence to suggest that some of these air 
attacks on defenseless citizens were instigated by the Ger-
mans to iµflame British public opinion, and so divide Bri-
tain~ rendering Chamberlain's task more difficult. 
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betv,een the general policy o:r non-intervention and no4~ ·,.,. 
intervention as expressed in the Non-Intervention 
Committee)-,, 
·'.I.·,/ i7t 
Emerging into the clelights of mass comsumption, _ the 
new Britain which was emerging in the prosperous Midlands 
and South of England bore little resemblence to the 
older England that had entered the tv1entieth century. 
The older industrial strata became smothered by the 
ever-expanding suburbs, where the humanitarianism or 
Sunday afternoon tea-parties began to replace the soli-
.darity of NO~king~class consciousness as the driving force 
behind the support of the Republicans in Spain. Sympathy 
for the R6 publicans was reinforced by a vague sense of 
national honour, a feeling that a nation of· shop-keepers 
should not be humbled ·before a nation o:r v1ai ters f'amed for 
their la.ck of:. fighting prov1ess and the dirtiness o:r their 
tov,ns. 
The British decision-makers began to pay the price 
for the lack of leadership of the Baldwin age, in which the 
political heirachy of the country had not stood up to 
attempt the education of the British public in the reali-
ties or the international politics of the 1930' s. Hoare was,··. 
sacrificed to the outra.ged v1ill of the people 1~ollowing his 
• 
attem:pt to f11ind a policy to1r.rard the Koyssinian crisis that 
:, C: 
accorded with the general desire in the country for the 
avoidance of war. The cotllltry had not been instructed in 
• 11 
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. " the knowledge that ir Britain was to act as the guardian 
of the small and weak, she would have to prepare for war 
to deter the strong and avaricious; or if· that cotmtry 
was not prepared to f'ace the prospect of war the ha.lcyon 
days of the Palmerstonian heroics would have to be f·or-
gotten and an aptitude for turning the o·ther cheek be 
developed. In 1935, Baldwin bowed to the storm and Hoare 
bowed. The result Was that the country/continued on its 
path unhindered by doubts as to its claim to a voice in 
the affairs of Europe without at the same time realistically 
facing the prospect of war. Hoare states the case against 
Bald\vin: 
"It is that after 1935, and having obtained a mandate for rearmanmnt, he (Baldwin) did not make better use 
of his opport1.mi ty o These v1ere two yea.rs during ·J1hich public opinion 1vas better prep8_rea_ f'or ct more vigorous policy e \Ve'"s it tha.t Balclv1ir1 v1as grov1ing old and_ tired 
and already thinl{ing of retiren1ent? Or tha.t he \Vas out 
of his depth i11 questions of· a_ef1 e11se a.r1a. 1·01"aeign 
affairs? o o a o The inescs.paJJle fact that shot1ld never ·be 1·orgotten \Vas that in spite ot; Hitler vs gro~-Ning povver the com1try s.s a 'vvhole re1nained ix1di1;ferent to t11e thre8t of danger. Up to tl1e tin1e of tl1e Abyssinian 201 
crisis I shared that geners.l :reeling of' omplacency." 
Decision-ma.kers stand bet\veen the conununi ty 1wvhich they 
represent and the international system which presents them 
with problems that have Oto be solved in accordance ·1Ni th 
the values, beliefs and interests of· the decision-maker 
and of the ne.tional community. Therefore, f·ollovving the 
...... 
"" ' ,. conception of decision-makers as problem solvers, it ~ill 
' 
be necessary at this point to continue \vith a_n examination 
* Admi t·tedly a defllicient conceptua.l attitude bu~ one v11hich is suff"icient t·o1'l tl1e purposes of this chapter. 
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of' the prob{eriis that v1ere presented to the British 
I decision-makers through the inter-action of the.civil 
v,ar in fI>ain and the international system. 
I 
We have already seen that Modelski has put forward the 
notion that every internal.v1ar creates a demEtnd for roreign · ..... 
202 intervention which is implicit in the logic of t:te situation. 
The logic of this demand, as seen by Modelski rlllls as 
t'ollows: on the assumption that one of ,the parties to the 
-
~~nternal war is weaker than the other, and also assuming 
that the weaker party has exaughsted all its internal 
means or increasing its strength: 
"The only 1vvay of redressing the internal pov,er bala.nce is to invite outside aid. 11his, the demand for outside aid, is the first n1ech2nism -of 'interr1a.tionalisa.tion' of· interna.l 1:19_r; it inheres in the f·una.en1enta.l co11di-tion of disparity found in internal warooooThe second mechanism follovvs from the first Q If1 the v1esJ{er party be presumed to be seeking ot1tside aid, then the stTong-er pc=trty, it· it is to rnaintain its prepona_erance 9 is driven to take i11terhationa.l countermea.sures ·oy antici-pa.ting as much as -by hard. andy f)ast inf·orrnation a-oout external intervention in aid of its adversarieso (Such inf)ormation is i~reqtlently f2_lse) o It n1ust destroy the actuc.tl or potential oppone11ts 9 and. -rnu~st cotmter them by alliances o:r its o,,Nn" rr-nus 9 as if b~,r a inatural 9 process of alignment, tl1e friends ofi your oppo11.ents become your opponents too o o o tl1e t~l1i11 d 1nech8.ni2ra 01· internationalisation~o.follows from the preceding two. The search 1·01"1) outsia_e aid and_ the ef·t·ort to collllter-act tnat search ms.ke every i11.ternal vva_r "a m,9_tter of· internationg_l concerno They complicate internatj_o11al alignn1ent inte-Pnatio11al alig111nex1t ana_ add. a.cerbity to them,_ a.11d may la.ed direc JYly to external Yvc?,.r '° Hence,,, the second powe~ might be brought in to intervene in the confilic t 9 ii-1 ai cl 9 as it \Ve re, of tl1.e tl1.ird pa.1')ty, and in order to perrorm the functions of~ rnedia.tio11 and reco11ciliatio110 Given an internal v1ar in one state the foreig11 policy of the second state f' aces three choices: 
(1) helping the \Veaker party - usually, but not invari-
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ably, the insurgents - and thus embarking on subversion; (2) helping the stronger party - usually, but not in-V8.ria-bly 9 t11e incu1n~bents - and thus ernba.rking on f)ore ig11 0_i cl.: (3) v1orl{i11g f'or a conciliat.ory solution o:r tl1e conf~lict by a.tternpti11.g n1edia.tion. ,,203 
A fev, preliminary re1nB.rks can perhaps ·be made ·before 
\¥e proceed to a.n examination of the internationalisation 
-of .the. Spanish civil~ wa.r. 'l'he tendency ofi the internal war 
to become internationalised will depend not only upon the 
desire of1 the parties "to the interna.l v1ar to obtaifl aid 
from th~ external parties, but also upon the 'vVilli11gness 
of these parties to grant such aidf This willingness, 
according to t.r1e analysis of lviodelski above, is to be 
seen as being dependent upon the existence of an inter-
national po,iver struggle ·bet'vveen the members or the inter-
JJ ·"· ; ' } 
national community, a povver struggle 1wvhich has led to an 
alignment o:r states into po,,ver groupings. The basic assump-
tion therefore is that the external states, as a result of 
the :pov1er struggles \Vi thin the international system, are 
unable to concert together to decide the fate of t11e 
internal \Va.r. 'I"o attempt to describe the system possibili-
ties vvith less irnprecision, it might be said that the 
• l'fucl1 turns,,.on tb.e def~inition of thevrord 'aid'. vVhere there is conununic2.tion ;,;itl1in a society and members of that society are a.v1are of occl11,',Je11ce s eJ_sevvl1ere ·:ri tt1in th·a.t ~ocie 'ty, 2ny forn1 of response to a.11 occu_rei1ce fJi tt1in tl1a.t society 1Hl1.ich involves a con.flict si-'Gtla.tion (\'vl1etl1er sllch a. respor1se -be i11te1"best 1 i11clif·f~er11ce, joy, l1ate or a11.y otl1er, 1-")espo11se) rnay be ts1~n1ed 'e ..icl' in one fo1';lrn or anotl1ero 111d_if·f;ere11ce rnay thus be Le1'lrnec.l ~negative 8.id 1 to tl1e stronger) of' tl1e parties to tJ.1e co11flict • .Aid av t11is poi11t 111e8.11.s a ·cor1scious att~einpt to affect the course of events in the internal war • 
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decisive fac:tor that will determine the attitudes of the 
" 
external states tov,ard the internal 1:1ar will be the level 
~ 204 of integration achieved within the international system. 
The level of integration will depend upon the extent to 
which there exists within the inte~national system a self-
r' 
205 maintaining level of· sharing of values, beliefs and interest-a. 
Where there is a high level of integration (i.e., a high 
degree of values, beliefs and interests held in common 
by the actors ~vi thin tre system) then one would find that 
the actors within the system would be able to formulate 
their individual policies towards pnoblems calling for 
solutions (such as an internal war) in accordance with 
these commonly shared values, and thus in accord with values 
held by the other actors. Thus the process of consultation 
and discussion will form the basis for the methods of 
formulating .and implementing pclicies of the actors vii thin 
the system. 
It was a high degree of shared values, beliefs and 
inteeests which formed the basis of the Concert of Europe. 
A desire to maintain the status quo, a belief in the 
monarchial system of government and a common fear of 
repub.licanism united Austria, Russia, France and Prussia 
(and for a period Britain) into adhereing to tle Congress 
system, whereby problems f~cing Europe would be solved 
in consultation. Established in 1815 by the Quadruple 
Alliance (to which France as the defeated nation did not 
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accede - France vvas bl'ought · into the 'system in 1818 by 
means of the Quh~uple Allaince) the states pledged them-
selves under Article Six to " ••• reunions devoted to common 
interests and to the examination of the measures which, 
at any one of these periods shall be judged most salutary 
206 for the repose and prosperity of peoples. ff 
... Harola Nicholson is of the opinion that the Concert 
of Europe did exist, and continua.ti to exist, even after 
the Congess system fell into disuse, based on a common 
sharing of values and standards: 
"It is incorrect to dismiss the conception o:f the Concert of Europe as being purely inoperative diplo-
ma.tic catchvvord or as a phrase designed to justify the domination of great powerso It was more than 
thato It represented a t2.cit understanding beicvveen great povlfers tl1at there v,ere certain comn1on stand-
ards of dig11i ty 9 h11n1ani ty and good :faith ·.vhich 
should govern the conduct of these powers in their 
relations with each other and in t~eir dealings with less potent or less civilised communitieso Vvhen, in 1914, this whole conception was shattered 9 something 
of great stabilising value, something of durable0c.om-mon repute passed from the policies of Europe,, u2 I 
When there exists a lower level of value-sharing, 
... 
there will be tendency f~or less emphasis to be placed 
on consultation with other actors in the system as a 
neans of obtaining desired policy objectives, and a 
greater emphasis on the use or the threat of coercion. 
T'l'he lower level of .value sharing vvill mean that the 
policy ob·jectives of the actors vv111 tend to conf'lict. 
The actors vvill t·ind they hB;ve to persue their goals 
in competi tion·.;\vith conf'licting goals of other actors. 
/. 
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Thus a· disintergrative mechanism is introduced into 
the system. Since, in the. international system, the 
ultima ratio of conduct remains the use of coercion, 
states in the persuance of their policy goals 1vvill align 
themselves with states \Vhose values coincide vii th their 
own in a sui!ficient degree to allow <tor co-operation 
to achieve policy goals. Alignments \Vill therefore form ~ 208 
as states ·seek to maximise the power base for the attain-
. ment of goals. In seeking to maximise their power base, 
states will try to p~event other international actors \ 
from entering an opposing grouping, and thus adding to the 
power resources of their opponents. A state which is outside 
a power grouping will therefore become an important stake 
if o~ important stratsgic in the eyes of the international 
actors; i:f considered to be of low 'strategic value, the 
non-aligned state will not become stake competed for if 
such competition involves an uneconomic expenditure of. 
resources. 
Thus one can conclude that the willingness of states to 
intervene in an internal war, and the methods by which 
such intervention is carried out will depend upon the 
nature of the international system and the nature of the 
state in ?/hich the internal war is being waged. In a poli-
tical system :fi~th a high degree of value-sharing, inter-
vention in an internal vvar vvill usually resii t fro1n con-
sultation between the majpr powers - Austrai intervention 
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in the dispute between the King of Naples and some of 
his liberal subjects followed the Congress of Laibach • 
of 1821. Where there is a low degree or value-sharing 
intervention ~vill often be on a unilateral, or limited 
actor basis, This intervention will usually be-opposed 
at least verbally by the representatives of the opposing 
international grouping. Counter-intervention may take a 
more positive form than words, as in Greece in the latter 
1940' s. In the latter case, the internal war 'Nill lead 
to a disintegrative input function on the part of the 
• 
internal war perhapseven perhaps bringing the possibility 
of external war. This possibility places reEtraints upon 
the actions of the external actors. It will involve the 
weighing of the consequences of the victory in the inter-
nal war favouring the opposing alliance against the risks 
involv·ed in intervening. The decision will revolve around 
the strategic (Or perhaps psychological) value of the 
stake; here we can contr~st the different reactions of 
the international conununity to the internal war in Vietnam 
to that iri the Congo. 
Thus the questi9n of formulating policy towar·d an inter-
nal war will be tied to the nature of the international 
system an_ the nature of the state in which the internal 
war is being waged. In a system vii th a 10·;1 level of inter-
gration and opposed groupings -where the-· outcome of the 
internal war represents a high strategic value and into 
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into which states are dra,m to intervene, possible policies 
open to an external power may be seen as follows: 
(1) helping the vvealrer party 
.,I 
(2) helping the stronger party 
....,, 
(3) ' mediating between the primary parties to the internal 
war. 
(4) mediating between those external actors that have 
become involved in the internal war. It is this set 
of mediation activities to bring an end to an inter-
nal war. Once a compromise can be reached between the 
external actors, a solution to the internal wan can 
be imposed on the primary parties. The task is 
·1 
difficult, since as long as the internal war is tUl-
resolved the state in which the tl1e vvar is being 
waged can be considered as unaligned, and in their 
desire to gain aid, the primary p\rties will hold 
out to the external actors the promise of alignment 
(even non-alignement may ~uffice). The losing side in 
the internal war may be concerned to prolong the war 
to gain a better position, or the winning side may 
be concerned to have stiJ.fficient time to finish off 
its opponent. The result is that primary parties may 
pressure their external allies not to reach any form 
of agreement. 
In the latter. part of the Thirties one may see the 
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-· the int;ernational system vii.thin Europe as a loose bi-209-
. ,, , :polar one. Two main groupings of povvers existed: _those 
• 
supporting the status quo - represented by Britain and France 
and those states within the Frerich alliance system (including 
Russia, \·Vhose security inte1,-asts coincided ·fvi th those of 
Brit.ain_and Fra.nce); the revisionist grouping - represented 
by Germany:,and Italy. These groupings it must be admitted 
did not represent tight cohesive blocs, but the countries 
Yli thin 68.ch grouping were bound to each other by co 1nmon 
interests, the German determination to gain a dominant 
position in Eastern Europe and the Italian desire to 
establish a predominant position in the Central ani Eastern 
Mediterranean bringing these two cotm.tries into opposition 
1vvi th the interests of\ Bri tcin and France.. This process of 
\ thecreation of ever hardening blocks was opposed to the 
basic desire of British decision-makers of maintal.ning 
Britain's freedom of naveuver and to remain fre~ of any 
binding commitments ta states on the continent of 
,r Europe. As we have seen in the pr1evious chapter the 
under-lying in1pulse behind British foreign policy in the 
later half of the 1930' s ViE.s to maintain the -pea.ce of 
Europe, to prevent any armed ronflicts developibg 
into vvhich Britain could be dra.wn, and to establish 
friendly relations 1Ni th as many states as possible, 
and especially Italy, in view of her strategic position 
in the Mediterranean. 
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Italy's developing E?nt,ente with Germany follov'ling the 
· Abyssinian invasion by Italy remained an anomdly. 
Utimately the establishment of Ger1nm dominance in 
Europe would threaten the strategic position of Italy 
anl Yv-ould make of Italy a 
1
dependent of Germany. Italy's 
/ 
traditional policy ,therefore, as before the First World 
War, was to balance bet\rveen the West European states -
Britain and France, and between the Central European 
states - Germany (and Austro-Hungary before the First 
War). Duff Cooper kas argued well the case that Britain's 
interests · 1ay in de.veloping friendly relations Ni th Italy: 
HI felt that the Abyssinian business had been badly bungled, that we should never have dirven Wm~solini into 
~~he r1rms of Hitler, and that it might not be to late to regain himo The Italo~German alliance was an anomaly. The Germans and .Austrians -.• vere the traditional enemies 
of the Italians: the English and the French 9 who had 
contributed so much to their liberation 9 were their historic friends :1 ard Gabibaldi had laid a curse upon 
any Itr:-2lic?J1 Government tahat fought ags.inst themo The 
size 2nd the strength of the Third Reich ma.de her too formidable a friend ror the smallest of the Great Povvers 9 rvho \vould soon f'ind that fro1n anally she had sunk to a sa_telliteo 90 210 Thl1s Britain, in her atternpt to pre·vent the he.rdening of da.11.gerous bloc grouping of powers looked to ·Italy to see if the Axis coul
1
d be 
vveakened a_t that em, si nee, as Feiling nqtes, · it was felt that the German connection ·t1as not Italy's first choice. 211 
Eden, at the annual dinner of the Foreign Pres~ 
Association hel·d in London on January 12, 1937, stated 
" ••• One of the most disturbing tendencies in the international situation in 1936 Nas tre tendency~ div-ide Europe into two political doctrines. I hope and thin_~ that this tendency shows signs of diminishing. There is, for instBnce, the exchange of assurances betv1een this country and Italy •••• 
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... I 
"There is no coUn.try v1hich we would not be 
willing to move towards if by doing so we and that country~ 
could assist in securing a general settlement ae the 
strain and axieties to v1hich ~ve are all subjected. \Ve 
desire the circle of our friend.s to be as 1.:vide B.nd 
all-embracing as possible o 'rhere is so mucl1 .,chst 
can be done) but if it is to be done all the nations 
must enter on 1937 in this spirit of collciboration. 11 212 
Eden, as much as Chamberlain had believed in a 
rapprochement ,;,i th Italy, as v1as seen in the Gentleman' a 
' Agreement o~ January 2, 1937 which Eden mentioned above. 
Eden merely differed on the means through which a 
rapprochement could be achieved vvi th Italy - th.at unless 
established on a firm fotmdation of mutual respect 
,v· 
and v1ith assurances of good faith from Italy, Italy 
wou~d merely be encouraged to demand further concessions 
from Britain. 
Hassel ( the German Ambasaador in Italy) on December 18, 
1936, presented in a report to the German Foreign Ministr·y 
an e:icellent appraisal of the impact of the Spanish civil 
war on the relations of the states in Europe: 
" •• • Germany has in my opinion every reason fol' being 
gratified if Italy continues tc interest herself 
deeply in the Spa~ish affairG The role played by 
the Spanish conflict as regards Italygs relations 
\Vi th Frqnce and England could be sirnilar to that of 
the Abyssinian conflict 9 bringing out clearly the actual, 
opposing interests of the povie · s and thus preventing 
Italy from being d~awn into the net of the Western 
powers and used for thsir machinationso The struggle 
for dominant political influence in Spain lays bare the 
natural opposition bet\veen Italy end Fr~nce} at the 
same time the position of Italy as a power in the 
western Mediterranean comes into competition with 
that of Britaino All the more clearly ~vill It~:.;ly 
recognise the advisability of confronting the Western 
pov1ers shoulder to shoulder ~vi th Germany ••• 11 213 
Britain, therefore, had to watch anxiously as 
; .,:.;. 
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Europe began to crystallize into anta.gqnistic groupings, 
I 
~i-i 
each side seemingly· prepared to intervcnt in Spain vii th 
military f·orces to oppose the other. BovYers (the United 
States Ambassador in Spain) reported on ·July 30, 1936, 
the development of 
ttvery strained relations ••• between Italy and Gerrnany 
on one side and French on the other sia_eo Their 
envoys here surprisingly open on attitu~e _toward 
Spanish struggleo France has sent 20 airships 
lElSt three days contracted for before the struggle and 
commander British ship here tells me Germany has 
sent 14 .Cighting airships to the rebelso Attempt of 
German warship to land armed t'orces San Sebastion 
some days ago probably intensifying the clevage, 
important perhaps as indicating threat to European 
peaC8oH 214 
Kirk (the United States Charge in Italy) had reported on 
the 25th of July the outspoken coBcern of Italian officials 
over the Spanish situation: 
"They point out that the uprising there combined 
with the Communistic tendencies alrea.dy manifest ... :}. 
in France constitute a very real threat of Bolshevism 
in the WestoooUnofficial opinion couples expression 
of anxiety over these increased Communistic 
activities Ivi th references to the evidence of 
harmonious r~elationship betv1een Itc1ly and Gerrnany and 
stre~;ses the vievll' tha.t coopera.tion bet·vvcen the tvvo 
counilies \VOuld form a bulvvark ag ·: inst tlE spread of 
Bolshevism both frorn the East and the West. "215 
Hendenson {the United States Charge.in the Soviet 
Union) reported on August 4, 1936 tha.t: 
"Soviet press and leader1 s are beginning more openly 
to shoiJv their s:ympathy fort he Spanish Government as 
the latter's position becomes more precariouso 
Mass de·monst~ations of solidarity rJi th the Spanish 
people ~vere held in cities and tovvns of the Soviet 
Union yeste1~day o The 1noscov1 Prs.vda of this morning 
sta.te s that 12 9 000 demonstrators gB_thered in the 
Red Square and that 1909 000 toolt part in the 
Leningrad demonstrationo According to the sane 
sources the meeting9 both in Mosco\HT and the 
ieningrad, addresses telegrams to the President and 
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the Prime Ministers of Spain.t1216 
Straus reported from Paris .on July31 t~?t in view 
of the cruicial strategic position o~ Spain to tle 
French, 
"Blum appearing before the Foreign .Affa_irs 
'f;,Committee of the Senate yesterda:y admitted frankly 
that the· F1,,ench Government had at :first seriously 
considered acquiescing in the request of the · .. 
·• 
·-
Spsnish Government for assistr~nce o o oHovvever, ••• after 
mature considerc1.tion by the French Government \Vould not 
permit the despatch to Spain of any aeroplanes or 
munitions of waroooin saying thiS9 however, Blum stated 
that the French Government \VOUld 1--aeserve its 12osi tion 
regardi the future a_e ending- ii on \¥hat ::the attitude 
-· .·. 
. 
o:r othr f·ore~gn gove~n~ents might be.· 217 
We can at this point remind ourselves of Baldwins 
:fnjunction to Eden on the 27th of July"··· that on no 
account, Frellch or other, must he bring us into fight 
218 
on the side of the Russians." Suspicion of the 
Soviet Union reinforced within Britain the desire to 
1' loca.lise the developing conf'lict in Spain as far 
' 
as possible, and to prevent the French from becoming 
involved in a escalation spiral that would draw Britain 
into its cortex. The effect of the Spanish con1·1ict 
was to drive Europe into divided ca.mps, a process that 
was directly opposed to Britain's interest in the 
avoidance of armed conflict on the Europem mainland, 
from v1hich Britain could not mpe to remain aloof. 
Britain's interests, as then perceived, seemed to 
demBnd an attempt to reverse the spiral or escalation 
of interv,~ntion by two opposed groupings. Britain's 
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quandry was to attempt to prevent what Kenneth Boulding 
ref'eres t_o·, _a.$· the reation process· of the conflict si tu~tin 
leading to a breakdown of the international system into 
. . ' 
war. The reaction process, as seen by Boulding, is 
the process " ••• in which a movement on the part of 
one par~y so changes the fi·eld of the other that it 
forces a movement of this party, \Vhich in turn changes 
i the field of the first, :rorcing anotm r move of the 
219 
second, a.nd so on. 11 
'-···---.. -- --- ~ ' 
Two solutions would seem to prevent themselves to 
the British decision makers: (1) exert diplomatic 
.. Pre.ssure on France to obtain her v.rithdravval from 
the reaction process by capitulating to the Italian-
220 German action in Spain (2) reorganise the system~ 
Both solutions present problems. While Britain was in 
a position to exert pressure on France to capitulate, 
such an action on the part of the French Government could 
rebound in view of the division within the Cabinet and 
within the French nation. Wilson {the United charge in 
France) reported on ~ugust 10, 1936, 
..... 
"We are told by a usually ·v1ell-in:rormed .. sourqe that 
the meeting of the Ca_binet on Friday i.vas a stormy one, 
Cot in particular urging that in view of the undoubt,. d 
aid being given to the 'insurgents by Italy and GLrmany 
deliveries of war material should be allowed to go 
forward to the Spanish Government •••• Thera is ••• un-
doubtedly great pressure rrom the extreme left being 
I! r , ... 
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bro·ugh·t on the Government to persue a policy more. 
favoura.ble to the interests of the Spanish Government. 
There hava recently been tlRJ. large mass meeting 
of adherents of the Front Popular at which demands 
221 
were made that aid be given the Spanish Governmert. 11 
Thus 1:r those in Fr a.nee who were in favour of 
granting aid to the Spanish Government observed the 
capitulatiorm by France to the intervention by Italy 
and Germany in Spain, domestic pressures could build 
up in France that would either force the Government to 
alter its policy to one of active intervention in 
Spain, or even bring about the replacement of the 
Government by one more in favour of intervc;ning on 
behalf or the Spanish Government. Either 
result would be to increase the reaction co-•fficient 
of France and make the possibilities of a spiral of 
intervention by _,he two opposing internaLic:nal 
~-
grouping le8_ding to outbreak of war far more likely. 
The other possible solution what ~vas open to the 
British Government was the reorganisation of the 
inter-national system. This one might arre ·Nas in fact 
the aim and the function of the Non-Intervention Committee. 
However any attempt to reorganise the international 
system would be dependent upon the willingness of the 
other actors ~vithin the system - and we have in 
mind Italy and Germany at this juncture - to accept 
any restraint upon their freedom of action. It was 
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unlikely that Germany and Italy would accept any 
reorganisation of the system,· since this implies a 
move av,ay from the soverign stEite system to that of 
a more structured system v1h.ere the system v1ould 
. attempt :;.iegal processes by means of vvhich the 
relations of states to\vard the Conrlict in Spain ~vould 
be regulated. Revisionist states such ~)S Germany and 
Italy would be unlikely to accept limits upon their 
freedom to alter the· status quo. 
Dieckhoff (the Acting State Secretary to the German 
Foreign Ministry" reported that Fre.ncois-l·oncet on 
August 29th stated that the Non-Inte:fivention Conuni ttee 
".~.was intended primarily to afford the particip-
ating governments the opporunity of maint·:i_ining 
const,9_nt touch vii th eD_ch other on the subject of the 
arms embargoo Furthermore, it v12s me -nt to serve 
the purpose of enabling the governments to in~orm 
one another o:r the decisions made in the v:~.rious 
countries in carrying out the arms embargo a~~d 
possibly to adjust these decifions to one another. 
There was no int ntion of appointing special 
delegates for this purpose ••• 
of 
ttMoreover, I hardly believe that the plan 
could really ential any serious dcnger to us. The 
~ord 0 control~ does not appear in 0he French note; 
accor ·'i ng to Francois--Poncet 9 s explaination9 too, 
what was involved was primarily an exchange 
or information and co=ordination 9 We ourselves, 
after all 9 can play a part in seeingthat this London 
arrangement does not develop into a permanent policy 
agency 9 ;vhich 1night make trouble for us; and in this 
we can secure It2.lian and British support too o 91 
(on September 3 Weizacker, the Acting Directo:e··'l 
the German Political Department reported that the 
French Charge d'Affairs ti ••• clearly implied that the 
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, committee and its powers had been a British rather than 
. 223 
a·French invention ••• ") 
The extent to which British Government was not 
intent upon reorga.nising the international community can 
be seen from this memorandum by Diekhoff on Septe,mber 
3: 
· "Mr. Ne·vvton (the British Charge d 1Affairs in :s·erlin) 
stated thatooothere v7?S no intention Of setting Up 
the con11ni ttee in London as a.n independent body ·vfhich 
v,ould have to make decisions or 'Ivhose jurisdiction 
might later be extended in any Wijy; it was a question 
only of org8nising loosely the diplomatic representatives 
of the interested pot1ers acc1-aec1i ted in London~ The British Government itself by xio me(1.ns intended to go beyond i~his and to create a neN interna.tional 01.,gan but 1.¥8 s really confining its· .. l:f to making ava.il~:ble 
a.meeting place for Lhe joint conferences which take place from tirae to time. The c·ommi ttee ·.v8.s not to have the task mf either exercising control powers or 
of mt=Jking majority decisions or the like." 224 
Britain was in part motivated by the developing crisis 
in French politics that was arising from the rlagrant 
int rv ntion by the Italians and Welczeck 
(the GBrman ·Ambaddaaor in Frr.~nce reported on August 21: 
- .,;;.;I .•.. 
"Within the (French) Cabinet the modera.te members, particul.a.rly Blum and Delbos, believe that they \¥ill be able to prevail ag?:.inst the interventio11ist· members I) 
steeped in Popular Front ideology 9 only if they can find support very soon in an international oblig::J.tion 
regarding an arms embBrgoo If the arms en1bargo cloes 
not· materialise ai thin the next f:et1 ds.ys 9 Blum and Delbos fear that they csn no longer resist the growing dorne stic political pressure ana_ . hat they ·;1ill have 
to give u.nlimitedsuppor>t m the Spanish Government. The deliveries ~ind the stre: m of Red Front volunteers to Spain ~,;'tould thenassume such proportions that 
consequences for foreign policy vvould incalculable. tt 225 
Thus the German Charge d 1 Affairs, Bismark, at the first 
" meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee. held on f ·; 7 
September 9th, 1936, reported 
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"Today's meeting left the impression that with France . and England, the tvi.ro po·;1ers principally interested in the committee, it is not so 1:auch a question o:r taking actual steps inL~ediately as of. pacifying the aroused ~eelings of the Leftiest parties in both countrieSoooin particular during my conversation today 1.vith Vansitt2.rt in regard to anothe1'} matter, I had the feeling that the British Government hoped to ease the domestic political situation for the 
, I 
French Prt.mier by the esteblishment of the committee. "226 Britain in its attempt to resolve the conflict 
situation that was presented by .. he impact of the Spanish 
conflict upon the international system helped to 
establish a committee for non-intervention that gave 
the outward impression of achievi~ a reorganisation 
of the international system and thus enabled the French Government to c· pi tula.te in the r action process that had been in the early stages of being established during July and August 1936·, v,i thout a feedback of reaction from the French Left into the international system 
in the form of increased pressure on the French Government to increase aid to the Spanish Government. The chain 
of' the re;:;ction process ws.s snapped and the Non-Interven-
tion Committee threafter became usefully employed in 
talking issues to death, in transmuting potential 
conflict on the Spanish battlefield into a conflict of 
words in that device so belmved of the English~ the 
committee. 
We sh.all in other places deal in more detail ·nith the 
activity of the Non-Intervention Commjttee, and for the 
moment will content ourselves not 'Ni th the details but 
the subst2nce as seen by Maisky, the Soviet representative. 
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Jlaisky draws for us in his usual vigorous style this 
portrait of Lord Plymouth who was for much of the time 
the British representative and the Chairman of the Non-
Intervention Committee: 
" ••• a practically ideal personification or. English political mediocrity, nourished by the traditions 
of the past and by 1vvell=worn sentiments ••• an en-
tirely· helpless and comic figure.," 
Maisky sketches a typical incident in the Committee: 
- _) 
"On the agenda for the day there is some thorny .. a--que s tiono A fierce debate flares up. The opinions 
of the Soviet ·and Fascist representatives are 
directly opposedo The representatives of the so-
called O democratic <J povvers are 11vam-~1'9tngo Plymouth 
as Chairman should take up a definite stand and 
win over a majority of the Committeegs members to 
it. But Plymouth does not know what to settle on. 
His face expresses agonised bewildermento He turns 
to his advisors =Francis Hemming who used to 
sit on his left and Roberts on his righto A hurried 
consultation in whispers begins among themo The 
recommendations of the advisors turn out to be at 
variance9 often diam.metrically opposed? foroco 
Hemming sympathised with the Spanish democrats and 
Roberts was a supporter of ~rancoo The indecision 
on Plymouth 9 s counternance grows greater 9 he goes 
redj then pale 9 and at· last, asswnes his severely 
impartial air, proclaims solemnly :'The meeting is adjourned.'"227 
Francis Hemming, the Secretary of the Non-Intervention 
Committee, had all the skills of the professional 
civil servant: 
tt ••• (He could) pick up with the greatest of ease 
the most violently opposed of views and find for 
them an exceedingly well 'streamlined' formula-
tions, as the reslut of which the gulf between 
them was somehO\V made invisible, smoothed out." 
Hemming was thus ideally suited to the task that was 
cen1ml in the British attitude toward non-intervention 
- the reduction of conflict to a mere verbal· formula; 
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Principles, interests and realities became submerged 
Q 
beneath a flood of words dedicated to the cause of 
I •. 
disguising conflict: 
"Hemming ivas in his most special glory \Vhen 1 t was 
time to dra,¥ up the official communique on the meeting 
of the Committee or the sub~committee just concluded. 
A word was enough for him to catch the wishes of 
each pa.rticipant in tl1.e di scussion 9 \rVhich he vvould instantly clothe in a forme of words acceptable to 
the majority; if there were any objections he would 
at once make changes 9 B.ddirig something here a11.d tak-
ing away something there, and in the end produce a 
document which satisfied everyone. •·•228 
In this structure the bete noire was the Soviet Union 
threatening at any moment to throw a scycle into the 
smooth non-functioning of the Non-Intervention Committee. 
Maisky tells one staory or an incident that occurred in 
the midst of a fierce tussle over infringement by Italy 
'> 
of the Agreement on Non-Intervention: 
" ••• I assuraed my most innocent expression, suddenly 
turned to Plymouth and said: 'On a point of order, 
Mr. Chairmano o o' 
"Ply1nouth looked at me, puzzled and suspicious. He 
might have been waiting for me to throw a bomb down 
on the tableo His secretaries were also thrown into 
alarm; they were clearly having visions of some new 
and cunning moves by the Soviet sideo Silence descend-
ed on the green covered tableo Everyone waited with 
bated breath to see what would happeno 
"'Yes on a point of order 9 9 I repeated, deliberate-
ly ptolonging the moment of tensiono 'oo.may I sug-
gest that 1Ne have a break nov1 for a cup of tea?' 11229 
The follov1ing incident provides an. example o:r the 
desire on the part of Plymouth to maintain the smooth 
functioning of the Committee even at the cost of main-
taining an ignorant silence towards the events in Spain. 
On May 30, 1937, Germany withdrew from the Non-Interven-
'I 
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_tion Committee in protests at the bombing of t.he pocket 
battleship Deutschland by the Spanish Republican airforce. 
< On June 189 1937, the German delegation returned to the 
committee. Before the session of the Committ~e began, 
the German and Italian requested Plymouth to prevent 
any discussion of the past in the committee meeting, 
pointing out the consequences· that might otherwise arise. 
Plymouth having agreed, used his influence on the Soviet 
Ambassador to this end, and refrained from welcoming 
back Germany and Italy so that their past absence should 
. 230 
not be a matter for discussion. The question of the 
shelling by Germany of the defenceless Spanish town of 
Almeria in ~etaliation for the bombing of the Deutsch-
land was thus relegated forever to the past. Eden had 
already sucessfully used his influence to prevent any 
231 discussion of this question in the League of l~ations. 
There seems to be an inevtable comparison between 
the British reaction to the Spanish conflict and the typi-
cal British reaction to many crucial domestic problems. 
When, in Britain, a serious problem becomes apparent -
be it education, penal reform or::1~poli tical irresponsi-
bility - the usual recourse is to establish a Royal 
Commission or Committee of Enquiry to look into the 
matter and report in language, which is usually lengthy, 
foggy and designed to conceal disagreements: 
,; 
"Vfuen a report is tmanimous, like the Devlin Report 
on Nyasaland, it is translucent; when it is a com-
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_,,- promise, like the Radcliffe Report on the Bank of England, it is ops.que. I1nportant VJhi tehall doca.ments all go through the :process of toning dov1no o o gpapering over tl1.e cracks i o o o until 1nuch of the original force or even the sense has vanishedo vBy the time the civil service has finished drafting a document to give effect to a principle, said Lord Reith,. 'there may be little or no principle left0tt232 
The Cammi ttee oh i{on-Intervention was designed to act 
as a neutralising agent that would com1ter-act the 
dangerous catalyst of conflict that Spain represented; 
to reduce the tensions that seemed ·to threaten to rend 
Europe apart to acceptable levels. In this, the search 
ror compromise came to dominate the fulfillment of the 
principle for which the Committee had been established: 
-to prevent intervention of s+ates in the Spanish War. 
As Bingham reported in November 1936, Britain was 
determined to make every effort " ••• to localise the vvar 
and certainly Britain had no intention of being drawn 
into a tug of war. 11233 
One may wonder on the question of the extent to 
which the British leadership made any real attempt to 
.. f 
think through the problem of the relationship of Bri~ 
tain and Spain, an-d thmi; :place of this relationship in 
the spectrum of Britain's political role in the world 
as a whole. To drOYin conflicts in a tide of paper, to 
vover disagreement and intervention among the niceties 
of · language . played an important role in Bri·tish policy 
' " in view of the dangers that a new European War held for 
Briatin. But this is not the sum total of British policy 
toward Spain. Other dimensiona existed which reflected 
1~ 
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. I 
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a more prec.ise calculation of British interests in 
Spain. It v1i·ll be the purpose of the next chapter to 
examine these other dimensions of British policy • 
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and the structure of· tl1e::, v1orking f·orce changed inways which increased not only the proportion 
of' urban to total population 9 but also the proportion of the population working in offices or in skilled f~a_ctory jo'bs =- avva_re ofa and 
anxious t_o acq_uir~, the consun1ption f 11rui ts or the mature economy;· 
"In a'.ddi tion to tl1ese econornic changes, the. 
society ceased to accept the f·u1·ther extention of~ modern technology as an over=riding objective. It is in this post=maturity stage 9 for example, that 9 t~rough the political process 9 Western societies have chosen to allocate increased 
resources to social vvelf'are and security o The 
emergemce o~ the welfare state is one manifesta-tion of) a societyv s moving beyond teclmical 
maturity; but it is also·at this satge that 
resources tend increasingly to be directed to the proq_uction of~ consun1er is durables and to · 
. 
• 
the di1·1~usion o:r services on a mass basis9 if' 
consumer sovereignty reigns" The sevving machine, the bicycle 9 and then the various electric~power-
ed household gadgets ·vvere grad1ially diffµsed." 
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202. Modelski, The International Relations ot' Internal 
• War, p.7. ,.: 
203. Ibid, p.7. 
204. The international system may be- deri~ed as that 
assemblage of sovereign states which are united 
0 
by some form o:f intieractio11 or interdependence by 
which the employment or the threat of· the employ .. 
ment of more or less commonly accepted means of 
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physical coercion is isued to maintain or to 
transf·orm the poli tica1· status quo. Tne inter-r 
national system is characterised by four main 
~ elements: the absence of a formal govermmant 
\Vith the povver and authority to judge or punish;, 
the use of violence by the component units to 
achieve objectives and enforce obligations, or 
to put it another way, the absence of a rule or 
law capable of governing the attainment of values 
ind interests; law and moral obligations are 
derived :from implicit ·bargaining, or by custom, 
i.e. habitualised implicit bargaining; the inter-
national system is organised through the component 
units (i.e. the sovereign states) wllch possess the \r! 
f-uncti1~n of ordering the economic, political and / 
social relations within the cont'ines of t11eir 
territory. 
For definitions of an international system 
from which the above is, in p~rt, derived, refer 
to: 
\. 
C.J. Rriedrich, Man and His Government (New York, 
McGraw-Hill, 1963), p.25. 
G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, The Politics of 
. Developing Areas (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1960), p.11. 
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R.D. Ma·sters. "World Politics as a Primitive Political 
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. Systemtt, \Vorld Poli tics, July 1964, p.612. 
For am attempt to reduce the complexities of 
j 
' 
-the relations betvveen states to va~rious types of 
international systems, ·see: ·.Mortan Caplan~ System 
and Process in International Relations (Ne\~/ York, 
Wiley, 1957). 
.,. 
205. Carl J. Friedrich, Man arid His Governnent, pp.137-
138. 
See also: Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification 
(New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p.4. , 206. Walter Phelps and William Davis, The Course of 
Europe since Waterloo (New York, Appleton Century 
Crot·ts, 1951), pp.28-29. 
207. Sir Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy (London, Oxrord 
University Press, 1960), p.72. 
208. See Note 1, supra. 
209. For an examination of the concept of a bi-polar 
210. 
211. 
212. 
213. 
214. 
215. 
216. 
217. 
international system, see Kaplan, op. cit. 
Duff Cooper, 01). cit., p,211. 
Feiling, op. cit., p.330. 
Documents, 1937, Vol.11, p.10. 
Germ.an Doc11ments, Series D, Vol.111, p.172. 
American Documents, 1936, Vol.11~. p.450. 
Ibid, p.447. 
Ibid, p.461. 
Ibid, :p.450. 
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Torchbooks, New York, 1963), p.25. 
220. Ibid9 p.29. 
221. An}erican Documents, 19)6, Vbl.11, p.447. 
222. German Documents, Series D, Vol.111, pp.63~64. 
223. Ibid, p.70. 
~·· 224. Ibid, pp.68-69. 
225. Ibid, p.49. 
,. 
226. Ibid, p.84. 
227~ Maisky, op. cit., pp.76-77. ... .. 
228. r-bid, p.92. 
229. Ibid, pp.62-63. 
230. German Documents, Series D, Vol.111, pp.353-354. 
231. Ibid, p.303. 
232. Anthony Sampson, The Anatoffll of Britain Today 
(New York, Harper-Colophon, 1966), p.300. 
233. American Documents, 1937, Vol.l, p.560. 
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·""" Chapter Three : Interests and Policies • 
ff . t 
••• the mutedn·ess hat had. so impressed me on arrival 
in England was developing into an awareness or what 
foreigners call, rightly or wrongly 9 English Hypocrisy." · 
Philip,O'Connor - Memoirs o~ a Publ~c pab¥• 
r 
11 
••• nationalistic interests are running,, riot." 
Joseph E. Davies - discussing the European 
situation in 1937. Jlission to Uoscow • 
•••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••••• 
Vansi ttart has stated that within Macdonalds second 
2 
National Government " ••• there werevllh.eels v-.rithin wheels." 
To paraphrase one might state that within the British reac-
tion to the Spanish civil war, there were policies within 
policies, which was indeed a part a reflection of the fact 
that there existed wheels within wheels. But, as we have 
already seen, the developing cnnfusion and transrer of 
policy-making authority meant that the wheels were not as 
well oilect as in previous times; friction led to the fusing 
of policias and policy-goals so that the various elements 
that composed British policy toward Spain cannot be laid 
bare so easily as one can peel the various layers off an 
onion and to do so would be to simplify out of existence 
the conflicts that t·ormed (and still do) a s~ignificant 
element within the po~icy making process. The struggles 
··· ,, __ ,,_ ··- ···•·-•·-~-,,~-,.,. .. , __ ,_,.-, .r,,n---., .,..,. .. --,---.,-~.',---~ ~"'-~--······•.- • · · 
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of Duff Cooper as the First Lord of the Admiralty with the 
3 
·Tr.e_asury over finance, can be seen as part or the long 
st-ruggle of· the Treasury to reduce as far as possible 
Public spending, the continuing mentality of the Treasury 
.4 
man concerned ,vi th 'candle-ends'. According to Sampson; 
each department has what it likes to call its ovm 
'departmental philosophy' so that once inside the building· 
" .. the rest of Whitehall can seem as remote as Scotland: 
·••T4ey spend ro much time fighting each other, said one 
civil servant, that it's dit·r1cul t to remember that 
~ 5 
they're ·all supposed to be serving the same government. tt 
DespiLe the problems of doing so we shall attempt to 
disentangle the threads of British policy toward Spain -
restating themes already developed with their wider rami-
fincations and introducting new themes. For convenience 
the assailt will be divided into two main parts: the 
relations of Britain with Spain; and the relations of 
Britain \Vith states oth3r than Spain \Vho were concerned v1ith 
the Spanish problem. 
We have seen that .. there were present in British attitudee1r 
tov1ard the Spanish conflict two main themes vm. ich can be 
taken as being mutually contradictory: (1) the desire not 
to see the strategic item that Spain represented move so 
far into the Axis (or Communist) sphere of influence that 
the European strategic balance would be altered signific-
antly against Britain: (2) the desire not to see competition 
between European eta.tea :for the allegiance of the strategic 
Uidt that, Spain represented lead to a European conflict. 
~,. 
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0ne might state that British attitudes toward Spain would 
thus be determined by the·value that was placed on Spain 
as a unit in the strategic balance, and the botmdary 
limits, i~ any, beyond which Britain could ·not allow 
. 
' . 
action by another international actor or one ·of the 
actors of the internal war such as to alter the position 
.. 
. ~~ :l 
of.Spain in the European strategic balance, without 
· feeling compelled to act to prevent such an alteration. 
Thus predictions as to vvhat would be the future alignment 
of Spain upon the putting into er·f'ect of' any of the 
various sets o~ possible actions by the actors concerned 
with the civil war in Spain. Buch predictions being, of 
course, dependent upon the extent and the quality of the 
information available to the British decision~makers. 
Thus the decision-maker in arriving at any one policy 
would have considered the actions by the other actors invo-
lved in the internal war in Spain, the outcomes associated 
with such actions, the probability of those outcomes, ani 
· the desirability or those outcomes. In reacting to such 
actions, the decision-makers would have had to consider 
the possiblJ linesof action open, the outcome of such 
actions, the probability and the desirability of such 6 7 
outcomes. One can transrorm this into very simple model: 
··j· 
.. 
DATA 
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One can on thiS;'b.asis. examine the deve1oping nature of 
British policy tcv1ard Spain. In the early stages of the 
Spanish conflict there existed th 1e diffd.culty of the lack 
. of information, the resulting difficulty of making pre-
dictions as the outcome of such activit,y as could be ob-
served in opain, and t,he difficulty of arriving at v,bat 
would be decision criteria that would form a continuing 
basis for decision-making. Britain during the early stages 
of the Si:anish conflict seemed to actjng in terms of a 
limited decision c~iteria, which were shifted in emphasis 
by certain sections of the Bri-tish decision-making structure 
to1:1a.rds the end of the year. The limited ('decision criteria 
utilised by the British_decision~makers in the early stages 
was in tge main a reflectimn of _the necessity of formulating 
a policy towards the deveioping conflict in Spa.in before a 
ciear appraisial could be made of the actions that could be 
observed and the lack of any clear information as to the 
events in Spain and the intentions of the outside powers. 
'l'he United States c;ha.rg' in France re ported on Augu.s t 20th 
a conversation that ha had had that day with Blumel~ ~hef de 
.. -~ 
':: 
,. 
Cabinet of B1um: "I asked Bl.umel v~hether the British uovern- , 
ment had from the outset realised the potential dangers to 
Great Britain's interests in the Mediterranean if a military 
in:fluenc e were established in Spain subJect to Fascist in-
fluenceo He said that the British Government had at first 
I been rather 1ukewarm in its support of the French initiative 
for a non-intervention pact. This he explained by (appara.nt 
omrnision) that at first Bri titll~ conservative opinion, includ-
~ :i·· ' 
I'·'. 
1111.; ........ ~ .. . 
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the Army and the Navy, had been that the triumph of, the 
Spanish Government would mean Communism and disorder in Spain 
and that a victory of the military elements was to be desired. 
However~ more recently the British Government seemed to have 
shown a clearer realisation of the :implications to their in-
terests of a victory of the military rebe1lion in Spain and 
the Bri tis.h communiqu, of last Saturday and ·the 01--der of the· 
Board of Trade yesterday forbidding the export of ¥Jar mater-
,ial and even civilian planes to Spair- indicated this. He 
. 
added that the British were 'strongly supporting' in Berlin 
and Rome the, French proposal for a non-intervention pact. 
nAs of possible interest he said that when Blum met Van-
si ttart recently in Paris on the latters return from Berlin 
Blum felt that Vansitta.rt had failed to show a clear realis-
ation. This Blum felt might be explained by the fact that 
' 8 
Vansittart had then been avi1ay from England for some time." 
.~ 
Hassel in reporting of conversation with Ciano on the 
6th August, 1936, stated that he had '1 ••• referred to the 
decisive importance that the British attitude necessarily 
had; unfortunantly it ,~as to be noted that so far it had 
./' 
,I 
lacked a clear orientation. Ciano agreed but said that he 
9 
was not too optimistic in that :~)respect." 
It would appear that British policy in the ear1y stages 
was dominated almost entirely by the awareness of the possi-
bilities of an escalation of conflict between France and 
Italy and Germany into which Britain might be drav,n, once 
an initial move toward intervention were to be made by the 
. 
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French. Straus reported to Cordell ffuli on the 27th Ju1y,1936, 
,-
this account of tl1e steps .that led to the decision by the 
Blum Government in France not to supply arms to· the Span.ish 
Government: 11The reasons which led to the decision v1ere 
communicated to ~he El1bassy by a reiiab1e press contact who 
obtained his information from a member of the Rrench Supreme 
War Coun·cil. According to his i(J.forman.t certain members of .,., 
the Blum Cabinet pai~tid!ularl;w Cot , Air l\E:inister, decided on . 
July 21 to accede to a request from Spain to send arms and 
ammunition urgently required by the lvladrid Government. To 
j?;his decision it is understood that Blum gave. his tacit 
consent. 
"On y"uly 22 Corbin, French Ambassador in London, te1e-
phoned Blum persona.l.ly and ca1led to his attention that the 
British Government was extremely wor~ied about this contin-
gency. Corbin urged that Blum come over and discuss the situ-
ation with Baldwin and Eden as soon as possib1e. Thus Corbin's 
Pequest was the chief reason for Blum's sudden decision to 
procede to London and not as is generally believed to join 
in the tripartate conversations that were then taking place. 
"In London Eden drew Blum's attention to the grave inter-
national con~equences which might result from French active 
support of the I~la.drid Government. The fears of the British 
Government were strengthened b~/ a report from the French 
Military Intelligenc.e which indicated a certain movement of 
Germ.an troops on the French Eastern border. Eden furthermore 
made it qju.De clear that he conside~ed any assistance lent 
>. 
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I< . 
by-the French Government to the ·Spanish Government might_ 
conc~ive .. bly develop a most critica1 international situa-
tion in vievv of the. Italian aod German attitude in the 
~ I ·'I '· • 
matter • 
./ 
"Blum returned to Paris on the 25th and immediately call-
ed the Cabine~ Council meeting mentioned above in the course 
of which the British point of view was brought forcibly to 
the attention of his extremist colleagues particularly Cot. 
After a lengthy debate the more moderate elements Blum, 
\ 
Daladier and Delbos \l\/ho advoca. ted a policy: pf ,Stpio:t neut-
10 
rality won out and the decision mentioned above was taken.~ 
The British Government had persauded a French Government 
that, in view of the serious dangers presented by the possible 
vic:t,ory of b,ranco, had seriously considered_· acquiescing in 
11 
the request of·:'"_the l?patlish ··Gove"r.omentJfor arms. According to 
Wilson in Paris, it was large1y on the advice of the British 
that the French inquired of the German, .oelgian, Portugese, 
· Russian and f:olish Goverments on August 5th their views re-
garding a declaration of non-intervention in the affairs of 
:;,pain; Wilson added that the Counsellor of the German Emqassy 
understood that the Britis~ Government had advised the French ,. 
r 
Government to use the method of consultation through the · 
ordinary diplomaic channels, rather than trying to hold a 
12 ~ 
conference on the subject. While Eden was applying presaure 
on the French, he v1as in fact. also engaged on a v,ide-~·cale 
Campaign to bring the other st.a tea into 1ine wi tl1 the non-
. 
intervention proposai, employing tactics that ran.gad from 
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diplomatic pressure as with the French to pleading and ·per-1 : 
'·' 
sausion, as vJell as an attrnpt to employ the force of example. 
Bingliara ( the United States -Ambassador in Britain) reported· 
on the 15th August that he was reliably informed that a press 
report that the British Government was appealing to British 
firms and private ov~ners to refrain from sending civil planes 13 
to Spain was true, while on the 19th Eden announced that 
Britain would apply an arms embargo to Spain uvi thout waiting 
for otl1er powers. Eden wrote to Bald,Jini nyou vJill have seen 
the action which we took yesterday to prevent arms or aero-
planes going frorn tr1is country to Spain. I felt it was nec-
essary to do this even before we achieved international 
agreement in order that we might, by setting an example, do 
our best to induc.e others, more particularly Germany and 14 
Italy, to follow suit." 
Pressure was applied where Britain was in the position 
to do so, as for example in Portugal. The Director of the 
Legal Department to the Letlgation in Portugal, Gaus, on the 
7th of September re1)orted that: "At the request of the Portu-
guesecGovernment, the German ship Usaramo was unable to dis-
charge a 'certain' cargo in the port of Lisbon and must re-
turn to the northern coast of Spain. According to informa-
tion received by the Navy S> the Pontugueser:::.Government acted 15 ' 
under British pressure." The Cha.rg~ d'Affairs of Germany in 
Lisbon had already reported on the 22nd of August that the 
outbreak of the Spanish conflict hs.d raised grave issues in 
Portugal., especially the 'spectre/.of a communist victory in 
I 
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Spa.in, in which case Portugues.e_ opinion felt that Portugal 
would go co.mrnunist in two months o Gaus then went on to state 
that '°The decis~on was~made particu1arly difficult by the 
fact that-the British ally by ho means encouraged a policy 
in line with the interests of Portugal 9 but on the contrary 
. tried by all manner of remonstranees to get her to follow a 
different course. I have recently confirmed that England 
went so far as to threaten that .her obligations as an ally 
should by no means be taken for granted in the event of a 
lo 
conflict with Red Spain provoked by Portugal's attitude." 
Other states such as Germany and Italy were not so 
amenable to this kind of pressure, but Britain used to the 
full such means of persausion that were open to her. On the 
8th of August, the British Ambas_~ador called on von Neurath, 
the Germall Foreign IVIinister, and as Neurath records: 0 e •• read 
me a telegram from his Government, in tAJhich hewas instructed 
to give his warmest support to the step taken b~ the French 
Government to bring about an agreement regarding non=inter-
vention in the internal affairs of Spain •••• The Ambassador 
••• declared again how important it was, in the opinion of 
his Government, at least to make the attempt to:loca.lize the 
confl.agration in Spain by acceding to the non-intervention 
agreement proposed by the French Goverrunento He therefore 
17 
asked that v,e give our assent as soon as possible." 
., 
'-'imilar representations were rna.de by the British Charge 
18 d~~ffairs in Rome to Ciano ,on the 17th of th~ same month. 
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The jjri tish .It ore ign Office , under l!iden, at temp-ted to 
harness the power factor that the United S·tates represented in the attempt to bring about an international ag-£1.eernent 
that would serve to limit intervention by outside powers in 
the Spanish conflictQ James c. DWlll, tl1e Special Assistant 
to the United States Secretary of ~tate and the Chief of 
the Division of Vlestern European·affairs, stated in a memo-
randum of the 4th December, 1936, that: "The British Ambassa-dor came to see me this afternoon to tran8mit a message 
from the British Government. This vi1as tm the effect that the British and French Governments have appr,oached the Govern-
ments of ~ermany, 1 ta~y, Portugal and the Soviet Union with 
a virevJ to ( 1) having these four nations.join vii th the Bri-. . 
tish and. French Governments in a renounciation forthwith of 
any action which might be likely to bring about inte.rvention by a foreign nation in the S,panish conflict; (2) having these four nations join with them in a stronger and more effective prevention of the sending of supplies and equipment to Spain; (3) initiating steps with a view to having the six interested Governments join in an offer of mediation in an effort to 
terminate the conflict in Spain. 
"The British memorandum further stated ·that it was the hope of the ~ritish and French Governments that our Govern-
ment could make some possible statement of general sympathy 
with the .,proposed steps and suggested that in adcii tion to 
such· a statement it~would be of great value if we could, 
through our representatives in the Qapitals of the-four Gov-
., •. ,. ,./~:l ernments to be approached, say a word in favour of those 
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-237-Governments participating in this mediatory effort.· 
'· 
"The Ambassador went on to read to me the sense of a 
·:: strictly confidential instruction which he had- received 
at the same time as the text of his GovernmentB memorandum. 
in which his GO~Jrnment stated that while 1 t v,as not expect-
ed that th8~ed ~tat~s would take any active participation 
in this proposal for mediation, they did attach great impor-
tance to some public statement in support thereof and to our 
conveying through our representatives in the capitals con-
cerned as expression in favour or participation by those 
19 Governments in he mediatory effort." 
Bingham~ the United States' Ambassador in Britain, gave, 
five days 1ater, his opinion in a report to Washington that I 
" ••• what he (Eden) really wishes is support of the British 
and French thesis a.gainst interference in the· Spanish 
20 
e1 tuation by the Governments of Italy, Germany and Russia." 
In both the goals and the methods of implementing British 
policy toward the Spanish co~lict, the British decision-
makers were haunted by the memories o~ the failures 
that hBd. been made by Britain during the Abyss~nian episode. 
The still-echoing reverberations of the Hoare-Laval fiasco 
made British decision-makers determined that the mistakes 
would not be repeated. Thus even staunch supports of the 
League of Nations, such as Eden, felt a need to reappraise 
same of the high hopes that-had been placed on the League 
and to reassess.a the utility of the League institutions as 
a mearis of advancing British policy goals". Eden told the 
House of· Commons on the 18th June, 1936, "· ••• that the 
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future · of -the League needs · to 'be urgently and //er'nestly con-_ 
sidered by al.l its -members. o •• I must make it plain that the 
Go·vernmentSare determdineci. that the League should go ono 0 •• 
··rn our view, the fact that the League has tried and failed-
in this inptance (referring to the Abyssinian episode) is 
not a reason for making us 'v'Jish that the attempt had not be en 
made, but it is reason for making us determine to seek so 
to organise the ~eague that it may achieve the best chance 
'•(::" 
•.t., 
of success hereafter. (interruption) I beg to think that my 
remarks have some importance. If the League is to have its 
best chance of success then it must be organised on a basis 
which takes into account the lessons of the last few months. 
Those lessons have to be analysed, and the instruction which 
they give has to be emdodied in the future practise of the 
League •••• The.-.,.question< i~, ·can· the :_world succeed in ·reorgan-
ising itself::_on '.a ip.eace basis? I am convinced despite the 
events of the~last few months that it can; if it will. 
I am convinced that it remains true that a universal League 
of Nations of substantially disarmed states, in a world made 
safe for democracy - that it what the Covenant contemplated -
can yffectively and without doubt maintain peace, but un-
happily as I believe for mankin& such a League has never exist-
ed in fact, no.r in present conditions can it be readily seen 
how such a League can be made •••• Vle have· to comprise vii thin 
.. 
one organisation the willing collaboration of Governments 
of totally divergent character, That gives some indication 
of the nature of the problem, but unless we face it we can-
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I•, i.not expect the League in the future effectively to. meet tl1ese problems. 1~t least I \\7ill give ••• this definite 
assurance, that the Goverl"llllent will strive to restore to the League its full authority, after this set-back which we 
21 admit, and to that end we propose to devote ourselves," These were br.ave words and fine hopes, though the final impression left by the speech ia of the difficulties rather than the possibilities. Baldwin, · in a speech £6llowing Eden°s gives a more accurate description of the philosophy underlying the :formulation of British policy: u~i'le often ... talk, statesrr1en vJho go to Geneva and many o:f us here, as to vvhat tr1e League sl1ould do and what it should not do, and states-Lflen go, and, I suppose, in certft.in circumstances they vJould commit their people to figl1t •••• I feel convinced that among the common people of ~urope in may countries and in our own coW1try a.nd in France, there is such a lotr1ing of vJar as such not from fear but from kno"Jvledge of what it may mean, that I sometimes vv1onder if they v~oulo. march on any 
h other occasion than if they believed their own frontiers were. in danger •••• if you are to have collective security and if there be any truth in v1hat my instinct tel.ls me about men' hearts in Europe, then, indeed, one of the problems before the League of Nations is to educate the peoples of Europe, tl'a t they may be ready to fight to restrain the aggressor, and I doubt if today they are •••• I hope that the 
- f League of Nations will be able to make collective security ' a reality, but there are real. difficulties about it •••• with 
/•I: 
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the experience I have learnt I ~,ouJ.d not be res·ponsible 
for sanctions again until this country had given us authority 
f 
J''""" 
-;-
. to strengthen our arms~ The right hon. Gentlemen may c·all 
that cowardice. Frankly I do not. I think that it is what 
one O\ves as trustee for the people, but if there be vJar in 
this country, I mean war nearer than the Mediterranean, they 
will pay.for it on the first night with their lives~~,.The 
man who puts sanctions on or allows this country to do so, 
unless he has done all in his power to see that his people 
can be defended at home, is not fit to carry the responsibi-22 . lity of governing his country." 
British treatment of the Spanish conflict in the League 
did not even reflect the pious hopes of Haldwin, becomin, 
concentrated on preventing the conflict from becoming a 
matter of discussion such as would be likely to lead to 
action by the League. Del Vayo, the Spanish Foneign Minister, 
made a plea to the League Assembly on the 25th of September, 
1936, pleading for a better understanding of his Governmento~s 
moral and legg.l position, insisting that non-intervention 
was contrary to international law and wholly to the advanta:ge 
-of the rebels, and' while he argued that foreign states were 
furnishing the rebels with the means of resistance, he denied 
an)' interference by Spain in the affairs of her neigbours. 
During the speech Del Vayo, according to .Gilbert, the United 
'. States ·Consul at Geneva, exercised considerable constraint 
as to the content of his speech, .and this felt Gilbert could 
~ 
have been a result of a "Cs>ntinuous effort (that) ~d been 
\ 
I~:,:?~ 
.. 
' ' 
' . 
( . 
·1 
'•/F 
. .'.; 
/•I 
;1 
·-- ......... ·--·---···-·-··~--, .. - .. · .. ~r-,,._... .. -.-.... ,_ ........ , ............ ~··.,··~ .. , ... -~ ... · ····-·-·····"': 
. ··--···:_-.. /'~:---e~;----:--· .... --.,..,,._.,....,...,, .. ,r-.,. I . . 
••••• 
0
_
0
_ •• 
0 
,. _
_
_
 
••• ,.,-, •• -,.·-··.•-¥•-.,W·• .• •• a•-•.••
0
•~.-·•·--•~--•-··-;-;-_ ... " •• • ,_. ··-• _. -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-'-"
-~
· •rli.'1-r:Jt:.:>.::\ ·., •: ,_.iG: 
,'\ 
1,. 
.i . -
' ... .,. ..\:.1 
I .r-. f . 
, I 
¥ ' •·• ..,_ ........... . 
-241-
-
made during the last f-ew·a.a.ys by a number of delegations 
especially the· .l:)ri tish to persuao.e Del Vay9 to keep his 
speech within bounds which would not precipitate contrm-
23 
versia.l discussion of tl1e ppints he viould raise." 
. Technical arguments had been developed in the league 
of Nations to obviate the League's taking~ position on 
the Spanish conflict, such as tr1at the League dia. not apply 
24 
to a civil conflict, vvhile Eden advised the Spanish Govern-
ment not to appeal to the League under Article 11 of the 
Covenant upon the recognition of the Franco Government by 
25 
Italy and Germany in ~ovember, 1936. 
'' 
At a private meeting of the League c.;ouncil on the 10th 
of Llecember, tl1e Spanish conflict was placed on the agenda, 
while only Spain and Sweden were represented by their For-
eign r~1inisj.ers, which, according to Gilbert n ••• is regarded~.: 
as obviously ev,idencing the desire of the. Council states to· 
be involved as little as possible and in particualr to.be 
i'n the position more easily to evade making commitments." 
Gilbert continued in his report to ~Vashington: "In associa-
tion 11,ith tr1e virtually expressed desire of London and ~aris 
-to limit lEague action in ~his affair, note is taken here of 
" the Anglo-French joint demarche of LJecember 4 to Berlin, 
Rome, ~isbon and Ivioscow soliciting non-intervention in Spain 
and suggesting an offer of mediation between tl1e parties to 
the conflict. In certain League circles tl1is action is re-
sented as prejudicing in advance the action of the Council 
and as tant~,...mo.unt to a public disreg~,rd by the tv;o chief 
r 
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League pov,ers of. the international status and purpose of the .. 
League and as an assertion of its impotence, which are re-
- 26 
garded as prejudici,al to its future. 11 
In the -method of implementing policy tl1erefore, the Brit-
ish decision-makers desired to avoid the institutions of 
the League and to advance ~ritish policy goals by means of 
negotiations through the dij>~omatic representatives of the 
states concerhed, and thus retain as much freedom of maneuvre 
as possible. But what were to be the policy goals ~n the 
period after the raising of sanctions against Italy, Baldwin 
raised this question in the Commons on June 23rd, 1936: . 
urhe question is, what is our policy? The League bas received 
a set-back, and a bad setback •••• The dutyfof the League is 
t 
to see what t~ can do in the light of the experience they 
.. 
have had, in the light of' the present state of Europe, and 
to see how far they can make collective security a reality. 
Our policy is still based •• ,on the League of Nations •••• the 
sec·ond object ·of our policy is the appeasement of· the,~ ~itua-
tion in Europe. We are most anxious to get onto those nego-
tiations •••• The safeguarding of ourselves in the West is of 
vital importance. It may come to that if the League of Nations 
breaks down ultimately, but we are not there yet. I have 
every hope, but negotiations may be futile, if, when negotia-
tions come between our three countries, we cannot make pro-
vision for the same security in the countries to the centre 
and the East of Europe as we hope to make for ourselves. That 
is, the policy on which we shall be directly occupied for 
•,. 
''•, 
weeks ·to come·.L ..... and l hope that when September comes my 
.,.J J 
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right hon. friend and whatever colleagues go with· him may 
qegin to lay the foundations of the superstructure wh·ich 27 
we hope to rear." 
I• 
' l ,·, 
Eden five days earlier had decl.ared that flThe cmllabora-
tion. of Germany is indispensable to the peace of ~urope, and 
we have asked, as successive British Governments have, noth-
ing better that to work v,i th \.:iermany to that end.; •• v1hen I 
came to the 1''oreign t)ffice ,r felt that I must make it plain 
at once how ernest was my desire to enter into friendly 
discussions v1Ji th .tl1e Lierman l:iovernrnent in order to secure 
working arrangements in which that Government could par-
ticipate. Accordingly I instructed our Ambassador in Berlin 
.. , 
ot tell Herr Hitler that l shared the view he had expreessed 
as to the importance of close collaboration and understanding between Great britain, France and ~ermany, and~ expressed 
the hope that the two Governments would keep that object in 
vievJ despite the ract tl1at Germany vvas unwilling at the 
moment to open discussions •••• it was important for us· and 
for Europe to be aossured that ~ermany now felt. that a point 
had been reached at which she could signify that she recog-
,nised and intended to respect the existing territorial and political status of ~urope except of course as it might 
subseq~ently modified by free negotiations and agreements. 
A frank and a reassurring ansvJer to that question,~ I._ am sure 
would be the signal for a return of cbnfidence to Europe. I 
.. j believe that noj::.hing less, if·I may say so, t~g a Euro~:an . 
settlement and appeasement should be our aim. 11 
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. . The: Spanish conf.lict. t~~retore broke upon a .t;.ritain, 
whose Government were preparing to initiate a comprehensive 
attempt to arriye at the general appeasement of Europe. 
'l'he period- that follovJed the lifting of sanctions against 
Italy and the uerman remilitarisation of the Rhineland was 
in ~ritain a period of reassessement and reformulation of 
attitudes and policies in many areas of policy-formu4tion, 
in the recreation of the armed fore es of Britain to meet 
nev·l' challenges, as we have already seen, as tJetl.l as the re-
directing of 1:Srta.in' s policies to~vards poli ticaJ. question. 
Into this peri~d, which necessitated a period smooth read-
justment, the Spanish question entered to interupt the 
developing of these nevv _·relations • .H.oare makes his attitude 
very clear: "When I returned ~o the ~abinet in June, 1936, 
I 1ooked forward to a period of comparative calm from con-
troversial questions •••• It was the Spanish Civil War that 
upset my calculations. Franco's attempted blockade of_ the· 
Spanish coast and his bombing of ~ritish ships brought 
British naval policy into the very centre of international 
..... 
affairs. Scarcely a day passed in the aytumn of 1936 and 
throughout 1937 that did not involve discussions with the 
b'roreign Office over the many problems raised by incidents 
in Spanish waters and our policy of non-intervention. The 
Cabinet was unanimously aireed upon doing everything possible 
?9 to localise the Spanish conflict." i, 
The S,Panish conflict was an unconveniant irritant in 
the foreign rela)ions of Britain,.. o.tte which .J::Sri t.ish pOlicy 
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1 
iri general became concerned to ensure would not deflect the 
direction of British foreign policy. One must remember the 
position of Eden in ·a Cabinet that was, as Alan Campbell 
30 
Johnson had described it, "topcmheavy with foreign expert·s." 
The position of Eden became all the more difficult in May, 
1936, when Hoare rejoined the Cabinet. Eden has described 
his feelings on this event in this way: "Towards the end of 
May Baldwin told me that he had asked Hoare to rejoin the 
Government as First Lord of the Admiralty. He went on to 
assure me that I need not be wo~ried that Hoare would 
interfere with ~oreign affairs. The importance of this, 
according to Baldwin, had beer1 explained and a .. ccepted. I 
felt no- enthusiasm for this appointment in itself a.nd some 
disquiet at its possible consequences. I explainted that 
the-re would now be three :rormer Foreign SeGretaries in the 
Cabinet and that although I was sure that MacDonald would 
always be.as helpful as he could, this was not a particulaly 
happy state of affairs for me. Baldwin spoke comfortably, 
repeating his assurances. Lord Halifax, however, was much more 
outspo~en when we met the next day. He criticized Baldwin 
,. 
sharply for yielding to Hoare's importunitYa A few weeks 
earlier, Sir Samuel had made a speech in PEt:rliament a-oout 
31 
Baldwin so adulatory as to ·oe embarrassing. to all who heard it!' 
In addition to Ma_cDonald, Simon and Hoare (the latter 
two who were to become apart of the 'Big Four' in Chamber-
";\~ 
lain' s Government that were to tAke Britain on the road 
to Munich, and who both had greivances - they had seen the 
younger man, Eden, become Foreign Secretary - while each 
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was suspicious of the appeal of ~den to t,he Hri tish public ... 
and were oppos¢ed to Eden's adoption of the cause of collect-
. 32 
1·.1' \ ive security) , Baldwin's Government included Halifax and . 
Chamberlain. On e-fune 10th, 1936, Chamberlain in an address 
to a Conservative political club drew some conclusions from 
the failure of the League to halt Mussolini's conquest of 
· Abyssinia; referring to the idea that the further application 
of sanctions v1ould aid the cause of-.the Abyssinians, Chamber-
• lain stated: "That seems to me the very rnidsUinrner of madness •••• 
Is it not apparant that tt1e policy of sanctions involves, I 
do not say \Var, but a risk of vvar? ••• ls it not also appa.rant 
from what has hap.l.Jened that, in the presence of such a risk, 
nations cannot be relied upon to proceed to the last extre-
33 mity until ttieir vital risks are threatened?" To .tiden, "Nev-
ille Chamberlain's speech ••• was to me unexpected, not the 
least because his support of my arguments for maintaining 
jf; sanctions had been so consistent and firm •••• ~llhatever the 
merit of this argument, its timing was explQsive. I had 
known nothing of Chamberlain's intention to express these 
34 sentiments, vvhich aroused a storm in the .tlouse of Comrnons. ,~, 
Halifax, as Lord Privy Seal and the Leader of the House 
of Lords, pccupted an undefined position in the Cabinet, 
but his relationship to Baldwin as an old and trusted 
friend and lbe.ing .. :.a.s ~v.el1 a distinguished and experienced 
statesman, gave .l:ialifax. a special position on problems. of 
foreign policy. Halifax was therefore plha.aed to act to 
lend his aid, advice, and from the point of view of the 
. remainder of the c.;~tnet, a restraining inf1uence upon ' ,. 
, .. '.) .. • 
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Eden. To the problems that confronted Br1 tain .. ".in this 
• • I period, Halifax brought a dispassionate desire to apply 
logic and to avoid emotion in arriving at oolutions, the~t 
set a mode-1 of English prs_gmatismQ Saupson quotes Halifax 
as saying before the v1ar that: ''I distrust anyone v1ho 
forsees consequences and advocates remedies to avoid 
35 · 
them." It has there:fore been asserted that "Lord 
Halifax had been appointed to second Mr. Eden, vvho, the 
British Cabinet feared, might act reckleesley if left to 
36 
. himself". 
On the 29th July, Halifax declared in the House of Lords 
that: " ••• it will be ••• the duty of this country to use all 
its in.fluence for the reconcilia_ti on of opinions that will be 
very sharply opposed to one another ••• there must be a 
collective plan. Without it tl"e world falls into chas. On 
that there is universal agreement, and indeed I think on 
no point in Europe toAay is there greater agreement that in 
the opinion that to return to any system that invited, or 
, appear·ed to invite, the esta.blishment of armed camps ranged 
'· in opposition to one another vvould be to court disaster ••• 
it is the duty of all of us, and your Lordships will, I 
hope believe, that it is the constant endeavour of His 
Majesty's Government, to use every ef·fort that vve may 
liberate these forces of peace through the promotion of 
.understanding and through the removal between the nations 
37 
'·{ of everything that would impede 1 ts growth." \ 
. Of special interest is the fact that ~den·was absent 
·· from the Foreign Office from the 30th July to the 16th 
of August, 1936, and Halifax was in charge of the day to day 
;' I 
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·38 events in the Foreign .. Office, during a critical period for· · 
the formulation of .bri tish ,(and therefore French) policy 
toward the Spanish conflict. the British supported French 
proposal for the observatior1 of a policy of non-interven-
tion in the Spanish conflict was published on the lst of 
August anci informal inquirie,s were made uin the most in-39 formal rnanner" of the other governu1ents concerned. Vle shall 
see later on that Halif£lX once again took charge of the 
Foreigr.1. Office during a cri tic·al period for the formulation 
of British foreign policy, in J:Jovember, 1937; vJ:t1ile Eden 
was absent d.t the Brussels Conference, Chamberlain and 
'Halifax pressed eagerly ahead v~h the arrangements for the 4 0 '~<>.'=,_cj visit of Halifax to Berlin. · 
V/hile it may be stated in general terms that the British 
Cabinet was agreed during 1936 and 1937 upon the necessity 
of a policy of appeasement, of the conciliation of conflie·ts 
tl1a t vi/ere dividing Europe, t·he value given to the various 
possible and conflicting policy goals and the methods en-
visaged as the most likely to achieve a stable ~ope, did, 
, lead to disagreement vi,ithin the British Cabinet, and it v,aEfi 
this disagreement over mett1ods as well as go2.ls that led to 
disagreement over what should constitute British policy to-
ward $pain. 
Britain during 1936 and·the early,part of 1937 had, and 
_ was, advancing in the attempt ~9. come to some form of 1nodus 
vivendi vvith the ~ge:ir.ernm:ents of Germany and Italy. In the 
. ' 
attempt to ,analyse the nature of the differences that did 
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exist within the British Government toward the dictators, 
one useful approach is provided by Dean G. Pruitt in his ~-
study 0£ the definition of the situation as a determinant 
of international relations. Pruitt advances the ide~that: 
"One way- to account for an individuals social bel1aviour is 
to describe his definition of the soni&l situationo By this 
is meant his image of the people around him - their capabi-
lities, intentions and traits - and his view of how these 
people relate to his goals and codes of behaviour. Likewise, 
the decisions made by a,policy-maker or the proposals corrunu-
nicated to l1im by another citizen may be d.erived frorn a de-
finition of the international situation. By tliis is meant a 
set a images possessed by an individual, representin6 his 
vievJ of what other nations are like, vvhat relevence tl1ey 
pave to the goals of his own nation, and what behaviour to-
wards them v1ould be appropriate for his 01vvn nation. Takin~ 
this approach, it is possible to distinguish three broad 
classes of images that influence action toward another 
nation: 
1. Predictions about the future behaviour of the other na-
tion. Policy-makers and interested citizens are constantl:y· 
·Ltrying to predict the future behaviour' of other nations •••• 
2. Perceptions of the basic characteristics of tl1e otr1er 
. f//il 
nation. Iv.Test people are not content \"Ji th simply observing ~,, 
" and predicting another person's actions, They usually· v,ant 
to go further and assess his basic characteristics, the 
springs from vvhicb his behaviour flows. The so.me·. is true in -'\ I • 
.;. 
·\' the perception of' nat~o,nS~ Whole 'nations are classi{i~d ~nto 
I j 
. ' . 
-250-
. ·, f 
-'------· categories· such as friendly, hostile, weak or trustworthy. 
people rely on such categorisations to explain the behaviour 
of another nation, and to predict what it Yd 11 do in the 
future. They are also a guide to the choice of ~propriate · 
policies for dealing with the nation. 
3. Conceptions of appropriate ways for dealing vii th the other 
nation. When two nations ineract over a period of time, 
certain kinds of action are repeated over and over ••• the fact 
that certain patters are repeated suggests, in addition, 
the existence of policies or rules or thumb concerning the 
actions that are appropriate to take toward another nation 
under most circumstances ••• 
"Three rather specif'ic kindsof image correspond to the 
three broad classes just described: 
(A) threat perception - the -oelief' that the future behaviour 
ot· another nation is likely to frustra e the attainment of 
a specific goal. 
~) trust or distrust - the perception of the basic character-
istics o:f a.nother nation as genera.lly trustv1orhy or untrust-
worthy. 
(C) responsiveness - the conception o~ how helpful one's 
nation should be in dealing with another nation - a general 
41 
orientation that underlies rp.any more s:pecif·ic action patterns." 
. ..-
Hoare is typical of many who have described the attitude 
of Eden as being too rigidly bound by a moral view o:r inter-
national relations, in which Eden's dadication to the·sanct-
i ty of_ principles such as the maintainance of good :Cai th 
between nations in respect to agreements willing entered Jn-
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to, placed a serious and dangerous impediment upon his •·.! 
ability to viev1 problems in tl1e 'proper I persective: 
"Vlhile . I cannot point to any specific difference of opinion betwe·en us over British policy during the Spanish Civil \. Viar, _I) formed tl:i.e impression, when I was the First Lord, 
that he regarded the conflic.t as one betv1een absolute right 
and absolute virong in 'fJhic.t1 tl:1e dictator should at all costs 
42 be totally defeated and democracy tota.lly defended." 
This indi tement bJ' Hoare of Eden would seem to be rather harsh in its evaluation (or at least an indication of Hoare's lack of principle), since Ea.en's attitude toward the Spanish 
conflict was a function of his image of the world aroun~ him 
and the methods by which one should deal with that world. When Eden arrived back from the. -Brussels Conference on the 6th of November (Eden was present from the 2nd of November to the,~ _,_.L, l.937, at the Nine--l?ower ·;Conference held. in Brussels. which was concerned with the probl~ns of the F~ East), as 
recorded in ~den's ?demoirs, he found that u ••• tlie Prime Tuiinister and rialifax vJere pressing· eagerly ahead v,ith arran5e-ments for the visit (of Halifax to Germany). The original intention had been that Halifax should see Hitler in berl.in during the Sports Exibition, and it v,as on this understand-ing that I had agreed that he should go. A series of tele-grams from Hendc:rson novv told us that Hitler vvould not be in Berlin during the material time and that he showed no inclination to meet Halifax there •••• If Halifax wished to 
meet the Chancellor, he would have to iO to his eyrie at 
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'f'· Berchtesgaden. It even appeareq that the Germans v,anted to 
.r·· ' 
. pretend· tr1a:t· the· whole idea. emanated from us. Here was the 
precise sequence of events that I had 1Jvished to avoid •••• I 
-~ did not think it good, either for Hitler or for us, that we 
should appear to be running after him, p~ticularly when 
tr1e tr±partate pact bet1vveen Germany, Italy and Japan r1ad 
just been announced on November 6th. So I telegraphed Lon-
don: ' ••• from tlie point of viev, of our position in Europe 
and public opinion at home it ~is essential to avoid giving 
the impression of_ our being in persuit of the German Chan-
cellor.' At the same time I explained my views by telephone 
to Lord Cranborne and asked him to speak to Chamberlain. 
Cranborne did so tl1at afternoon, saying tl"1at it would be 
most undesireable that we should appear in the role of 43 
supplicant Cl)" VJhen Eden arrived back from Brussels for the 
' 
.. 
last time, he v,ent to see Chamberlain to eKplain his concern 
at tl1e exaggerated accounts o:f the scope of Halifax's 
visit given in the press, together with complaints over the 
slowness of rearmament, he was advised by Chamberlain to go 44 home and take an aspirin. "This, tt comments Eden j "hardly 
seemed an adequate remed;/ for the national deficiencies, so 
I returned to the Foreign Office and wrote to Chamberlain: 
. 'Not to exaggerate the ·significance of tr1is visit. It is an 
occasion for an informal and unofficial contact and not. for 
negotiations. That being so, it is even more rediculous to 
suggest that a visit of tnis character is indicative of any 
. 45 change in the fundamentals · of British fmreign policy.'' 
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The fundementals of British forei.gn. policy included, in 
Eden I s vi ev1 , .. not only goals to be attained but also the 
methods to reach these goals. His concern that it was essen-
tial. .to avoid giving tr1e impression of chasing Hitler, of 
" not placing Britain in the role of the supplicant v1as based 
on his belief tbat agreements made between states are worth-
. l.ess if made on the basis of a threat by_ one of the parties. 
1Ialif'ax in his meeting wi tl1 Hitler he.ts spoken of ''possible 
alteraftions in the European order which might be destined -
to con1e about with the passage of time •••• England \'Vas inter-
ested to see that any alteration should come about through 
the course of peace·tt1l ev,olution and that methods should be 
avoid~d which might cause far-reuching disturbances, which 
46 neither the Chancellor nor other countries desired." 
:Eden I s comment or1 this was that: "I vvished that I-Ialif'ax 
had warned Hitler more strongl;/ against intervention in 
Central hurope. 'Alterations through the course of peace-
:ful evolution' meant one thing to Halifax and probably some-
thing quite different to the Fuhrer. I-Ii tle1., vvas capable of 
taking this as giving him. freedom to increase subversive 
Nazi activity in Austria, or to stir up the grievances of 
the Sudenten Germans •••• 
"The conversation was carefully studied at the Foreign 
Office,~where it was noticed that Hitler had now adopted'the 
theme that a general settlement was not careful politics, 
that immediate negotiatio.p.s between Great Britain and Germany 
were unp.ecessary, but that if Britain really wanted to improve 
,, relations, she could. do so b~- satisfying German colon;al 
L..._,,i, utl 
,_.,11 
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clainlS. It was noticeable that Hitler had offered no guaran .. 
_ tees about his polic~r in Central Europe. Once more vJe VJ ere 
to be asked to rnalce all the concessions wi tt1ou.t any ret.urn. 
I minuted: t If we do not ge,t, we shall not give 1 •••• 
ttAs I had feared, Lord Halifax's visit was vri tr1out posi-
,. 
~ .. \ 
tive results. lviy loyal c.olla:borators at the ~1oreign Office 
we1~e proved right in the uneasiness which tl1e;/ had expres.sed 
about it from the start. One of its e£fects was to weaken 
47 
my own position and I was rnistal<:.en in ever toler~ting it." 
.· Eden's sense of vJhat vJas realist.Jic in ir1ternational 
affairs tl1e1~efore differed quite radic·ally from that of 
Ch~Tiberlain, and to a lesser extent to that of Halifax, being 
built on an as·sessment of the appropriate w~ys to deal 
with otl1er nations and his belief that for Br~itain to nego-
tiate \Ni tl1 the Dictators merely for the sake of negotiation 
or the vagµe hope that it would improve the international 
situation would only lead Britain into a weaker negatiati~ 
position, wl1ile encotlra.ging the Dicta to.rs to deffiq!l.d more. 
Pruitt, having· defined trust as tr1e expectation that another 
nation v,ill be helpful, attributes trust to a feelin(l that, 
or a c-onception in tl1~ mind tr1at, one's nation should be 
- helpful to anotl1er nation. He then states that there are 
four ways by which one nation can judge another nation to 
-·~ 
be trustvvorthy: (1) by reorganising incentives for the other P, $,.--,._,,:.._;' 
nation in order to induce it to be trust1wvorthy (2) judging 
the other nation on the evidence of its_ past experiance 
(3) by means of tests (4) by· means of a general evaluation 48 
of the other nation. In vie1.v of tl1e suspicions that vt1ere 
he~d by Eden and the British Foreign Office on the aims of 
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i.,_ ·:· : Gerriia.n1 foreign policy,·--· general evaluations and pa.st expei!i-
. . 
ence did not serve a view that Germa.ny·would prove helpful 
to Britain of its ovvn volition, and so Eden demanded that 
I Hitler should prove his trustworthyness bs· meeting Britain 
with concessions that would equal those made by Britain. As 
we have already noted, Eden felt that incentives granted to 
Germany vJould only serve to encoura ..ge her appetite, rather 
than to engender a more helpful attitude on her part. 
During June, 1937, the possibility of a visit to London 
by the German Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, was discussed 
between London and Berlin. On June 11th, Ma.ckenson, the 
German State Secretary, in formed the British Ambassador 
that Neuratl1 \n1as prepared to visit, arriving on tl1e 23rd,. 
c.;. 
and added that the visit would only be possible on the con-
dition that German demands made aft£\ the Iviza incident had 
49 
., been settled in a manner satisfactory to the Germans. The 
i 
'! . "~ 
Iviza incident refers to the bon1bing of tl1e German pocket _., 
, ba ttleship,,.1Deutsi1hlahd,as-=: it 1• waa lJing in the roadstead of 
Iviza. Reference has already been made to this incident and 
the German action of bombing the harbour of Almeria in reta-
liation, a measure that Eden considered as too extreme and 
leading to a very dangerous situation. On May 30th, the Ger-
man Government vii thdrew from the If on-Intervention Committee 
until such time as it obtained a positive guaranty aga.ins t 
repetition of such incidents. The details of the British 
,i 
and German proposals v,ill be deal~_/ __ · n ·greater deta'il at a 
later point, but the essence of the di .. ffering vievvpoints 
i 
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.. laJr in the German demand the.t paragraph ( c) · of the British 
proposal, v1hich read that: "The tv:,10 parties should be in-
~ formed that failure to ·implement these assuarnces and any 
<l 
interference with ships emplo;fed in patrolling duties vJill 
in future form the subject of consultation between all four 
50 
count~ies on the situation tl1us creat,edo'° should be altered 
to read that; 0 That anyinfraction of the afore said c1ssuranc es 
will be regarded as concern of all four powers who, ir~espect-
ive of an~-- j.rnrnediate defensive measures considered necessary 
by the directl~/ concerned povJer, will immediately seek agree-
ment among thems·elves concerning the steps to be taken con-
·51 
certedly." 
On June 12th, the British Ambassador in Germany at the 
personal request of Bden, called on l\:1ackenson to inform him 
that: "Eden regretted exceedingly that the visit had sudden-
l~r been made to depend on a settlement of the Iviza incident 
~ 
and reminded us that the first suggestion for the visit had 
bee-n made precisel~r in connection with a settlement of this 
incident. rJor had the Foreign Iv.Iinister set tt1is condition 
later but l1ad made the time of the incident dependent first 
upon the completion of his Balkan trip and then on sounding 
out the lt1urhrer 's opinion, and had finally designated the 
l 
time between Jwie 21 and 28 as convenient for the trip with-
out mentioning the condition that was now being advanced • 
. 
Eden deplored the presen~ standpoint all the more since the 
danger of indiscretions continued to make it extremely de-
sirable to announce tl1e visit a.s soon as possible. The .Am-, 
/ 
bassador went on to read from tl1e instruction that &:len did 
. ~ . 
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. 
. not under·stand why tr1e Spanish sr1ould 
. 5·2 not be taken up in ' '. 
the London disscussions." 
It becomes clear that -to the Germans the holding out 
of tr1e pr·oc1ise of talks offered a 1neans of obtaining 
British accession to the -German viewpoin~ that the 
guarantees follo~ing from the Iviza incioent, shoJld allow, 
in· tl1e event of tl1e reoccurrer1ce of such cU1 i.r1cident, tr1at 
'the J.irectly con.cerned povier' sho~,~ld have ~reedom of action 
to undertake such I immediate defensive n1e.asures' as it 
tl1ought fit. _But Eden, as with I{al.ifax's visit to,.Berchtes-
gaden, was anxi0L1S tl1at tt.1.e talks vJi th 1'Teurath sho~·ld not 
lead to ti1e appedrance that Britain was acting in tl1e role 
of SL1pplicant to Germwiy. It is this that for·ms the basis 
o:f ~den's insistance thc:1.t the Eritis.11 sl1ould be able to 
announce that the Germans had agreed to definite points of 
departure for the neLotiations, and esspecially a discussion 
of t:n.e .Spanish problen1. On June 8th, the British goverrunen t 
proposed the following text for tl1e press announcement of 
tr1e v.isit: u Baron von Neurath will visit London on June 24t11 
as the official guest of riis !:~aje~ty 's Goverrunent. No 
negotia.t~ons are under"' co11.sidera.tion out it is l1oped tl1at 
visit will offer an opportunity for an exchange of views 
.. 
. ·• l 
'1... •• 
(on Spanish problem and.) on (other) matters of corrunon interest 
to the two countries. u53 On the followin~ day, Neurath 
told rdackensen tl1at l1e vvisl1ed the text to be amended 1.to 
omit the vJords .,Spanish problem" and after "opportunity 
for an exchange of viev1s" add ''on matters of cornc1on interest 54 for the two countries". Also of interest is the quibble 
•. 
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-258-•I \ 1 11.}' I • -~ that geveloped on the. question as to where it should·appe_ar 
tbat .the initiative for tl1e talks had con1e from; IVIackensen 
'L'· .... I-~ :', . ~- <,-
:reported on the 8th: "Conc.er11ing tl1e pro1)ose.d. text of the 
press announcernent I noticed tl1e abs~ence of any emphasis 
on the f'act that the invitation comes from t:qe British 
Goverrunent. Sir 1Ievile \1.1as of a different opinion, since 
in England to be a ttgt.1est" means to be "invitedn. Af1Y__., · 
\., particular emphasis on the Spanish question as the subject 
of discussion is in my opinion inexpedient b.ecause of the 
sensational effect to be expecte(i frorn it. Reference to a 55 tour d 'ho1-.izon would probably be sufficient.'' 
It. is clea1" tl1at tt1e ~pci!lish question be~ins to trar1s-
cencd the is.sues di: ectly devolving from the strdtegic and 
economic interests of Britain dl•:i Spain, and evolves into 
a ''test'' of the utili t~/ of talks between Britain and German~/, 
in particular, and the tttrustworthyness II of the German 
Government, in general. Without some semblence of a quid 
pro quo, Eden was reluctant to pay the price that the Germans 
dernanded, ncitlely·, the German \AJarships sr10 1J.ld be allowed 
to retaliate in any v-1a:/ seen fit in the event of theiP being 
,subjected to an attack by Republican aircra:ft or submarines. 
The metaphysical quality ascribed to the Spanish problem 
b~r Eden is 1nore clearly observable in the case of tl1e 
relations betv,een Italy and B1~i tciin. Brita.in had moved 
tov,ards the appeasement of Italy b~/ the Gentleman's 
. 
. Agreerr!ent of January 2, 1937, by wl1ich Great Britain and 
Italy disclaimed any desire to modify the status quo in 
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. . 
. . the. ll1editerranean and undertook to respects each, otli:e-rs', 
. I 
rigr1ts and interests. In a note delivered to the 
Governments re presented on the Non-Inte1"1vention C'ommi ttee, 
on the 20th of December, 1936, the British Government 
stated that it had observecl v1itr1 grovving conc-ern the 
increasing numb·er of foreigners entering Spain. I'Joti~ 
that the representatives of the Governments on the Committee 
l1ad on December tl1e 9th, undertook to ask their respcetive 
goverrunents to agree to extend the Non-Interventior1 A~ree1nent 
to cover indirect as well as direct intervention and, 
as a first step, that this extent ion should cover the 
question of1 ''volunteers'',. the British Goverrunent considered 
that· it was of the utmost irrlportance that steps should be 
taken by these Governments to put an immediate stop to 
the departure from their respective countries of their 
nationals with a viev1 to tl1eir taking service witl1 either 56 
of the parties in ~pain. 
On January tJ:1e 13th, Ciano informed Hassell that the 
desire of Italy before giving her offical reply to the 
Bri tisl1 note, was to impltLnent fur•ther tactics of delay be-
cause on January the 14th, an additional 4,000 men were 
to be shipped to Spain, and in addi tio11, a new division, 
of 9,000 combat troops plus 4,000 other personnel~ were 
5? to be ready between January 22nd and Januar:/ 25th. These 'I 
· actions. on the part of Italy vJere in direct contradiction~ 
to assurances that Italy had !nade in regand,.-. to the 
maintr ... -, 
airiance of the status quo in the Western Mediterranean 
., J, I 
I 
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, tha.t·haa. been given in the Gentleman's A~reement, the· 
undertaking of Decembe1~ the 9th, by the n;iembers of the 
Non-Interv.ention Committee j and assurances given by 
.. Cian.o to Ingram, the British Charge d 'Affair es in Rome, 
on the 12th of Septer9}?er 1936, that the Italian Governn:ient 
had not, either before or since the revolution in Spain, 
engaged in any negotiations with General .B,ranco whereby 
the status quo in the \f/estern Iviediterranean 1vvould be 
altered, nor would they enio.ge in any such negotiations 
in the futur~e. 1-Gden, in the House of Commons on December 
the 16th 1nade references to these assurances. Atherton, 
the Counselo1" of the United States Embassy in London, 
reported tvvo days later: "In a conver·sation at the Roreii£.n. 
Office on the follovving da~r, the Embassy was informed that 
Vlr. Eden' s • • • was made in order to remind tl1e Italian 
Government of the underta.~ings which they had given to the 
Bri tis.µ Government last Septernber, both in Rome and in 
London, in viev1 of the activities of c ert~in Fascisti in 
I • : .: 58 
the Balearic Islands," 
One startling admission was made by the Italian rep-
resentative at a meeting of the sub.committee of the 
Non-Intervention Committee on the 23 rd of Iviarch, 1937, 
des.cribed here by lviaisky: uGrandi began a lon~ and 
rhetorical speecl1 to prove tr1a .. t tl1e 1voluntee1--s' played a 
quite insi~ificant role in the Spanish war, and that . 
~-
' 
the Soviet side vva.s draggia.1.g up the natter purely for 
propaganda purposes. In doing so ha got very v,orked up, 
and I noted to myself 'He's risin;:;1 1 . To add f'·uel to the 
. . • .,_; I 
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" 
flames, I began to 'stare out' the Italian···Anib~ssador 
_J ,, f 
fixedly. He gave via:y first, stirred uneasily i.q. his chair 
and tried to turn away. But I kept n1y eyes on hirn, and 
slovJly, v;i tr1 pauses, putting c1eliberate emphasis on certain 
words, I asked:'Are we to underst~ . nd the Italian Ambassadoi> 
as meaning that Italy and Germany, contrar~y· to the decision 
of the Committee, are positively refusing to bring their 
"volunteers" out of Spain?' 
"And here Gran.di' s It.alicUl teinperament aiain did him. a 
disservice. 1Ie, as it were, broke his cha.in) and suddenly 
fired out in one breath: 'If ~ ou v1ant my opinion, I'll 
say this, not one sir1~le Italia.n volW1teer vv ill leave 
59 tipain until l?ranco is vict.oriousl'" :1. 
Eden, in a merJorandum on January tl1 7th, had set out 
the w-ider implications of tl1e Spanisl1 confJ~ict: ttThe 
Spanish civil war has ceased to be an internal 3panish 
isst._e and has becorne an inter-natic·nal battle-grourid. 
The character .of he future government of cipain has no¥/ 
becon1e less iL1portant to the peace of Europe than that 
the dictators shoulcl not be victorious in that countr\~/· 
The extent and cha.1~acter of the intervention now practised ' > 
' ' 
by Gerniany and ItalJ'· have rnade it clear to the world •• i 
ii: 
• I 
;~:: 
that tr1e object of tl1e se powers is to secure General 
Franco's victory whether or not it represents the will of 
·-the Spanish people •••• 
,· 
"It is tl1E..refo1~e n1y conviction that unless we cry~·a. 1 ,,t;. 
halt in Spa.in, vJe shall have troub.le this ye.ar in oi1e or1 
-:oth~ ~t t~~-- danger po~nts I have r·eferred to. It foJ.lows ' ... - . - " 
'· 
__ ... _.c,c--•-·•·•---••-•---·c:•-c,--c••-------==-----•--"-•c---'-";'",:z~~c~-C-,·. -cc,••c-
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that to be firm in Spain is to gain time, and to gain ti.ne 
is what 1-Jve v1ant. We cannot in this instar1ce gain t i~:-ie by 
marking it. It is to be rememberec1 that in tl1e language 
of the If azi Party any adventure is a minor adventure. 
They spoke tl1us of t~e· Rl1ineland last year, they are 
spea.k.i~ t,hus of Spa.in today, they vri 11 s1)ecilc thus of ?i1emel, 
..•. , ... Danzig or Cz.echoslovakia to1norro'VV. It is only by sl1ovvi~ 
ther:i that these dangerous d.istinctions a.re false tl1at \Ve 60 can hope to avert a greater cala.r.nit~y.u. 
. ' ..... 
Eden, on re·tu1·ning to the I?orei~n Office from YoI·kshire, 
on January the::4th, learnt tl1at tl:~e further large con-, 
sigrunents of Italian volunteers. had ju.st arrived in Spain. 
To Ea.en it seamed, that since the Gentlemc.m's Agreen1ent 
had been signed two days before, that it was only too 
likely tl1c:1. t ~.1ussolini had used the negotiations for a 
cover plan for further intervention. Eden wrote in his 
diary; "It is fortunate that I insisted on an exchange 
of letters about r~'lajorca. and tl1e integr·d.ty of ~panish 
territorJr, ••• At least vve have Jiven nothin~ av-1ay to Italy. 
It r·emc.1.ii1S to be seen whetl1er~ v.;hd.t 'Ne have gained v1ill 
prove of aJJ..Y n1a t er ial value • 'rime a lone v1 i 11 show u.n d 
nothing would be foolish thu..n openly to ( to r:1ore attempt 61 woo l'wlussolini avtJay frorn 1-Ii tler. ,, EderJ. 1 s c o.cn.r:l en t • l1is lll 
memoirs is that uThe failure of the so---called Gentlenit:tn Is 
Agreen1en:t. taught rne a lesson, that there was no value (; .: . 
~ ' ', ' in negot:La.t:ind v1j. tl1 rjussolir1i agai11, unless he first 
62 car1,ied out the erigagements he had already entered into. 11 
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Signor Crolla, the Italian Charge d'Affaires, short1~~ 
before Cl1r·ist:nas 1937, handed.· Eden a docurnent reminding 
him· of Chamber~lain' s pron1ise of the preceeding · Jul:/ that 
Britain woL1ld be "read~r at any tirue to enter upon conver-
sations '' and decl~in~ that the Italians 1dVere ready to do 
so. Eden in his reply reiterated that Britain desir·ed 
to improve relations \/\Ji th Italy but tl1ese could only be 
o3 
realized on a basis of· recir.)rocity. On tl1e subject of 
the projected talks between Britainaid Italy, Eden minuted 
to the 1'1oreign Office on Janµary the 30th 19 37: 11Do we, 
really believe thc.1. t we c.~ ·r·each an agree1nent lNi th Italy 
' 
.. 
' 
of any real value if the ~panisl1 ques-tion is not dealt v11i th? 
A year ago we attanpted this: vJe signed an agreement 
wl1ich ignored the Spanish situation an:l a fortnight 
aftervvards Italy began sencting men in large quantites to · 
3pain. Any repetition of suchan event - and it can surely 
not be ruled. out-~. s a possibility - would finally destroy 
our new agr.,eement as it begeu1 to destrpy our old agreernent 
· a year ago. If we ere to ask the Le·ague to :pprove our 
agriee1nent with Italy anc1 to ~tl1onize us to grant de jure 
recognition on accoun~ of that agreeLnen·t, tl1e.:r:•e r:1ust be 
some contribll tion i_n it to Europed..11 appeasernent. Spain is 
clearly the lar~est co11tribu tion cJf this kind. that ca.ri 
be rnade. 
'O 
"FJ101~eove1··, is it so certain that Signor Iliussolini v;ould 
dislike to discuss the ~panish si tuat\i. 011 vJi tl1 us in our 
q 
conversati 01.!.S? ;· ;, } .; -~t·;. After all, he r1as clearly some ~ious 
' 
decisions to take i"n the next. few mohths. 
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''In any event- it is surely true that so long as the 
S,panish si tltation continues with re CUJ.,.,,rer1t b,ombir1ris of the 
civilian population by Italian aeroplanes and otl1er 
manifestations of I.talian inter·vention in one form or a.n-
othe~, there cannot be an irnprovcrner.1t in relations betv,een 
,\·.' 
this·; country and Italy. Signor Grandi well re,:a.lizes this, · 
. 64 indeed, he o:ften refers to tthe Spanish shadow.:~• 
This attitude on ihe part of Eden has led many to accuse 
Eden of being rapidly anti-Italian., and allowing a personnal 
dislike of Iviussolini to mar his judgement.. One rnig;l1t feel 
that Eden's attitude is a reflection of an appreciation 
general to the Foreign Office during trat period of the 
status and significance of the European Povvers. Valentine 
Lawford having joined the E_oreign Office ai1d being selected 
for the Central departrnen-t (so1netl1mng of an honour as 
Nigel Ronald, "the pote11ticllly sympathetic, potentially 
professorial Diplomatic·Private Secretary, had hinted, 
between impressive sniffs ••• for the department ,:. in 
.Foreign Office parlance- 'dealt with' France ana Germany 
did not play a part, b,ey·ond feeling sick and solemn, when 
the news was received of the assassination of King Alex-
ander of Yugoslavia and rvronsieur Barthou. ;\s Lawford 
rela t·es: "The King's murder, I gather,ed, vJas the concern 
of the S0utl1ern departn1ent, who from their rooms adjacent 
65 
.... ) ' 
.. to ours, along the ground--floor passage, tried sportingly 
' ( but by Central depctrtinent stanclarc1s not quite seriously) 
to cope vv i th a picturesque but politically secondary 
province ranging from Italy throuill Austria and the 
• . ., •. ,, .•. , •• ·--,•·.-,.,,,_ .• .._.,,,,,._~ ·"'·" '""'°·;,-,-;;,e"·•·- , •. ~,- ~- .. ,••••' ,, ,••·. -·--·-~--, .• ' . ' .. - .. ' - ·- -~ .---· ... _. ____ - ..... 
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Hapsburg Succession states 4.,0 tthe soutr1errunost tip of the I ~ . 
· 00 
Balkans o '' 
' ' While it is true that the 1najority of Britains find it . 
·difficult to take seriously a country chiefly associated 
v-1ith summer vacations,op-era singers, mandolins, and rather 
inedible cooking, this cannot be taken to be the sole basis 
of Eden's attitude toward Italy. It is true, however, that 
Eden's attitude towards Italy vJas based on the belief that 
Mussolini's Empire was but a cardboard substitute for that 
of the Romans. · · · In 194 3, Eden wrote in his diary: "Look-
ing back the thougl1t comes again, Should vve not l1ave 
shovvn more deterErination in pressing through with sa.nctiouns 
in 1935 d!ld if v,e had could vJe not have called l.1usso 's 
bluff and at least postpbned this war? The ansvve1·, I an 
sure, is ~/es. We built k1usso into a greut power, the 67 G1~eeks first -debunked him.." In Februar·y of 1938, Eden 
tried to ia1press upon Cllaillber.mn the real f'acts of Italy''s 
position in the vvor·lld and the difficulties faced by that 
country:. "as I see it, the position is now tr1is. I\1:ussolini 
is an extremely uncon1fortable position. He has com.rn.it-
ments in Abyssinia and Spain, neither of which is turning 
out v~ell. He nov, sees a government in power in Berlin 
which, it is quite true, is comparativelJ' enthusti.astid 
for the Rome-Berlin Axis, but v;l1ich is also a ..pparently 
determd.ned to pursue a rr1ore active foreign polic2/ in 
Centr·al Europe v1itl1 :\ustria as the fir .. st ite!1.1 on its list 
of intended victiI.as. In such a position vJe have nothin~ 
~ 
.\ , .• , .. 
_tQ- !ta.jJ\_,J;!Y.-rS!}9v1tr~ 0 ~:··ot;t;~peJ~ves py~r~~~ge~ ~. If t!ussolini is 
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really anxious to reach a settlement with us, then the 
,, 
opportunity vJe are affording him of liquidating l1is 
commitments in cipain gives hir.n an excellent chance of' provini 
his sinc:rit·J'• He vJill noviJ, moreover, l1ave heard from 
--Gr and i r1ow ready we are to take up this ~uestion ,ni thout 68 
delay."· 
In ,examining the- differing attitudes of Eden to Italy 
and-Germany, ·it is useful to rever·t to the study by Dean G. 
Pruitt of the definition cf the situatiQn as a detenninant 
· of internation action. / In addition t0' trust and distrust, 
Pruitt saw two other broad classes of images that influenc.ed 
the action of one nation to another nation: threat perception, 
· &ld reaponci~tess. For Eden, in Europe, the main threat 
to British interests lay in German aspG.rati\olis :for territor-
ial expantion. It VJas tl1is, in the main, that underlay 
Eden's conception of the approprta te metl1ods for dealing 
with Ger1nany on one hand, and Italy on the other hand. 
Eden was far t1ore ttresponsive" to the dsmands put forward 
by Germany than to those put forth by Italy. In the course 
of tl1e Iviza Incident., Britain did far .mo~-e ·to n1eet the wishes 
of tr1e Germans tl1an she was to move tovJar~ds the policy 
~~-, goals of the Ital.ians while Eden remained in office • .....__ 
. "'-. 
'--., 
",,_"'-~en's justi:t'icati.on for the Nyon Conference { to which """', 
we sh~ll b.e referring at a later point) v1as thut: ttThere 
are those··--wh.Q __ say that at all costs we must avoid being 
brought into oppos-it,ion Vii th Germany' Japan. and Italy. 
This is certainl~~ · true·;~,~,bUS, it is not true t 11.ct t the best ; ·-··· 
--.... ___ _ 
' ··,, 
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retreat before all three of-them. To do so is to invite 
<} their converging upon us. · In any retreat tr1ere rnust on 
,: .. occasion be counter-attack, and the correct method of 
counter-attack is to do so against the weakest member 
of tr1e thl-.ee in overv1helming force. That is the justi-69 1"'ication of }Tyon. u 
Itv,ouldbe an1istake, however, to formulate Eden's 
a.tti tude towards Spain pur~e1y- in terms of that conflict 
being a "test" of tl1e v;illingness of Italy and Germany 
to enter into meaningfuJ. negotiations v;i th Britain. 
The strategic importance of Spain has already been 
considered, and ti1e economic importar1ce of triat country 
to Britain has yet to be examined. The relationship of the· 
J strategic and economic factors to British policy will be 
full~- examined shortly, but in the meantime impact of France 
upon British policy should be examined. Bri~ain and 
France during this period were tied to each other in a 
bond V"Jith neitl1er fully desired, but neither v,as able to 
,>j jettison. The bond Vilas the threat to the security and 
interests of these two countries posed b.y German military 
might. and revisionists asperatioriS. In any conflict in 
which France became involved vvitl1 Germany, Britain could not 
stand aloof and watch passitely the defeat of France, 
for such a defeat raised the spectre of a German hegemony 
~ . that would threaten tl1e s ecuri t,r of the British Isles. ~ v 
' •. ,._ .. -
!· . ., 
Vlhether the British decision-Ir~kers wish to admit it or not, . , 
Britain v1as committed to the n1aint~d:nance of a balance of .... ,--- . 
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..... power in Europe,., and Praoce was essent.ial to some semblence 
of an eoriu.li'bri:wn • 
.:;::, 
But Mth©)ugh the interests ot Britain aod France in the 
main c©incided, suspicions existed between the tv10 · states 
as to the dedication of th® o~her to t,he common cause. 
Lawford provides us with an indication of the suspicions 
t, that va~e held ill Britain of the French leadership, as he ~ 
sketch@~ for us this incident that oc~red in the Fo~est of 
Rambouillet: ·~-• •• the afternoon beg~ 't@ seem long as o.ne 
after another my companions, he~ring that l was a .>ecretary. 
in the J:Sritigh Mnbassy, manoeuvred their mounts into a posi-
tion where ~hey could conveniently assure me ot their life-• 
lon~ friendship for perfidious 6~~lbion, some of th~ add~ 
however: 'But why do you English 1ike this awful fellow Blum?• 
I did my best with the stock reply that His Majesty's Govern-
ment \rJ®X°e less concerned with who was a.t the h®a.d of the · 
Freneh Government that with whether it .might be was williq 
to cooperate with u~ in matters of common in~erest, which 
in our opinion Monsie-u.r Blum certainly was. They looked 
puzzl~d$) and asked me instead what I thouiht of French 
·, hunting: a qliestion which was even more difficult to answer 70 
convincingly." 
' 
. 
"· ,i.,~ ·rhe Abyssinian episode had J.eft its mark. on the relatiooa 
beiwe.en the·· 'tvJ.o codntries0 The ~1ophobe press, more 
venomous "than usual.,. vilified Britain rather than the 
Germana, while the French always seemed to be able to f1od 
convincing reasons for doing nothing. In Vansittart'·s 
eyes "LavaJ. was. troubiesom.e and displeasini, aa were. 1"the 
., . 
. ~---·-, 
.• 
, 
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iJ.!Ubbiness. of his white ties and a chain-smoking swarthiness 
SUBi8S.tive of S.Wl rather than soapo e o o He tho.ught SO J •. 
little of. us that we inevita.b:ly., ·eicpected too much of him.••• 
Reasoning from fear he saw obstacl.e.s everywhere ... he and 71 Flandin always struck me as frightened men.u Chamberlain 
wrote in Jan1Jary 1938, nshe can never keep a secret for 
more than half an hour, nor a ~overnment tor more than 
nine months o u 
72 
d 
The Popu1ar .b·ront. Government,: which came to power in 
France durin~ May 1930, was faced with formidabie difficul-
ties, the chief being the mainta.~ce of the cohesion of 
the coaJ.itio.n of the ~ocialists and the Radicals. The 
workers~especial.J.y in the Paris re{lion,. mistook the electora.1 
victory and the prospect of exercising po\1er for the 
be,lini.iµg of the Revoiution, and in the weeks that followed 
the election called a series of strikes. As James Joll 
has writ ten, Blum S:aw both · . the reasons for this. and the 
da.nger represente.d. He tol.d the con~ress of the socialist 
Party that met on the 31st . of Mayi a•rt is perfectly natural 
aod p.erfectl.y expl.icable, especially after a lon~ period of 
hardship and. suffering, that the victory achieved in the 
poli "tic:al fiel.d shouJ.d crea ~e· in the working class a 
fee~. of impatience to see realis.ed those reforms f o~ 
73 which the el.ectoral victory allow.a them to hope. u 
The revoit by .Fran.c·o against the Popular Front. 
Government in Spain exacerbated the divisions existini 
within the fabric of. French society-, threatening to . shift 
' 
the· policy of the. i·rench Gover.Qa,:3hta from its uneasy perch 
' ' 
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)· t . 
bet.ween the Communists and i:>ocia1is.t.s on the Left., and 
. . 
,.r , thos;e on the Right who coined the s1oian 'Better Hitler 
than Bl11rnl' 
''There was •• states Joll., •rperhapa no issue which 
caused Blutfl more personal suffering and no point in his 
career where a policy,. adopted on rational grounds, even. 
if it did not w·holly accord with his own instinct, led 
him more obviously into the kind of dilemma with which a 
sensitive and intelligent man in politics is l.ikel.y to 
be confronted. Blum had to use his own personal credit 
with the. Social.ist Party to persuade many of its members 
to accept his policy: he made a dramatic:: appeal to t.he 
most critical of them on 6 tieptember, 1.936, when revol:t. 
int.he party was rising, and ended with the v,.ords: 'There 
are two things I can never be ~eproached with - lack of 
courage and lack of ioyalty. • His ~panish poliey le ..d" 
him into a position in which both his courage and his 
; 
l.oyal"ty were to be cal.led in ques.tion by the critics in his 
74 
own party, and, more especially, by the Communists. tt 
Tied to 1trance by the power balance, t,he British Govern-
ment was. necessarily anxious that.. Jtrance should do noth!ni 
to precipi t.a~e an armed conflict between herself and 
the Dictators. '.there v,asjthereforei an awareness in 
Brfta.in of the necessity to formulate poiicy towards t>pain, · 
in form if not in substance, so that the susceptibilities 
of the Left. would not be excessivly outraged by the 
abandorunent. of ..Oemocracy in tl1at country o ·r11e German 
AfDbassador in b"irance, ~lelcz.eck, reported on !vi.arch the 25th, 
. , ... '·--····-·······--~ ,- , .. - ··--:-.. ·-···--.... ·--·-· ··-···- ~- . . ·:·--.----.. 
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1937:''The attitude of Italy at th~ last meeting of the • • •. ·1 ' 
London r,ron-Int.erven tion Comrni t tee, in which C:rrandi stated that. the question of the tvitl1drawal of Italian volunteers. from ~pain could not be discussed and declared tha .. t the 
volunteers would not ieave Spanish soil before Franco 
had won complete and final victory, was su.ch a flagrant. 
violation of the basis and the spirit of previous agree-
ments that b'rance considered it a serious danger to the peace. View~ from the standpoint of reciprocity, F'rance had at least as much right to intervene in bpain as 
Ita:Ly, and could not permit Italy to usurp in the most 
obvious manner the right to decide the fate of .:>pain, at-
tl1e same time completely disre~ardin~ the in~erests of 
this neighboring country. lt'rance would show Mussol.ini 
I that she v,ould not. allow hers.el.f to be treated in this 
cavalier manner, as if she were a second-rate state. 
A matter of such importance could not be dealt with by 
the .Non-Intervention Com.mi ttee in London alone, which 
was competent for techliical details, but, in view of the 
~avi ty of the situation, would also have to b.e brought \, 
up for dis.cuss ion throught the usuai diplomatic channels. 
"France had gone to t he very limit of tolerance in the face of this inadmissi~1e behavioJr> on the part of Italy, ( but she could permit such cavalier treatment no longer. 
'the French Government did not request. that we exer~ pres-
&11re on our Ital.ian friends, but that we join with those powers wh~ch demanded of Italy tl1e same strict observance 
• Y,·' 
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1
obligations entered intQ as was required of all the other 
participants. '..Chus it was not a question of mediation but 
of a joint a.ppea.l for good faith in observing an agreement. 
In trhe course of the discussion w-e also spoke in a g·eneral. 
way of the practical impiementatian of the p.lan, which I 
t.ermed impossible, as far as. the Reds virere concerned, 
becouse of lack of authority. De1bos replied that recip-
roei ty was, of course, essential, and, if tr1is should 
prove impossible for the Left, then those on the Right 
woul.d have to be granted the same privileie• In no c.ase, 
however·, should it be permissible .for one of the partners 
' 
t.o reject implemen.tation bluntly from the very start a[\d 
75 thereby violate the very concept of non~intervention. u 
While~ .British Diplomats in this period do not seem to 
have indulged in the present American passion for 
c:atagoriz.ini and labelling, ~ir Eric Phipps, British 
Ambassador in Paris, might have found the current terms 
'
1 hawks 11 and 41;doves· 6a of·.·use when he reported on ~j!ptember 
', 24, 1938,: ur think therefore that His I\:Iajestyis Govern .. 
ment shoul.d realise extreme dan~er of even appearing to 
7b encourage small., but noisy and corrupt, war ~oup here. 11 
Lord ~trang has recounted the sense of outrage felt 
in t_he British .lforeign Office at this t.el.egram, and those 
who had the best interests of ~'ranee at heart b.ein" 
described as a corrupt war iroup. The Foreign Office .. · 
and tien felt that British Policy had to b.e based "on an 
understandin,i' w~ th 1trance of tl1e co.llllnon interests of the 
~wo cowitries. Of Chamberlain's desire to begin conversa--
'' 
... ---~---- --... ,_.. ......... , .......... r._•r,:-.r·~., .. ,,,·,··-1:~· ~-... , ........ ..,.._ ..... ...,." ... ---·. '. 
-
- , :.-.· -, , , , • '• ··, '. .•. 
. 
-·. ·---.---. 
' 
........ _._ ..... 
ID~~;,,, /. f/_,'. 
:. ·· .. i'i 
u 
:J 
( . . -) 
. )-; 
-, 
I '; 
,: 1\ 
~ '• 
t 
·" 1· . 
. 
;, 
:.1 :, 
-' 
,. 
.. :"' 4 ~. 
... •• 
-273-
t.ions with I.taly, Fden wrote to Vansitt.art .on t.he 4th of 
A~s~ l.937: HI am presuming that there v,il.l ~e no 
fur-ther correspondence_be.tween N·o. 10 and Kome v,i thout my: 
seeing it. I naturally attach irr1portance to this. 
,,,. 
''Meanw-hile I think that the Jfrench are taki!li a more 
reaiistic biew of this Italian move tl:a.n some of our press. 
I~o doubt Mussolini w:ants recognition of Abyssinia, but so 
do we \Vant the Italians out of Maj orce, mechanized divisions 
',\ out of Libya, explanation of fortified islands in the 
Mediterranean and lied Sea, etc. It woul.d be the height of 
folly to c. oncede in fact what the Ital.ians want, in return 
for mere promises •••• I think it irr1portan.i that our press 
shoul.d emphasi~e the connection in our m·ind bet.ween It,aJ ians 
in ~pain and better Angit6~Ital.ian relations •••• we must 
not be backward in setting out our desidera~a vis-a-vis 
Italy and t.here must be an end of givin.i and of not gett~ ... 
By all means let us.- show ourselves ready to talk, but in 
no scrambling hurry to offer incense on a dictatorts 
al.tar •••• W:e have to remember in all our dealings with Italy 
.. that Tulussolini •s object is to show hinself courted, 
waning weakling. we must iive him no pretext for that, or 
we shall damage ourselves in the l~ear and Dlliddle East a.t a 
time when our authority is important to us- for Palestine, 
etc •••• 
u.Persona.1ly I feel that 1e have a chance now of better-
ing conditions in l!a'urope, but this depends on two thin.gs: 
(1.) our own finnness 
(2) maintenance of friendship with J·rance ,-·-wh_ich . 
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, 
·., ... alone has mainta.ined peace these la.st diff'icul:t2 eighteen 77 ~.--...... ...; .i;;._...,..,,,_, .. ,·.,.·.-~,·, .. :~ . . ' 
monthso'i ,· . 
Eden tried to impres.s- upon his colleagues_ that Britain's 
real. affinities and in"terests,strategic as well as pol.itical, 
1ay v1ith France, a fact that s:>me were reluctant to accept. 
·.this-. extract from Eden ts memoirs serves as. an illustration: 
''An incident after the Cabinet had broken up one day 
1· '. was typical. Kings1ey \fJood was standing by the fireplace 
at io JJowning .:>treat, within earshot of the Prime Tuiinister 
and als,o of myself, as I moved away on the otherside of 
the table. He said, in tones clearly intended to b.e heard 
by me , a s well as by the Prime Minister : 'It ts time that 
the Roreign Office thought lless about 1---ran.ce and tried to 
· 78 
~et on terms with Germany. ' I made no comment thene u 
while liiden based his desire to s-ee the I\lon-Intervention 
AiiI'eement upheld on his. Ull\f\1.illingness to give encouragemen ~ 
t.o ·,~the revisionist des.ires of Mussolini and Hitler and to 
maintain the understanding with France by easing th~ 
position of the }trench Premier; he bas justified the adoption 
of the general policy of non-intervention in .;pain by \ 
atat-ing tl1at such intervention would have served l.ittie 
purpose while bringing great risks to the security and peace 
of ~urope. In a speech to the House of Commons on 
January the 19th, 1937, Eden made a prediction: ttif any 
hon.Member believes. that as the outcome of the civil war 
in Spain any single foreign. power, or pair of foreign powers, ! 
is going to dominate Spain for a. generation, to rule its 
Ufe, to direct its foreign policies, then I ·am convinced he i~ mistaken in his judiement, and I would reply to him 
',··· .. 
-
,., .. , ... 
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that.. of all the. possible outcomes of this civil. war, that 
is most .unlikely. I will tel.l the House why. 
. 
. "We should be. s.tron.gly opposed to aD.Y. such happening, and 
I have no. doubt that we should not be alone in our oppo-
s.i tion •••• Almost the only thing that can unite Spain, 
profoundly, bitterly divided as she is, woul.d be a common ' . 
hatred of the foreigner. That strong partisans on one side 
or the other will feel gratitude to those who have helped 
them in the civil. strife is likely enough, but, unless 
the whole past history of Spain is belied in this conflict, 
the great mass oft.he proud .:>panish people ,,ill feel the 
ieast illwill to those nations which have intervened the 79 least ••.. ,. 
But while Eden may have qeen justified in feeling that 
• the t>panish peopie would not ,eact with gratitude to 
outside nations who intervened\in ::ipanish affairs, his 
optimism that no sin~le foreign power, or pair of foreign 
powers would dominate ::Spain as a result of intervention, 
-this. ma:y with s.ome jus,tification 'be deemed a rationalization ' 
. 
of the strategic weaknesses of Britain that led ·,_intervention 
by .tiritain ~o carry tuo many risks. Since, as we have 
already s.een, the domination of .)pain by a power in 
.. ), 
conflict. with Britain and ,·ranee would constitute a 
serious threat both to the s-trategic balance in Europe 
aod the security of Britaints sea!D.links with her Empire,; 
to prevent such a foreign po~wer dominati.Di Spain would 
become a policy goal of Britain. The desire to prevent 
such an occurance would "therefore reinforce Eden's . 
'· ,,,.~' ~.~.~~ .. ~ .... ~· . 
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at..titud,·s towards Ita.ly and ·Germany, and his desire ·to· 
.\·• 
' 
make. the Noni=-Intervention A~reement a real limitinit 
factor upon Italian and Germ~n inte~vention in 8pain. 
Eden, as he records in his memoirs, bepn to be aware in 
Auaust of 1936 that Italian intervention in Spain ·raised 
new danger0 JBor Britain: 11 If Mussolini were to1 occupy 
the Balearic Islands, he w oul.d gain a base for naval and 
military operations 250 miles nearer Gibraitar. In spite 
of this, my own belief was that no Spanish government, 
whether o f the right or the le. ft, would willingly grant 
to a foreigner facilities of such importance as to threaten 
our- sea c.ommunications, if only for reasons. of national 
pride. But 'there could be no certainty. We bad, until 
this time, counted up,on a friendly or neutral ~pain. If 
a Communist or b~ascist go.~ernment were established there, 
we could no lollier assume the safety of our communications 
through the Mediterranean or by way of the Atlantic. 
This was a powerful. reason :for the enforcement of non-
intervention. It was important to us that the winnill(l 
side should not. grant territorial priz,es or negotiate~ 
closer military re1ations with other powers. bJven so, we 
couJ.d not tel1 whether Mussolini would extract some 
concessions from a victorious Franco. I minuted: 
"''I fear that whichever side wins, the outlook for us 
must be anxious and we must have the ultimate posi_tion·. Bo of Gibraitar constantly in minden 
On Auau,st 14th, l936,F4en telephoned the Foreip Office 
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tram ·Yorkshire to ensure· that everythin~ possible was bein1 
done to support the Jfrench nona1intervention initiative of 
Aupt 2nd, since, to Eden, the newspapers had seemed "~o 
indicate that we had taken up an acquiescent attitude~
1 
rather than one of firm support of Blum 8 s·J proposals€) '° From 
then on, Eden was engaged in a long and up-hill struggle to 
iive meaning to the 1\J·on-lntervention Agreement, both with 
I 
his colleagues in the Cabinet and with the other states con-
I 
cerned with the stru~gle in Spain, notably Italy, Germany: 
and Portugal.. 
During the next months the failure of certain of the states 
f 
party to the Non-Intervention Agreement to act in accordance 
with the princip1e embodied in the Agxoeement, led to an acri-
monious series of meetings in November of the Committee. In 
these conditions Eden decided to elaborate a pJan to super-
vise the entry of war materials into Spain, a suggestion 
that had been made earlier by Corbin to Eden and Maisky to 
. 82 
the Committeeo On November 2nd, Plymouth placed the plan 
before t,he Committee the control plan, which contained 
0 
provisions for the creation of two i£roups of neutral persons, 
one to be stationed in the territory of the Government 9 the 
other in the territory of Franco's forces, with the.· right to 
ascertain by all appropriate methods that nothing prohibited 
' 
by the Non-l.ntervention A~eement was being imported. The plan 
was on the i2th 11nanimously approved, with the total number 
of personne1 required to operate the ~lan set at 1,000 and 
the annual rate of expenditure at £1,oeo,000. 83 
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Meanwhile the Italians and Germans were beiinning to .. , .. 
move into Spain large .. scale military forces~ 'The American 
Amb~s'kdor in Italy reported on the 28th of November that ,1 
active re~i ting was taking place in l taly to obtain trained 
men for b-ar~co O ~ forces., and that 10, ooo _militia men. wJere 
being sel~cted for gpain. In addition, 400(machine gvJJQners, 
and a force of Alpine infantry, probably in e2i(!®S~ of one 
battalion, were being sele~teda It was also understood that 
. 84 2,000 men had alx-'eady sail~d at that date0 Hay, the American 
Consul at Seville reported on the 29th that 5,000 Germans, 
mostly aviation service, had arrived in Seville, vJith 2,500 
also ls.nding at Vigo. Bay also reported $hat, with __ the fail-
ure of F1'anco to capture the insurgent troops had become 
spiritless~ so that Captain Ronald Strunk, said to be HiUer's 
chief agent in Spain, had informed .kJ·ranco that unless he 
accepted German ~irection of the campaign Ger.many would with-85 draw most of its materia1. 
T!le British control plan had been proposed by tsritain, in 
Jarge part~ to prevent a breakdown of the Committee~ as the 
pro-Republican ·and prof.D.Natio.nalist tractions in the Non..,Inter-
vention Committee alleged b~eaches of the Agreement by ea.ch 
other and tempers began 'to ,flare. F--or Eden "A breakdown on 
. ' the Committee would have had baleful consequenees 9 perhaps 
even on the Anglo-b~rench alliance, which I regarded as indis--
86 
· pensable to ;our joint survival and that, of freedom in Europe." 
.,,..~ ""'' The result of the increased intervention by Italy and Germ.any 
was the series of notes and appeals addressed to ·the two count-
. ..- .,··.: ·, :. ,. .r·· 
,.• 
~ . ' .. 
,.,t 
i· · t . !; 
~ 
~\. ,,...'...~_:;;.' 
-280- (>'7' 
·~'"""'"1.-• .. -i·· \ 
--- ---- q 
1
ries by &len, that we have already opserved, and answered in 
• I • 
an evasive fashiono; In reply to the British and l~rench de-
marches of Decembelf 5th9 calling upon the Germar.ll, Italian, 1'"" 
Portugttese and Soviet GoveJf.nments to announce their firm 
determination to refrain from any actij, direct or indirect, 
which might result in foreign intervention in Spain, the 
position of tl1e German Government, as defined by. Vleizsacker 
(the Acting Director of the Politica1 Department in BerlinJ, 
was as follows: "In connection with the discussion in the 
embargo committee of the problem of indirect inter"vention, 
the idea of granting priority to the question of volunteers 
arose, The German Government, in accordance with the positian 
it has: taken from tl1e outset, unconditionally advocates the 
extention of the embargo measures to the question of volun-
teers, but it is. of th@· opinion that the problem of indirect 
intervention at the pre~ent stage must be considered as.jf, a 
who1e, or that at least the problem of fitDanciaJ.-~. support;·~-·., ~ . 
>which is of equal. importance in strengthening the belliger-
87 
ents, should be settled simultaneouslyo 18 
This attempt to extend the terms of reference .to the 
more controversial problems which would necessariiy· present 
far greater problems for re~ching agreement between the powers 
j 
can be taken to be evasive tactics by the Ge.rman.s to pr~ent 
consideration and agreement on the more straightforward quest-
ion of the entry of volutlt,eers into ~pain, which formed the 
focus of concern for Brita.in and .1t·rancr, and it was in this 
. ~ 88 
liPt that the <.:ierman '·'manoeuvre~'· were seen by J!iden, 
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. : '!he British pressure on the Governments concerned continu-
ed, shifting from the Committee where no progress was bein& · ," 
achieved to direct representations to the Governments of 
ltaly, Germany, Portugal and the Soviet Union. In its note 
of the 26th· of December, the British Government e:n:pressed 
its concern over th~ incjpeasing number of v@ltlllteers enter-
ing Spain and Ulfged that the.Governments of "these states 
w,ould .kke appropriate legis.lative action to prevent their 
89 
natio.nals from taking service with either party in Si;ain • 
.kiri tain e1gain ad~essed notss on the 6th of ~ anuary, 1937, 
expr@ss.i.ug its concern over the continued flow of volunteers, 
and in its note to Germany, it was stated that.: "His Maj estyjs 
Government cannot but take the gravest view of any f@gomher 
prolongation of the present circumstances in wgich ~o~@al.led_ 
•volunteers a continue to flow in or~.n.ised contingents into 
the affected areas of Spain. Time is of the essence in th:is 
~-,, 
' ' dangerous prob1em and for that purpose it is. essentlll that 
90 
no further time should be lost by any delay in any qua.:cter." 
., 
Eden asked the <.:Jerman Charge d'Affairs to call on him, on 
the following day and asked him to transmit the followine 
([': 
information to the .Berman Government: "He was uder the im-
pression that the Anglo-Italia.ri Agreements could be miscon-
strued in Germany t.o mean that ~ince their con@lusion blr!gland 
was less interested in putting the ban on volunteers. into 
· immediate effect. ·rhe contrary was the case. ~ince the 
s·igning of the Mediterranean pact, England's attitude on the 
question of vol.unteers had rather stif)fened considerabl!f as 
a result of the numbers flocking to both Spanish parties. 
• 
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He had just spoken to .Baldwin, who had expressed t.o him his 
grave an.xiety trvith reg~d to the European situation because·· ... , .... 91 
of the influx of volunteers to Spain." 
.Eden, in his memorandum which he drew up on the /1th ot. 
Jan1Ja.ry, 1937 (and to \Vhich reference has already been made) 
havillg 0Jr>av11n the conclusion that tipain had become an inter-
national ba"ttlegro11nd, with the result that the character 
of the f'uture government of that coun~y had become of 1ess 
importance to the peace of Europe tha.n th~t the Dictators 
should not prove victorious in the conflict~ proposed that 
Britain should devise a control plan that woul.d serve to 
limit the entry of vo+unteers into Spain. .tt.;den thought that 
since jjritain was known to be truely neutral that she sho11ld 
take up the heaviest share of responsibility, and that the 
services of the Royal ~avy should be offered to supervise 
at sea al.l approaches to ports and harbours ~o preven~ the 
entry of men or material. Other nations wpuld be asked to 
agree that British ships be entitled to visit and search 
merchant vessels or send them ill.to a convenient port if the 
search could not be completed at sea. As evidence of Britain's 
impartia1ity, Eden suggested that each British vessal carry 
a naval officer of one of· the countries that had signed the 
Non-Intervention Agreement. 
Eden explained the purpose ot the memorandum to .lialdwin 
~·l:. · who approved ·the policy, and agreed to call an informal 
meeting of the principal Ministers on the t3th. Aithougg I . 
Halifax, just be.fore the meeting expressed his lik .. tng for 
D 
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the plan, Eden was 11nable to ·convince his colle&i'fles to 
.,,, accept it-in the :form given by Eden. Hoare, the First 
.L.ord. of the Admiralty did not like the plan, stating that 
·' 
Brita.in was getting to the point where she was trying to 
prevent .1t·ranco from ,r~inning; there were others he said 
who were anxious that the Soviet Un.ion shou.ld not viiin. 
Hoare advanced every kin.d of ~echnical argument to invali~ 
date Ertien•s plan; these arguments 9 which~accorvdin.g to .t!aden, 
impressed the inexperienced of their colleagues, run along 
the lines that ·the Spanish coast was very 1ong, with many 
ports; a large ntm1ber of vessels would be required to 
examine the me.ny neutra1 ships; it would involve mobilis-
ing the Home and Mediterranean f1eets and calling up the 
naval reserve; that bloc~ades were difficu1t to implement 
on the high seas and never.watertiiht; and what ~den refers 92 
· to as u other chatter of this kindo " The most that lSden 's 
' 
colleagues would agree to was tl1at ~ritain should wel.come 
the recent replies of the other powers, professing to be 
willing to prohibit the enlistment or r§cruitmen:t of 
voiunteers and fasten on the ~eneral desire to exclude 
foreign vo1witerrs from Spain, working for a more 
effective version of the Non-Intervention Committe·e·ts 
existing control scheme rather than em.pl.oying 1'd.en ';s 93 proposal to use the Hoyal. Navy. 
Thus~ the British Note of .January the· 10th, addressed 
to the .tt'rench, Italian, Portuguese, and ooviet Gov~rnments 
'· stated that: "His Majesty's ~over.nm.ant in the United 
'{:. 
.. 
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Kingdom are happy to note that there is in princ ip1e . 
general agreement among the Pov,ers mainly concerned 
that immediate measures should be taken to stop the 
fl.ow of f©reig:n vo·lt1nteers into .:>pain. Indeed some of 
the replies indicate that certain Governments would have 
readily taken such action at an earlier stage. It is 
now gene:ral:Ly stipulated that these measures should be 
siroul t.aneousl.y taken by all tl1e participating liovern-
ments", that the whol.e pro.blem of dealing v11i th indirect 
forms of intervention in Spain is also actively pursued 
forthwith, and that there is established an efficient and 
effective sustem of control. 
... 
"As regards the establishment of a system of control, 
the uovernments are aware that the Non~Intervention 
Committee has elaborated a detailed scheme for supervision '\:y'' 
at ~panish ports and on the land frontiers of ~pain and 
that this scheme is at present being considered by the 
two parties in ~pain. It appears to His Majesty's 
uovernment·that this scheme could without difficulty 
be ext.ended to cover the arrival in Spain, both by l.and 
and by sea, of volunteers and military personnel as 
well as of war material. ::iuch an extension might indeed 
render the schert1e more acceptable to th~ two parties in 
94 t>pain than it may b:e in its present limited form." 
V/hi1e Drummond, the British Ambassador to Italy, 
handed the British ~ote to Ciano, he asked whether Italy 
would be willi'°" to prohibit hence forward new·contingents 
. . 
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1 
'95 of-volunteers going to Spain. ,, 
The Hri tish dipl.omatic pressur'8 was the reason advanced 
by Von Neurath for the limiting of the influx of German 
volunteers into Qpain to Signor Attolico, who repeatedly 
-~ endeavored to induce uerman.y to send larger contingents: 
" I told him clearl.y today that we were not prep~ed to 
do this, bec~use we considered that- such a step \IIJould 
seriously endanger the larger European situa.tiona Un1ess 
we \Vanted to accept the risk o{ vJar, we wquld have to 
rea.l.ize triat the time was drawing near when we woul.d. .. 
have to ab~don any further support of franco. In the 
last note t.o the British we had therefore agreed in 
principle to an understanding regarding the question of 
volunteers, and we now had to take a definite position 9b regarding the second noteou 
During tl1e conversation between Mussolini and Goering 
on 23 January, 0-Min.ist.erpresident Goering said that. he 
had received re1iabl.e information that the Burgos 
Government has instructed its representative in Berlin 
not to accept more volunteers for Spain. 
11The Duce noted this with satisfaction and declared 
that he, too, held t..hat the Spanish National Government 
had now sufficient men,~and arms at its disposal. The joint note by Germany and Italy to Franco has meanwhile 
been delivered; further, ·on Monday, in the capital.a of 
both countries, there wili be delivered to the British 
diplomatic representatives the almost identical reply 
by Germany and Italy to the last English note. These 
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notes in repl.y wi11 be publ.ished by the pre.ss on Monday 
97 
afternoon. u 
. 
. t . 
On February 20th, ·the Governments on the No~Inter---
vention Committee agreed to extend the Agreement t.o 
l 
cover the recruitment of volunteers. 1'he British 
Government persisted with the emas,cu1ated edition of 
the scheme Eden had put to his coll~ues, which came 
., 
before the Committee early in Marcl1, with the proposal 
that supervision in Portugal. be carried out by ~ritish 
observers j vJhile international staffs would be establ.i.shed 
a~ suitable points on the other Spanish frontiers. 
V t" 
All merchant vessels belonging. to countries wl1ich had 
signed the I\Jonc.Interv~ntion Agreement were to embark 
an observer to watch the unloading of the cargo at 
~pa.nish ports and be given facilities to carry out 
investigations. The navies of Great Britain, Italy, 
J 
France, and Germany were each to be responsible for a 
portion of the ~panish coast but were unable to do any-
thing more than look out for· ships not reported as 
having submitted to observation, board them, and warn 
98 
them. 
M~skt's opi'.nion of the plan ac-cepted on the 8th of 
March was that u ••• the control plan accepted on 8 ?Jiarch 
/ l.937 could have. served a certain purpose, if it had been 
quickly brought into action and efficiently operated. 
Italian and Ger1nan intervention ,,ou:Ld have come up 
against. considerable deff~culties, in that case. But 
-
tor that very reason the c·ontrol plan was immediately 
·~ 
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__ dogged by bad luck." 
i The contr.ol pla·n did not finally go into force I until · 
April 19th, and··according to Maisky did not take effect in ) 
,_ entirety until the 9th of J»1.ay o 1v1aislty describes the da. te 
"'·-, 
~or_the entry into force of the plan as being systematically 
pushed furt~er and further back, under the sabotage 'of the 
Italians and Germans 9 vihile vothe British and Ia,rench treated 
the saboteurs with their usual tolerance. They looked sour, 
spl'ugged their _shoulders, complained sot to voce of the. 
intra.n.li.itnce of the ~rmans ~d .L talians ~ but .nwer once 
- ,, WO 
displayed the firmness that was neededo n The methods of 
this sabotage consisted of withclrawing payments towards the 
cost of tl1e organisation (Germany, pleading a shortage of 
foreign currency, at one point declaring that she wished 
to pay in kind - typewriters, office furniture, etc. ) , 
and alleged difficulties of finding Germans and Italians 
. ' /' 101 · 
who wished to serve on the control organization.~ 
One contributing factor to intran~\{nce on the part 
. 
of Ital.y way the battle of Guadalajara at which the 
Republican f·orees, ta.king advantage of the rain and 
snow which rendered the airfields prepared by the 
Nationalis.ts unusable but which enabled the Republican 
Air Force f:Lying from allca-weather bases to bomb, 
11nhindered, the Nationalist infantry, inflicted a decisive 
defeat on their opponents. _ 1/lus~olini, whose troops ($ 
composed the majority of the Nationalist forces taking 
'\ .r . part. in the battle, suffered a severe blow to his 
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prestige in the eyes of the worl.d: 11Mussolini •s 
'legionaries' , which he had advertised the i,vorld over 
as fearless heroes, were now like hunted hares. 
They ran for it1 a.bandoning their arms and ammunition . 102 
. 
as ,they went. 11 
Li tvinov, the ~oviet Commissar for ltore ign Affairs , 
told Davies on A~ch the 26th that from the point of 
view of Europea.n peace the Republican forces were 
doing almost too well. He feared that the reverses 
of the Italian forces would stimulate Mussolini to 
project. additional forces into ~pain to rehabilitate 
his prestige. In that connection, he stated that the 
.Non--Intervention c.;ommittee was having great difficulty, 
which had taken up, following a German suggestion, 
the question of the evacuation of all volunteers from 
~pain, whereupon Grandi had interposed the con<tlition ' 
• 
that- the matter· of the embarg.o upon the gold of the 
. 
. 
~panish Government should first be considered. ~ut 
once the other Governments had a.eceeded to this demand, r • .. 
li.randi had announced that the Italian Government would 
not discuss further the question of the withdrawal of 
.103 volunteers from ~pain. 
Leger told Vlilson on the 2.'l-·th that. he was just. in 
receipt of information that Italian ships were even 
in en.~·,route to ~pain carrting troops, and that since 
it v1ill be a week before the. control plan could go 
into effect, Iv.lussol.ini would have that period of time 
to send in troops -G", berved u.u.O . . • He remarked that- Italian· 
'· . 
' 
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' .. 
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calculations with regard tlb ~pain had proved wrong: ·Italy 
. had accepted the dat.e· of 20th February for putting the ban 
on volunteers into force feeling confident that within a 
• few ~ys thereafte~ b\ran.co would capture Madrid; when this 
104 failed, they lJad continued to send troops to ~paino 
The defeat of ltalian troops at utl.adalajara had an even 
more decisive effect uppn the attitude of Mussolini toward 
the wi thdraJrJal of volunteers from Spa.in. Hassel .teported 
on March 29th: "Today Ciano read to me the personal 
instruction which Mussolini sent Grandi Friday, laying 
down the Italian viewpoint in final form. It stated that 
actual withdrawal of the Italian volunteers 'N as out of 
,I 
the question until the set--ba.ck at Guadalajara, which 
was not very ~ignif'i.cant:~.ihili tar.ily\~: but ... w.as · a~vkw~d.~: ~- ~ 
politically, had been made goodo Mussolini was not 
entirely opposed in principle to a withdrawal of the 
voluntee1~s after he had obtained his revenge, especially 
in view of certain Spanish currents of opinion which 
deserved notice; in any case, however, an equal number of 
Vlhi tes and Reds should be withdrawn. Tactically it was 
not expedient to assume the odium of refusing to with~ 
draw. It would be better to consent to turn the matter 
over to a subcommittee and to continue the tactics of io, 
sabotage and delay there." 
The bombing of the Germari batt.leship Deuteahland in 
May resu1ted in Germany and Italy. withdrawing their 
warships . from the naval c· ontrol scheme. While after a 
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f'or·tnights argument. between Eden and Ribbentrop, both 
·' · countries returned for a '\lVhile, the alleged attack 
on June 18th of the Germam cnuiser · Leipzig by a sub--
marine renewed the impasse.. Rippentrop at a meeting 
of the four powers engaged in the patrol, demanded 
the joint naval demonstration and the despatch of a 
st:ern note to the~i;:)panish Government .... Upon the 
refusal of Britain and France to accept this without 
an investigation, Italy and Germany withdrew from the 
106 
patrol scheme, which was never resumed in full • 
Despite the many setbacks, the .cri tish Governmen.t 
persisted in its attempts to obtain some formula that 
would result in a reduction of the numbers of volunteers 
serving in ~pain, trying first one tack and then 
another. On June the 21st the British Government noting 
in the <.;ommittee its disappointment a.n:i being of the 
opinion that the problem needing the greatest attention 
was that of the combing out of the volunteers from ~pain, 
suggested that the British Government should be empowered 
to tak~ µ.p negotiations with either side in the ~panish 
conflict with a view to obtaining an agreement that an 
equal number of vol.unteers should be withdrawn from each 
side., This ran into the objections of the representative 
of the ~oviet Union:, '''• •• roughly the total number of 
foreigners fighting on the side of General Franco is 
100,.000, and, on the other hand, at the outside, the 
present number of foreign fig~ting forces vvith the Spaliish 
Government is not more than 15,000 or 18,ooo at the 
•''; .... 
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•• I ·, 
most • If you were to e.vacuate 5 ,.ooo from one side and 
' ' ... ; ,ooo from the other s i<iesr '11Jhat ·\!vould it mean? General. 
Franco would l.ose only 5 p.er cent of his foreign troops, 
but. the opanis h Government would lose something like 
one--third •••• Would this 0,e just or fair? · I do not 107 
think so.•t 
-
·-· ~en told Ribbentrop on the 1st . of July that he considered -
i"t incon1prehensible that a patroi by the british and 
Frencl1 fleets should not be given compJ.ete confidence, 
especially in view of the British and French readiness 
to take neutral obs.ervers on board. (This proposal had 
been put forward as a result of the withdrawal. of 
' Germany and Italy from the control plan.) Eden further 
stated that though ~rita.in had not seriously considered the 
granting of bell.igerent rights to the iJNo Spanish parties, 
since the British Government urgently wished to adhere to 
the non~intervention policy, that in the interest of retain~ 
ing the pr:bncipl.e of_ non-intervention, perhaps a combination 
of non-intervention, recognition of rights as belligerent 
108 states~ and \P\lithdrav1al of vo.lunteers could be considered. 
' Plymoutli~ at the beginning of the session of the !\Jonc:,lnter-
vention Cox1t11tdttee hel.d on the 29th of June proposed that the 
naval patrol should be carri~d on exclusively by Britain and 
France, with the ships of the two countries carrying neutral 
observers on bo~do vVlule-· the representatives of the majority 
of the powers on the Committee accepted the scheme at once, 
the represeoatives of J.taly, Germany and Portugal put forward 
J 
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~293- 109 ob.jecti.ons t; the scheme that .in tact amounted t.9 ·objections. 
Joint represen&:ations were made by the British and French 
Ambassadors. on the 1st. of July to urge that this. proposal 
should be accepted, but met the same objections to any control 
scheme , and Germany ~ged tba t the obliga.tions assumed under 
the establishment of the Non-Intervention Committee be retain-
ed, and invited discussion of the question of the recognition 
of the Spanish partiea as be1ligerents with ~he rights impli-
-:··, (., cit, therein. .Both the Frencl1 and the .l::tt'i tish Ambassadors 
' 
·· . 
. ·· .... ; 
declared that their Governments were not ready for such a 120 
step. 
In a statement by .~reat .Britain on the 14th of July it 
was· dec1ared that: "At the iast meeting of the Non-lnterven-
tion Committee held on the 9th July, His Majesty 0s Government 
in the United Kingdom were entrusted by their col.leagues on 
the commission with the task of drawing up prposals which 
should aim at closing the present gap in the control scheme 
and enable the policy of non-intervention to be continued. 
This task has not been an easy one. For any proposal \Vhich 
can be put forward with any hope of success must not onl.y 
harmonise the· wide1y divergent views v~hich have been express-
ed but must a1so give promise of an effective scheme of non-
intervention. 
.. 
"His ~~jesty'a Government have, however, bent their best 
end~ours to t.heir task, am have evolved a sch81l1e which they 
herewith submit to other Governments represented on. the Commitl!.1· 
ttee in the hope. that it may lead to .an agreed solution on 
the pres.ent ditficul.ties. In subnitting it, they will however 
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\\ 
ma-ke one· observation. It is admi~tedly a- compromise be-
tween varying points, of view;; it can only be successful. 
" 
if it is accepted by the governments in ·a spirit of 
compromise$ All the Nat.ions represented on the Committee 
have repeated.J;y expr·essed the vie1S1J that they vJish non--
intervention in the Spanish conflict to continue. They 
have no~i a.n opportpnity to give to that wish pract.ical · . 121 
. 
effect.'' 
The proposal.s o.utlined by the British Government was, 
as. Ribbentrop put it: it; ••• a combination of all the ideas 
discussed so far and gives ex~ensive recognition to the 
122 German~Italian proposal in particular.'' This amalgam. 
of the various and varying viewpoints held by the s.tates 
concerned with the conflict in Spa.in contained three 
·,. 
main concepts& (1) the reconstruction of the sys.tam of 
supe.Mris!on, ,(2) the recognition, by all parties to the 
Non-Intervention Agreemen-t,. of the two parties in Spain 
as possessing a status which justifies them in exercising 
- .•--·~~- ··-
belligerent rights at · aea (3) the withdrawal of foreign 123 
nationals.o 
-This plan formed the. bas.is of the discussion of the 
Spanish problem in the Non-Intervention Committee into 
tp.e next yeart with the discussions gradually devolving 
into what p,er centage of volunteers should be w,i thdrawn · 
as a condition for gr.anting belligerent. rights.. Vloe~n, 
·· the Ger.man Ch8.rg~ d 1Affaires in London,. reported on the 
13th of January: "The ques~ion of the soei.ca.lled •substant.ial t,,," I 
withdrawal t is now reaching an acute. stage. As reported, 
1 .: • ~ . '• 
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' 1 t was decided -in the·)·session of the Non-Intervention 
Committee on January -11 that the matter ,should next be 
discussed in inf'ormal conf~erencas bet\veen Lo.~·d Plymouth 
and individual representatives in the Committee • 
"The pro:posa now orficially mace by Lord Plymouth 
that belligerent rights are to be granted after 75 percent 
o:r the volunteers have . been wi thdravvn is not, as was quite 
clear from my conversation with Lord Plymouth, the last 
word of the British. It is rather a te~tative figure 
mentioned only :for the purpose of starting the discussion • 
It but ;1ould even be satisfied vvi th a still smaller percent-
124 
age if general agreement could be achieved on it." Grandi, 
on the 10th February, reported that Eden, having asked him 
to call on him to discuss the si tua.tion in the Non-Interven-
tion Commi t·tee, concentrated entirely on the question o:r the 
number of volunteers that should be \.Yithdra\m, a "substantial 
~;, 125 
wi thdra,,al" being reduced to between 15,000 and 12,000 men. 
While Woermann had stated that the work of the Committee 
' .. 
had something unreal about it, a g8.me ~vhere everyone saw 
through the other but feared to say a cibe.ar 'no' in case the 
entire artificial structure collapsed (the question of the 
with-drawal of volunteers had been on the agenda for a whole 
year subjected to the diliatory tactics of the Germans, it 
would not be correct to state that this game, as seen by Eden 
had no relevance to British policy goals~ Apart rrom the fear 
of a European conf·lect should the Committee colapse entirely 
and the concern with public opinion in Britain and France, Bri-
, 
tish decision-makers (and Ed~n in particular) w~re concerned last 
~ .:,: , f,-.\,i;~' '• 
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\_ 
-Spain-should fall. from the •neutral position that was its 
r·· \i ·. _l.ot while the Spa.n.ish conf1ict raged into the arms of the Dictators. It was to prevent such an occurrence that Bri ttsh policy was directed o 'J:he qu_estion of the with--drawa1 of vo1unteers was,, therefore, not an academic one, or even a ·matter of O principle• , but was related to a. precise cialcule~tion of the British interest. The continuing ~~. emphasis, as. is clear from the proposals tb.at Britain put· forward in tl1e Non-Intervention Committee and the protests that were sent to Germany and Italy,. was to limit· 
.• 
the number of fore.ign volunteers entering Spain and to 
reduce as far as, possib1e the n11mbers of thos,e who had 
already entered tl1at country. Vloermann, had continlil..ed his ana1ysis of the work _of the eominitt.ee (made in January of 1938) by stating : 1tApparently the main point of con--tention, name.ly,. the question whether the volunteers are to be withdrawn or not, is no longer considered a vital question even in England. Here the main problem of the Spanish conflic·t is still considered to be wJhether Italy will establish herself permanently in l\lajorca or even on the Spanish mainland. The question of withdrawing the 
volunteers is in the main considered from this point. of 
view and- is regarded as a means of achieving the objective 126 of Italian evacuation from Spaino n 
On liarch the 5th, 1937, C.iano requ~sted Hass:ell of the fol1ov1ing: "Since the British have once again brought up in the London Non-Intervention Committee the idea of wi thdraw.ing all volunteers, he repeats the request ··that. 
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''the German repres,entative be instructed ot, sabotage .it.•• 
Ciano added •• .... behind the British move ther·e was. pres.umably. 
the ulterior motive off .. ohtaining from. Ita1y a guaranty 
to wi thdrawJc following_ the conclusion of pe.ace, if vJi thdrawa1 
. ' 
now. shou:Ld. prov·e imprac-Uca1. 
. . 127 This was w.hat England was. ..) 
re·a1ly interes"ted in." j· 
The· GenUeman ts Agreement bad . been eoncl.uded to prevent-· 
the es.tablishment of Italian predominance in the ·Western 
Mediterranean, and the protests directed towards Italy' 
expressed "the conc.ern of England for the maintainance 
of the status quo in this region. Eden had been prepared 
to move a long way. towards the German demands. follo,ving 
the Deu .. tsc:hland incident in order to retaip German partici-
pation in a naval patrol. that did have s.ome ·utility as a 
limit up.on the numbers of volunteers entering Spain. 
In the later part of 1937 and into 1938, Eden was prepared· 
to use the granting of belligerent rights as a barganing 
position to obtain progres_s. towards ~he goal.. of the 
wi thdrawa1 o-f volunteers. 
Eden had stated that with the Spanish would not react with 
gratitude toivards those who had intervened in the conflict, 
but his policy ref1ects a d.esire to ensure that the resu1t ~- · 
of the Civil War would not b~ the domination of the policy 
of that country by an outside power. Vlhile the two parties 
in Spain t~ere in combat some form of balance was maintained 
between N~tions and ideo1ogies that sought to influence the 
, deve~opnent of political Spain, while the Spanish were nat-
urally preoccupied with Spanish matters. The eventual victory 
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of one or other of the partjes would serve to disrupt this 
ba.la.ncea.n.d make fo~ the possibilty of Spain being used for 
al.ien designs. To maintain this balance, or tp put it another 
way, to prevent one side totally defeating the other, there-
fore became a major preoccupation of the British. One facet 
of this preoccupation was the concern over the question of 
volunteers, another was the attempt to arrive at some f'orm 
of mediation that would arran~ an 8lrmistice, thus achieving 
a compromise peace, and a compromise between the fore es at 
work in Spaino In March 1937, Bin~11am outlin®d his personal 
views to Vuashington on tl1e Spanish conflict: "Germany remains 
in official eyes the greatest threat to European peaceo The 
British Government's attitude tov~ard the Spanish situation 
has been from thJSbeginning that a decisive victory by either 
of the contending sides vJould endanger European equilil;>rium 
-- rather peace wmthout vies>ry was preferable,· with the sit-
uation ending in stalemate after withdrawal of foreign volun-
teers, leaving a settlement to be .megotiated be·tween the con-
tending elements in Spain on a basis of provincial autonomy. 
It was with this in mind that English diplomacy has been 
concentrated on the maintainance of the ivorlt of the l\Tonc:-3Intee-
vention Committee and this will continue to be the ultimate 
objective of British policy even under the most difficult 128 
circumstance's •11 
Ribbentrop, on .IVla;J.~h, reported that Fden had spoken to 
I 
1·.·.him concerning the intention··o:r the British Government to 
.. 
work for a cessation of hostilities in Spain through diplo-
,· 129 
··.matic channel.a, and on the following day the British .. _.Amba.s~a-
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dor at Rome called-on Ciano and on the instructions of his 
130 
Governmen~ had talcen up the question of a truce i vJhile on 
the 17th, Hend~~son ©all~d on Neurath and presented a 
communication from London that related the question of-the 
the withdrawal of volunteers-· to the calling of a truce o 131
 
The Italian S:ta,te ~ecretary, Bastianini, told Hassel that 
,..~. , .. ,J."-f"'...., 
he regarded the British note as a move to reach a compromise 
in Spain 19 Goo in accordance with the old British aim of prevent-
ing a victory of Fascism under all circumstance%. 11LHassell:: added) 
.. 
in·~'his .rc~eport of the conversation: 81 Priva te reports which I 
have received from Spanish circles here confirms the existence 
of lively British efforts, supporte__..d by the Vatican, to bring 
about an anti~Fascist settler.dent of the Civil War. In this 
connection the name of Gil Robles, who is supposed to be in 
132 
Portugal was mentioned to me. 11 
The British concern over the fate of the Reublicans in 
Spain was not merely a matter related to concern over t.he 
strategic implications of a !Hascist 0 victory in Spain, 
there v1ere other factors that entered into the considerations. 
One factor that w~ of considerable import to British decision-
.makers was the position of the iron mines around Bilbao which 
constituted one of the pri.ma:ry sources of highc:Dgrade iron ore 
in Europe. About sixty per cent of these iron mines had been 
in Spanish possession and about forty per cent in British. 
Of em:ports, previous to the Civil War about half had gone to 
Britain. and about half to Germany~ but with the advent of 
t the conflict this region had,Wltil the capture of Bilbao ,in 
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June of 1937,remained in the hands of the Spanish Government 
· forces, and the total output had been sent to Britain. Britain 
was particularly interested in these ores since they were 
well=tempered ores, and the ~ritish blast furnaces needed. 
fifty per cent of such ores to operate smoothly, and could 
/\ 
not smelt upto a hundred pe·r cent of the much harder ~vJedish 133 
ores, as the German.so Faupel, the German Ambas-sador in 
Spain, :reported on May 23rd, 1937, that uon the basis of 
prospective iron-ore deliveries England had advanced large 
sums to the Bilbao Government in order to enable it to con-
tinue resistanceo .t!ngland had f@~ed an early fall of Bi1bao 
and consequentl1 the loss of the sums advanced to the ~uzkadi 
Governmento Therefore ~land had the greatest interest in a 
quick armistice with a view to preventing; .. the capture of 134 
Bilbao." ~ 
Hitler had told Faupel in November of 1936 to concern 
himself particularly with the extention of commercial relat-
ions between Germany and Spain, to utilise the favorable 
moment that existed gain an entrenched position before Brit-
ain could use her favorable advantage in capital resources 
to take away the market. To this end an official experienced 
in commercial policy was to be placed at the disposal of the 135 
&lbassy. On D9cember 31st, the Agreement of March 9-th,1936, 
on uerman~~panish trade was extended in.:,.its.·existing form 
until ~ch 31st, 1937, and it was agreed that negotiations 
would begin for the purpose of adapting the trade agreement 
not later than April. ls.t, 1937. rt was also agreed in prin-
.. _ ._ ,,_ -~- -····" ...-.-·-~~,-.-, . ...,_,..._,_ . ~-~-·..,r~ ... -"'"' _, ~, .. -•. ~u.,,,_-,,_,...,.,..,..-,~ ~.a . :- .... ,.,.._.-,.~~:·-·· •• --~- • • 
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ciple that commercial relations between the two countries 
w·ould be conducted on a favorable basis·· as possib1e ~d that 
preference in supplying such goods as tJ11ere of special int.erest ~ 136 to the two parties would be mutually guaranteed@ Ritter, 
the Dir~ctor of the German Economic Policy Division informed 
the German l:inbassy in Spain on January 16th, 1937, that nego-
tiations for a commercial agreement should be started as 
soon as possible while the economic delegation was expected 
to leave Ger.many at the end of the week so that negotiations 
coul.d begin on the 25the Ritter added: "Ple_ase report at 
once concerning the status of negotiations between the ~at-
iona1ist uovernment and Italy and England on economic 
questions and matters mf compensation. What agreement was 
reached with .!!inglind re~rding ·the duty on coal? It would be 
very desirable if the full text of such agreements could be 
- 137 dispatched by air mail.'' The preparations v,ere being made 
for the commercial battle that was to follow between Britain 
and Germanw. 
One object of this struggle became_ the Rio Tinto mines 
in Spain, a British owned company producing copper pyrites. 
The Rio Tinto Company reported to the British Government that 
the Spanish Nationalist Government had confiscated certain 
quantit~es of their outpti1J~g; 2,120 tons of copper precipitate 
-:....... . 
which had been _shipped to Germany after its confiscation on 
September 13th, 1936, and 500 tons of £Opper precipitate 
that was lying in the port of Huelva. The total output of 
' the mines, apcai,.t, from S,ranish requirements, had previously 
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gone to the refineries of the Rio Tinto Company in Port 
Talbot, south Vlales, but since new supplies were not to be had (the refineries having had no deliveri®s from Spain 
' since October 15th, 1936) the plants were expecting to close during February of 1937. Mr. J. Mo Magowan of the Commercial Department of the British Embassy in Bf)~l~m 9 having taken •J 
- -this matter up with the ~conomic Policy Department in Berlin, 
stated that: ''The refineries were an important element in 
'I) the British economy, and it .. 'make aa unfavorable impression if the closing were attributed to 'circumstances beyond our 
control~ for which Germany was partly responsibleo O Since 
the British Government considered that the seizure constituted 
an illegal act, in which the uerman <.:rovernment was involved 
through accepting the confiscated copper, Magowan, in the 
course of his representation on February 4th 1937, said 
that the British uovernment would support the c1aim of the 
Rio Tinto Company against the German Government for either 
the return of the copper shipped to Germany, a delivery of 
a like amount, or payment in pounds st.erling of the quantity ,· 138 
shippedo 
On January 13th, 1937, woermann had reported that '' ••• the 
a1leged confiscation of the Rio Tinto mines for the benefit 
of copper exports to German1i~0 had led to lengthy discussions 
139 in the main sub-committee of the Non~Intervention Committee • . ,,fif:· Faupel reported on the 20th that the &1ationalist Government 
' 
' 
) 
had assured him that they had flatly rejected an arrangement proposed by the British by which forty per cent of the total 
1. 
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output of the mines confiscated by Franco would be placed at 
the disposal of the British and sixty per cent at the dis-
posa1 of the ~rmans, of which the Germans vJould be obligated 
to give Franco twenty per cent • .tt'ranco had rejected the offer 
on the grounds that the company was an enterprise under :;,pan-
ish 1aw and the ~panish uovernment (National.ist) had explicit-
],y reserved for itself full freedom of action in distributing 140 the production of the Rio Tinto mineso 
~he question of the Rio Tinto mines became a matter fer 
discussion between the Rio ·1·into company and the German 
Government, ~and between the .ttio Tinto vompany and the repre-
sentatives of the German firms tlbat had received the con .. 
fiscated copper. The Commercial Secreta,r;y of the British 
.Embassy informed the <.zerman .troreign Ministary on the 12th of 
July that Messrs. Buchanan and liobbins of the Rio Tinto 
Company had arrived in Berlin and requested that they be 
.;. 
received at the 1t·oreign Ministmy~ to present their viewpoint, 
and that he be present in the conference. Whi1e Kreutzwald in 
the Foreign Uffice felt that the aim of the statements of 
the representacPtives of the ttio 'l1int0 Company was to establish 
<: a more permenant basis for the relationship between the Com-
pany and the German purchasers of its copper ores, the c.;om-
pany had to insist that the confiscation of its products by 
Franco's Government cease, and that further deliveries to 
141 Germany be paid either in pounds sterling or in refined copper. 
i' . The British l!m.ba-ssy, on the 7th of Jul.y had presented to 
the German Government a note which sought to bring to the 
not~CJ= of the German Governm~nt as"a matter urgency" the 
' . 
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question of the Rio Tinto mines: "The si tua.tion of the .Bri t.ish 
. 
. 
mining companies in l\Jationalist Spain is causing His Majesty's 
" Government the most serious preoccupation, and _His Majesty's 
Government, being unwilling to allow the situation in regard 
of these companies to continue thus, are considering what 
142 
_ steps can be taken to protect these important British interests." 
Lord Chandos, having at one time been part of the British 
Metal Corporation (which had been formed by the jjritish 
desire of the ~ritish Government to ensure that the British 
Empire would remain self=supporting in non~ferrus metals), 
and having been Controller of .Non-Ferrus Metals, came to 
know the 'ins and outa' of the international copper market 
143 
together with political and strategic aspects. Copper, 
of which ~ritain has no domestic sources, constitutes one 
• • 
.. 
of the most important of the pricipal non-ferrus metals, 
being used in the manufacture of cartr'tidge and shell cases. 
The Abyssinian crisis had shown the British Government to 
be very short on copper, and the British GotJern..rnent could 
not but be concerned with the diversion of tl1e copper 
resourc~s of the Rio Tinto (one of the principal shareholders 
of the Bri tis.h Metal Copporation) to G.ermany. ( 
Britain, in order to maintain its economic position in 
Spain intact and to ,.be able to exert influence on whatever 
future government sl1ould come to control the destiny of 
tipain, had therefore compelling reasons to maintain an 
'impartial.' attitude towards the two parties to the 
tipainish conflict. Reinforcing the desire not to. become 
invo.lved in, and not to precipitate, a conflict in Spain, 
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was tl1e wish to be in a position to be able to bring the , I 
economic resources at Brita.in' s command to bear to influence 
~pain's future gover~ent. towards· a policy acceptable to Bri-t.ain. 
Contacts were maintained with Franco by Britain with a 
view to protecting Britain's economic intere·sts and Britain's economic influence, but also with a more fundemental basis in a desire to maintain a political. influence at Burgos. Schwendemann, the t1erman Charge d 9Affa.ires in Spain, 
reported on January 2nc1 1937: 0 The diplomatic Chef de Cabinet to the Generalissimo, ~angroniz, sp·oke to me today 
about the a_ttitude of tl1e British tovvard the Franco Government. He told me that the British Ambassador, Chil. ton, who is accredited to the Red (xovernment and has __ ., been staying at tit. Jean~ Luz ever since the sojourn of 
the dipl.omatic corps at ~an Sebastian during the summer, 
was maintaining active diplomatic intercourse with the 
.b1ranco Government. Notes and telegrams came from him 
every day. Men's statement.a in his last important speech in the House of Conunons on the :::>panish question had been ,, 
, 
\ communicated in advance to the Nationalist Government. The 
speedh had been deiivered in the House of Commons at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and by about 10 o'clock in the 
morni.ng the Government here had ,aJ ready received a long telegram on its contents fI'om Ambassador Chilton. The 
commercial. at tac.he of the British Embassy, Mr. Pack,- was frequently in Burgoa and tialamanca ·;·in · order to discuss 144 economic questions.'' 
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-307- ,. Woermann reported on October the 7th, "The competent 
official- in the .tforeign Office gave the :follov!ing str~ct1y confidential information regarding the establishment in h:ngland of ~panish Nationalist consulates of a semiofficial character: 
uGeneral .b·ranco had made such a reque~t of t.he British Government as early as the beginning of ~eptember. The British · Government had recently replied to t_his via Ren-da.ye and ha.d given its consent in principle t,o the dis-patching of agents of a semiofficial character wJho were to enjoy neither the title of consul. nor diplomatic privi-leges but should in effect possess the duties and rights Qf a consul. Finai consent was made conditional, however, upon a satisfactory solution of certain questions. Inquiry 
revealed that. a.m.ong them were presumably the fol.lowing: 
"Release of certain .twitish ships, 11nhampered activity 
of the British consuls in Nationalist tipaif}-, and solution of some economic questions. 
''·Franco had further be-en promised that a British ,1:om-
1.45 mercial agent.would be sent to Salamanca.•f 
The J~glo-;-jpanish negotiations followed logically from " the mutual self-interest of the Nationalist Government in ::.pain and Britain. Britain could regard the ~pa,inish 
conflict confident, to some degree, that Franco needed British capital and that thi$ requirement would prove to be a w.aj or determini~g factor in :b"ranco ts policies ' '"' . towards foreign powers. Mackensen reported, July 7th 
~937, that the assertion was becoming more and more pro-
·. ' 
I 
C I • 
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' nounced in the ·-Britishmd French press that Franco was 
beginning to s.eek a rapprochement. with Britain. He had ~ 
. 'j., 
recognized, it w.as said, t.hat Germany and Ital.y could not 
give him the desired help after all and that the miJ.itary, 
naval and economic power of the Anglo-French bloc was o:£ 
greater_ importance for the future fate o:f' ~pain than the 
interested help of Italy and Germany. Mackensen illustrated 
the developing favorabl.e attitude of Franco tovtards 
Britain by commenting upon the favorable progress of 
negotiations between Britain and Franco concerning the 
British mining interests, the conversations about financial 
questions that were to have been concluded in a few days, 
and the fact that Franco had instructed his propaganda 
officers not to let through the censorshi_p any further 
""' 
. 14t> articles which were hostile to Britain. l\Jeurath was 
of the opinion (in a note sent to the German Jmibassy in 
i:)pain dated I'fovember tl1e 30th 1937) that very co.n$icler-abl.e 
concessions which the German l''oreign Office had been 
reliably informed,. in contradiction to assurances given 
to Germany by l'~ranco, that the Nationalist,,.Government 
in Spain had offered "tD Britain represented a serious 
l.47 threat to German interests in Spain0 
Britain's attitude towards the two parties (and to the 
general problem of formulating a-policy towards the Spanish 
prob1em) would naturally be. dependent upon the progress of 
the w_ar in Spain. As the suc'esses of the 1fationalist~!s 
" forces made a victory for Franco more like1y, so there devel.oped the nec.essity to come to some agreement t.o 
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.~ 
regu.J.ate Britain's relations w,ith the Burgos Government 
and to safeguard Britain's interests. Atherton, the 
American Charge d, 1Affaires in London, reported on 
.1t·e.bruary 12.th l.9°37, that the discussions of the Non--
Intervention Cammi ttee on the question of the v,i thdrawal. 
of volunteers had been admitted by~ .. the British Foreign 
o·ffice to be possib1y entirely academic in view of 
Franco's succ-ess and that. the British Ambassador in 
Spain was in contact with Franco!s Government "as occasion 
148 
requir-es '' e 
To the British decision-makers intervention in the 
Spanish affair was, in .!!:den's phrase, 'bad politics and 
bad humanity' , but this could not be taken to mean that 
Britain could disent.eres:t herself from ~pain. '!'he cJ.earest 
exposition of this has been given by Wel.czeck, the 
German Ambassador in b .. rance, in a report on July the 7th 
J.9.37,: ''"I hear from a reliab1e source that the Quai dl1 Orsay 
at the present time judges the negotiations between England 
and Franco rather optimistically. The subject of these 
is not only the question of no~·thern Spanish ores. Rather 
it is. believed that England thinks the time has come for 
strengthening her ties with b'ranco. England -has always 
1-ooked at t.he Spanish problem only from the British point 
of view, that is with.1a view to preserving strong British 
... ~ 
~. 
influence in Spain, regardl.ess of the outcome of the Civil 
-- . 
war. She expects that ~pain will in any pase be dependent 
on British financial and ec anomic hel.p after the Civil Viar. 
" 
''At the Quai dtOrsay the moment is consiaered propitious 
l 
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,, 
to establish rela.tions with Franco, since 
b"ranco is now more in need of heap than ever before, 
while, Italy and Germany, on the other harld, are not quite 
clear a bout their further a~tti tug.e. - As for Germany, they 
continue to assUW,e in London and Paris that she is averse 
to ·greater intervention. Britain wants to take the ground 
out from ¥der Italy's·intervention policy, especially , 
M9 by influena· F"lranco in the volwiteer question." 
The pros ect of the recognition of Franco·by Germany 
and Italy in Novemb:f of 1936, had given rise to great 
anxieties in Britain of the possibility of a significant 
rise in the influence of the Dictattors over the 1fationalis t 
uovernment. According to Americanoources, these were the 
thoughts of a high official in the British Foreign Office 
on this ,prospect: n:1n view of the known sympathy of those 
two Governments with Francots movement, the British feel 
that their influence at. !Iadrid will in that event be very 
powerful. and that it will consequently be essential for 
the Governments of the democratic countries to take some 
early ac;§ion which will prevent Franco from falling com--
pletely into the pockets of Berlin and Rome. .Tr1e question 
of recognition of Franco, should he be successful, is now being carefully studied in the b~oreign Office •.. The ~ificia..1 ,, felt it to be important that some tmiddl.e ground', short of· 
actual immediate recognition, be found which would meet 
"" 
,;the situation o£r_-:fact. He emphasiz.ed that the matter was 
still under consideration and that no real decision had 150 been reached.'' - Bingham reported on the 25th of November 
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that·: ''In a conversation at the Foreign Office today it was admitted that the .ttrench had ••• exerted sufficient pressure to dissuade the British Government from according belligerent rights to the Spanish warring factions and the Foreign O~fice obviously conside,red its recent action as a makeshift mea.su.re which might well prove to be merely a temporary stop-gapo I ~ i9-thered that the b'oreign Office would have preferred to have recognised F'ranco' s faction as a belligerent and accompanied the recognition wi~h a statement setting forth fully the reasons therefor. 
"My informant personal.ly characterised the position as absurd: Great Britain and !t'rance were recognising a govern-ment no longer in power , Italy and Germany had recognised one that had not·yet come into power, and none of the belli-gerents had recognised the real situation, namely, a state 15,1 ' 
" 
of belligerency arising out of a civil war.« The recent steps referred to were proposals made to Franco towards designating a specified safety zone that could be used by foreign shippng, and the problem arose from the anomolous position of the relations between foreign states and tl1e 1t·ranco Government and tl1e rights that the Jtranco Government possessed. In this connection the diplomatic correspondent of the D9!1Y ~e!§graph stated:"The position of l:lri tish shipping willing to utilise the Spanish Govern-. ment's ports must remain somev~hat obscure until it has been ' decided whether .the' .Nationalists are entitled and able to t· 152. establish a blockade." The aruiouncem.ent by b'ranco on the 
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l7th of November, 1937, of his intention to stop the traffic in arms v1hich v,as being carried on thro~gh the port of Barcelona raised new problems for the .British. b~ranco had declared that he would if necessary destroy the -port and 
warned all foreigners and foreignships to l.eave • ·rhis 
announcement vvas regarded in .1:Sritain as implying a blockade 
and ltranco could not make this effective ~i thout belligerent 15.3 
rights, and the granting of these raised the question of 
~ritain's relations with 1.-·rance, t.he state of public opilidi.on 
. in ~ritain and the effects of this action upon the course of the war in ~pain (as we have noted it was not considered by 
.t!den to be in ~ritain's interest to see a decisive victory 2/ by either side in Spain). 
'' 
~ritish public opinion became excited over attacks upon 
~ritish shipping, and Templewood in his memoirs has descibed the questions in the liouse of ~ommons that were raised over 
'Potato' Jones, the skipper of a smalJ tramp "that plied between South Vlales a.nd the bay of Biscay: "InLl.oyd George's eyes the obstinant vvelshman was a national hero engaged upon a crusade against a threatening tyrant.u To Hoare, it was a question of preventing u e •• the ships of the Welsh skipper 
and his friends from embroiling us and possibly the whole . 154 of &lrope in a conflagration." The question of the granting of belligerent rights raised the --wh-ol.e problem of the. attitudes 
' of the British public, and the Labour Party in particular, ; t~wards the Spanish conflicto The Left in Hri tain was not •/ 
able to observe Spa.in in quite the detached manner that the 
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Foreign Office was able to manifest; Attlee stated to the 
Commons in cJanuary of' 1937: ''My first complaint agains-t the 
right hon. Gentleman ( Eden) with regard to · the whole of h:is 
treatment of the Spanish question is, that he always treats 
the Government of Spain and that of General. Franco side by 
side, and as Governments of equal validity o e •• The Government· \ 
alwaj~s seems to take the view that tl1ere are two parties in 
Spain, and that their claims are of equal validity •••• I think 
~ there is a definite bias in favour of General F~anco because 
~e is regarded as representing the governing classes, the 
priviledged classes of Spain •••• The Government have played 
a leading role against non-intervention, but it has mainly 
been a leading part in ~etreat. Those powers that are anxious 
to see this struggle brought to an end and genuinly anxious 
·I that the Spanish people should manage their own affairs would 
welcome a stand by our Government, a statement that will 
restore to the ~panish Government its right, that they will. 
see that British shipping going to the Spanish Government 
will be protected ~d that General ltra.nco and his friends, if 
they take any steps against those ships, will be treated as 
pirates. It is about time that we ceaeed accept the dictates \' 156 
of Her lin and Romeo 11 
· L . 
·' 
Before l'tranco's declaration of the blockade, instructions 
had been issued to the Royal Navy to protect British ships 
, ~· outside tµe three mile limit of Spanish territorial waters, 
but in view of the increased likelyhood of incidents, nevii 
' orders were drawn up by the Admiral~ty, whereby British ships 
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-3ll+-i' ·· ships would not be protected, while Hoare wishe& to grant 
belligerent ~ights to Franco. But Eden has stated in his memoirs: 
n ••• I did not wish to follow thd.ih short cut. I preferred to 
find a policy which would protect our interests and minimize 
the risk of an encounter, without helping the .insurgents. I ·'' 
thought that we should achive our purpose if we forbade Hri-
tish_ships to carry arms to ~pain 9 at the same time giving 
notice that our vassals wou1d be protected on a11 legitimate 
trade. On Saturday, I~ovember 21st, I wrote in my diary: 'A 
heavy and difficult day at the office. Admiralty have got 
out some interim .regulations for lVlediterra.nean which will not do for more than a few hours. After spea,Jting to Sam (Hoare) 
and ::; B. (Baldwin), I arranged a meeting of some ministers 
for tomorrow afternoon. My own feeling is at present against granting of belligerent rights to Franco for international 
reasons. I do not want even to appear to follow Hitler and 
Mussolini at the moment, but would prefer to 'show tooth' in 
the A'lediterranean; still less do l want to facilitate an 
attempt at a blockade ,-)that is ma~rbe intended to starve Madrid. 1 
A long tussle duly took place on the following afternoon. I 
;.,. -drew attention to 1t·ranco Os statement that he woul.d stop all .. ~-. 
ships on the high seas. To grant belligerent rights would be 
to isolate us among non-dictator powers~ for neither !'·ranee 
nor the United States was thinking of such action. Moreover, 
- . 
its effect would be to give de facto recognition to b .. ranco, 
..... although the military situation had not changed significantly 
in his favour; I preferred that we should show ourselves . 
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-strong in ·the Mediterranean by protecting all our ships 
-engaged in legitimate trade, while forbidding them to carry 
arms. l!.-ventually, l\iinisters agreed that my policy should be, 
carried out and I despatched telegrams that night to the · ',' · ,, 
. 157 Spanish Government and to the insurgentso" 
1 The resulting policy was one that while it did not give 
:rranco the full status of a belligerent gave him some of the 
benefits and did accord him some·international status, in that 
the distinction made by Eden between 'legit:imate 8 i~1.and .. ~non-
·\ 
.legitimate 0 trade admits to the Burgos some rights as a. 
belligerent and denied to the Government of Spain access to 
weapons. v-1oermann in anal.ysing the policy of .l:irita.in came 
to these conclusions: "The British <.lovernment's declaration 
that for,the time being it would not recognise the parties 
in the conflict in Spain as 'belligerents' often is construed 
incorrectly in my opinion. As is shown by the whole behaviour 
of &igla.ncl in the .Non-Intervention Committee and also recently 
toward the b.·~(·allco Government in the question of a safety zone 
in the harbour of Barcelona, the British Government recognises 
both parties as parties in a civil war but not as belligerents 
in the sense of the rules of war, in which connection doubt-
less onl.y the rules of naval warfare are meantc This means 
that in principle ~ngl~d concedes to both parties the right, 
f, 
within their soverUgn territory and including the three 
('f~ ... mile limit, to engage in military operations, but that the 
parties should not have the right to exercise the rights on 
the high seas, particularly not the right of blockade and the 
right of seizure, including the right to stop and search •••• 
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ttAccording to r·eports. which I ·have not .been able yet 
to verify, there was for _s ome t-irne a tendency in the 
Cab·inet to go a step further and conce(je to both warr~ 
parties belligerent rights in the sense of the rules of 
war- • This tendency originated in 1he attempt to keep 
\ 
England out of any conflic~ts, so far a, this can possibly 
be done. This~ however, is exactly the policy of the 
whole Cabinet, It was therefore mainly a question of 
which of the two alternatives would offer less possi- . ; 
bili~y of conflicts. 
l 
' ' 
''"A practical exception to the concession to both parties 
· ~that they may engage in military operations in their 
sovereign territory is the above mentioned British demand 
for safety zones, that is, for harbour zones in which 
Bi;-i tiah ships are not exposed to bombardment.. ~uch 
z.ones already exist in a considerable number of Spanish 
ports, but not in Barcelona. according to the reports 
today, the Franco Government has now. complied wi ~h thia 158 
. 
reqµest." (Report cated Novemb:er 27-, 193·6.) 
r __ ; Claude Bow.era,, United .:>tates Ambassador to ~pain, 
has described the problem in these terms:. " When this 
bombing or detention of British ships became a. favorite 
outdoor sport without desturbing the complacency of the 
Chamberlain government, the Labor and Liberal parti·es in 
' 
the Commons drove 1he rJlinistry into a corner in a five-day 
debate and they forced the promise from t.he government to 
protect tsri tish commerce on the high seas.. Franco c oun.tered 
,,.i,. 
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with the :bhreat to fire on British destoryers escorting. ~ - -.,,, :. 
. :rood ships, --even outside territorial waters, and British ·--
.. 
merchant ships were instructed from Londo11to stay in the 
i'!' 
harbour of Saint-Jean-de-Luz .. or Bayonne to await further 
instructions. The great battleship, the Hood, v1as ordered 
from Gibraltar .. ,to Saint-Jean-de-Luz, and the little 
harbour was crowded with destroyers and merchantmen. 
"At length, the Chamberlain government announced its 
decisiono It would not tolerate any interference with 
British shipping by Franco, to \t:hom belligerent rights :~4 .. l • ( ' " ' 
had not been granted. Therefore, it strongly urged British 
~ 
ships to bow to Franco and not go to Bi·lbao. This \Vas 
interpreted to mean that British ships would protect 
British shipping on the high seas, but would not challenge 
Franco's right to sink them in the harbour. But the old 
deadogs of England asked.nothing more, and, gaily enough, 
they steamed into\the harbour of Bilbao. 
But almost immediately came a clari:rication of1 the 
policy of Chamberlain. He admitted the right or British 
ships to deliver their cargo in Bilbao; that they had this 
,... 
right under the Nonintervention Pact; that Franco had.no 
rights to interfere, since he had not been given belligerent 
rights. This being true, food ships ror Bilbao should not 
attempt to deliver their cargoes -- because the waters 
there were mined! Thus was darkness made visible. 
"It wa.s now clear that the dominant vting of t,he 
Chamberlain government w2s willing to lik9ke its contribution 
to the starving or the women and children of Bilbao, but 
the British food ships continued to pour into the 
' ' ·>· -
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'1159 ha,i:bor, and the people were not starved.n / 
. 
-:--·"'·····. 
-i.; 
I . 
-
' 
._ As evidence of Ede·n • s "concern vJi th the effect of granting belligerent rights to the two parties in Spain upon the balance w-ithin Spain between the two .forces one can ci·te 1'den's statement on June 25th to the House of Commons: 
"Supoose there were no Nonc=,intervention Agreement and we 
returned" to what the right hon. Gentleman describes as free trade in arms and people being allowed to sell •••• the /united 
~tates long ago put an arms embargo on the export of arms, 
and everybody knows quite well that nothing would induce the United States to depart from that course •••• Does the House 
conceive our selling large numbers of aeroplanes at this time, at this moment, when we have the greatest difficulty in ful-filling the smallest contracts with those.with whom we are 
- . 
under treaty obligations? ••• There remains .1t·rance, and l ..... leaije it to the House to judge how far the French Government 
,.(\ -~ 
r ' 
in tge present condition of France would l?Je willing to allow ··~ 
vast exports of war materials to Spain. What we have to face is that in what are-called the totalitarian states, Germany, Italy and Russia, all their armaments are in an infinitely 
-- -
-- . 
more advanced state than those of the democratic states, and if there were an wilimited supply, with the un-ited Sta.tea 
excluded, -I do not believe that the result would ~ so favour--able to the Spanish Government as many right hon. Members 
seem to believeo 
ttBut we have to follow this matter a little further. If 
~ 
_non-intervention ceased, is it the view opposite that bel]t-ierent rights should be granted? Certainly, if there were 
I ' 
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no non-intervention every precedent would be in favour 
of granting belligerent rights as was done in the American 
civil war. But suppose belligerent rights were granted •••. how much of these arms vJould reach the Government in ~pain? It is perfectly well-known that General Frarico is much the '... . •, '· . . 
stronger on the sea, and the exercise of belligerent rights 
would mean tha.t he would have comparatively little difficulty in intercepting the majority of these supplies·-o_f arms going 160 to·· Spain." 
The device of obtaining safety zones as ·a solution to the undefined nature of relations with the governments of 
~pain enabled Britain to achieve its object of safeguarding British ,--shipping entering opandsh harbours without raising the legal question of the status accorded to the governments. We have already seen that the device was resorted to as a 
means to enable the naval patrol of the .wo·n-Intervention 
~ommittee to function and avoid as far as possible a reoca.ir-
rence of incidents such as took place at Iviza. The efforts 
of the British Government to induce the uermans to return 
to the Committee offers an example of Spain being treated 
as an object of Hritish policy -- being viewed purely in terms of calculation of interest as determined by tµe relatiora of ~ritain with Germapy, and without reference to what might be termed the moral or legal rights of the two parties and the issues involved in the Spanish conflict. tiir Nevile Henderson, in discusiing with Mackensen the measures that 
should be taken following the Iviza incident, stated: '' ••• t~t 
,i:- in his opinion the furtHer procedure wouid be tha. t, after an 
• 
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agreement had been achieved, the British Governm_e.nt would 
send word to that effect without delay to both Spanish 
. a.:r parties. It was not a m}ter of asking their agreement, but 
I. 
I 
Ii I 
' ' 
merely of notifying them of the measures which the four Powers 
participating in the naval patrols had decided to undertake 
in case of any new incidents. lie assumed that after this 
\. declaration pad been made to both parties, Germany andTitalJ 
- 161 
.. . would resume their places in the Non-Intervention Committee." 
It w~J over the question of attaeks on British shipping 
t11at British policy assumed its most forceful shape. In August 
• 
and Sep:bember of 1937, attacks on .i:sritish· merchant and na'\B. 1 
vesse.ls increased in ntimbers, leading to the rising tide cf 
anger that we have already observed in Britain. On ~eptember 
2nd, H.M.S. Havock was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine 
sixty miles.off Valencia, and on the same day, S.S. Woodford, 
a Hritish tank.er was torpedoed and sunk of the coast of Sp.a.in. 
According to ~den, t:t1ere was little doubt that .there were 
"' 
about 15 Italian submarines were attacking ships in the 462 
Mediterranean. Men's proposed line of action was to convene 
a meeting of the powers to obtain an agreement to put an end 
to these attacks. In view of the .: fact that. Italy and GerD1Uny 
therefore had indicated an unwilling.ness to attend the proposed 
meeting, the .tiritish Admi.talty and the .tt·orei$11 Office worked 
a plan by which the Mediterranean was to be divided into 
zones. Britain and b'rance would patrol the, wes.tern basin, 
and Russia together with other eastern Mediterranean states 
; the Aegean. ln a memorandum, Eden suggested tgat Britain should 
attempt to obtain agreement at the Conference on the follow~ 
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proposals: that any submarine · attacking a merchant ship in 
a m~er contrary to the _rules as to the action of submarines 
wi t..hrnregard to merchant ships should be counter-attacked and destroyed; and that this should extend to any submarine in 
the vacini ty of a position in vJhich a merchant vessel has 
-· been at.tacked or sunko Tl1e Conference, which was held at Nyon, 
reached full agreement on September 11th, little more than 
tv.enty-_four hours after convening • Great Britain and France 
were to patrol the main Mediterranean trade routesj from 
the LJ~adenelles to Gibraltar, and from North Africa to 
Marseilles, providing sixty destroyers for the purpose. The 
Eastern Mediterranean states were to patrol their own terri-
torial waters, and would assist jjritaih and b'rance, on request, 
ti1 to patrol the main routes. bome areas· were specifically 
excluded, particularly the Tyrrhenian ~ea, in order that they 
might 'form the subject of special arrangements.' this was 
done in order that a large area coul.d be offered to !Vluss.olini 
- 163 to patrol should he decide to join the agreement. 
Ciano' s ac_ount of the Italian accession to the Agreement differs from that of Eden's. In Ciano's diary the account 
runs: "September 13. Ingram and .olondel have given us a copy 
of tl1e .N·yon decisions. I have prepared a reply, in which, 
without advancing a claim to take part, I affirm our right 
. to parity, lt will certainly embarrass themo Either we co-
operate or the scheme fials and they are to biame •••• 
~eptember 21. Hlondel and Ingram handed me a note which gives 
us virtual satisfaction, though the word 'parity' is care-
fully avoided.~ 'rhe Duce has approved my reply and the press (_, 
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I 
communique: we agree to a technical conference to modify the 
Nyon ·clauses in_ accordance vvith our wishes. It is a fine 
·-------···----
victory • .t.t·rom suspected pirates to policemen of tr1e Medi-
terranean --and the Russians, whose ships we were sinking 164 
excluded. 0 
. ';~ 
l!:den 's account runs: "The Fascist Government returned a 
reply to the effect that the share allotted to them in the 
Nyon Agreement appeared unacceptable. Italy's vital interests 
in the Mediterranean made it necessary that she 'should heve 
conditions of absolute equality with other powers in any zone " 
of the Iv'.ledi terranean. rt •••• The British and b'rench Governments 
had always said that they were willing to give ltaly a share 
in the work of the patrols. The Nyon ~onference provided for 
revision at the end of the month and, when that time came, 
165 fvbssolini was allotted his share and accepted it." 
l.i'orster, the lrerman Charge d}:_!Affaires in F'rance, analysed 
the i'Jyon ~onference to accord with ~en's view: "The initial 
rejection of the invitation was probably not unwelcome here, 
for that meant the agreement could be quickly concluded along 
,, /· ,--, 
.J 
1 Angloc:,lt~rench lines and Italy cou1d be confronted with an 
· accomp.lished fact. This, to be sure, first created a critical 
situation for a few days. lf Italy had flatly refused to accede 
to the agreement, events of great consequence might have re-
.. l ' sultede Of course, Anglo-French policy would have been in a 
position to provoke or avoid incidents as needed, to make 
light ot' them or to magnify the.m, but it would not have 
be.en mast.er of everything happening in the Mediterranean. 
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From conversations here I have gained ~,the impression that 
thi.s risk was taken deliberately. Italy's accession in 
principle has eliminated this d.anger for the tir:rie being. 
1
• •••• The military potential of France and England in t_be 
Mediterranean has been strengthened t.o such a degree that 
French interests seem assured even from a military point 
/;. of viewe· Polit:Ccial and military cooperation witr1 Britain 
in the Mediterranean,, wl1ich Laval had avoided, has now , 
become a fact. All s.tates bordering on the Medi terrane.an 
have at the very least been neutralized in relation to 
' Italy in case of a conflict. These· r·esults w.ere achieved 
without France having to take an open position against 
Italy and without the strengthening of the power potential~ 
appearing as an anti-Itaiian demonstration; for Italy ,. 
was explicitly invited beforehand to work out the agreement 100 
and later to accede to it." 
The Nyon Conference brought sharply )o the fore the con-
tradictory tendencies in the Cabineto To Eden to continue to 
retreat before the Dictators was tm invite disasterJ but to 
Chamberlain, tl1e important task before ..t:tt-i tain was to work 
towards improving relations with _Italy. Of the conference, 
Chamberlain wrote in his diary: ''We have had a great success 
at ~yon but at the expense of Anglo-Italian relations •••• It 
167 would be amusing , if it were not also so dangerous • 11 
Itaily had rejected the invitation to Nyon on September the 
9th, wishing to refer the matter of piracy to the Non-
Intervention Comrni ttee. c.;bamberlain had asked the views 
{ .. 
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of the b·oreign Office, · as he thought there was something 
to be said for it. Men's comment illustrates the divergence 
of thought between the two men: n·AJ.though at the time, 
perhaps, the Prime fJlinist.er did not know it, he was trying 
to reconcile two incompatibles: the theory of being on 
good terms with dictators, and the practice of dealing 
with their behaviour as exemplified in the llbyssinian 
_ 1.68 war, the tipanish war and l\r1edi terranean piracy. u 
Vlith-~den's resignation, t..he attempt was made to 
reestablish good relations with Italy through friendly 
and frank discussions~ Lord Perth, in stating to Cianoo 
on the 8th of ~Jlarch 193&, that he was authorised by the 
British Government to open the conversations with the aim 
of reaching an agreement between Britain and Italy, added 
that he was happy to deliver a personal message from Lord 
Halifax, containing a personal word of greeting. Lord 
Halifax a.aid he was led to do so not only because he had 
-~:.· just assumed the post of His Majesty's ~ecretary of State 
for b'or-eign Affairs but because the moment coincided with 
the opening of conversations which, he trusted with all 
siceri ty, would l.ead to the rebirth of that old :friendship 
between the two cowitries - a friendship which, he main-
tained, l1ad been until recent times the cardinal factor 109 in the policy of them both. 
'£he d.evel9pment of these con,ersations has already 
been traced in a previous chapter and there is no intention 
to cover the gr·ound once again, but merely to demonstrate 
\· 
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other facets of a policy that w·as dominate.d by a belief 
~ in the necessity to remove from the path of reconciliation 
'· with Italy any obstacle which Chamberlain felt could be 
,-.· ,, .,·. {v·~\ 
- ,~~.,:a.ispos,ed of if only the effort were to be made. 
Spain was one such obstacle. Chamberlain made use of 
the .,oCOPJtersation betw.een himself and Herr Hitler on 
s,pt.ember 30, 1938, at Munich, to propose the idea of 
a Faur Pow.er Conference to bring about a aettlement in 
S.pain. Chamberlain said to Hitler: "He wished to report 
to him a conversation which he had had the previous evening 
,, 
with Signor Mussolini on the subject~)of Spain. He had 
suggested to the Duce the pos.sibility that the Four Great 
Powers might call upon the t..wo sides in Spain to establish 
an armistice and that they might offer t.heir services. in 
assis~ing them to arrive at a settlement of their 
differences. The Duce had said, in reply, that he was 
tired of Spain. (Here Herr Hitler laughed heartily.) 
He had lost 50 ,ooo men there; Fran.co had time a.rid again 
thrown away his ppportunities of securing a- victory. He, 
' 
Mussolini, was no longer afraid of Bolshevis.tic domination. 
He had n~ver bad any territorial aims in Spain, and it was 
his intention shortly to withdraw a considerable body of 
Italians. As to the suggestion, the Duce had expressed 
his intention of thinking it over. 
tt •••• he had thought that if the two sides received a . ' (1~:) 
call from the Four Great Powers. they n1ight w~ll· · be induced 
to listen and that , one e the truce had been called, the 
Powers might be abl.e to heip in getting a settlement. 
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• 
However, he only now wished to report to the Fuhfrer 
· what had pass.ed between himself' and Mussolini on this s11b-
j ect and he hoped that the Fuhrer too wou~d give it his 
l.70 
personal attention." 
Chamberlain's aim was to produce the appeasement of 
Europe and to establish a working relationship between 
' Bi!itµiar,t:".1France, Germani and Italy. Batween this goal 
stood the bad relations that existed between France and 
Italy. Francois-Poncet indicated to Ciano on November 
the 9th, France's de~ire to contribute to clearing the 
atmosphere once and for all by improving relations between 
Italy and France, and he proposed- examination of the 
problems that were rendering conditions, betv~een Rome and 
Paris difficult. Ciano replied t.hat one great difficulty 
still remaining was Spain; Italy and France were still 
. 
on opposite sides of the barricade -- Italy stood solidly 
on the side of Franco until. he gainea victory, and there--
fore it would be difficult to start talks until the 
, 171 Spanish problem had been cleared up • 
Sir Eric Phipps reported on ,the 19th of December the nature 
of the impediment that Spain presented to the betterment of 
relations betw,een Italy and France, as viewed in France; "In 
the first place, the whole of the Left and much o'f the moderate 
oplllion in France hope for a victory of the Spanish Government, 
and bitterly resent Italy's continued assistance to General 
Franco. Feeling on this score is so deep :bhat ii& the French 
Government made themselves responsible for any s~ep directly 
contributing to the defeat of the Spanish Government, .. they 
i,; .i,~- ,1/ 
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· it' I .•. miiht fall. Already not only the Communists but the Soo-iali"tst · 
are expressing the fear that Mo A«ussolini at the January 
meeting will ask for the jm,media-te grant of belligerent rights 
.to General Franco; and opposition from the Left would be 
most violent to any such step be:fore th·e enrty into force c£ 
the British plan •••• But there is a more important aspect of 
the Spanish probleme Not only the Left but the Centre and 
most of the Right~ as well as the General Staff, are alarmed 
at the pro~pec·t of the esta~lishment of Germany and Italy in 
Spain on the lines of French communication with Africa. M. 
Kayser, the 'homroe de confiance 0 of M. Daladier, recently 
stated that the Government would consider no agreement with 
Italy satisfactory unless the withdrawal of ~taly from the 
Spanish ma.inland· and the ~- Balearic Islands were assurred. On 
this question of the safety of imperial communications the 
172 
cowitry is more or less united. u 
It was on this question of posaible strategic concessions 
&ained from Franco bF Italy that Chamberlain and Halifax, and 
Daladier and Boru1et disac§treed in the course of conversations 
that took place on January 10th, 1939: HThe French Ministers 
expressed concern at Mussolini's refusal to give the same 
assurances regarding the territorial inviolability of Spain, 
', her islands and her colonies as he had given to Great Britain. 
Did this mean that he regretted the assurances given to Great 
¥ritain in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and that he meant to 
violate them? It might be well to ask the Duceeooto repeat . ) 
those assurances •••• he (Bollllet) enquired what His Majesty's 
Government would do in the event of the Italian Glbvernment 
.. 
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failing to keep their word. The Prime Minister (Chamberlain) 
• observed tl1at that was _a difficulty that would have to be: :-l~/1:,," 
faced if and when it arose; but M. Bonnet at least did not 
seem satisfied and reverted to the pmint at a later stage of 
the conversation when the Prime Minister assured him that 
His Majesty 0s Government attached not less importance to 
the ppint than did the French Government. 
''The Prime Minister and Halifax thought that this would 
~ not get us much further.. To ask the Duce to repeat his 
assurances would merely elicit verbal promises in the same 
sense as the assurances already obtained in writingo It would 
appear on this point better to wait and see. It seemed diffi-
cult to believe that Mussolini, who had shown such anxiety 
to put the Anglo-Italian Agreement into forec, should intend 
flagrantly to violate it by any permeaant military occupation 
1z3 of Majorca, or any other part of Spanish territory e" 
Bowers reported: "Since the Non=Intervention Coaunittee 
• has taken the position that belligerent rights will not be 
granted until all foreigners are removed from the fighting 
forees, and since Mr. Chamberlain has so assured the Commons 
time and again, this would seem to mean that the granting 
of such rights is ve~y remotee 
"Even so it is commonly believed in circles usually deperu!-
able that Chamberlain, in his eagerness to give further 
assistance to Franco, and thus to appease Hitler and Musso-
lini, is anxious to gr~nt such .. ri·ghts regardless of the pledge. 
, When interrogated in the Commons this week Mr. Butler, Sub-
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uJster of Foreign Affairs, was far from downri~t in.his 
answers. 
"It has been thought probable that one of t,he purposes 
of the visit of Chamberlain and Halifax to Paris ••• is to 
174 persuade the French into agreeing to this course.•• 
Bri,,;tain, under the impetus of Chamberlain,had moved 
closer inJ.its relations with Franco attempting to gain 
influence at Burgos with a view to making the settlement of 
the conflict quicker. Stohrer~ German Ambaseador in Spain, 
reported on the 19th of May, 1938, that the Nationalist 
Foreign Minister, General Jordana, had told bim in strict 
confidence that u ••• the Spanisp; Government had the impression 
that Engla.na. was on the point of a more positive rappro~chement 
with Nationalist Spain. The British Government had given the 
Duke of Alba to understand that it was endeavoring to have 
the French border closed to shipments of war material to the 
Reds. It had even urged that the Spanish Nationalist Govern-
ment use its influence with Mussolin~ to get him to take a 
stiff er attitude toward the !t'renah and that it~:: suggested to 
him that he for his part demand in Paris the closing of the 
French bordero The part of Mussolini's speech at Genoa referrioi , ...... --.. , ... .' 
to Franco-Italian relations (in which Mussolini\ stated that l . 
! it was unlikely that the Franco-Italian negotiations in 
progess would reach a conclusion since the two counties were 
on opposite sides of the barricades in Spain) as well as 
'-' the repo~t over the radio tonight that Mussolini had stated 
that he did not wish to continue the French-Italian conver-
' sati'ons so long as deliveries of material to the Reds acroes 
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the,,_bord_ :r continued, seemed to him, .. to be a result of this l7J 
. i\ step.n 
. 
-Chamberlain had urged Daladier, in the course of their \ . 
meeting on Novenber 24th, 1938, that the French appoint an 
agent at Burgos as the British had done •. Chamberlain explained 
that since this had been done (basing the action on commer-
. ci~l rather than political grounds in view of Left-wing 
criticisms in Britain) relations between Britain and the ' 
Nationalists had improved. Chamberlain also explained that 
'' ••• His Majesty's Government were very anxious that the w'ar 
.should be brought to an end but that their present informa-
tion was that General Franco was confident and would not en-
:J-7$ tertain the idea of an armistice e" 
Time however brought the solution to the conflict as the 
Nationalist forces began in 1939 to overcome the Government 
resistance and the defeat a,emed e~ more imminent. Chamber-
lain wrote to H~nderson, on February 19th, 1939, that things 
looked as if they would clear up in Spain soon, and that the 
next job would be to get the bridges between France and Italy 177 in vJorking ordero ·cca.mp-bell reported from Paris in March that 
L,ger had complained that it looked like the British Govern-
ment were trying to put the brake on the French rather than 17~ 
on the Italians.) Chamberlain wrote on the 19th of February 
that they had heard from the. Spani~h Government that they 
would surrender if Franco would give ~a.;surances that there 
would be no repri·sals. Britain had held ·back recognition of 
Franco until the surrender should occur;"~ but felt Chamber-
lain, if' that were to be too long coming BriUin would 
' 
.I; •• ,\' 
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• .. 
· recognise Franco anyway: ''We ought to be able to establish 179 excellent relations with Franco." De jure recognition 
was granted to the Nationalists by Britain on February 27th. 
During September of 1938 the ~ationalists had informed 
the British and French Governments that they intended to . 
~ -,---.. 
remain neutral in the event of a European conflict;-8Qhich 
f~ 
was only a confirmation of the belief that had been held in 
Britain that the future Government of Spain would be too 
preoccupied with Spanish affairs to undertake an active 
part in European politics. The concern of Britain was to 
see an end to the fighting and the removal of a problem that 
was felt to be hindering the read to European conciliation. 
-Stohrer reported on October 2nd, 1938, that England was 
.... _.! 
merely waiting for a suitable moment in order to intervene 
politically in Spain to bring anout an end to the war: "Accord-
ing to reliable reports, Sir Robert Hodgson, the Britisµ·agent 
here, stated recently in a circle of intimate friends that 
after the peaceful settlement of the Czech question England 
181 would attack the Spanish problem 1anergetically. 11 
One attempt to aid in the conclusion of the war had 
been the Hemming Mission which had been sent to Spain to 
182 J try to persuade Franco to withdnaw his volunteers. Another 
method was to amke the likelyhood of surrender of the Govern-
ment forces the more likely by attempting to influence Franco 
t.Q be as humane as possible and give assurances to. the 
the remaining Government forces of goo~ treatment. This may 
be p~t of the motivation behind the representations that 
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were made b) Sir George MounseY (Assistant Under Secr~:t.a.ry of /J St.ate) to Woermann on April 25th, 1938: "Sir Ge·orge Mounsey 
made the following statements which were obviously not 
improvised: It seemed to him very desirable that the losini (' party in.bpa.in should receive moderate treatment •••• (He) 
· also pointed out that it was for a permenant pacification 
of Spain·desirable that Catalonia, in keeping with tradition, 183 should receive some kind of autonomy in Spainou British 
efforts were also made to aid in the surrender of Minorca to l6 
the Nationalists. The British CruiseE Devonshire brought the 
Nationalist negotiators from Majorca to Minorca to conduct 
I .. 
the negotiations for the surrender, and brought several hundred 
184 of the Republicans from tne island to the safety of Franse. 
The German Junbassador to Spain reported later in February 
that the Br_itish Government, according to certain indications, 
was not loath to repeat the unofficial intervention which 
185 had. led to the subjugation of the island of Minorca. It would 
appear that it was following a personal letter sent by Enanco 
to Chamberlain on Feb»uary 20th, giving·satisfactory assurances 
to the British Government on the question of neutrality, the 
withdrawal of foreign volunteers and the question of reprisals 
against the Republicans, that recognition was accorded on 186 
the 27tJ. 
With resignation of Eden British policy-had been dominated 
by Chamberlain and Charnberlaines ~esire to come to an accord 
with Germany and therefore Italy. All .. o,ther problems 'iiVer-e 
viewed in this perspective, and only ia,ineS relevance in 
:j 
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raelation to. the German problem and to Chamberlain's programme 
of the systematic removal of all obstacles to free under-
standing. Ciano, in the course of writing into his diary 
his impressions of the talks that were tru!ing place· in Rome 
: I 
'' in January, 1939, b~ween the British leadership and the Ital-
·~ 
ian (and having described Halifax as wishing that Franco's 
vicotry would settle the Spanish question), recorded: "The 
recorded discussion of the afternoon"' as characterzl ed ·by 
the profound sense of preoccupation which dominates the 
British \Vi th respect to Germany. Gerl'!}a.F/1rearament weights ( - / 
•Dn them like lead. They would r e"'ai :ror any sacrifice 
187 i~·-:··they~~:.conld see the f'luture clearly." Any sacrifice 
included the submission by Chamberlain to Mussolini of the 
outline of the speech that Chanioerlain was to make to the 
Commons, in order that the Itali2ns could make any changes. 
The duce, i~ approving the s:peech, declared: ''I believe 
that it is the first time that the Head of the Bri·tish 
Government .submits to a foreign Government the outline of 
188 
one of his speeches. Its a bad sign f·or them" 
Chamberlain's concern with Gerrrunproblem led him, as 
concern became preoccupation, to develop 'tunnel vision' 
as far as the wider span of the international scene was 
concerned, which re·sul ted in a :rar less precise calculation 
or the British interest in such areas as the Iberian 
Peninsular, than had been true with Eden and the Foreign 
Office~ for in the case of Chamberlain, the British interest 
0 
in these 'peripheral' areas was pre-calculated: the avoidance c£ 
conflict with Germany or Italy. Sir Walford Selby, Upon going 
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to take his post at the :te ad o:r the Briti-sh Mission is Lisbon 
I 
,[! in December of 1937, was received by Neville Chamberlain and I 
l~ 
the interveiew made c-lear to Walford Chamberlain's interest 
in the }·German. assault upon the British position, commerica.1 
. 
' . 
a.nd political, in Portugal: "Despite my long -and intimate 
assosiation \vi th his hal:r-brother, Sir Austen, I scarcely 
knew Mr. Neville Chamberlain. He reminded me that we had 
'once' met at the Embassy in Paris. Our conversation was 
only a very brief one/ It v1a.s quite ob·vious that whatever 
assurances Mr. Eden might be giving to me as to the 
importance he attached to my new post, Mr. Chamberlain was 
only remotely interested. He asked me no· questions about my 
last post at Vienna, nor did he see fit to take me into his 
,, 
confidence in regard to the deal with Germany over colonies 
in Africa which he 1vvas at the moment contemplating, and 
which might greatly a1-lfect the overseas possessions of our 
I"'' 
ally." 
ttl{y interview terminated very quickly, Mr. Chamberlain 
189 
wishing me good luck.'' 
Spain came to be viewed alnost exclusively in terms of 
ther German threa.t as the crisis in Europe developed. Qne 
may take the developing shape or British policy to be the 
result of a eelf-assura.nce and sense of purpose (or mission) 
on the part of Chamberlain that was carried to the point of 
arrogBnce, and be right to a large extent. But one should 
remember the natre of the times; the Prime Minister would 
have been lacking in his duty.if, in the evolving eris~ 
had not manifested a sense of urgency. If the choices made 
" -
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by Chamberlain were chosen vvi th too inadequate an aesessmen t 
.,./• 
. . 
of the effects of that decision upon Britain's relati 1ons 
with the non-Dictator states of Europe, then this is .t·he 
J 
usual effect of a crisis pEriod upon diplomacy. As Pruitt 
1. 
states: "In times of national stress when national aspira-
tions seem· threatened, decision-makers are likely: 
(a) to be less aware of the complexity of.their environment 
(b) to consider fewer al terna ti ve s 
(c) to choose among alternatives more impulsively with less 
190 
adeg_u~ :·review of their consequences.J' 
This is perhaps the best description of British foreign 
policy as it developed under Chamberlain: the attempt to 
develop good-will and the signalling of a willingness to 
negotiate became the essence of British policy. In his 
domination by the perception of a threat and the resulting 
inability to consider alternative possibilities, Chamberlain 
inevitably reminds one of Piglet, one of the Winnie-the-Pooh 
. 
character. In one episode, Pooh and Piglet were making 
their way to Owl's house on a v ery windy day, stopping 
to shelter in a wood, nervously listening to the roaring 
gale among the tree-tops. 
"Supposing a tree fell dow~, Pooh, whenwe were underneath 
it?" 
"Supposing it djdn' t, tt said Pooh after careful thought. 
191 
Piglet was comforted by this. 
\, 
\\. 
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I 
No people are uninteresting. 
Their fate is like the chronicle of planets. 
,... Nothing in them,, is not particular. 
And planet is dissimilar from planet •••• 
Not people die but worlds die in tliem. 
Whom v1e knevJ as faulty 9 the earth vs creatures. 
Of whom 9 essentiallyp what did we know? 
Th~y perish. They cannot be·brought back. 
The secret worlds are not regenerated. 
People 
Yevgeny Yevtushenko. 
******************************** 
."i , ...... 
The point has now been reached in this examination of British attitudes 
and policies towards the Spanish Civil War at which it becomes necessary 
to attempt to· draw together the threads of the story, as well as to 
reach some oon.clusions as to the driving impulses behind British 
foreign policy and the essential nature of the spirit of Britain 
in the Thirties. In making this summary, it is inevitable {and perhaps 
even desirable) that judgements will be made as to the "correctness" 
of the concepts behind, and the content of, the foreign policies 
implemented by the British Government between the years 1936 and 1939. 
There are, however, pitfalls in setting oneself up as an armchair 
Soloman to judge the actions of others. This ·is especially true of 
a period, such as that which preceeded the Second World War, which has 
managed to arouse furious passions and to shake the moral conscience 
of a nation accustomed to making easy assumptions as to its unblemished 
rectitude in such matters. The pusillanimous outpourings of outraged 
probity have been such that one is led to conclude, upon reading some 
of the accounts of British foreign policy in the latter half of the 
1930's, that the results of the researc¥s of some historians bear 
a marked parallel to the advent of Shakespeare's Caliban into the world 
of erudition: 
·, ·· 
,. 
"You taught me language, and my profit on't 
Is, I know how to curse." 
.~ ~.~ 
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This can, in part, be explained by the fact that the historian lives 
- I 
in the material world as well as the metaphysical realms of abstract 
thoughto AoJ oPoTaylor in discussing his "Origins of the Second trlorld 
War" has stated that: 
"Obviously, historians like Sir John Wheeler-Bennet ·and- Alan Bullock 
and the younger American practitioners are hostile to my book because, 
whether they know it or notp they have vested interestso They have 
1 written textbooks 9 and they have their own books.and legends to sell." 
The political leaders of the ThirtieS-Jiaye had to :fact not only 
the onslaught of the historian in the postwar period, but also had pre-
.. 
viously had to fact the incursions of the political pundits of the Thirties • 
Sagittarius, one of the political analysts of the New Statesman with a 
satirical bent, penned· the following parody, entitled "Eden Put the Kettle 
On", in 19 3 7 : 
--
Eden, see the table spread, 
Chamberlain take the head, 
Greet our long soli~ited guest! 
Foreign Office Chefs with care 
Gastronomic flights prepare, 
All the solid British fare 
Nazis can digestl 
Meet the Fuhrer's hungry wish, 
Hand the Soviet with the fish, 
Carve the League up on a dish, 
Covenant chopped fine; 
Serve what the Nazis love to eat -
Sauce Valencia with the meat, 
Loans and credits with the sweet, 
Mandates with the wine. 
What! the guest will not partake? 
All in vain we boil and bake? 
Has Von Neurath stomach ache? 
Can't he come today?ooo 
Well~ the food will keep, we find, 
Later he may change his mind; 
Meantime 9 till he 2feels inclined, . Eden~ clear away! 
. . 
One way feel that political leaders should be prepared to accept 
any form of criticism which should be considered, as a Front Bench seat 
in the Commons, as coming with the job. Those who accept the responsibill4 
of guiding the future of their state and yet cannot bear the gibes of the 
·· disgruntled should, perhaps, t~ke the advice of Juan Chi, the medieval 
Chinese poet : 
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o, men of ·irlfluenoe 
Remember to wi thdrav,; in time J 
You look sad and frail. 
Is it because of power and fame? 
I prefer to fly with jays and tits, 
Not with hoary heron~o 
For they travel high and far, 
Making the return too hard.3 · 
There is, hoivever, a significant difference bet,-1een the criticism 
leveled at the politicians of the Thirties by the historians of the 
present day and that by the analysts of the 1930 1s. Those of the pre-
sent time who level their retributive darts can base their case on the 
sure knowledge of the out.;0ome of the policies of the appeasers· and upon 
documentary evidence of the intentions of the leaders of the Fascist 
states. The importance of this difference has been pointed out, with 
justification, by those of the appeasers who have written their memoirs 
and by the apologists of those policies. Iain Macleod wrote of the 
year 1937 in his study of Neville Chamberlain: 
"That such appeasement of Germany, at this point of history, 
rested upon falsely optimistic assumptions about the measure 
of Nazi ambit ions is now undeniable. lie kno1r1 from the 
Nurenberg trial documents that Hitler was insatiable, war 
inevitable and appeasement therefore a forlorn hope. But since 
those who pursued appeasement lacked the benefit of hindsight, 
it was neither a foolish nor an ignoble hope." 4 
If one is to understand or to judge the policies of the political 
leaders of Britain in the 1930's, one must reconstruct as closely the 
wo·rld as it was seen in that period and not as it seems in retrospect, 
so that the point of the exercise is not to attack the.appeasers for 
their blindness but to attempt to understand why they (together with 
.. 
the vast majority of the population of Britain) were not able to 
- --~~perceive the true nature of the intentions of the Fascistr leaders, the 
possible outcomes of the policies open to Britain and the capability 
of Britain to undertake to implement these policies. 
One might take as a starting point .of a tirade upon Chamberlain's 
policy to Italy over the Spanish question the following record by 
Count Ciano of' the· Ang]Jfo-Italian talks of January 1939: 
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"The recorded discussion of the afternoon was characterized by_the 
profound sense of preoccupation i1hich dominates the British w:i.th 
respect to Germanyo German rearmament weighs on them like lead. 
They 1r1ould be ready for any sacrifice if they could see the future 
clearlyo This dark preoccupation of theirs has convinced ·me more 
and more of the necessity of the Triple Allianceo Having in our 
hands such an instrument we would get whatever we want. The British 
do not want to fight. They try to draw. back as slowly as __ possible, 
bu.t they do not ivant to fight." 4 .. 
Chamberlain's policy was to weaken the Axis at the Italian ·end by a 
policy of appeasing Italy's demands, since it was felt that Germany 
was not the Duce's first choice.5 Chamberlain came into conflict ~ 
with the Foreign Office over this question, since Chamberlain felt 
that the Foreign Office continued without justification to see a 
Machiavelli in Mussolini using treatment which would not get anywhere. 7 
Thus Chamberlain was prepared to advance c3r.long way towards the 
Italian viewpoint and, for example, to grant to Mussolini recognition 
of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia after, what many felt to be, 
only nominal withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. This readiness 
of Chamberlain to move towards the Italian viewpoint led Mussolini 
to retort: 
"These men are not made of the same stuff as the Francis 
Drakes and the other magnificent adventurers who created the empire. 
These, after all, are the tirefl sons of a long line of rich men and 
they will lose their empire." , 
One could buttress the general line of argument -v1ith exposition 
on the inglorious record of the Italian armed forces in Libya and 
Albania, together with the impotence of the Italian surface navy after 
the battle of Taranto in November 1940. The effect of this battle wa.~ 
to have, in the words of Viscount Cunninghan, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Mediterranean fleet in 1940, a profound effect on the naval 
strategic situation in the·· Mediterranean: 
"It reduced, if it did not al together abolish, the threat of 
the enemy fleet interfering with our neverending succession of convoys 
to Greece and Crete, ~nd enabled our battleship strength in the. Eastern 
Mediterranean to be diminished.~ This in turn brought relief to our .. 
hard-preased destroyers, as fewei were no~ required as an anti~ 
submarine screen for the smaller battle-fleet. Within the next few 
weeks the Malaya and the Ramillies sailed for home."9 
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. One result was that the Italian Chief of the Naval Staff was relieved of his position at the same time as Mussolini accepted the resignation of the Supreme Commander of the Ital_ian Army, Marshal Badoglio. 10• 0 
~o accept such arguments would, however, be to use the power of· hindsight where it_ should not be used. ~ie should remember the renewal of the t,hree pow~ warning that was given by the British Chiefs of Staff in November, 1937, who insisted that Britain's interests lay in a peaceful Medi terra·nean and that every effort should be made to return 
·1 
to a state of friendly ,,re_lations with Ita;lye 11 The threat of the Italian submarine fleet, which .had a hundred su-b'Inarines in commission before the outbreak of hostilities, and had appeared as presenting an 0 t t f t • th M d•t dJ.•d t t • l" 12 
1mpor an ac or in e file 1 erranean, no ma er1a 1ze. Cunningham, who had expected that upon the Italian. declaration that he and his fleet would spend most of the daylight hours beating off he~vy bomber attacks, had the encouraging experience on the first day of never sighting a plane.13 The supine direction of the Italian fleet was an unexpected ,.bonus that could not have been, forseen. However, even this could not remove the danger that the strategic position of Italy across Britain's Mediterranean route to the Far East presented. Captain 
. 
S.W.Roskill in the official ~ritish History of the Second World War makes this clear: 
"While the Italian high command did not realise sufficiently the importance of taking the offensive to secure their communications with North Africa, especially the elimination of Malta, the Italian fleet could not be ignored, and the British ships which were urgently ,/ required else~vhere had to be used to contain the fleet in being. May, I 1940 reinforcements were sent from the Home Fleet to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham at Alexandria as the Italian attitude became more threatening. The threat of the Italian destroyers and ~ubmarines based at Massawa on the flank of the convoy route to Suez meant that on 24th May, the Red Sea was closed to shippin:g 11ntil counter-measures had been taken" 14 
If decision-makers in Britain were too impressed by the Military parades of Mussolini's legions and the utterances on the might of the 'New Rome', it was natural since the Fascist regime was built on its ability to impress and to create the aura of greatness. Luigi Barzini, in his portrait of the Italian people, represents Mussoli~i as the supreme showman, enthralled in his own act: 
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"He was a flamboyant interpreter of heroic roles in the style 
of the great nineteenth century tragedians or operatic baritones. 
· Paolo Monelliv the author of the best life of :Mussolini v1rote: 'The 
Italians saw in him only the tenor for whom they had raved as they 
had years before for Carso and Tamagnoo As one does with tenors 7 they 
enjoyed his good long notes and the melody 1-1i thout paying· attention 
r • 
to the vJords, but, if they had listened more carefully, they v1ould 
·+ 
., 
not have been surprised by the catastrophe later. He had announced it.' ''15 
The tanks built under Mussolini were slov1 and protected by such thin 
armour that they could be pierced by machine gun fire. They had been. 
chosen by Mussolini because they were cheap and therefore for the same 
.. 16 
price there could be more of them to fill .. a parade. The act and the 
pose were important but behind the facade there was little 9:f substance. 
The deficiencies of the Italian Army had not escaped the notice of the 
German military mission which visited Italy in 1938. The Italian Army 
possessed no effective modern tanks and was quite unprepared for a 
modern campaign, while the Italian Gemeral Staff, realizing the true 
extent of the Army's weaknesses was, under Marshal Badoglio, working 
for peace. It was stated by reliable friends of the members of the 
Germ,::"n military mission that Fascism had neglected armaments, as it 
wanted to maintain its popularity by giving priority to social reforms. 17 
To draw the conclusion from the knowledge that we have today of 
the weaknessof the Italian military position behind the facade of the 
revived Imperium Romanun, that it was a mistaken policy to attempt to 
slake the revisionist thirst of Mussolini by meeting him more than half-
way. on the question of the recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia, would 
be less than f•ir. It would be to overlook the central fact that the 
Three Power warning issued by the British Chiefs of Staff stemmed 
( 
-
from the position of Britain as facing too many demands upon her 
military resources: the importance of Italy stemmed from the necessity, 
if Italy were not to be placated by political means, t·o divert much 
needed naval strengthifrom the Far East and the waters around the 
British coast. The importance of Italy sprung from her cruoial position 
across Britain's route to the Far East through the Suez canal. Even a. 
poorly equipped and organised military force would be able to pose 
a considerab.le problem to those concerned with the defense of Britain's 
sea routes. 
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One must also bear in mind:.i that the pol.icy of Chamberlain towards 
Italy was based up~n political as well as strategic considerations. 
Chamberlain was directing his policy towards the appeasement of Europe 
as a whole, in which a plann·ed policy toward Italy played its part. It 
was Germany that occupied the role as the major problem in Chamberlain's 
hierachy of solutions. Hov1ever, while the most important, the German 
problem i-1as the most intra.ct able, so that Chamberlain decided upon the 
course of seeking to bring the southern partner of the Axis into thos.e 
states whose influence could be relied upon to bring about a peaceful 
solution to those problems that faced Europe, a role in which Chamberlain 
sought to use Mussolini at the time of the Munich crisis. 
' 
One must therefore be careful to see the world as it would be seen 
through the eyes of the decision-maker and not as it seems thirty years 
later and in the 1930's Italy presented a far more formidable spectacle 
than she does to :those wh~.ee view is highly coloured by the image of the 
long streams of Italian soldiers surrendering in the Libyan desert. 
Professor Butterfield makes the point very clearly that our -understanding 
of history will depend upon our ability to imagine oneself into the 
place of the statesman: 
"Our traditional historical Vi:ring ••. has refused to be satisfied 
with any merely causal or standoff-ish attitude toward the 
personalities of the past. It does not treat them as mere things, 
or just measure such features as the scientist might measure; 
and it does not content itself with merely reporting them in the 
way that an external observer would do. It insists th~ the story 
cannot be told correctly unless we see the perso11alitiel- from 
the inside, feeling them as an actor might feel the part he is 
playing - thinking their thoughts over again and sitting in the 
position not of the observer but of the doer of the action. If it is 
argued that this ·is impossible - as indeed it is - not merely does 
it remain the ·thing to aspj,;t~'e to, but in any case the historian 
must put himself in the position of the historical personage, must 
feel his predicament, must think as though he was that m~no Without 
this art not only is ·it impossible to tell the story correctly but 
it is impossible to interprete the very documents on which the 
reconstruction depends. Traditional historical writing emphasizes 
the importance of sympathetic imagination for the purpose of 
getting inside human beings o irle may even say that this is part of 
the science of history for it ·produces communicable results -
~ the insight of one historian may be ratified by historians who then 
give currency to the interpretation that is produced".18 \ 
Objections have been stated to t~e "empathy theory" of~ historical 
explanation on the basis, that while this method is useful as a heuristic 
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'!.,. device, the soundness of historical explanation will depend upon the 
factual correctness of the empirica~l generalisations which the method 
of understanding may have suggested. 19 The argument fOllo~s from the 
-belief that implicit in the use o'f the word "because" there is a 
reference to a generalization from which the explanation gains its 
meaning. Gardiner, for instance, st2 ..tes: 
"• •• every explanation of the above kind that is ever offerred 
always contains a reference to one or more generalisations, But the·expression 'contain a reference' is ambiguous. It may well be argued that very often to give an ordinary causal explanation 
- 'he slipped because he stepped on a banana skin' - does not seem to involve a reference to a generalization 7 either for the_flpeaker who enunciates the explanation or for the hearer who understands it. Such an objection may be circumvented by the device of staJting that _on such occasions only an~im~licit reference to the general-ization is expressed ••• whenever a causal explanation is doubted or queried •• it is the generalization that warrants its utterance which comes ~nder fire, and the same generalization must be defended by 
reference to previous experience if the claim to have offered a 
satisfactory explanation is to be upheld."20 
Related to this problem of the correct basis of historical explan-
ation is the prcblem of the extent to which the subject matter of history 
is amenable to the making of generalizations and to the general inductive 
method: 
"One answer to these questions boldlystates tha.,t the subject matter of history is amenable to ordinary inductive treatment. History admittedly differs from science in that it has to do with different objects; never-theless these objects can be generalized about, the behaviour of abother such object. And, if sufficient generalizations are made on a wide enough scale, why should not the body of sucl1 generaliz tions be called a science? Historians have been doing the spade-work for such a science for hundreds of years: n?w allthat is necessary is to gather together the information they have collected and throw it into the form of laws. 
" ••• an alternative view is presented. According to this we are asked to accept the diversity between the subject matter of history and the sciences,~and to realize that the nature of history will not permit the formulation of laws in the scientific sense of the term, namely'by 
·means of correlations observed to hold in experience. Nevertheless, it is possible to grasp the meaning of an historica .. l entity· like a civilization, to 'understand it, by means of historical insight, which rep~esents the faculty of the historian for penetrating into the objects of his study, and fo~ coming to know the 'principle of development' of a nation, social 
movement, or class." 21 , , " ) ,. .. 
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Professor K.R.Popper, Professor C.G.Hempel and P.L.Gardiner, 
amongst others, have put fort·1ard the theory that explanation is achieved 
1
solely by means of bringing that which is to be. explained under a general 
law, so that explanation oan be taken to be prediction back to front. Thus 
Popper states: 
"To give a causal·explanation of a certain event means .,,__ 
to derive deductively a statement (it will be called a prognosis}--
which describes ~_hat event 7 using as premises of the deduction " 
some universal laws together with certain singular or specific 
sentences which we may call initial conditionso The initial 
condition (or more precisely, the situation described by them) 
are usually spoken of as the cause of the event in question, and 
the prognosis (or rather, the event described by the prognosis) 
as the effect •••• "22 
This statement that explanation should be achieved through means of 
covering laws may be seen to be in contradiction with the frequently made 
statement that aach historical event is u.Jtique: 
l 
" ••• history is different in that it seeks to seeks to describe 
and explain what actually happened in allits concrete detail. 
It therefore follows a priori that since laws govern classes o.~ 
types of things, and historical events are uni~ue, it is not possible 
for the historian to explain his subject-matter by means of covering 
la1-J"s. If he is to understand it at.all, it will have to be by some 
kind of special insight into particular connexions."23 
One might attempt to formulate the problem in terms of agreeing that 
while individuals may be seen as unique beings, they will find themselves 
in reoccuring situations. Patterns of behaviour will therefore emerge, 
since in any given situation the variety of courses open to the individual 
being faced by that situation are limited. Given a defined situation, 
one may be able therefore to predict the possible courses of ac~,/ion 
available to that individual. As an example, if one had undertaken a 
period of observation of plumbers in action one should be able to 
predict the likely courses of action open to a plumber when faced by a 
leaky pipe. 
One should deal, before moving on further, with the extent to which 
individuals can be considered as involved in these decision-making processes. 
The elements of a decision include, as we have noted before, the values 
and beliefs of the person making a decision and the system of reasoning 
by which the individual attempts to adjust the situation so that his 
values and beliefs are given effect, ... to. To take the question of the 
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value-belief system held by the individual, it would not be entirely 
correct to state that an individual's valu~s and beliefs are derived 
from the individual searching 'within himself' to a~rive at these viltles 
and beliefs. It would be more correct to state tliat a person's value-
belief system is derived from the accumulated experience of the person •·s 
pattern of social relationships. For example, ·a person's moral beliefs · 
and behaviour pattern tvill derive from the moral precepts taught to t.hat . 
person as a child, his observation and experience, his existence with-,, 
in a group and the social pressures exerted on the individual who does 
not conform to the group concept of the normal behaviour pattern. The 
concepts of nationalism and national culture in as far as they have mean-
ing provide useful adjuncts to this statement of the impact of the group 
~pon the individual through means of a national language, national press, 
radio-and television syst~ms, national education systems, religion and 
a host of other means by which the individual comes to look at the world 
· in terms of the state within which he lives rather than as a single, 
" ' 
untainted entity. 
The system of reasoning by which the individual attempts to give 
reality to his value and helief system in the world around cannot be 
taken to be entirely unrelated to the community from which the individual 
springs. One. may take as the justification for this statement the 
definition of reasoned thought as the application of. knowledge to the 
solution of a problem which faces the individual. This knowledge we 
make take to be the accumulated memories of past situations in which 
the individual found himself and the results of these situations in 
terms of the solutions which the individual had previously _applied. 
The above is not intended to deny.the existence of the individual 
personality, since for each individual there will be a unique pattern of 
"'"~ 
interacting social rel.at ionships, and there will be varying degrees of 
i~~~lligence, or.,the abilityto apply the lessons learned, and aptitudes 
in mental and physical equipment. But it is to say that the strands 
of the individuals personality can be related to the community· in which the 
individual lives and that the existence of the individual personality is 
no insuperable barrier to the formulation of generalised statements 
about human situations, past, present or future. 
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Such generalised statements are made in historical study, as for instance 
when an attempt is made to relate the revulsion felt in Britain toward 
·" · the slaughter of the First World War to Chamberlain's attitude toward 
the Gex•man problem in the 1930's•" The attempt may even be made to ar:range 
a series of generalised state~ents on human reactions in defined situations 
• 
into a unified theory of human activity within a defined area of iru,man 
endeavour. The creation of theoretical models of man's economic activity 
is one well established field of study. In the field o·f the inter-action 
between states, and especially in that of the question of arms races, 
conflict and deterrence in the neuclear.age, a great deal of work has 
been produced. One of the pioneers of this field, Lewis Richardson, 
attempted to apply his theories on conflict situations and arms races 
to the two arms races of 1908-1914 and 1929-1939 with varying degrees 
of sucoess.24 
It is a regretable necessity that we cannot take time to examine 
~ 
further the philosophical implications of the word 'because', together 
with the extent to which there exists an implicit reference to generali-
zations in all explanations. We can however agree that in each explan-
ation there is a reference to·an implicit or explicit generalization, 
which ought to be examined to test the validity of the explanation. 
While it is possible to state the existence of the individuality of the 
human personality and the uniqueness of historical events, this does not 
preclude the stating of generalised statements on the relationships 
between the individual and the community in which he lives and of the 
construction of theories of human behaviour ~f general application. We 
should however recognise the diffioul ties of the construction and 
application of theoretical structures to historical events. One such 
difficulty is the question of the selection and the availability of 
:aata. Another liesin the changing pattern of the kaleidoscope of the 
images that the actors in the historical situation will have of the 
other actors and of the situation itself. These images change and the 
theorist has to be able to recreate these images and incorporate them 
into the model. This p~oblem of the non-coincidence of images held 
inwardly-orientated organized groups has been termed by Kenneth Boulding 
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'the ~isunderstanding processes' , 35 and it is in this field that the 
,.._ .. 
empathy method of historical interpretation becomes important. ....._ 
The difficulties of applying models to human activity does not preclude 
the theoretical approach from beingAr a fruitful one for. gaining entry into 
differing levels of explanation from that offered by the more traditional 
one of concentrating upon the actions of the individual. The abi~ityto 
postulate generalised patterns of behaviour and to state the relation-
ship between the decision-making processes of the individual and the 
' 
community in which he lives raises the problem of the extent to which 
the individual can be considered t.o be exercising free will in decisions 
which he makes, and therefore our ability to make moral judgements on ., 
the individual in making certain decisions. Dr.Pieter Geyl has attacked 
A.J .P.Taylor for "•• .writing old-fashioned politi-cal history, from which 
it appears that the great.issues of the world are settled in Foreign 
26 Offices rather than in society at large". This brings the question to 
what extent is history the result of the interaction of the flowing 
"' 
streams within the societies of the world, and to what extent the formal 
decision-makers can alter the tide of events. Eden, having resigned from 
the Foreign Of-fioe and told Harold Nicholson that he did not wish to lead 
a revolt in the Conservative Party or to secure any resignations from 
the Cabinet, stated that: 
"(HE) would probably have done the same if he had been in Halifax's place. 'Only' he adds with a smile, 'I do not 
think that I would have put myself into Halifax's place.• He says that ~j is ve~y difficult to criticise· one link in the 
chain of events, when the whole chain is itself vicious." 27 
Could Eden have avoided the pitfalls, or are politicians merely -
tumbling curr~nts in the tide of historical forces? We must first examine 
the forces. Britain, after the very rapid industrial expansion in the --
early and middle parts of the nineteenth century, entered a period when 
industrial expansion began to slow down. Britain relied upon its trade 
with the underdeveloped countries and failed to keep up with the latest·· 
technical advances that were being spurred on in such other countries 
as Germany that had to export into themmore· complex and demanding market 
, I. ' 
of Europe. The impact of, i;he·,Imperial idea can therefore be seen as very . ~., .. 
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injurious to Britain, since there was a failure to invest in the develop-
ment of the technical advance of British industry. While people in 
Britain did save, this money was used to finance the development of 
• 
agricultural count-ri~s which did little to add to Britain's industrial 
oapaci ty. The result was a slowing do1"1~ of Britain's industrial growth 
and a decline in output per man. 28 Upon this declining economic position 
was placed the ~train of financi·ng a world-wide defense system and compet-' . 
r-1 ing with developing industrial powers, such as Germany, Japan and the 
United States in armaments whose developing technical innovation was 
leading to the~ rocketing of the costs of maintaining a modern defense 
system. Moreover, Britain was beginning to move into what Rostow has 
·termed the age of mass consumption, in which: 
" ••• real income per head rose to the point where a large number of persons gained a command over consumption which transcended basis food, shelter and clothing; and the structure of the working force changed in ways which_increased not only the proportion of urban to total population, but also the proportion of the population in offices or in skilled factory jobs - aware of and anxious to acquire the consumption fruits of a mature economy. 
"In addition to these economic changes, the society ceased to accept the further extention of modern technology as an overriding objective. It is in this post-maturity stage, for examplep that, through political process, the Western societies have chosen to allocate increased resources to social welfare and security. The emregence of the Welfare State is one manifestation of a society's moving beyond technical maturity; but it is also at this stage that resources tend increasingly to be directed to the production of consumers durables and to the ~ diffusion of services on a mass basis, if consumers sovereignty reigns. The sewing machine, the bicycle, and then the electric-powered household gadgets were gradually diffused." 29 
Thus Rostow can state that:" A good deal of American and Western European history sinoe about 1900, Japanese histrory since the 193o•s ••• can be told in terms of the problem of choice posed by the attainment of maturity and in terms of the different balances struck among these three objectives (military power, the welfare state and mass consumption), at different times." 30 
In a democratic country, such as Britain, the oho.ice will be made by 
consumers., the electorate; s-0- that Britain in· the. Twentieth Century . ' 
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moved more an~,. more into the age of the welfare state-and of mass 
' 
.,. 
. consumption. The/ burden of social welfare v-1as therefore added to the 
costs of defense, so that Britain was faced by a reoccurring series of 
economic crises, and so the need was felt to cut back on armaments at a 
time when Brit-ain was faced by potential enemies possessed of political 
i 
systems which enabled them to concentrel,te the fruits of the emergence into 
the age of technical maturity upon developing extensive armed ~orces 
equipped with modern weapons. · 
The peopl·e of Bri.tain, having recoiled from the horrors ·of the First 
World War which had resulted from Britain sending its first large scale 
~ "·· ' '. ' -
army to fight on the continent of Eu.rope {with the possible exception 
of Wellington's army sent against Napoleon), found themselves emerging 
into the delights of th,e age of mass consumption. Even those in Britain 
who were at the lowest end of the economic scale in Britain found that 
there were divertions to make bearable their otherwise pall.id existence, 
I 
as is made clear by George Orwell in his study of the English working 
classes, The Road to vlgan Pier: 
"A working man does not disintergrate under the strain of poverty 
as a middle-class persnn does. Take, for instance, the fact that the 
working class think nothing of getting married on the dole. It annoys the 
·old ladies in Brighton, but it is proof of their essential good sense; 
they realise that losing your job does not mean things in a distressed. 
areas are not as bad as they might be. Life is still ~airly normal, more 
normal than one really has the right to expect. Families are impoverished, but the family system has not broken up. The people are in effect living 
a reducred version of their destiny they have made things tolerable by 
lowering their standards. 
"But they don't necessarily lower their standards by cutting out 
luxuries and concentrating on necessities; more often than not it is 
the other way about~ the more natural way, if you come to think of it. Hence 
the fact that in a decade of unparalleled depression, the consumption 
of all cheap luxuries has increased. Th·e two things that have probably 
made the greatest difference of all are the movies and the mass pro-
duction of cheap smart clothes since the war ••• You may have three half-
pence in your pocket and not a prospect in the wor.ld, and only the corner 
o:r a leaky bedroom to go home to; but in your new -tlothes you can sta.,nd 
on the corner of a street, indulging in a private daydream of yourself 
'~s Clark Gable or Greta Garbo( which compenstates you a great deal. And 
even at home there is genercilly a cup of tea going - a 'nice cup of tea• 
and Father, who has been ou~ of work since 1929, is temporarily happy be-
cause he has a sure tip for the~Cesarewhich •• Even people on the verge of 
,, 
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can buy a few days hope ('Something to live for', as they. callit) ·by 
having a penny on the sweepstake ••• Of course the postwar development of 
. cheap luxuries has been a very fortunate thing for our rulers~ It is quite 
likely that fish and chips o o o the movies? ra,dio ~ strong tea a11d the football 
pools have between them averted revolutionoo(by) the quite natural 
inter-action between the manufacturervs need for a market and the need of 
half-straved people for cheap palliatives." 31 
With the age of mass consumption, England turned in upon itself and 
devoted its time t~ the exploration of the new worlds opened by the newly 
available means of transport. The image that one receives from the England 
of the Thirties is a sense of serenity epitomised by the tranquillity 
of the cricket mat'ches which attracted record crowds and the long queues 
waiting at the train stations to relax on the beaches at Bank Holidays. 
The great achievement of Baldwin as Prime Minister had been to maintain 
the unity of the English nation through the tria:is of the Ethiopian crisis 
and the abdication of Edward VIII, a cohesion which Chamberlain inherited. 
The majority of the people in Britain were moving forward on the wings of 
comfort and prosperity. Only the Marxist intellectual and the remaining 
areas of the nineteenth century industrial ghetto, (where, in the East 
End of Londo¥, South Wales and the industrial North an industrial 
proletariat··oould still be identified,) maintained a cosmic world sense 
of involvement. The remainder sank into the attractions of the English 
• 
weekend (which was not to be interrupted by the threat of Hitler), cricket 
and the silver screen. The English maintained a sympathy for the Chinese, 
~ 
the Abyssinians and the Spanish, and in most cases upheld the cause of the 
underdog, but this sympathy rarely went beyond words or scratched the calm 
interior beneath the bland exterior. English contact was kept with the 
. outside world by means of the Empire where the dusk;y peoples were kept in 
their place, while the stately ship continued serenely forward, suspicious 
as ever of those peoples across the English Channel~ David Thomson, 
in his study of England in the Twentieth Century,. has pointed to an 
incorrigible immobil:isme of society in the Thirties, a structural 
resistence to change and especially to any radical movement, while t~ 
inability to come to grips with the problems that faced Britain led to 
a sense of helplessness and d~ift. 
Q 
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The result was an escapist flavour to many of the most· fashionable 
pastimes; what appealed most was getting away from it all by means of 
-
-the Youth Hostels, But~ins holiday camps, football 'pools, the cinema, 
the radio and the motor car. 32 
..... ~ ···-
·. There ivere, however, many _organisations springing up in the 
Thirties to mobilise the sympathy that was felt for the.unemployed at 
home and the peoples abroad be1ng deprived of their freedome The left 
especially controlled powerful levers of public opinion, .especially 
the Left Book Club which generated and mobilised the existing and latent 
sympathy for oppressed peoples. There developed a cult of the working 
• 
man among the intellectuals of the middle class, and among the poets 
and novelists, which put forward the idea of the essential goodness 
. of the common man, with the adoption in literature of the language 
of the working classes. To the dissident members of the middle class 
wandering in the Waste Land, embarrassed by their middle class back-
grounds, the Soviet Union became the land of hope and -the common man 
the source of salvation. To J.M.Keynes the middle class rebels were 
the spiritual leaders of British politics: 
"There is no one in politics today worth sixpence 
outside the ranks of the Liberals, except the post-war generation of intellectual Communists under thirty-five. Perhaps in their feelings and instincts they are the 
nearest thing we have to the typical nervous nonconform-ist English gentleman who went to the crusades, made the 
reformation, fought the great rebellion, won our civil 
and religious liberties and humanized the working classes during th~"last century." 33 
In his study of Poetry and Politics in the Twentieth Century, 
. 1' 
C.M.Bowra, examines the position of the poets of protest: 
"In Great Britain there was no crisis comparable to 
what was ·happening elsewhere, and the opiates so skillfully 
administered by Bal_dwin in his years of power might seemed to have lulled the British public into a complacent indiff-
erence to the fa.te of the world. But it was just this 
advertised security which stung a young generation of poets 
of protest and complaint. They were in the first place 
moved by the social condition of their oivn country, where the d~smal acceptance of an outmoded system seemed·to offer no hope to a large part o.f'the population. 
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In t·his way they were p:eirs of a long tradition of British 
·radicalism which goes back to William Morris and Shelly and Mil tone But in the second place, the standards by tihich they judged their own country and found it wanting were relevent 
abroad 9 where in the rise of the Nazi~ the slaughter of the 
Vienna socialists by Dollfuss in 19349 the invasion of China by Japan~ and the Spanish civil war? deadly threats were 
manifest to the ·structure of free societies and the essential pre-requisits of a civilised life. Their ovvn poi-Jerful reactions to these new horrors came not from any fear of their own 
s~fety but from their outraged consciences and their innate 
sense of hum2 .. n wortho They were driven not by personal 
dangero o but by abstract beliefs v1hich meant a ·great deal to them. They suffered frorn not, being immediately engaged in the events 
of which they wrote, and perhaps for this very reason they felt that it was necessary to speak in a mare public and.more 
simple way than was natural to them." 34 
\ 
Thought the middle-class rebels may be taken as the spiritual 
vanguard of the,Left in Britain during the Thirties, their total impact 
upon was the Left was not as great as one would expect. While the cult 
of the common man was adopted, the intellectuals dwelt apart because 
their experience and arguments bore little relation to those of the 
common man, and did little more·· than spread a shimmering dialectical 
light upon the political scene. Orwell points with horror to what he 
considers the synthetic adoption of the ooll).Illon cause by the disaffected 
middle class conscience: 
"The first thing that must strike any outside observer is that Socialism in its developed form is a theory con-fined entirely to the middle clas~e~ ••• most middleclass 
socialits, ivhile theorectically pining for a·classless 
society, cling lik~-glue to their miserable fragments of 
social prestige ••• it must be remembered that a working man, 
so long as he remains a genuine working man, is seldom or 
never the c.omplete Socialist in the complete, logically 
consistent sense. Very likely he votes Labour, or even Communist if he gets the chance, but his conception of the Socialism is quite different from that of the book-trained Socialist higher up. To the ordinary t1orking man, the sort you would meet in any pub on Saturday night, Socialism does not 
mean mucl1 more than better v1ages and shorter hours a,nd 
nobody bossing you about ••• It may be said that even if the 
theoretical book-trained Socialist is not a working man himself, at least he is actuated by love of the ~1orking class. He is endeavouring to shed his bourge,ois status and fight 
op the side Of\ the proletariat - that, obviously, must be his motive. .. , ..... 
r . T'. ~ • 
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"But is it? I look at the Socialist - the intellectual, · .c·ft.':i· } · .. 
tract-writing type of Socialist, with his· pullover, his _ ... 1, •. -.<K 
fuzzy hair, and his MarJcist quotation - and wonder v1hat the 
d~vil his motive really iso It is often difLicult to believe 
~hat it is love of anybody I e·specially o:f the 1:Jorking clas.ses, 
from whom he is of all people the furthest removedo The under-
,, 
•,._. 
lying motive of many. Socia.lists, I believe, ··is simply a hypert~ophied 
sense of ordero The present state of affairs offends them not 
becaus~ it causes misery, still less because it makes free-
dom impossible,. but because it is untidy: what they desire 
basically is to reduce the world to somethir1g -resembling ~ 
chessboard ••• The truth is that, to many people calling 
themselves Socialists, revolution does not mean a movement of 
the masses with which they hope to associate themselves; it means 
a set of reforms which vweg, the clever ones, are going to 
impose upon 'them', the Lower Orders ••• A whole generation has 
grown up more or less in familiarity ·with the idea of Socialism; 
and yet the higher-water mark, so as to speak, of socialist 
writing is W.H.Auden, a sort of gutless Kipling, and the even 
feebler poets who are associated with him." 35 · 1 • 
Despite their intellectual slumming, the middle class intellectuals 
could not become a part of a true working class movement or understand 
-} 
the motives of the working class. This was due to the fact that the 
idealised proletarian of the socialist literature is a very rare creature; 
the majority of people are concerned with the details of living rather 
than fitting neatly into the slot allocated by the Socialist plan. The 
tradition of British labour is that of organised self-help through means 
of trade unions and co-operatives, while violence has play~d only a very 
minor role on the British political scheme. The result tended to be a 
love-ha~e complex behind the intelleotual's relationship with the allegedly 
down-trodden; the supposedly uncorruped side of the workers was placed on 
> the pedestal, but the desire of those same workers to alleviate their 
dreary lives with unpretentious pastimes, their insensitivity to the 
subtilties of the middle~class nature and their unwillingness to 
sacrifice themselves to the dialectic filled the Red proselytisers with 
dismay •••• if not with disgust. The workers elected their own leaders through 
:._ 
the trade unions who reflected their own desires and interests with the 
result that Bevi.n rat.her than Cripps represented the true character of 
the Left and the intellectuals of the extreme left were left to wander 
in their waste land. 
,:_.• 
I • . 
,,) 
· It would Ne difficult in the Thirties to talk of class warfare 
in Britain. Fdf the majority life was better than it had ever. been 
~(l 
$' 
~-;;~b,~fore, and those who were still .. suffering the rigours of unemployment I 
i 
were isolated in c.ertain· arears away from Britain in general; though 
reminders of the fate of the less fqrtunate were brought to the general 
attention by means of the Jarrow marchers, but this through the news 
media of the press, the radio and the cinema. Some have argued 
against the importance of the term class, or :its validity in the 
Twentieth Century. The concept of class-consciousness is important 
because people associate certain characteristics with certain classes, 
so that there exist a number of preconditioned images held within the 
society. The importance of class is on the stress on the differences, 
the incompatibility, of the different classes. It is this stress on 
the differences that leads to the conflicts and antagonisms assoc-
iated with class in Britain. One important distinction that the middle 
classes saw as dividing the working man from their betters (apart 
from keeping coal in the bath) was that the working classes smelt, 
upon which subject. Mr.Somerset Maugham gave us this: 
"In the West we are divided from our fellows by our 
sense of smell. The working man is our master, inclined 
to ~ule us with an iron hand, but it can~ot be denied 
that he stinks; none can wonder at it, for a bath in the dawn when you have to hurry to your work before the factory bell rings is no pleasant thing, nor does heavy labour tend, 
to sweetness; and you do not change your linen more than you 
can help when the week's washing must be done by a sharp-
tongued wife. I do not blame the working ma~ because he stinks, but stink he does. It makes social intercourse difficult 
----- ~. -to persens of sensitive nostril. The matutinal tub divides 36 the classes more effectively than birth, wealth or education." 
Orwell describe~ in greater detail the operation of the images 
that acted to divide Britain: 
"It is probably true that class-feeling is for the moment-· 
a little less bitter than it was*. The working classes are 
submissive where they used to be openly hostile, and the post-
war manufacture of cheap clothes and the general softening 
of manners have toned down the surface differences between 
class and,class. Every middle class person has a dormant 
class-prejudice whidh ·n~ds only a small thing to arouse it; 
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and if he is over forty he probably has the firm conviction 
that his own class has been sacrificed to the class below. 
Suggest to the average unthinking person of gentle birth who 
is struggling to keep up appearances on four or five 4undred 
a year that he is·a member of a para~titic exploiting class, 
and he ir1ill think you are mad a in perfect sincerity he will 
point out a dozen ways in which he is worse-off than a work:ing 
man. In his eyes the workers are not a submerged race of slaves, 
but are a sinister flood creeping upwards to engulf himself and 
his friends and family and all decency out of existence. Hence 
that queer watchful anxiety lest the working classes shall grow 
too prosperous." 37 
* This was first published in 1937. 
With their economic position becoming gradually undermined by 
creeping inflation, the lower middle classes became intensely conser-
vative and opposed to any radical changes for fear that any change 
would further act to weaken their economic position. Those who wished 
to raise the clari·on call of opposition to the growth of fascism in 
Britain and throughout the world found that the majority of the 
British were unresponsive~ Any attempt to found some form of national 
party to combat fascism ran into the hurdle of class emnity that 
~-
remained tfrom the Gene1'al Strike and the hunger marches and into the 
constricting hand that party politics placed upon political leaders in 
Britain and upon personal conflicts. Eu.gen Spier, who was concerned with· 
the organising of Focus (an association for the defense of freedom and 
peace to concentrate anti-fascist feeling), relates the difficulties 
of getting people of different political persausion onto the same 
platform: 
"But when it came to getting public support we discovered 
that most of those who had expressed their agreement with us,.· -
drew a sharp distinction between their personal views and an 
official statement with which they would be prepared to be 
publically associated, Such an association might lead people 
to believe that these were the views of the party or assoc-
iation to which they belonged. So we were compelled to accept 
the fact that we,oould hot obtain a binding commitment to. 
co-operate publically even after a satisfactory initial meeting 
in private, and that the matter had always to be referred to 
the party or association ••• Our future associates wholeheartedly 
approved our aims, but were by no means prepared to appear with 
each other on a public platforrno There was fol"' instance the great 
difficulty of getting Sir Walter Citran,e to appear together with 
Churchill, mainly on account of their differences during the 
General Strike, and even to get· them to meet inforn1ally to 
---· - ............ "'.'"-··· ---,,-..... -... ,,.~--··-"·~~-~·-·----·- ---- ·-·····-·· .. . 
I 
!' / -· 
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·~-.t 
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discuss the matter needed the upm·ost_ patience." 38 
Those prepared to take positive aotion against the growth of 
' fa$cism, small in number and divided by party lines, could do little 
', 
.. 
to shatter the introspection of the British nation. The doctrines 
of the League of Nations were coming into disrepute; the desire in 
Conservative Party was to move away from the commitments to Europe 
' and to revert to the position of Victorian England, which conjured 
_up a glowing picture of solidarity, of freedom from the troubles of 
I Europe. Anti-ltu,ssian to the core, the Soviet threat to capitalism 
and suspicion of the lower classes became merged into an uneasy 
concern that their way of life was under seige. Harold Nicholson 
0 commented on the motives of the Conservative Party: 
"• ••• my own party has behaved ··1ike worms and kissed 
the Chamberlain boot with a resounding smack ••• all the 
Tories and die-hards are hugging themselves at having got'rid of all the nonesensical notions of the past and 
at having got back to good 01,rrory doctrines •• 
"We havelost our will poive~ since our will power is 
divided. People of the governing classes tl1ink only of 
their own fortunes, which means hatred of the reds. This 
creates a perfectly artificial but at present most effective 
secret bond between ourselves and,Hitler. Our class interests 
on both sides cut across our national interests." 39 
th(\ 
We can, from the discussion above, put forward the case that the 
British political leaders were caught in forces whic.h made the policies 
, they adopted inevitable. Britain's economic position would not allow 
Britain to rearm,·wi-th sufficient speed to meet the three-pronged 
threat from G·ermany, Japan and Italy. Face~ with this threat there 
was no alternative but to attempt to placate the revisionist states 
until such time as Britain's military power had developed to allow 
her to seoure the defense of the British strategic position. The great 
majority of the British people wanted the allocation uf the resources 
of the country to be directed toward social welfare and economic 
stability, while the sentiment of the country wa~ against involvement 
in the storms that were brewing on the continent of Europe. The advent 
of the Spanish civil war and· i t·s inter-miming into the class divisions 
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of Britain saw the possibility·;_of Britain being split in two at a time 
:f• 
when cohesion was essential. ·while the Conservative Party controlled · 
the levers of poiver, the Left controlled many powe~ful instruments for 
stirring public opinion, especially on the Spanish problem, where the 
I. 
issues could be represented in terms of an heroic : people st·riving for 
freedom from the machinations of inter-national fascism. To effset 
the growing public opinion among the lower classes and dissident 
middle-class in favour of the Republican cause, it t"las necessary to 
~~intain the almost impotent structure of the Non-Intervention 
Committee (which lived up_ to its name by intervening as little as 
,• 
possible in the questiqn of 'volunteers' in Spain),:_\O that the. British 
decision-makers could maiij~ain their freedom of movement in negotiating 
with Italy and Germany. 
The modified version of Modelski 1 s model of the international 
reaction to an internal war that we adopted, posed the possible 
choices of policies open to an external power as follows: 
(1) helping the weaker party. 
(2) helping.the stronger party. 
... . ·, 
(3) mediating between the primary parties to the internal war. 
(4) mediating between those external actors that had become involved 
in the internal war. 
For Britain, the policies that would have to be adopted, would have to 
be mediation between those states that haa become involved in the 
internal war in order to prevent the development of a new trouble spot· 
in l1u.rope, .and, as the logical corollary of this policy, an attempt to 
bring to and end the internal war itself by arriving at an compromise 
peace through mediation. Though Spain did represent an important 
strategic stake in European power politics, Britain could undertake 
this policy confident that whichever side in the internal war emerged 
victorious in the internal war, the Spanish need for British capital 
, 
in the period of reconstruction that would have to follow the conclus-
ion of the war, and the need for such a period of recon,struction 1 
would ensure that the victor would not do anything to damage Britain's 
defensive position. .. , .. ' 
. . ···- .. 
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If one concludes that it is correct to take a determinist 
__ position toward the formulation of British policy and that the 
decision-makers were in fact not able to divert the tide of events 
··1 in which they found themselves' can one ··advance any moral judgements 
as to the nature of the policies put forward by British decision-
makers in the Thirties? Should not rather say that it was not the 
decision-makers that ca~sed morally undesirable outcomes of inter- ···· . 
. national problems, i~1 ·spain, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, but facts .. I... 
. '. 
• \¥° 
and forces over whic'h;they had little control? If one should want 
to indulge one's outraged conscience, should one not point ····.:a finger 
at the immoral times in which those statesmen lived? Were Baldwin 
or Chamberlain to blame, or the uncaring peoples ·who had elected 
them? Could not Chamberlain, heir to the political dynasty of 
\. 
• 
Joseph Chamberlain and the leadership of the Birmingham political sceme, 
echo these words?: 
_"The ex-King said, Yon star's indifference '· 
Fills me with fear I'll be left to my fate: 
I needn't think I have escaped my duty, 
For hard it is to~keepYrom being king 
When it's in you and in the situ~tion. 
Witness how hard it was for Julius Caeser. 
He could'nt keep himself from being king 
He.had to be stopped by the sword of Brutus. Only less hard was it for Washington. 
My crown shall overtake me, you will see, 
It will come rolling after us like a hoop". 40 
It would, however, be a mistake to take the view that the policy 
of appeasement was merely a reaction on the part of British statesmen 
to the military and economic weaknesses of Britain in the face of the 
challenge offered by Japan, Germany and Italy. Appeasement had its roots 
in a positive desire to contribute to the peace of the world by mit-
igating the sources of conflict and aohieveing a more ordered internation-
al society. The constructive elements of appeasement are most clearly 
to be seen in attempts of Eden to bring into existence a comprehensive 
f scheme for the achievement of a lasting European peace. This scheme 
Eden revealed to Harold Nicholson in February 1936. Eden stated that 
his aim was to-avert another German war, and that to do this he was 
prepared to make great consesei9ns to the German appetite provided 
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that the Germans were prepared to sign·· a disarmament tre1It-y and to join 
the League of N9-tions. His idea was to work for this for the next three 
·· years and then to put it before the Le.ague. Nicholson commented in 
his diary that he was all in favour of such a farsighted pla~, •. 41 
The cl?m that the policy of appeasement was determined by the 
military-strategic position of Britain overlooks the extent to which 
Britain's position was the result of deliberate choice~rmade by the 
decision-makers in London, flowing from a political view of the world 
-, which helped to structure Britain's military posture. To say that 
·British policy toward the Dictators was determined by the strategic 
balance in Europe and t·he Far East must be dependent upon an examination 
of Britain's military policies and especially in the re~ctions to the 
rearmament programmes of Germany, Italy and Japan. One must ask more 
speci_fically vJhether the rearmament programmes adopte<¥by Britain were ... 
,.;.. 
intended to allow Britain to lay claim to a greater voice in the councils 
of Europe and to-provide a military force on the basis of which Britain 
could intervene to shape the tide of European history. 
Aircraft were recognised~ even in Britain, as .constituting a 
weapon that brought new and unparalleled dangers to the civilian 
populations of belligerent countries. Therefore A.J.P.Taylor has 
pointed to the importance of the universal belief that there was no defence 
against attack from the air: 
"Baldwin expressed this when he stated: 'The bomber 
-will always get through'. It was expected that every great 
city would be levelled to the ground immediately on the 
outbreak: of ·war; and the British Government, acting on this 
assumption, made preparations for more casualties in London 
alone duri~ng the first week: of war than in fact the entire British people suffered during five long years. The only 
ansi.,1er was supposed to be 0 the deterrent' - a bomber-force 
as large as the enemieso Neither Great Britain nor France claimed to posses such a force in 1936 or even in 1939: hence, in large part, .~he timidity of their statemen." 42 
Qne could, ·with justification, take issue with ·,Taylor on the question "v-~~ 
of whether it was the lack .. of e.,-deterrent which led to the timidity of 
) 
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--·British~ policy' or whethe;r it was the timidity of British Policy that 
led to the lack of a deterrent. One could .also quarrel with Taylor• s 
-~ 
statement-\t_hat the 'deterrent' was the universally accept - answer 
.. 
t"o the air threat, and his later statement that fighter aircraft 
despised in Britain before the war.43 W~ shall pass on later to 
consider these points i~. greater detail. 
In th_e period while Baldwin remained Prime Minister, it would seem 
to be more true to speak of myopia rather than timidity, of a chronic 
inability to perceive the nature and extent of the ·threat that was 
offerred by Germany. Denis Richards, in his study of the Royal Air Force, 
makes the following observations on the lack of urgency with which 
Britain, under Baldwin, re-acted to the· German rea.rmament programme. 
"How had it come about that a country· tffat, in 1937 
was still considerably stronger·than Germany in the air, 
should contempate surrendering any ti~le of that advantage 
within two years? There were many reasons. Economy was only 
beginning to loosen its stranglehold; th§ country was 
gravely divided on the need :for arms; the Government felt it 
impolitic to speak too frankly about Germany; the Air Staff 
i tsel:f, while strongly in favour of expansion, was all. against 
a hothouse or mushroom growth which, by piling up reserves 
of outdated aircraft and swamping skilled men with novices, would 
destroy the efficiency of the service.. But fundementally all 
these reasons reduced themselves to one·- that the Nazi 
threat to European peace, though apprehended_ in a gene.ral wa,y, 
"\ 
was not yet recognised in'·its true and terrible terms. This 
led to a sense of time, if limited time, in hand: a sense 
of urgency, but not of immediate and over-powering urgency. 
In consequence the Government, fairly reflecting the opinion 
of the country (which it made little attempt to educate) was 
at this stage prepared to take only those measures which would_ 
not upset the peacetime basis of ind.ust~y and trade -
measures which would still leave freedom in the factories, goods 
in the home, and cash in the pocket. The Germans were able 
to expand their Air Force and aircraft industry so rapidly 
because their rulers ·had adopted an appropriate and very 
different formula; guns before butter, with us, until the 
direst hour of danger, it was butter, butter all the way.n45 
One result of the lack of a sense of immediate urgency was that 
the Englishman did not forbear, even in the face of National Socialism, 
from his natural predilection for the preservation of wild-life, even 
at the price of progress, WLthout pangs of remorse: 
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motto for business,, the landowner and the farmer could fairly 
claim its application to their industryo The result ~as that 
the Air Ministrytts proposa .. ls for new airfields, schools and·· 
camps met vJi th constant opposition in the countrysideo Air gunnery and bombing ranges were especially unpopular 9 for even if by some miracle of human selection lighted on a spot at once 
suited to the purpose and void of human haunt and habitation, 
voices t-Jere rarely lacking to defend the rights of the local 
wild fowlo In one case a colony of swans was held to be 
threatenedp but fortunately the birdsp when their supporters lost the day 9 rapidly adjusted to their new and noisier 
surroundingso Indeed, as Sir Philip Sasson pointed out when introudcing the Air Estimated in 1937, the bird difficulty was 
apparently two=fold: either they might be driven away from 
sanctuaries where it was hoped to preserve them, or else they 
might be driven away from coverts where it was hoped to destroy 
them" 45 
As Baldwin mo;ed toward the end of his term as Premier, weakening 
health reinforced a natural aversion to foreign affairs, while the problems 
posed by Mrs.Simpson occupied most of Baldwin's time. Aware of the weak-
ening mood of the Government to the problems of defense of Britain, 
- -
a parliamentary deputation and its military advisors called on Baldwin ~ 
and Inskip {The Minister for the Coordination of Defense) at the end of 
1936, and consisted of Lord Salisbury, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Churchill 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes, Marshal of the Air Force Lord Trenchard 
and Field Marshal Lord Milne. 
The Prime Minister merely sat in at the meeting, while Inskip assurred 
the deputation that everything possible w!s being done for the defense 
' 
of the country without causing public alarm and despondency or upsetting 
industry. "The emphasis on these last words meant all the difference 
between peril and security. The deputation went morosely away." 46 
With the advent of Chamberlain as Prime Minister there can be seen 
to have developed a more incisive reaction to the problems of British 
.. defense, though it must be reiterated that it would be a mistake to draw 
too much of a dividing line between the administrations of Baldwin and 
Chamberlain. Chamberlain had exerted a very powerful influence upon the 
development of :British :foreign poli·cy even before becoming Premier: acting 
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as heir-apparant in the latter years of administration, and, more 
I 
specifically, being the chief architect of the 1936 and 1937 Defense 
White Papers while Chancellor of the Exchequer. 47 Ho11ever, while the 
Chamberlain era showed a greater awareness of the dan~ers that faced 
- 1'" 
., • :Britain arising from the re-establishment of German military power in 
.,,~).al:!,' ,,•,~:, ,:,,.-- _.,.· 
', Central Europe, British rearmament policy was shaped strongly by a 
political view of the role that Britain shoul.d play in the affairs of 
Europe. British rearmament was directed toward the safeguarding of the 
.. British islands rather than providing substance to underpin British 
foreign policy toward Europe. 
The political policy that did so much to shape the rearmament 
programme of Britain was that Britain had only "limited liability" 
for the events that occurred on the European mainland. By ~his policy 
it was felt that Britain should remain aloof from making binding commit-
merits on the Continent, and would become in the event of war the 
organiser and money-lender for alliance against the aggressor. The 
main concern of the British decision-makers became to attemptc~o prevent 
Britain being knocked out quickly by the German bomber fleet; once 
Britain had weathered this initial storm, it was felt that she would be 
able to bring into play her traditional weapons and what were felt t.o be 
her greatest assets: her financial reserves, her Imperial connections 
and the Royal Navy. This policy reflected a general desire to return to 
sound Tory principles and move away from the novel and dangerous League 
policy that had a rank radical odour to mahy in the Conservative Party; 
and also a desire to avoid what many felt was the gross and ghastly 
mistake of Britain forsaking the 
army to tirht on European soil. 
December 29, 1937, that: 
bosom of the sea to se~d a large sca1e. 
·< .• •~_C-~j•~::v+-,''r'''<•····- - •-•-·-
( 
Ironside recorded in his- diary on 
"The cabinet, in a muddled way, are terrified of making an Expeditionary Force. They reason that if they have such a force they may be forced to send·it to the Europe once more. They dread a Continental commitment such as we had, and hon-
oured, in 1914. I don't blame them, for France will scream launder than ever for help in the next crisis. Belgium will 
shout equally loudly. Once we are landed, our commitment is limitless. vJiih our good faith it is always ahead of expectancy 
-372- I / 
,,._ 
r 
'11, 
- ' 
- ,. 
~: 
=~~ ,• =• -·-.. -
.;;· -··· ......... 
l 
l 
l j 
,J·· 
· .... , ,. ... 
-~----· 
r .. I ~ ,L 
by our ally. They only wish to get us committed, and then 
we are harnessed to the cart driven by them. Our contribution 
outside an Expedi tio·nary Force is never considered. Out of 
sight out of mindi is particularly applicable to a people 
come to such straits as France todayo 
"The cabinet noU\J think:s that the Air Force can finish the 
oaqipagn. They are terrifie·d now of war being finished in a 
few weeks by the annihilation of Great Britain. They can see 
no other kind of danger than air attack and.discount all other 
dangers •••• " 48 
',.<i) 
· This policy of limited liability, according to Eden, was n~ver a 
viable one, and would depend upon a massive development of the Royal 
Air Force: 
"Neville Chamberlain and the majority of Ministers shared 
what was certainly a popular view at the tin:e, that we could 
support our allies eff'ectively on a basis of limited liability 
This was probably never true, for psychological as well as 
military reasons, It was only rational if our contribution in 
the air could be ·dominant over Germany's, of which.there was 
by this time no hope in a war within the next few years." 49 
-It was true that under Chamberlain the Air Force did receive l)ri.or.i t'.y 
for the allocation of resources over the army, together with co.astal 
defences, as Ironside recorded in February, 1938: 
"The Air Defences of Great Britain was absorbine all the money 
which was intended for the field Force. The Air Ministry 
dictates what it wants and the Army Estimates bear the cost ••• 
We have no control financia.lly. Then the Navy are callingfor 
Coast Defense to be put in order. They call the tune there." 5o 
The critical words are "the air defense of Great Britain and 
coastal defense. The development of the Air F·orce wa,s not directed 
toward increasing the offensive power of Britain, but rather the 
- I 
. ability to withstand the bomber fleet of Germahy. L0 rd Trenchard, 
Chief of the Air Staff, argued in a memorandum of May 1928 to the 
---\ 
Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on the War Objective of the Air Force that 
the ~uture role of-the Air Force should be an offensive bne, based on 
heavy bombers, and directed against the enemy's mea~s of producing 
the means of waging war: 
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" ••• air ctttaoks will be directed agaiiltst any objective ' 
' which will contribute effectively toward the destruction of the e.nemy.'s means of resistance •••• 
"To attack the armed forces is ••• to attack the enemy at his strongest pointo On the other hand, by attacking the sources from which these armed forces are maintained infin-) ..... itely more effect is obta,inedo In the course of a few days ;r'.i?attack upon tl1e aerodrornes of the enemy perhaps 50 aeroplanes could be destroyed; whereas a modern industrial state will produce a 100 in a day = a11cl produc·tion \rJill far more than replace any destruction 1,iTe ca.,n hope to do i11 the :forward zone. On the other hand, by attr~cking the enerny' s factories their output is reduced by a much greater proportion." 51 
Following upon the growing awareness in 1935· that Germany had 
reached parity with Britain in aircraft, and Baldwin's admission 
to Parliament in May of that year and his Government had miscalculated 
as to the rate of German rearmament, the Cabinet appointed an Air 
Parity Committee under Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, who, on 7th June, 1935, became the Secretary of State for Air. From the deliberations !• 
of this Committee emerged two plans for the expansion of the air force 
schemes C and F. However, as the Abysssinian affair made clear the· 
need for heavy bombers and further information made it evident that~ 
Scheme F would not be sufficient to obtain parity with Germany in the 
air, several new plans were put forward {which also had to take into 
account the lack of trained workers, the inadequate capacity of the 
new shadow factories and the lack of trained air crews.) Finally 
in Scheme J which was put io the Cabinet in October, 1937, the Air {,1 
'k/ Ministry decided that it had to have a bomber force equipped with 
new heavy bombers in accordance with the strategic doctrine that only 1, 
an offensive force with a greater bomb capacity than the German's _pould 
win the war for Bri t·ain. The emphasis in this plan was upon Bomber 
Command which was to be increased to 90 squadrons (1,442 aircraft):, / 
According to Eden it v1as estimated that th~ Germans in 1939 would 
have .a bomber force of 1,500 aircraft, while the most favourable 
"' ( estimate of British strength based on the ·then existent plan woul'd.have 
· 52 been 1,000. A most important ·aspect of the plan was :that the bomber 
aircraft would have become progressively larger - Whitleys, Hampdens 
·and Wellingtons - which would have been repl:ced in turn by new aircraft 
in 1943. 
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However Sir Thomas Inskip refused to put forward these ._increases,. 
-
and demanded that the sum to be allocated to Scheme J should not be 
increased by more than t.110 million, and t
1
hat the sa~ing should be 
made by limtting increases in overseas air strength and·by a drastic 
· .... 
reduction in the proposed strength of Bomber Command: 
"The point I want to put before you, therefore, is 
whether you can~devise a revised programme based on the 
conception that at the outset of war our first task is to 
repulse a knock=out blow within the first few weeks, tru~t~ 
ing thereafter to defeat the enemy by a process of exhaust-
ion, resulting from our command of the sea, in the latter 
stages." 53 
Once the initial attack had been beaten off, according to Inskip, 
Britain's inherent strength would tell: 
"If Germany is to win, she must knock us out wi.thin a 
comparatively short time owing to our superior staying power."~4 
Priority was therefore to be given to fighter aircraft, while 
bombers were to be reduced in numbers and the emphasis was to be placed 
upon medium and light bombers. Despite protests from the Foreign Office, 
the Cabinet accepted Inskip's viewpoint and on 22nd December, 1937 
decided that the whole increase should be reduced to £100 million. 
The Air Staff made elaborate calculations as to the wastage that would 
occur if Germany tried to know out Britain at the beginning of the war, 
and estimated that Britain wuuld be left with only nine weeks reserves, 
a small training establishment and a war potentia~ that would not be 
in full production until after many months of war: 
"It appeared probable that there wou*d be a period ___ when 
·- -=-the Air Force would come to a standstill owing to lack of 
reserves and the war potential would be consequently useless ( since the war would have been lost) if it were n-ot destroyed ... 55 
-
.', 
Scheme J had included in its arguments a reference to the advice 
of Lord Grey in 1912 on the position created by German military strength: 
"You must not rely ent·irely on your foreign policy to 
protect the United Kingdom. That is to say, if you let your 
margin of naval strength fall below that which may be brought 
to bear on you rapidly 9 you are setting foreign policy a 
task which you ought not to set it. The risk of an attack 
on the United Kingdom stronger in force than we could meet 
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with the ships we keep in Home Waters is not one to be settled by diplomacy." 56 
\:,.;.,. Vansittart told Eden in discussion of the .Air Ministry's paper: 
··, "There is not a man among us who does not feel that foreign policy cannot continue on our present basis of mateltial strength. Lord Grey is rightly quoted, and nothing on earth can ever alter that truth. None the less, day by day the Foreign Office is ·tacitly eJCpected to live in the teeth of that 1µ1a1terable dictum, and is 
criticised for obvious inability to do the impossibleoo@•I feel that you ought to point out to the Cabinet that it is becoming steadily more perilous to disregard the wisdom of Lord Grey. I have pointed 
out that on many occasions. from the beginning of 1934 th.~t nothing can be guaranteed in Europe from the end of 1937. 
'!The moral is that the present scheme of the Air Ministry 
represents a rock-bottom minimum. Even so we .shall be two whole years behind Germany ••• Of co~rse you,-will be told that the Foreign Ministry can help and must by lowering tension ••• The Foreign Office may well agree to pass a sponge over the past, if we get the Air lJij.nistry's present proposals and get them quickly. This time we 
should be in ernest against a day's unnecessary for we shall still have to live through four frightfully dangerous years. I only hope this programme will be discussed and accepted at once. n' 57 
The significance of the shape being given to the British military 
posture was evident to the French. Daladier, the President of the Council 
of France, attempted in his meeting with Chamberlain in November, 1938, 
to persuade Cham~erlain to shift the emphasis in British rearmament 
away from anti-aircraft defense towards the offensive role of bombers.58 
The meaning of ~he Chamberlain line bears a marked parallel to that of Jt 
the policy that was implemented by Stalin after the purges of 1937. 
The important factor in this case was the modification of the strat-
egic line which shifted the emphasis from the offensive bomber to the 
> defensive fighter, a shift which may be interpreted as a reflection 
of a reneral move to isolationist policy on the part of Stalinist ~ 
Russia in this period, and a move away from the policy of collective 
security, since, by the shift in the strategic line, the Soviet Europe 
··~ 
would have been able to render less aid to the countries of Europe 
against German aggression.59 Similarly, the emphasis by Chamberlain 
-376-
·~-
... ;.------ - ·' ... -
.·-·.. 
··.~ 
,,' 
• q 
-,;: - :'-.:.;;;..._ - j 
• 
.-,, ..... 
and his group upon fighter aircraft, and anti-aircraft defenses may be 
\ taken as a function of the political policy of insisting that Britain 
had only limited liability for the even_ts- that could occur upon the 
European mainland, and it would be, thus, incorrect to state that the, 
. ti ... : . 
political policies implemented.by Chamberlain were entirely determined 
by the military position in ii!hich Britain found 'herself in the second 
half of the 1930's. This 1r1as made clear in the discussions between 
Chamberlain and Eden on the Air Ministry's paper: 
"Had a talk with N .c. this morning about_ rearmament based 
on the air force paper. Told him of my conviction that 
rearmament must go faster, and that we should buy from aborad if necessary. I knew that some of my colleagues thought that we 
at the Foreign Office were insufficiently insistent in our 
efforts to improve relations with dicator powers. This, however, 
v1as not the true position. Unless it were known that we-t-v'ere 
rearming effectively, our efforts in international sphere 
today were useless. In this connection I emphasisied the Grey 
quotation •• N.C. did not, I think, share my view and clearly 
had the financial position much in mind. I maintained that 
good financial position trJould b-e:~·small consolation to us if 
London were laid flat because our Air Force had been insufficient. 
N.C. thought this was today too alarmist a view, Despite'the 
darkening international outlook, which he admitted, he did not 
think anybody was going to attack us for the next two yea56. It was necessary to follow a very cautious foreign policy." 
While Eden complained that Britain's proposed bomber strength would 
not give British diplomacy much chance in 1938 {as in a sense it was 
not intended to), the Regular Army sunk into the depths of unpreparedness. 
This c~p, in part, be exylained by the traditional and inherently 
conservative nature of the British Army. The plans of the General Staff 
were, according to Liddell Hart, to reproduce the army of 1914, that 
" is to base the army upon i~fantry rather than upon mechanised forces. 
\. In the army estimates of 1937, the bulk of the newly available money was 
devoted to the re-equipment of infantry divisions,·, and in the allocation 
for new equipment barely a tenth went for all types of tracked vehicles. 61 
In a letter to Geoffrey Dawson on October 28th 1936, Liddell Hart w~ote; 
-. ~'Since my return to London I have been impressed, and 
depressed, by the prevel.ence of ~'military, opinion that the 
/ 
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War ·office is sinking into fresh stagnation, instead of accel-er~ting its pace; I am also struck by the contrast between the satisfaction, verging on complacency, which is expressed to me by most of the heads of Departments, and the increasing dis-satisfaction, verging on despair, which is expressSd by the . younger officers, the lieutenant-colonels and majors, 1A1orking in tho.se Departments. 
' .. 
"Their general view is that Deverell wants to get on with things, if he has a certain slowness in crystallising his in~enttons, but in that carrying these into effect he is handicapped by his own inexperience of the War Office, com-bined with the facto~ having a team of ·directors who, while quite ab1e, are essentially of static mind. Since his three military colleagues on the Army Council are also of the same kind, it becomes even more difficult for him to give momentum to the machine." 62 
As a result partly of this antipathyto mechanisation .on the part 
of many in the upper echelons of the Army command as a result of the 
~diverting of resources into the air defenses of Britain, the Army presented a woeful state. Ironside recorded in his diary in February, 1938: 
~'I don 1t wonder that our government is in a fluster over its military affairs after their years of neglect in the fact of so much warning •••• We have no continental commitment now. I told the Commander's Conference that our wretched little Corps of two divisions and a mobile division was unthinkable as a contribution to an Army in France. Nothing behind it either. Let us make Imperial plans only. After all, the ~oliticians will be heard put to it to refuse to help France and Belgium when the 1914 show begins again. There won't be any doubt about the Germans occupying the Channel ports this time ••• Belgium has once more declared her neutrality and has asked for protection from the great poivers. I see that our-people have been sitting in the Foreign Office discussing the6situation for hourse. They must all be in a terrible fright •••• " 3 
· 
Just over a month later Ironside was able to· :read the report on 
the state of rearmament in the Army: 
"It is truely the most appalling reading. How we .. can have come to this state_ is beyond believing: present situation: .. we can put into the field two divisions only, with an inconplete 
. quota of Corps t~oops, and deficient in many types of equipment 
· essential for warf~re under modern conditions." 64 
.. 
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This examination··· of the strategic policies of the 1930's and 
.'1 .--their relation to appeasement draws attentio~ to .. the dangers~ inherent 
' 
· in making such statements -'-as 'British po~icy to~1ard the Spanish Civil 
War ·was determined by the military wealmess o:f <Britain.' British 
policy toward Spain, under Chamberlain, was in fact more a reflection 
of a belief in (or rather, perhaps, a desire to achieve) the ability 
of Britain to keep its distance from the European storm centre and 
a limited interest on the part of Britain in tho.se events. Polio~· 
can be seen more as a gen~ral structuring of attitudes iii-thin. 
Britain rather than a question of military capabilities: the reaction 
to the Great War; the developing conservatism,and opposition to 
radical idea.s; and the involvement with the growing complexities of 
a consumer society and its attendent delights. But while the tide of 
introspection-flowed strong in Britain, the powerful levers that the 
proselytisers of the Socialist ethic could use upon public opinion, 
together with the tendency of people in Britain to see the world around 
themselves in class terms, meant that Brit.i~,h decision-makers had to 
avoid enflaming further the acute case of stricken conscience with 
which: the majority ~f British people viewed the struggle in Spain. 
British decision-makers felt that they were able to view with ., 
,.-, F ·,~ 
equanimity the outcome of the struggle in Spain, sure in the knowledge 
that whichever side were to emerge victorious, the victor would need 
British capital to rebuild the shattered body of Spain. In this they 
were correct. Germany and Italy who had supported Franco to victory 
'l found that they were suckling a very strong-willed infant. In an 
interview Between Hitler and Count Ciano in September of 1940, the future 
role of Spain was discussed. Hitler told Ciano that the Spanish price 
for entering the war on the Axil? side .. hc+d b~en that Germany was to 
deliver 400,000-700,000 ~~ns of grain, all fuel, all equipment lacking 
in the army, put up artillery, planes and special troops for the 
assault on Gibralter, hand over Morocco and Oran to Spain, while 
• I) 
..:h•••• •. Spain in return wuuld promise her friendship. Hitler commented: 
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" ••• Ge~many, on the basis of experiences during the Civil War, 
was clear about the fact that one could not make progres~ with 
the Spa11ish v1i thout quite concrete and detailed agreement so e •• It ir1aso ;o-necessary to talk: over very calmly for a fetv hours with 
the Duc-e the t-Jhole q1.iestion in the light of its usefulness and 
military signi:ficance 1 especially since the deliveries demanded 
of Germany would represent a great sacrifice, which after all 
could not be made only in return for the good graces of the Spanisho Thus far 1 at any rate 9 the Spanish had not yet held out 
the prospect of an equivilent o o oThe case would. certainly be c~ear if Spain would assume distinct obligationsooaThe agreements with Spain would only involve obligations for her partners and in practice v1ould have to be made good militarily by Gerrnany and Italy. The consequences would be very unpleasan-toohe was not convinced 
that Spain 'had the same capacity for giving as taking." 65 
At the subsequent meeting of Fr~nco and Hitler at Hendaye on October 
of that year, liitler's fears were confirmed as Franco refused to play 
the part cast for him by Hitler and instead of committing himself to 
a definite date for the entry of Spain into the war, insisted instead 
on Spain's need for economic and military aid. Of his nine hours fruit-
less and exasperating wrangle with Franco, Hitler told Mussolini: 
"Rather than go through that again, he would prefer to have two or 
66 three teeth taken out." 
To the extent that Chamberlain and Eden's judgements of the future 
role in European politics were correct, the Spanish Civil War may be 
seen as the ~continental sideshow', a fratricidal struggle that owed 
its roots to the historical development of Spain, belying the labels 
of fascism and communism that were placed on the two sides by outside 
observers. Karl Marx observed some ninety years ago that "There is no 
country except perhaps Turkey, so little known and so falsely judged 
by Eu.rope as Spain", explaining that this was because historians 
"instead of viewing the strength and resources of these peoples in their 
provincial and local organisations have drawn at the source of their ; 
court histories. 1167 While the Spanish struggle came to symbolize for 
many in Europe~~eir own hopes and dreams of a better world and 
their frustrations and anxieties as to its future, this had little to do 
with the realities of the issues involved in the civil war. This is 
made clear by Gerald Brenan in his study of the background of the war: 
"Spain, the symbol, was however rather a different thing from Spain, the 
actuality. The war had begun as a straightforward class struggle 
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between the reactionary landowner·s · on one side and the revolutionary f 
. ..-'' 
peasants and factory workers on the other. The Church, the Army 
officers and the majority of .. the ~iddle classes supported the forraer, 
the peti~e bourgeoisie and the intellectuals the latter. Such is the broad outline, though the fact that the Republicans had brought over by the grant of an_autonomy sta.tute two of the most solidly Catholic 
and anti-liberal provinces in the country introduces a complicat·ion. n68 
Elena de la Souchere places the Spanish Civil War in the histor-ical context of reoccurring cycles of revolution, i~ which the cycle 1898-1950 was prefigured by the cycles 1808-1854 and 1854-1898: "Thus, the f~rst glance at the preceding century strips the civil war of 1936 
and Franco's dictatorship of ani clinging a .. spect of the exceptional, 
and shows these blbddy pages to be only episodes in an historical process whose dawn coincides with the dawn of the nineteenth century 
and the collapse of the Spanish Empire."69 
While the issues involved in the conflict between the Republicans ......_ 
and the Nationalists in Spain and the role (or lack of a role) that Spain 
came to play in the world war that broke out in 1939, may lead one to 
conclude that the Spanish Civ.il War was indeed a sideshow, this view 
overlooks the catalytic effect that Spain had upon the structuring 
of opinion within many European countries and upon the relationships between the states of Europe. The impact of Spain in these spheres 
was by no means symbolic, serving to render the British aim of achiev-ing a peaceful Europe more difficult. 
""'I'' ;iu .~ .. 
There was considerable agreement in Britain·upon what should 
" 
constitute the general line of policy tow~rd Italy, though there 
,·,/was more than minor disagreement on~ the best means to implement this,. policy. This general line of policy was neatly summed up by Vansittart 
" in a memorandum:· ,of May 21, 19 36 : 
.I 
"Italy may become dangerous, but .. has not yet the same striking force or resolve __ or reserve of power as Germany, Mussolini has made his first advances to his fellow dict-ator across the Alps~ but unless we drive him into an active I I and offensive co~operation with Hitler, we are entitled to hope that he wil·l not be ~anxious to take the high road to Berlin. 
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We shall have to-compromise with Mussolini fQ~ we cannot 
compromise or even live safely with Dictator Major if we 
are at loggerheads with Dictator Minor." 70 
i The implementation of such· a policyi:wou~d have meant granting to. 
Italy a free hand in Spain and recognition of the Italian conquest 
of Abyssinia. This policy however ran into the emotional and symbolic 
importance which was attached to the Spanish- issue in Britain and_ the 
fact that Italian policy toward Spain and the recognition of the Italian 
'policy toward Spain and the rec_ogni tion of the Italian Empire were 
"I I ~ linked together. British· policy, as a result, fell between the two 
oppossing viewpoints: one that concessions must be made to Ite.ly; 
the other that Italy should limit or terminate its intervention in 
Spain before those concessions should be made. The vacillations and 
contradictions that resulted reflected and were partly a result of 
the dualism that steadily developed (up to.the resignation of Eden) 
in the policy formulating machinery in Britain: the Foreign Office 
under Eden held the view that Italy should give proof of her good 
faith by withdrawing some of her volunteers in Spain: Chamberlain 
believed that Italy's goodwill should he obtained by British con-
cessions on the Spanish question. While Eden had his minor triumphs, 
as in the Nyon Conference at which the Itali.ati' assertion of power in 
the Western Mediterranean was challenged (and deeply regretted by 
.C·hamberlain), the final victory was Chamberlafn' s with the resignation 
of Eden in February of 1938. Public opinion allowed Chamberlain to 
move only some way toward the Italian·viewpoint so that the Spanish 
1-1 struggle remained as a wedge between Britain and Italy,_ as von Hassell, 
., 
,Ji' 
the German Ambassador in Italy had clearly forseen in 1936: 
>to 
"The role played by the Spanish conflict as regards 
Italy's relations with France and England could be 
simila~r to that of the Abyssinian conflict, bringing 
. 
' J out clearly.the actual, opposing interests of the powers 
and thus preventing Italy from being drawn into the net 
of the Western Powers and used for their machinations. 
,The struggle for dominant political influence in Spain 
lays bare the natural opposition between Italy and France; 
at the same time the position of Italy as a power in the 
Western Mediterranean comes into competition with that of 
Britain. All the more clea.rly will Italy recognise the 
advisability of confronting the Western Powers shoulder 
to shoulder with Germany." 71 
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The Spanish conflict not only acted to bring to the surface 
conflicts of interest between Britain and Italy, it served the same 
- .... ,.,,-<,j ·, .. :, .; - -
end in the relations between Britain and France. Since very con-
.. siderable French interests were· involved in the Spanish conflict,· 
in as far as the French were not prepared to go as far as the 
Bri t·ish in the sacrifice of these interests to gain Itali~n goodwill, 
such a policy as suggested and implemented by Chamberlain would lead 
to conflict between the French and the British. Despite the consider-
able strategic importance that the outcome of the Spanish outcome 
·had for t~e French - the hitherto undefended frontier with Spain 
would have to be defended in the event of a victory by Franco, while 
the Balaerics lay across the line of communications with the supply of 
men and materials from North Africa - it cannot be maintained that 
non-intervention was a policy foisted on the French by London. It was 
Blum who, at the instigation of Leger (the head of the French Foreign 
Office), had suggested the policy of non-intervention to Britain. The 
reasoning behind Leger's action is however significant: he was afraid 
· that the Conservative Government in Britain, alarmed by the Popular 
Front Government in power in France, would enter,, into an alignment with 
White Spain, Germany and Italy "in a Holy Alliance in the style of 
Metternich." 72 Leger felt that British neutrality had to be maintained 
with the price of French neutrality in the Spanish war. It' was far 
~! 
V 0~ 
more difficult for the Fr~nch to maintain a position independent of the 
t ' ' . .,;. .. . 
events in Spain than it was for the British: the division of opinion 
on the Spanish issue was greater in France than in Britain,' while the 
\ 
majority of the country were agr~ed upon the need to maintain French 
"S. ··········· ~·· 
freedom of communication with North Africa; While Eden had been consciou·s· 
of the need to take int·o account the di:fficul ties which the French 
Government fabed in dealing with the war in Spain, under Chamberlain 
' ' 
"<, this regard· for the state of French opinion was cast aside and the 
French were placed under pressure from London to go further towards 
placating the Italian and German viewpoints than it was felt in Paris 
it was possible to go. A result of this was that the French felt that 
Britain was interested only in its own security, caring little for the 
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· fate of France. Marshal ·.Petain' s view of the English reflected this 
suspicion, as he made clear to Sir Edward Spears: 
. "•• •• you English, .vous autres Anglais, vous etes de grandes politiques.' There was a soupcon of sarcasm in 
his voice. It tvas easy to discern his meaning; then as 
now, as always, the British follo1r1ed the policy of their 
own interesto They could be relied upon to produce high 
moral motives for whatever they dido The Marshal had not invented thiso It had been the verdict the French have pronounced on the British since the two ~jve emerged as 
nations on either side o-f the Channel." 
· Some observers of the French politica.l scene in the latter half 
of t~e 1930's have commented upon what they term the decadence of 
the French. William Shirer wrote in'· 1938: 
'~Paris is a frightful place, completely surrendered to defeatism with no inkling of what has happened to France. At Fourquet's, at Maxim's, fat bankers and businessmen 
toasting peace with rivers of champagne. But even the 
waiters 11 taxi-drivers, w·ho used to be sound, gushing about how wonderful it is that war has been avoided, that it would have been a crirr:e, that they fought in one war and that was 
enough. That would be okay if the Germans, who also fought in 
one war, felt the same way, but they don•t. The guts of France 
- France of the Marne and Verdun - where are they? Outside of Pierre Comer, at the Quai d 'Orsay no one with any idea at all 
of the real Germany. The French Socialists shot through 
with pacifism; the French Right, with the exception of a few like Henri de Kerillis, either fascists or defeatists. France 
makes no sense to me any more." 74 
;t.../ 
.i'I 
'1f France suc_cumbed to the temptations of defeatism and Fascism, 
part of the explanation must lie in the situation in which France found 
itself. Feeling that the support of the English could;not be relied 
upon, that France should seek to secure her own interests as the :English 
were seeking theirs, some were led to the belief that the defensive 
system so carefully constructe·a in Eastern Europe should be abandoned 
and security should be sought through the attempt to reach an aocomo-
dation t-1ith H".:t---ler. Thus part of the foundations of Viohyism were laid. 
p. The war in, therefore, helped to weaken the Anglo-French alig;nment, 
tor push Franc towards a self-seeking policy which·developed independ-
t>. 
ent of moral or ideological ~onsiderations, and to undermine the psycho-
• logical position of the French nation. For many in France the struggle 
) 
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· of the Spanish Republicans was felt to be an heroic· fight on behalf of 
all of civilisation. But as a result of France following Britain into 
devoted adherence to the hypocrisy of the Non-Intervention Committee, 
I ' 
there tended to develop _1 a malaise in _the French nation, a crisis of 
self confidence, which led some. to. defeati-sm and others to the belief 
. 
that the salvation of Frarice lay in j'oining the marching tide of Fascism .• 
J~an-Paul Satre has portrayed the guilt-inferiority syndrome that the 
policy of non-intervention helped to develop in France in his novel, 
The Age of Reason: 
I, 
"· •• he took a paper at randon; it was the Excelsior ••••• 
Excelsior vJasn't an objectional journal, it was printed on· 
coarse p~per, ~irith a dull velve~7~.aapioc~ texture. ~t didn't 
succeed in ~ak1ng you lose yourttemper, it merely disgusted 
you with life t·Jhile reading it. ~erial bombardment of 
Valencia,' Mathieu read ••• 'Forty ~roplanes circled over the 
centre of the city for P~ hour and dropped a hundred and fifty 
bombs.The exact number 'of dead and wounded"'is not yet ascert-
ained.' He noticed out of the corner of his ey, beneath the 
headline, a horrid, huddled little paragraph in italics which 
looked very chatty and convincing: 'From our Specia.l Correspondent,' 
and gave the figures. Mathieu tu~ned over the page, he did not want 
to know any more. A speec1l by Ir1onsieur Flandiii at Bar-le-Due. 
France crouching behind the Maginot Line ••• A state~ent by 
Stokowski - I shall never marry Greta Garbo. More about the 
Weidmann affair. The King of England's visit: Paris awaits her 
Prince Charming ••• Mathieu shuddered, and. thought: 'All Frenchmen 
are swine.• •••• He closed the paper a~d began to read the special 
correspondent's di1patch on the front page. Fifty dead and three 
hundred· vJounded alneady counted, but that 1ias not the total, there 
···" 
were certainly corpses under the debris. No aer9planes, no A.A. 
J 
guns. Mathieu felt vaguely guilty. Fifty dead and three hundred 
wounded - what exactly did that signify? A full hospital? 
Something like a bad railway accident? Fifty dead. There were 
thousands of men in_ France who had not been able to read their 
paper that morning without feeling a clot of anger risin.g in their· 
throat, thousands of men who had clenched their fists and 
muttered:. 'Swine I Mathieu clenched his .fists and muttered: 1 Swine'. 
and felt himself still more guilty." 75 
L 
If Britain were ever to come into a military confrontation with 
Hitler's Germany, a ···free and independent France would be of the upmost 
importance to the security of the British Ibles. France was the great 
' 
:.:;. ..... 
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barrier between Nazi Germany and Britain; if that barrier were to fall 
Britain t-1ou1d be placed in the greatest peril. It would seem to have 
\ been in t-he greatest - interest of Britain to bolsteil' as r·ar as possible 
the military preparednes~ and morale of the French people. Howev-er, 
the Spanish conflict had the effect ··,or creating the predicament for 
\ 
Britain of choosing between support of France~and Italy. For some 
this was a simple question of hoping to gain the alignment of Mussolini, 
t·o the. cause of peace; for others, notably Duff Cooper, there was hope 
of giving new reality to the Stresa Front. But these viewpoints failed 
to realise that the basis of the Stresa Front and meaningful negotiat_-
ions with Museolini was a solid alignment between Britain and France. 
·, 
Without this alignment-there would be no reason for Italy to move away 
from Germany, since greater rewards could be obtained from exploiting 
the divisions between the Democracies. It was this question of what 
should be the British attitude to France that created a basis division 
~ - between the policies advocate4 by Eden and Chamberlain: for Eden, s~pport 
of France was to be a cornerstone of British policy; for Chamberlain, 
the concern of France with her security. constituted just one more source 
of tension that hindered the achievement of the appeasement of Europe. 
Thus, under Chamberlain pressure was incr·easing applied to France to 
give way to the Dictator's view point on the question of Italian 
volunteers in Spain and later the Italian demands on Tunisia. Djibuti 
and Nice. In doing so, Chamberlain helped to undermine the political pos~ 
ition and elan of the anti-fascists in France and to push further the r~ 
French nation into the downward spiral of apathy and defeatism which 
helped to bring about the defeat of France in 1940. Britain was saved 
in 1940 by the British development of radar, the decision by Goering at 
the height of ·the Battle of Britain to shift the weight of the German 
air attack from the sorely-pressed British Fighter Command to the 
civilian population and the fact that Hitler's eyes were turned to 
Russia r~ther than Britain. The belief of Chamberlain that Britain 
could maintain a limited commitment to the struggle on the European 
mainland, sheltering behind the body of France, was shattered by the 
fall of France in 1940, as was Stalin's attempt to divert the impact 
of the Nazi onslaught to the West by the NonQAg~~esston with Hitler 
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ln 1939. The defeat of France brought home to both the reality that· the 
war agai11st Hitler could not be fought by proxy but only by all i-1ho 
were opposed to the aims of Hitler fulling accepting responsibility 
for bringin~ to an end that threat to the freedom.of Europe. Mussolini 
' ·'
1
' ' · ·,:1r, 
had entered the Spanish struggle initially in the hope that a quick 
victory for fascism and Italian arms could be gained. This hope ivas 
frustrated by the heroism of the supporters of the Republic in Spain 
and the entry of the International Brigades into the struggle. Once 
c. 
committed to the oa1.1se of Franco Mussolini found it very diffi0ul t to 
withdraw, especially after the resounding defeat that the Italian Legions 
suffered at Guadalajara. The appeasers in Britain had hoped to deal with 
Spain irrespective of the ideological and moral issues involved, but 
the result was that Hitler was allowed to achieve his aim of seeing Britain 
and France alienated from Italy, as the majority of the peoFle in 
these two countries were unwilling to see the intervention of Italy 
sanctified by their governments. While Britain refused, except at Nyon, 
~ 
to give effect to their declarations that the states of Europe should 
not intervene in Spain and tried to move towards appeasing Italy on 
Spain but was prevented by public opinion from paying the full price, 
• 
so It~ly was forced into co-operation with Germany. Italy became 
convinced that in co-operation with Germany lay her fullest advantage, 
since Britain and France were too supine to act against the combined 
strength of the Axis. While one can argue with great force that non-
intervention was in Britain's best interests, the way in which that 
• policy was implemented played ·an important part in developing the crisis 
of Europe in the latter 1930 1 s. Spain may be called a •·continental 
sideshow', but the policie~ that were implemented toward that struggle 
had more than symbolic importance. 
Harold Nicholson, writing to his wif_e in February 1938,- wrote of 
" 
the general structure of British foreign policy: 
"The Government may say what th.ey like, but their present 
policy means nothing less that the scrapping of the ideas 
which have be,en built up since t·he war and the reversion 
to the old pre-war policy' of power politics and bargaining. 
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This means that: (1) that we shall have to1buy the friendship 
of Italy and Germany by making sacrifices; (2) That this· 
friendship i-vill not be v1orth 2d once i't is bought; and -( 3) 
· That in doing so we shall sacrifice the confidence of. France, 
Russia and the United· States and all the smaller countries. I 
mind this.dreadfully." 76 
~ In attempti~g to explain the policy of appeasement, of which 
'I, 
British policy toward Spain was an intergral part, one can try to place 
the blame on a small group of people··, especially the 1Clivden Set 1 • 
Harold Macmillan has written to oppose the view that Clivden was a 
hive of plotters for appeasement, and should be looked upon as a 
circle rather than a celi. 77 One might see appeasement as a function 
of the development of ':ari tain into a society enjoying the r:rui ts o-f the 
arriving age of mass-consumption, careless to the trials of the world 
beyond the borders of Britain. One might also attempt to investigate 
·.·:-: ... ··- .. ,~· ,. 
the realm of theories developed on the nature of collective group 
action, of appeasement being a function of group interaction rather than 
. '1,#. 
the result of the ruminations of the individual. Neil J.Smelser has 
developed a theory of collective action whereby one would look at the 
analysis of the reactions between actors in a system rather than at the 
individual personalities or the principal types of systems. 78The four 
main components of collective action postulated by Smelser are: 
{a) Values - generalised ends held by the individual; 
(b) Norms - regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these values;_ 
{c) The motivation of the individual actor, and how motivated actors 
are _organised into roles and organisations; thus, the mobilization 
of the individual energy to achieve values within the normaiive 
framework; 
:(d) ~The available situational facilities which the actor utilises, 
such as his knowledge of the· environm~nt, predic·tabili ty of the 
consequence··s of actions, and tools and skills·. 
The main area which one examines is that of structural strain which 
develops between the components. The principal strain occurs on the 
situational facilities as ambiguity develops as to the adequacy of the ·· 
I 
means available to achieve a given goal. (In a study of appeasement, 
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• • • fori· exa;mple, one ·might look at the lao:k ·of· resources available to 
guarantee Britisl1· security.) q 
In each, of the components of collective ac,tion there'"·are varying 
levels of generality. to which reference· can be made, .. from very specific 
tovery general. Smelser gives the levels of specificity of the 
-~ 
situational facilities as follows: 
(1) 
·(:.2) 
. (..3) 
.. 
.(50} 
Preconceptions concerning causalityl 
Codification of knowledge. 
( 
Technology or specif.ica.tion of knowledge in -:s4,tu.at,io~al 
terms. 
Procurement of wealth, power or prestige to activate 
level 3; 
Allocation of- effective technology to_: sector of 
society; 
{:.6) Allocation of effective technology :t·o roles and 
organisation; 
Allocation of faoili ties w,_i:':~:hln organisation to attain 
concrete goals. 
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Collective behaviour, according to Smelser, consists of a search 
.1 
for solutions to conditions of strain by movi°'ng to a more generalised 
level of resources. Once the generalisation has taken place, attemps are 
made to reconstitute the meaning of the high level component, but in doing. 
this people develop a belief which short-circuits from a very generalised 
component d;irectly to the source of st-rain. Collective behaviour is 
' 
.. therefore a compressed way of attacking problems created by strain. 
It compresses several levels of components of action into a simple 
belief from which specific operative solutions are expected to flow. 
As an example of this short-circuiting one could cite the reaction of 
,f 
Britain to the economic depression of 1931. According to Lipson, the 
•t;> 
great depression produced in Britain a reaction which was out of all 
) 
I 'i 
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'\ ' p~oportion to the cause, in which the determini-ng element was the 
psychologica.1 reaction of the British people. A wave of pes"semism 
swept through Britain, inducing a beli~f that the econ<~mic interests 
of Britain were no longer bound up with. those· of the world at large. 
A general opinion developed. that international trade and fina11ce 
were a source of danger to Britain's well being, and that ···it was 
necessary to insulate Britain against these forces. This belief le.d 
to ~ritain~s abrupt- abandolllllent of the two main pillars of her economy; 
the integrity·· of the pound sterling and the open door in commerce. In 
the atmosphere of blind panic, a~tion hastily discarded its historic 
policy. 79 The age of economic riationalism had its corollary in the 
political insulation from the world around. 
In a norm-orientated society, there will be a belief that-extra-
" ...• -. 
i 
ordinary results will fol.low if only certain reforms are adopted, and 
gloomy predictions are made of the results that will follow if' the 
reforms are not adopted. This exaggerated view of reality follows 
from the beliefs which are generalised and short-circuited. In a country 
such as Britain where great importance is placed upon the accepted method 
pursuing goals in society, stress was placed on the way in which German 
demands should be made rather than upon judgement of the nature of those 
demands.· The almost academic detachment with which the problems of the 
nations of Europe were viewed by the appeasers reflects the importance 
pked on method rather than matter. Chamberlain wrote to his sisters 
in November 1937: 
"! don't see why we should' nt say to Germany, 'Give us 
satisfactory assurances tha1t you won't use force to deal with 
the Austrians and Czechoslovakians and we will give you 
similar assurances that we won't use force to prevent t~e 
changes you want if you can get them by peaceful means.' "80 
The Lytton Commission in 1931 on the Manchurian dispute, 
The Hoare-Laval Plan on Abyssinia, the.Anglo-German~Naval Agreement of 
1936, the Non-Intervention Committee on Spain,- together with the ~emming 
Mission, the Ru.nciman Mission and the Munich Agreement, were in part a 
function of an overblown belief in the efficacy of channeling crises into 
acceptable forms. But in the creation of the plans to bring about 
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solutions to crises British decision-makers often juniped from the consider-
ation of the details of the crisis and· the· .s:pecificaition of rules to· 
achieve ob-operation to the efforts to achieve general conformity to 
~ .... 
that plan, without consideration of how the plan would be put into 
effect or,, how it would be ensured that the parties_ to the a~_r_eement 
would abide by its measures. To put it into the language of Smelsey, 
C 
there were :failures to relat·e plans for the solutions of crisis to the 
, 
specification of the requirements for individual observation of norms and 
a failure to specify norms according to the type of roles and organisations. 
·-, I 
Appeasement reflected more than the belief in the need for the 
maintainance of accepted methods of solving i,nte.~p.ational crisis. It 
also reflecte,d irrational behaviour that grew out of anxiety that was 
rooted in the ambiguity as to the adequacy of the means available to 
achieve the ends of. British policy. Anxiety was at the center of 
appeasement and the desire to resolve the supposed.causes of anxiety 
was the impulse:-1::>~hind the British diplomatic assault on Europe and the 
# 
-
··-- ... 
League of Nations. This anxiety stemmed not so much from an appreciation 
of the objective facts of Britain's strategic position in the world, 
as from the difficulties of estimating the correct nature of the world in 
which Britain found herself. It was the impossibility of defining exactly 
the nature of the National Socialist regime in Germany and the aims of 
Hitler's fore~gn policy, and the nature of war if it werE~ to occur, 
especially the effect of aeroplanes upon civilian populations, that 
made future pos.~ibilities fraught with dread. Smelser explains anxiety 
in collective behaviour as lying essentially in the ambiguity of 
si tuatio·ns, consisting of a generalised reponse which is not .. -tied to 
precisely definable environments. Anxiety exists as a vague and incom-
........ r". 
"' l,· 
prehensible uneasiness about unknown or shadot-1y threats. It is because 
these threats are ill-defined that they ·would seem to contain potentially 
enormous powers of destrt1ction. In the fo-llow-diagram, Smelser explains 
the way in which exaggerated and unduly pessemistic outcomes are pre-
dicted as the outcome of the ambiguous situation. Stage 2 involves; 
-3~1-
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the selection of unfavourable possibilities from an ambiguous situation 
and a leap!into the world of generalized forces whose efficacy is· 
ex~ggerated. Stage 2a involves ···a leap back to the concrete situation 
·"·,·i.,,, and the. enumeration of specific outcomes as ·flow·ing· from w·hat was an· 
initilally ambiguous situation, bypassing many logical and empirical 
., ' 
contingencies in levels 2-4. 
FACILITIES LEVELS 
7- 5 
Stage 1: 
Strain giving 
rise to ambi-
guity. 
Stage 2a 
Specification of 
concrete outcomes 
flowing from 
generalized forces. 
.. ....,_,.. 
·4 -· 2. 
.'"S 
,·_ ... )/. 
.if 
Stage·2: 
i 
Anxiety - the world 
of generalj(zed threats. 
This generalization on the nature of t:h.,e :amb-i-g11ous threats and its 
relation to the concrete world leads to the creation of wish-ful:fillment-,. 
a semi-mystical belief which links the potency of the formless t.hreats 
and forces to the estimated outcomes and thus seems to guarantee these 
outcomes. Thus the ambiguity of the situation is the source of anxiety, 
and therefore the source of ~concrete policies which it is felt, if put 
~ 
, . 
into effect, would resolve the dangers which are viewed as part of the 3 
81 
world. 
Appeasement, therefore, can.be seen as part of a generalized 
response by the British people to the an~ety t]iat'· resulted. from an 
. awareness of the impending dange/hich had come into the world with 
the development of HiWer's regime in Germany and the long-range bomber 
., . 
against which, it wa.s proclaimed, there was no defense. Peace, it was 
d.e.clared, could be obtained by· adhering to accepted methods of inter-
\, ' -
:.·-~ 
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nationa~ conciliatib'n, without any real thought as to h
ow the settlements 
· that resulted could be carried out or maintained as a l
asting solution. 
i' 
ror the majority, the~e-was no real ~ffort to consider the impact of
 the 
.___,. 
solutions that would be arrived at upon the syndrome of 
the -political · 
and strategic relationships within the .. European society~ 
The necessity 
,11' 
• 
y 
for conci1!ia~tion. was advocated, .Jto this extent, not as a
 way· for Bri ta,in 
to buy peace at the expense of the other countries of E
urope, but :fr.om 
the belief that oonci'liation was the only way in which pea
ce could be 
obtained. J·umping from the awareness of the th.reats that
 faced· Britain 
to. the enumeratioJ' of concrete steps that would reduce 
the dangers pent 
up in the f'orces of National Socialism and modern milita
ry technology, 
this process glossed· over the way in which these forces 
were:~ related to 
the steps advocated and avoided the o~itical and enormo
usly~4ifficult 
task of specifying the.: norms that would govern the roles
 of the inter-
national actors involved and institutions that might be 
set up, and 
specifying the requirements for observation of the solut
ion. Commissions 
and committees were spawned for the purpo.se of concili~
ting but not 
enabling the world to live securely with the results of 
that concil-
iation. The Non-Intervention Committee on Spain was set ~
P, but there 
was never any attempt to establish its role or the rules
 through which 
it would Op,erate. In this, those who advocated conciliati
on considered 
themselves to be the only truely rational people and the
ir opponents 
warmongers and dangerous fools. While the Foreign Office g
rappled with 
the diffioul t taks of the means bt which conciliation could -be imp
lemen-
ted in terms of the laying d-0wn of the future roles of 
the states of 
Europe, this activity was dismissed by Chamberlain as th
e unwillingness 
of the Foreign Office to break from traditional methods 
and concepts. 
Convinced of the validity of their proposals, those who 
advocated 
appeasement brushed aside the protests of their opponen
ts. One must 
consider appeasement as ~onsisting not so much of the ma
chinations of 
a small political clique, but rather as a mass movement 
with Chamberlain 
as its arch apostle. Anxious to avoid entanglements on t
he European 
mainland that would distract their attention from a new 
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found prosperity, the Briti~J1 ·people sought refuge by clinging· to the 
maintainance of accepted methods and they avoided reaching conclusions 
as towhere this·emphasis upon.method rather than facilities and outcomes 
would b~ing them. 
Do our ruminations into the nature of collective action bring us baak 
to'the viewpoint that the policies which states adopt toward each other 
are manifestations of cultural, social ·and economic forces and trends 
within the individual states and the international society as a whole. 
Further, if this is true, are the political leaders within states to be 
· ,,. . absolved from the responsibility of the policies which they are instrumental 
. in put-ting into effect? To answer these questions one must examine the 
interrelationship between individual human behaviour and the social 
processes we have so far describ.ed. 
At this point we come back to a consideration of the relationship 
between the processes by which people assimilate ahd develop social 
behaviour patterns and the social culture in which they live, Tamotsu 
Shibitani has defined culture as a common prespective that is shared by 
people in a particular group, being derived from the similar pat·terns of 
behaviour in which that particular group engage. Thus people with dis-
similar perspectives would define identical situations differently, 
responding selectively to the different aspects of their environment. Thus,. 
\ Shibitani states that a prostitute and a social worker walking through a 
slum area would notioe different things. 82 
The import .. anoe of oul ture within a political syste~ lies in ab.ili ty 
a common culture gives to people to enter into concerted action. Each 
person is able to predict the behaviour of others and adapt his own 
behaviour to the predictable responses other people will. manifest in each 
situation. 83 Taking the argument further, Rose states that man learns 
values an~ social behaviour from the q.Otions of other men, and that this 
knowledge is gained through the communication of symbols rather than 
,· ~ through individual trial an4 error. Symbols in this case being taken to 
be stimuli that have a learned meaning and v~lue to which people react in 
terms of their own learned meaning and value, derived through. social 
interaction. Men will commµ.nicate with each other, therefore, by taking 
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a role in social situations employing learned symbols, Thinking becomes 
a symbolic. process since al terna .. t i ve · courses of action are assessed in 
• 
·terms of ·th.e in1ividual 's values, and selected in terms of what the--
individual thinks he ~ows about the past. 84 Mead contributed to this 
concept of individual activity by stating that each individual.deals with 
- - . the world through the selection and .indication to himself of phenomena 
..,__ 
to which he gives meaning. The individual sees society as a set of symbol·s·; 
society can be seen as consisting of the interaction of symbols; and 
collective action can be seen as the aligning of individual action 
... through the ijterpretation of the actions of others. 85 
Each individual in society will communicate to other individuals 
his intentions through the adoption of a role which is constructed from 
-
the commonly.accepted symbols existing within that political culture. For 
example, a school-ieacher wishing to communicate to his pupils his position 
of authority will adopt the commonly accepted role of a school-master, a· 
role which will be expected of him by his p~pils. When the school-master" 
goes home to his family, he will change his role from that of a school-
master to that of a father or husband, each role requiring the adoption 
of different symbolic actions and attitudes. 
' The adoption of a role would then seem to be dependent on the exist-" .. 
ence of tb.e other roles to which the individuals relate themselves. 
The role of the school-master can exist only ~ relation to pupils, the 
role of the father only in relation to a role. of the child. 86 The 
.../ existence of the other-role allows for an explanation of changes of 
behaviour, since these changes in one's own role reflects a changing 
assessment of the role of the rel-evant others. As Tu.mer states: "The 
idea of role-taking shifts emphasis away from the· simple process of 
enacting a prescribed role to devising a performance on,r .. the basis of an 
imputed other-role. The actor is not the occupant of a position for which 
,i" there is a neat set of rules- a culture or set of norms - but a·person 
., 
who must act in the.perspective supplied in part by his relationship 
t·o others whose actions reflect roles that he must identify. Since the 
role of alter can only be inferred rather than directly known by ego,· 
testing inferences about the rol,e of alter is a continuing element in 
-395-
.. r, 
(J 
. , r. 
. :;...., 
' } 
. 
·' 
I 
J • I, 
interaction. Hence the tentative character of the individual's own 
performance and own role definition is never wholly suspended. 1187 
'I, 
, Thus.a great deal of room can be made tfor the concept of the individual. 
·-~ -
It involves the way in which the individual interprets the symbolic ~ 
.,.-,.--.. 
-~ 
' 
structuring 9f t.he society around him and the inferences that the 
individual makes about the nature of the roles of other individuals and 
hence his own role.· We_may return at this point to our previous consider-
• 
ation of the nature of the individual personality. To this consideration 
of individual personality Leon H.Washay brings the concept of the breadth 
of perspective. Washay defines this perspective as the symbolic structuring 
that each person brings to a situation, and which serves as a frame of 
reference for defining situations in which the individual finds himself. 
This perspective, wh:·ich will determine the number and kind of definitions 
each individual can make of a given situation, is largely learned through 
symbolic interaction and is closely organized around one's self, since 
symbolic interaction involves role-taking and role~playing. One should 
not iake breadth of perspec.tive to be analogous to intelligence. Breadth 
of perspective is more the ability·to learn a variety of ideas, meanings 
.. _,. ..... ,.,., 
and. values. A person with a broad perspective will be one able to 
muster a variety of responses to given situations. The person who is able: 
to reach a number of definitions of given situations may be one who is-a 
puzzle to other people and be inconsistent in. his actions and ideas. 
Furthermore, a broad perspective, involving·as it does this inconsistency, 
may be a factor contributing to neurosis and provide basis for charges 
of we~k.ness of character. It is the person with the narrow breadth of 
.-
perspective who is more likely to be successful as a problem solver of 
.. 
·immediate issues for he will be the more likely to arrive at a solution 
which he will pursue with an· unet.oppable and unshakeable determination to 
go ahead. 88 1 
.,. 
' One can relate the concept· of breadth of perspective ~:,o the 
examination that has already been made of the differences that arose 
between Chamberlain and -Eden as to the policy that Britain should 
.t:. 
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' ' . adopt toward Italy _and the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. ,::J 
Chambe1"\lain, whose·:·breadth of vision was bound by tl1,_e_ ·austere nineteen-
th century radicalism of Jose·ph Chamberlain's Birmingham and the degi;h 
of a beloved brother in the First World War, carried throu.gh wit,h grea·t 
courage and determination a policy determined by a definition of a 
situation seen -in terms of war and peace, and carrying, on social welfare 
in Britain or wasting hard-earned money on armaments. The narrowness of 
Chamberlain's perspective carried the .seed of strong leadership since . 
there were few doubts in Chamberlain's mind and a· clear-cut plan of 
action to be put into effect. Chamberlain, in putting his ideas to the 
.test came into opposition t·o Eden, a man whose mind was receptive to a 
,, . 
far wider range of ideas, meanings and values. The receptiveness of 
Eden's mind to a variety of stimuli can be judged from his reading of 
Persian at University, while his inconsistency of character has been 
alledged by Hoare and Amery in a previous chapter (though these two, 
one should admit~ cannot be judged to be neutral· in the matter) •.. To 
British foreign policy, Eden brought a far wider perspective than 
Chamberlain, encompassing the need to align British policy as far as 
possible with that of France and, to a lesser extent the United Sta~es, 
the desire to maintain the League of Nations as an instrument of inter-
national co-operation, and to appease the demands of Hitler and, under 
certain conditions, Mussolini, However, these inputs were not mutually 
reinforcing or even compatible, since the League of Nations was linked 
. (if only in people's minds) with the Versailles settlement, which Hitler 
hoped to destroy. With the undermining of the Versaill.es settlement, 
the Franch commitment to the international concept of the League ... became 
weakened and eventually the same happened to the French defensive system 
inthe East European countries. Since the use of sanctions of any kind 
involved the ·risk of war, t.he undermining of the Versailles settlement 
meant the undermining of the willingn~ss and ability of the Frencp to 
give reality to the role of the League as a-decision-making institution. 
This broad perspective through which Eden viewed foreign affairs may 
account for the rather neurotic personality of Eden and his frequent 
bouts of ill-health, and in part, perhaps the rath~r dramatic and sudden 
nature of_his resignation from .the Foreign Office. 
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-We can profitably, at this point, recall the bitter yet brilliant 
darts of policical wit which were hurled.at Eden and Chamberlain by the 
... -. staunchest upholder of workinig-class consciousness - Nye _Bevan. Writing 
£or Tribune . in 1943, Bevan said of Eden~: 
"League of Nati,ns society at Geneva introdllced him to~ --
whole range of ideas strange to a Tory. There he acquired a ..... \~ 
progressive vocabulary, and this, allied to the amiability 
that flows from weaY~~ess of character, deceives many people 
into thinking that his political intentions are honourable. 
Actually there is nothing in his conduct to justify such a 
conc;lusion •. His resignation from the Government of Mr.Chamberlain 
over our Italian diplomacy provided him with a balance at the 
political bank on ·which he has drawn generously ever since.· 
His behaviour during the civil war in Spain prov·es con-
clusively that wherever he has to choose between his Tory 
instincts and his progressive inclinations his instincts can 
be relied upon to win every time." \ 
Bevan made it clear that he felt there was no question of such inner 
conflicts within the breast of Chamberlain and, in fact, the real problem 
was that within the bleak exterior of that person very little occurred 
to ruffle the fixed pattern of ~esponses. Of the transition from the 
reign of Baldwin to Chamberlain's tenure in office, Bevan .. let fly the 
following: -.. 
"In the funeral service of Capi talisffr the honeyed and sooth-
ing platitudes of the clergyman ·are finished, and the cortege 
is now under the sombre and impressive guidance of the under-
taker ••• He (Chamberlain) has the lucidity which is the by-_ 
product of a fundementally sterile mind ••• He does not have to 
struggle, like Chamberlain has, for example, with the crowded· 
pulsations of,; a fecund imagina1tion •• Listening to a speech by 
Chamberlain is. like paying a visit .to Woolworth's; everything 
is in its place and nothing above sixpence."· · 
Chamberlain came to the laade-Pship of Con~ervative Party and 
established such a dominant hold of that Party in_the latter 1930's 
' partly because he offered a clear-cut solution to the difficulties 
that faced Britain and partly because of hisunyielding perso11ality • 
.cc - . 
----......._ ____ _
l3ut leaders are never men who come to their position because of their 
personality alone, but because what they have to offer closely corres-
ponds to the values, interests c3.,nd beliefs.of~the group they are 
. . ' ' 
attempting to lead. The process is one of interaction rather than of 
control lying purely in the hands of the leader. This is made clear 
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• by George C.Homans in his study of leadership: 
1· 
"The leader is the man i·1ho comes closest to realizing the norms the &"roup value higl1est. The nor·ms may be queer ·ones, but so long as they are genuine~y accepted by the group, the leader, in that group, must_-embody themo His embodiment of the norms gives him his high rank, . and his ranlc attra .. cts people~ the leader is the man people come to; the scheme of interaction focuses on himo At the same time, his high rank carries i-trith. it the assumed right to take co11trol of the group, and the exercise of control itself helps maintain the leaders control and ·prestigeo This control he is peculiarly well equipped to wield by rea.son of h:;.s position at the top of the pyramid of interaction. He is better informed than other·me·n, and he has more channels :for the issuing of orderso He controls the group, yet he is in a sense more · controlled by it than others are, since it is a condition of leadership that his actions and decisions ·shall conform more closely than those of others to an abstract norm. Moreover, all these elements, and ·not just one or two of them, come into leadership; all are related to one anoth~r and reinforce one another for good or ill.'' 89 
One cqmes back to the propositions, that were put forward in the Introduction, following the ideas of Modelski, that decision-makers 
mediate between the community of which they are part and the outside 
world. One cannot dismiss the importance of the individual persona.li ty in foreign policy formulation. While the social culture of the community is of the greatest importance, the individual does not take an a·llotted 
role in society, bu.t rather emphasis should be placed upon role-making. The role that the_
0
,~ .. ndividual will undertake to create will be dependent 
upon the symbols that he selects as being significant from the world he 
sees around him, the selection being determined by the past symbolic interaction which the individual has experienced with the society around 
··"·· .. him. This role in turn will be dependent upon the part that the individual imputes as being played by the "significant' others" in the situation in 
which he finds himself. 
, 
The leaders of political parties, in dealing with th.eir group will, 
· ·-.however, function through a process of interaction and will reflect to a high degree the values, belief"~. ~~nd interests of that party. If they do 
not their impact upon policy will be strictly limited. One must come to 
the conclusion that to designate certain actions of a state as being 
und~r.t~e he&ding of fore~gn po~Jcy and the.separ~tion of the other 
aot1v1t1es of that state is arbjftrary and Id1slead1ng. Homans defines a 
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group by interaction. A social system consists of the activities, 
. interactions, and sentiments of the groµp members i-1i th two aspects-; 
the internal system and the external system. The external system is· the . 
-
state of those elements of group behaviour {sentiment, activity and 
interaction) insofar as it constitutes a solution to the p~oblem of how 
the group ca11 survive in its· environment. Homans emphasises that:' "The 
two aspects of group life we call the external and the internal systems 
are continuous with one another, The line between them can be. drawn 
where we choose, arbitrarily~ and we choose to drai-1 it here. The only 
reason for drawing a line at all is ·to save itords •••• "90 
Foreign policy must, therefore', be taken as a function of group 
"' behaviour and the structuring of society, rather than being me:r:'ely an 
elite-formed concept. One must look at the culture of the group, and 
. 
especially direct one's gaze to the degree pf homogeneousness of that 
·Culture. Examining the structuring of the reference groups within the 
society will be especially fruitful, sin.ce the concept of the reference 
group signifies" ••• that group whose presumed perspective is used by an 
actor as the frame of reference in the organization of his perceptual 
field."9l These reference fields will provide the basis for the select-
ion of symbols from the society and will thus provide the basis for the 
formation of attitudes to the world around and the taking of roles. 
The reference group will provide the means for the individual to form 
a picture of himself and those activities in which he will wish the 
·-· --~...,.,,. -~ 
state to concern itself. !n this study, one type of reference group 
·" 
which has been made use of is that of class groupings. The importance 
of the class group~ngs lies not in their being objectively derived 
groupings of people \vith statistically identifiable characteristics, 
· but rather ·as self--images which are derived frqm self-identification. 
This self image euao:Les tl e individual to· select (significant symbols) 
from any event. In looking at the Span_ish Civil War, people who identi-
fied themselves with the working ot-lasses would select different signifi-
. cant· symbols than those who identified themselves with the upper classes. 
To the working class man, the conflict would be seen in t~rms of the 
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•ordinary person' struggling against those who sought to deprive them of 
thei,r liberties and chances for a ·better life. The perspeoti.ve would be 
deri1yed from the experience of hostility against employers, and the 
struggle t·o achieve a better standard of living. Each self-identification 
presup!)oses 'both sel:f-images and the existence of ima.,ges of the reference 
groupso Images will c911sist rather of stereotypes rather than realistic 
pictures 1 s·ince the degree of communica,tion between the membePs of each 
reference group is o:rten limited. The result is that: "Each social world 
is a culture _area, the boundries of which are set neither by territory 
nor formal group membership', but by the limits of effective communication. "9 2 · 
The existence of these social worlds within the British state helped . ,' 
to define the nature of British policy toward Spain, since each reference 
group selected differing significant symbols from the conflict; while the 
ruling elite were drawn from one class, the majority of the people of 
Britain belonged to another, with the result that coii'flicts developed 
as the majority of people in Britain view,ed .with sympathy the struggle 
'o··r the Spanish people against authority ( o;, ~o the struggle was seen), wp.ile 
the ruling elite in Britain viewed with distaste the breakdown of 
authority, and saw the Republican side, as Nicholson put it, '' · ••• a mere 
Kerensky Government at the mercy of the armed proletariat. "9 3 Between 
these two perspectives, British policy toward Spain maintainea a delicate 
balance with the aid of the Non-Intervention Committee, and deception 
on the part of the British Government. 
Furthermore, o~e can take into account not merely the differences · 
that exist between reference groups within a state, but also the similar-,,. 
ities. We may at this point return to a consideration of whether the 
--culture of the state is orientated towards values (genera1-ized ends) 
L. . or towards norms (regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these ends). 
Britain one may consider as a norm...;orientated society; the British tend 
to see their country and way of life in terms of thEi° instit·ut_ions which 
have been developed in Britain: monarchy", Parliament, and nven the public 
houses.- The self-imag_e· which the Germans hold may be seen to consist 
rather in oencepts such as race, religion, and supposed national 
characteristics. Germany may be considered to be a value-dominated society. 
France would seem to have been poised between adherence to the institut-
e \ 
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-:.:. ions of the Republi'can concept of ·1789, and values such as communism, 
monarchis·m, the Church and its opponents. The adherence to these values 
of differing groups within France has led to the merry-go-round of 
political systems _and eve~-.falling governments, from which France has-· 
·,., % . 
only been rescued by abandoning the substance of 1789. 
/ ;-
~---This brief classification will enable us to pose at least part 
·ft~ 
~i, of an answer to certain questions -that have been raised on the nature 
of British politics and policies. For example, Peter tiorsley, in a 
·dissussion of political power in Britain, has stated that: 
"The uninterrupted, albeit modified, dominance of the 
. property-oiming clas·ses, in a society which has ·1·ibeen the -
most highly proletarianized in the world, is surely the 
most striking phenomena in modern times." 94 · 
This can partly be explained in terms of Britain being a norm-
orientat-ed society, .in which adherence to the _means by which values are 
obtained is greater than the importance placed upon the satisfying of 
those values. This orientation of British society towards norms rather 
than values can be explained partly by means of the early enfranchisement 
of the British people through the la111s of 1832, 1867 and 1884: through 
the freedom that the British working classes have had to increase their 
•. 
living standards through self-help, by means of co~operatives and trade 
unions; and the development of Imperialism which added a new symbolic 
value to the institutions of Britain, enabling the working classes in 
Britain to relate themselves to the monarchy and national pride. 
Disraeli said of Imperialism: 
"I look to the cultivation of public opinion, and 
especially to the working classes for the maintainanoe 
of the British Empire." ~5 · 
Ronald Blythe has asked the question" why was appeasement a 
positive creed in Britain and in France a vulgar necessity? 1196 The 
French might argue that this is merely~ reflectipn of the more 
rigorous nature of Cartesian logic over the English pragmatic mind, which, 
·,\ 
it often seems, would desire to avoid reaching a,oonclusion to a problem 
if the matter can possibly be phrased another way. Another answer to the 
question might be found in an examination of the differences in the 
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political culture of the two countries. In a country such as Britain 
I 
where norms of thepolitical system are considered to be of greater 
importance than the attainment of the values held by,the actors within 
the political system; appeasement became an extention of the culture of 
. t, .. • 
·the system, as we have considered aboveo In France, howeverv the 
political culture was fractionalized among reference groups; there·did 
···i not exist after'--193'6 a ·general consensus that the maintainanoe of the 
integrity of institutions of the French state was of greater importance 
than the result of the issues at conflict between those reference 
groups. Paul-Marie de La Gorge has described the developing tensions 
created France by the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935, 
!j 
·-·I 
and the advent of the Popular Front t-o office in 1936: 
"Right-1r1ing opinion, the. most ind1..1lgent with respect to the new 
dictatorial regimes in Germany and Italy, had no objection to a 
~ilitary effect, and its traditional sJrmpathy for the Army led it to 
criticise the Radical Governments which had too sharply reduced the. 
military creditse But already, in their eyes, the precautions that had to 
be taken against the dangers of revolution far outweighed those required 
by the new Gerraan threat o A rapprochement with. Fe.,scist Italy appeared 
absolutely essentialo An understanding with Germany seemed possible and 
certainly desira.bleo But the idea of an alliaJnce with Communist Russia, 
in the face of the Hitlerire menace, _was horrifying. This brought about 
the crystallizationv the new political alignment which occurred in Franch 
opinion·and lasted until 1939, ~fter having received a brutal impulse 
from the events of February 6, 1934 ••• 
There ivas, thus, a profound cleavage in the public mind •••• 
In conservative circles and f,or many segments of· the bourg~Ois 
classes, during thewint~~_of 1935 to 1936, resistance to Hitlerite 
Germany had not seemed the main requirement of French foreign policy. 
The events of the following Spring and Summer were to convince them that 
the real danger lay elsewhereo The triumph of the Popular Front would 
not have had the same effect on French_ public opinion ·if it had remain-
ed an electoral and parliamen~ary victory 1 although~ for the first time, 
the majority included a powertul communist party,., But more than anything 
_else it was a spectacleo And this spectacle was a frightful shock for 
all those who saw in it a revolutionary peril, the undermining of order 
and the risk of socia.,l. uphea.,val •••• 
During this summer of 1936, as •revolution' seemed to threateµ 
France, it broke out in fact in Fr?,nce. Public opinion realized tliat-~ther. 
struggles of the parties might very well cease to be a matter of students' 
brawls, w·orkers' mass meetings and press polemics, even the most ferocious 
_In Spain, it had all led at last to a civil waroThis, like the Franco-
Soviet Pact, served as a catalyst for the major trends of opinion i.n 
Franoe ••• Beyong a doubt, the majority of Army men instinctively rejected 
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the idea of' civ~l war. But for· inany officers they were9fsycholog-ioally ready for. it. S.ome · were even preparing for !.it." 
• I 
' 
The structure of the Third French Repub·l·ic had been maintiained 
.. , . 
·not so much by loyalty which the majority of Frenchmen held ~or its 
institutions but rather as result of an uneasy balance between 
political groups whicl1 embodied other values but which could not 
agree to replace a creation originally designed as .a stop-gap 
me~sure,until the monarchy could.be restored. The Third French 
. 
. 
Republic continued its precarious and unstable existence poised 
between more than one political divide. The fracturing of the polit~. 
" 
' ical system between the· clericals and the· ant i-:.clericals, the Radicals 
~. 
and the monarchists, the socialists and right meant that while one .. 
government replaced another with predictable .frequency ther~ was never 
a sufficient consensus for the political conflicts to be solved, for 
answers to continu::.ng problems to be reached and :ror an agreed set of 
". ,. ·'·. ' ' . . 8 
norms to be entrenched within political institutions.9 
Looking at foreign policy as c\ continuously evolving solution of 
a· social group to the problem of survival carried out through _indivi-
. . . 
duals who fill. and ere ate roles wi tl1in that social system, one can see 
·· ·-·~ that social system not as a ·system which rests in a self-restoring 
equilibrium but rather as a system .which attempts to manage tens ions 
within its elf. 99 The foreign policy that emerges will not only be a 
function of the' environment and the roles a decision-maker attempts 
.. - : ' ~ . 
to ,fill and create, but also of the extent to which the system is 
successful in its task of tension-manak!ng. It is to this problem 
' 
that much attention has been devoted in the attempt to show that 
British policy towa.rd Spa~n_ was not merely the result o:f the perilous 
"stratell,c posit i.on in, which Britain found herself in the latter half 
-
of the 1930's, but also of the fact that as Peter Worsley pointed to, ... 
in the most highly proletarianized coun~ry in the world political 
power remained mostly in the hands 
" ,~ 
The civil wi;·in Spain brought the 
/ 
of the property-owning classes. 
tensions that such a situation 
.. 
·. :~·-.-·1;. created to. the· ·fore; Bri tis~, ·Ilolioy was in part concerned with ' . 
• Q 
"r<_: 
.. 
• 
'l' 
... 
',\. 
I • ~. 
allevia,ting these tensions so that appeasement could be 'followed where-
ever it might lead, with non-intervention· fulfilling the role that. 
Pilate alloted to water as he stated that he was inno_oent of the blood 
of another • 
.. 
The framework that has_ been taken for t-he ··examination of tlie 
'tl:'-, 
tensions within British_ ~ociety has been that of the class structure 
within Britain. The c·lass concept occupies in Britain a place more 
central to the life of the community than any other country in the 
Western World. This is perhaps because Britain has not enjoyed the 
• benefits of a revolution able to sweep away permenantly the social 
structure imposed on Britain by t_he Norman victory in 1066, which 
- 'I . , 
established a clearly defined ruling class separated from a class which 
expected to be ruled. The ruling class survived, perhaps by virtue 
of Britain's isolation from the centre of the social revolutions that 
occurred on the European mainland, but. perhaps more by virtue of the 
fact that the ruling class in :Britain perceived the necessity of ad-
' 
mi tting to the·ir ranks the more weal thy and powerful of the outsiders, 
whilst ensuring that those admitted into the ruling club sl1ould be 
clearly distinguished f'rom the great unwashed (and ·at the sls,me time 
be suitably bribed into accepting the norms of the upper echelons) 
_through the distribution of meaningless titles and honours. ·The social 
order has become woven into a highly complicated and formalised religion, 
complete with a high priest or priestess, a chosen people, meeting 
.. 
places, holy days and seminaries. At the pinnacle presides the monarch, 
. 
. 
who leads the Establishment through a pre-estaplished routine that 
. 
seems to the ot1.tsider as baffling as the steps of an eighteenth-
-- ' ' .. 
. ' ....... 
century ball .dance. The participants, all suitabJy alert to their 
duties and instantly recognizable after long training at the public 
schools and Oxbridge, parade through the events of the _;social calender 
at which the masses are occasionaly allowed to gaze, as at Henley or 
Ascot. An aura is created which succeeds in disarming the underprivil-
edged, offering a glorious show o-f· pomp and ceremony in compensation. 
. ->·-
--=-
,,. 
In the maintainance of this enslaving mystique, the survival of the 
monarchy has been cf critical importance in diverting the ~hallenge 
of socia.,l change from the central pillars of the social structure 
't'y instilling a belief in the sanctity of existing institutions and 
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the importance of tradition in the smooth-running of the British way of 
life to which the trials and storms being fought out in foreign lands-- .. 
are held up as proof of the benefits to be derived from toeing the 
Establishment li_ne. Thi_s--,buffering effect of the monarchy has been 
pointed out c.learly by Anthony Sampson: 
"Among the more old-fashioned areas of British life, ~ 
blurred image of Buckingham Palace often lies in the back-
-
--1 groundo That re-occurring theme 'It may seem odd to you, 
but it works', which crops up in British institutions, 
from Lloyd's to the House of Lords and the election of 
Bishops, has its prototype in the mystery of the monarcty. 
Businessmen with feudal pretentions; arrogant Guards o:fficers; jingo speakers at Conservati~e conferences; pompous ambassadors, 
young blimps (a far less pleasant species than the old ones); 
parliame11tarians talking about bogous mystique - all tl'1ese 
invoke the palace in support of their mystery. 1fuile Britain 
is having to make the painful transition from imperial splend-
our to competitive trading, the palace represents in most lQO 
people's minds a feudal, uncompetitive haven of 'it's not done•._ 
However, despite the pannage distributed to the great majority 
:not admitted to the 'club' from the panoply of national majesty, 
tensions have not been eradicated from the socio-political systeme 
fl The changes in the economic s_tructuring of British society have been 
too great, the pretentions of ·the upper-classes too large, and the 
irrationalities of the existing structure too injurious to ignore. 
The voices raised in protest have come not merely from the lower classes, 
but also from the upper classes who have provided some of the most 
vocifez:ous detractors. Pierre Daninos, writing in L'Express, has made 
i' 
an ini.e.JJ-esting comparison between the structuring of British society· and 
the cultural revolution in Communist China: 
" ••• il y·a d-e la Chine dans l'Angleterre actuelle. Unt\ 
Chine sans guerre civile et sans autres gardes rouges qu~ 
.les tuni·ques ecarlates des gardes de Buckingham Palace ou 
-· de Whitehall, mais qui emploie un vocabulaire de plus pur style 
maotsetougnais: il ya les jeunes rebelles revolutionnaires 
qui ridiculisent les tabous de l'Establishment, les contre-
revoluti,Dnnaires qui cl1erchent a maintenir la perennite d.es 
traditions, les rebelles travaillistes, les travaillistes oon-
servateurs, les bourgeois reactionaires, les travailleurs des 
classes laborieuses 7 .,. les jeunes anti-contre-revolutionnaires des 
Public Schools - fils des plus affreux reactionnaires - qui 
veulent supprimer la queue de pie etonienne et les chatiment~ 
corporels, les aristocrates progresststes, les anti tout, 
les antirien, les antiquaires de la tr~dition qui ~borent comme 
,,,·· 
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un etendard melon, oe_illet _ et parapluieepee ••.•• "101 
Baldwin spent the majority of:his energies in the management of 
these tensions, and any attempt to account for the development of . 
.,, -
British policy toward Spain without reference to the social origins 
of t.he conflicts that the Spanish conflict wrought in Bri t'ish politics 
. 
would be inco~plete and misleading. Tension-management is a vital 
function of any social system and it is this aspect which -enables us ·~ 
_,_ 
to account for the method of implementation of British ;policy toward. 
the Spanish civil war and, in particular, the timing of B~itish initiat-. 
,,f. 
. ives toward Italy: th.~ delays that the probl~m of volunteers in Spain 
brought about in the rapprochement between Italy and Britain. 
- ti 
While the tensions created in Britain aid in the explanation 
·-of the tactics by which British policy was implemented to-ward Spain, 
the underlying concept behiri-d B.ritish policy wa.s ··that Britain had only 
limited liability for the ev~nts. that occurred on the European Continent, 
and thus the general lines of British p·olicy toward Spain are a function. 
of a much broader policy· towa·rd events in l1'urope and the rest· of the 
world in general. It is on an estimation of the rationality of this 
:· 
} general policy that a fin~l reappraisal of Britain's policy toward 
Spain must rest. Britain escaped from being engulfed in the Nazi 
onslaught of 1940-1941 through a mixture of over-reaching ambition and. 
inhibiting timeri\y on the part of Hitler. Heinz Guderian, who 
commanded the XIX German Army Corps in 1940, gives us- thi.s account 
' of the advance of the· German Army toward the Channel pci'rt s in May, 1940: ·1 
"On this day (the 24th) the Supreme Command·· intervened in the operations in progress, ivith results which were to have 
a most disasterous influence on the whole future course of the 
war. Hitler ~rdered the left wing to stop on the Aa. We were not~ \ informed of the reasons for this. The order contained the words: 
:.,'Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe.' We were utterly 
speechless •••• 
"· ••• we attempted once again to attack towards Dunkirk 
and to close the ring about the sea fortress. But renewed 
orders to halt arrived. tie were stopped within sight of Dunkirk:. ~Ie watched the Luftwaf:fe attack·. tie also watched the 
armada of great and little ships by means of which the British· 
were evacuating their forc~s ••• What the course of the war would 
.., 
_. 
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j 
have been if Supre~e Headquarters had not, kept ordering XIX Army Corps to stop, and thus nind_ered its rapid and successful advance. t-Jhat the. future course o'f the i,;ar would have been if we had succeeded at tha~t time in taking the British Expeditionary Force prisioner at Dunkirk, 
. ··:it is now impossible to g11esso In any event a military victox~y on that sca~e 1r1ould· have offerred a great chance to capable di}iomats. Unr-ortunatly tl1e opportunity was wasted 01ving to I-Iitlervs. nervousness. The reason he si1bsequently gave :for 110.lding ba .. ck my corps - that the ground in Flanders with its many ditches and canals was not suited to tanks -i- ivas a poor one." 102 
Other instances can be cited of the relief given to hard pressed 
r British forces by miscalculations in tactical p·olicy by Hitler. One of 
the most crucial of these miscalculations was the decision, at the 
height of the air battle over the British skies, to switch the focus 
·. of the Luftwaffe away from R.A.F. Fighter Command and the vital radar 
~communications centres to the mass bombings of London. At the very 
moment when the fighter defence of Britain had been pushed to the 
-~ limit of its endurance, it was reprieved and given the chance to re-
group which meant the end of the German attempt to establish air 
superiority over Britain for the invasion o~ those Isles. Through 
these 'tactical errors by t11e German High Command and through defects 
in the strategic co.nceptual frametvork on the part of Hitler, the 
British escape in 1940 - 1941 was built. Britain's final emergence as 
a victor from the war _pan·be seen, partly, as a result of the fact that 
Hitler's vision included grander victims that the British; the eyes of 
the dictator were directed toward the conquest of the vast plains of }'''"-. 
Eastern Europe occupied by the Russians. The conquest of Britain came ! 
'secon-a. to the enslavement of' the Slavic peoples to the task of 
building the 'Thousand Year Reich'. Thus on December 18, 1940, Hitler 
. issued War Directive No.21, 'Case Barbarossa': 
"The German Arpied F~rces must be prepared, even before the con-
clusion of the war against England, to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid 103 ~ campaign •. " / 
I. With the debouchment of the German war effort onto the endless 
horizons of the Russian steppe and the entry of the United States 
;' ·. "' . 
into the war on the British side in 1941, Britain escaped from a fat~ 
which William Shirer had concluded would not have ,been a gentle a·ff~i'r: 
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the German plans seemed to· be" ••• designed to ensure the systematic . 
. 
pltinder of the island and the terrorization of itB inhabitants."l04 
Britain had been brought closer to this.fate than any political leader 
has any right to expose those· committed to his car,3. 
did 
> 
In the .outcome of the war, the outcome of the Spanish Civil War 
not play a great part. One can find instances of the revictualling 
~ 
.. 
of German U-Boats f»pm the Canaries (stopped by diplomatic action in 
1941).105 A small trickle of ships carried contraband to Germany ,from 
Spain but this route was blocked by submarine and aircraft at the end 
of 1941. 106 If the German plan fer the occupation of Gibralter, 
Operation Felix, had been accepted by .franco, Britain would have been t; 
deprived of the use of that b\e to protect the Atlantic convoy route. 
• 
.. 
The Admiralty, however, was constantly prep.-ired to fulfill the occupation 
of the Canaries as a suitable alternative to Gibralter. 107 
It is not on such details that a reappraizal of British policy 
toward the Spanish conflict can be made. That policy was a function 
.. of a gen_eral attitude toward the events that- occurred on the Eurppean 
mainland. It is on our judgement of that policy that one can judge a 
part of the whole. Britain attempted to maintain a freedom from the 
military and political groupings on the European Continent, to refrain 
in fact from p~rtioipation in the dangerous world of power politics. 
Instead of using the military factor that Britain represented in the 
balance of politicomilitary power within Europe, this power factor was 
I 
withheld from the events that were coming to a conclusion. Instead, 
the development of Britain's military resources was neglected as 
' recourse was made to use diplomatic skill to achieve the ends of 
Bri·tish policy. The problem lay in the exact delimitation of these ends. 
Was t.11e avoidance of Britain's participation in a war on the E.uropean 
continent to be a major goal of British policy? This could not be 
r 
so if the result of such a policy were to be the eventual establishment 
of German predominance, or even contra, over the entire European main-
,, land. There would come a time when Britain would have to call a halt 
to· such a process. There could be no escaping the distasteful world of 
power groupings. Britain, instead of aligning herself with those states 
who were opposed to the development of predominance by the most powerful 
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state in Europe, undermined the confidence of those states in the will-
ingness and ability of Britain to form part of an alliance system 
,. 
opposed to Hitler's threat. With the advent of the civil war in 
Spain, Britain was instrumental in the establishment of an inter-
national committee which had as its avowed goal th~ prevention 
·, . o:r the~1 entry of volunteers from foreign states into. the Spanish conflict, 
bu-t which instead demonstratect~ the hypoc_risy and cynicism of the English . ~ , 1 
~· nation.~While Italy and Germarly .supplied the men and material ~nich 
enabled Franco to gairi victory, the British were concerned with 
. maintaining the meaningless impotency of the Non-Intervention Committee 
as an edifice pointing out to all the perfidy of the English. British 
influence, it appeared, was not to be devoted so much to limiting the. 
l intervention of the Axis states in Spain as to -preventing France and the 
Government in Spain from bringing Axis intervention out into the open. 
The result was the undermining of the _credibility of the British as a 
~. 
a reliable ally.when Britain found it necessary to go seeking for support. 
Britain could preside with equanimty over the death of the Spanish 
Republic, but those in France of the Popular Front could only see a 
defeat for democracy, while to Stalin it helped to confirm the suspicion 
I 
that Britain could not be relied upon to participate in. an al"'liance 
against Germany. The whole of British policy, of which policy toward 
Spain was an integral part, helped towards undermining the confidence 
of the states of Europe in their ability to halt the German threat; 
Europe became divided into states seeking their own route to salvation. 
Britain cov.ld not limit its liability for the events that occurred in 
Europe or avoid the necessity for making judgements upon the demands that 
the German leaders put forward. If the British leaders accepted the 
destruction of democracy in Spain through their inaction, then this 
would seem to be a judgement made by the British in favour of such dest-
ruction. If in Spain, why not elsewhere? In the Introduction it was 
stated that it was mistakenly held.in the 1930's that the Spanish civil 
war represented a crucial struggle between Democracy and Fascism but 
that in fact the struggle represented .in Spain the conflict between 
tradition and progress. However, in the minds of people the reality· is 
_,,_ ... 
not what etx:ists but what seems to exist. Therefore though one may sta'te 
that though the two sides in Spain did not really represent either 
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' d~mooracy or fascism, they did in fact d6 so 1n the minds of th~ peoples 
of Europe who observed the struggle~. The victory of Franco appeared as 
a victory for Fascism and was one_ of great symbolic importance to those 
who stood on. the sidelines.· It seemed tha-t Hitler had· .. won a great victory 
and this was so, .for the greatest victory that was won in Spain was the 
psychological battle. Held up· as a conflict between two separate and--
competing ways of life, Spain demonstrated the superiority of the 
Dictator states; the tide was flowing for fascism and against democracy • 
.. 
One result was the developing fashionableness of fascism in France and 
' the undermining in that c·ountry of the anti-Hitler fo-rces. It is in 
) this intagible element: the loss of confidence in ·the integrity of Britain 
and of the· system of life in which the peoples of Europe believed, that 
Spain reaches its true importance and it is on this basis that one should 
•"I• ... 
" . judge the policies that Britain put forward .to meet the war in Spain. 
Ralph Bates, a volunteer in Spain, as he returned from the front in Spain 
in 1939, saw this clearly: 
. "I came down off the black hills one gale-swept night during 
the Brunete battle, into_Villanueva. The town was under shell-
fire and it was burning~ •• For safety I entered the church ••• 
Bowed over the centre of the alter, his head upon his arms, 
was a wounded man, blood streaming from his head ••• The man was 
dying I thought. He seemed to be pleading the sacrifice of 
Spain. I stood frozen in imagination, hearing that echoed 
wailing.Far off, ihe machine guns rattled. 
"Aterwards I went outside .and was sick.I was not sick at the 
spectacle of pain, but because of the unaccepted sacrifice. 
That it would not be accepted by the democracies, I forsaw,_ 
for not one of those governments had the courage even to 
dispense with hypocrisy. That the Bpanish r~sistance was a 
sacrifice for more than Spanish freedom can be seen by anyone now. 
For ~ad not nobleness gone out of the world and had we not 
b·een· abandoned, the dictators would not have been encouraged to 
demand Czechoslovakia and whatever else they next demand. And 
when we have defeated our enemy in Spain the peoples of the 
coward democracies,, may at last take heart. All tha~ I felt in 
that moment, staJnding at the al tar at Villanueva ·a.el~,-- CaI?,ada. nl08 
As an indict~ent against the unfortunate results of policies which 
embody a lack of' 'ral honesty and courage, Monty Blatt {a character in 
Chicken Soul? !1i t~- Barle;y by Arnold Wesker) is more succinct; 
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"Hitler won't stop at Spain, you know. You watch him go 
and you watch the British Government lick his arse unt.il lie spits in l1is eye." ~09 
This howe·ver, would be a harsh .note .. on which to end, implying §ls 
it does some hidden judgement. So ·far, the quest ion of the nforal issues 
'·1 
•-. involved in British policy toward Spain have been dodged. An attempt 
has been made to lay bare the bones of policies which still, .as ~ 
. 
---....__ __ . 
skele_tones in cupboard, rattle today. If these issues are to be faced 
up,to, there is the problem of the selection of the scales. The secret 
-
worlds of those c:;,f the Thirties ca1nnot be regenerated, and to many today 
~-: .'. 
the world of that period seems like life on another planet. Whose system ( 1 
of moral values is to be employed - those of the pacifist or those of the 
believer in international aotidn, or any other one,might hold? Each is· 
· of equal value to the individual wjao holds those beliefs. With the 
changing currents o:f morality, the tide of time may lec.,,ve the present 
. ' 
., 
•. 
w armada of indignation against the appeasers as but wrecks:" on the 
_.,~ .... ......r----· ...... ,--· • ·-· ....... i:-:.,_., 
.,. ,,,,. i, historical shore. Few people today hold it against Lord Palmerston that 
he observed Bismarck defeat Austria, Denmark and Fran~e, and unify 
Germany into the most powerful state in Europe, without any 
oppose this. One must here agree with the words of Buddha: 
"I look upon the judgement of right and wrong as the 
su~pentine dance of a dragon, and the rise and fall of beliefs as but traces left by the.four seasons." 
action to 
If criticism is to be ~ade, it should be derived from a statement 
of the necessity of facing up to the fact that foreign policy involves 
moral choices, rather than catagorising what moral precepts foreign policy 
should enshrine. In particular this would involve decision-ma~rs in 
. ' ' - ., .. - """-examining, or rather searching out, the nature of the relationship 
which their state have with other states in -¥e', international commu ~.!_!, 
and then facing up to the meaning of that relationship. Bri ta.,in, and· 
especially those favouring appeasement with Hitler, in the 1930's did 
not in many cases seek to establish the nature of their relationship 
with the states o,f Europe, outsid_e an immediate consideration of the 
problem imposed by Hitler and Mussolini. The focus was placed upon the 
source of danger and little thought was givento what constituted and what 
-~. . 
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should constitute the nature of :Britain's attitudes, actiorJ.s and res-
ponsibility towards the other states of Europe. This was,) to 1:1se 
Eden's words, 'bad politics and bad morality', since Britain was 
' . . 
inextri·cably tied to the other states in Eu~ope. The majority 
of people in Britain attempted to ~bsolve themselves-of responsibility 
. 
i in the events that were taking place in Europe and to ooncern'tliem-t.i}/;:~\:r 
selves merely with reaching for ~olutions to those problems which 
threatened to end Britain's supposed insularity. Britain's fate 
was ultimately bound up with those other states in.Europe, how·ever, 
and all.that was achieved was that Britain missed opportunities to 
.. 
""{-
use her in·fluence to obtain favourable outcomes to situations within ~ 
Europe, and at a later date, she found that she had to face those 
same situations when the choices involved were far more starkly posed 
and the ability to influence the actions of the s_tates of. Europe greatly 
reduced. There _cannot be a- meaningful policy of non-intervention in the 
sense of absolving oneself of invo~ivement in the is.sues· of conflicts' 
since inctction involves acquiecence in the domination of the weaker 
by the stronger. Britain w,as·- a; part of Europe and involved, whether 
she wanted to be. or not, in Europ·e. There could be n·o hiding from th.is 
by reaching _solutions to problems which in fact involved hiding from 
the real c.ru.x of Britain's relations with the European community 
by allowing force to dominate. It is in this fajlure to face up the 
meaning of Britain's.relationship to th·e countries a_nd problems of EurO.Jf>0 
that one can make judgements in terms of practical politics and f · 
morality. This is summed up, and more, in the much quoted but very 
meaningful words of John Donne: 
"No man is an .. island, intire of itself; every man 
is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if '· 1 
a clod bee washed away by the sea, Europe is the lesse, 
as well as if a promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor 
of they friends or of thine owne were; any mans death 
diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; and 
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls, 
it tolls for thee." 
---------------
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